



Jaarlijks voortgangsverslag betreffende de uitvoering van de strategie van de Europese Unie tegen de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens (2022)

(C/2023/383)

INHOUDSOPGAVE

SAMENVATTING	1
INLEIDING	2
NUCLEAIRE KWESTIES	3
Verdrag inzake de niet-verspreiding van kernwapens	3
De IAEA (Internationale Organisatie voor Atoomenergie)	4
Alomvattend Kernstopverdrag	5
Nucleaire veiligheid en daarmee verband houdende kwesties	5
Verificatieregelingen en -initiatieven	7
Regionale kwesties en aspecten	7
CHEMISCHE WAPENS	8
BIOLOGISCHE WAPENS	9
BALLISTISCHE RAKETTEN	9
RESOLUTIE 1540 VAN DE VEILIGHEIDSRAAD VAN DE VERENIGDE NATIES	10
CONVENTIONELE WAPENS	11
Handvuurwapens en lichte wapens	11
Antipersoneelmijnen	12
UITVOERCONTROLEREGELINGEN	13
Groep van Nucleaire Exportlanden	13
Australiëgroep	13
Controleregime voor de uitvoer van rakettechnologie en -onderdelen	14
Wassenaar Arrangement	14
OPKOMENDE TECHNOLOGIEËN	14
SAMENWERKING MET DENKTANKS EN NGO'S	15
DIALOOG EN SAMENWERKING MET DERDE LANDEN	16

SAMENVATTING

In 2022 werd de internationale regeling inzake non-proliferatie en ontwapening steeds meer onder druk gezet. Net toen de multilaterale fora na twee jaar onderbreking als gevolg van de COVID-19-pandemie weer regelmatig begonnen bijeen te komen, verminderde de illegale aanvalsoorlog van Rusland tegen Oekraïne — een grove schending van het internationaal recht en de beginselen van het VN-handvest — het vertrouwen tussen de actoren nog meer. Dit had een rechtstreeks en ernstig gevolg voor alle instrumenten en mechanismen. Door, naargelang het geval, desinformatie te verspreiden, zijn agressieve retoriek op te voeren, consensus te blokkeren of terug te komen op toezeggingen om bestaande instrumenten uit te voeren, droeg Rusland in de loop van 2022 sterk bij aan de uitholling van het internationale non-proliferatie- en ontwapeningsmechanisme, dat aldus het hoofd moet bieden aan de grootste uitdagingen sedert tientallen jaren.

Geconfronteerd met deze complexe en moeilijke situatie blijft de EU de leidende beginselen van de bestaande strategische documenten toepassen, zoals de mondiale strategie van de Europese Unie voor buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid (doc. 10715/16), de strategie van de EU ter bestrijding van de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens (doc. 15708/03) of de nieuwe actielijnen (doc. 17172/08), met name:

- effectief multilateralisme, met een waakzaam oog voor de spilfunctie en de bevordering van het universele karakter van de mondiale non-proliferatie- en ontwapeningsarchitectuur, via diplomatieke actie en financiële ondersteuning van derde landen en internationale organisaties;
- nauwe samenwerking met landen om de internationale non-proliferatieregeling te versterken;
- aanpak van non-proliferatiekwetsies in de bilaterale dialoogvergaderingen van de EU over politieke, non-proliferatie- en ontwapeningsvraagstukken, en in meer informele contacten, en
- effectieve en complementaire inzet van alle beschikbare instrumenten en financiële middelen ter ondersteuning van de doelstellingen van het buitenlands beleid van de EU.

In 2022 heeft de EU haar strategische focus op non-proliferatie en ontwapening verder versterkt door de aanneming, op 21 maart, van het strategisch kompas voor veiligheid en defensie van de EU (doc. 7371/22). Daarin verbinden de EU en haar lidstaten zich er onder meer toe het kader voor ontwapening, non-proliferatie en wapenbeheersing te handhaven, te ondersteunen en verder te bevorderen, teneinde middels een gecoördineerde aanpak met partners mondiale en regionale uitdagingen aan te gaan. In het strategisch kompas wordt een aantal van die uitdagingen in kaart gebracht, zoals de nucleaire programma's van de DVK en Iran, het herhaaldelijk gebruik van chemische wapens, de ontwikkeling en de inzet van nieuwe geavanceerde ballistische, kruis- en hypersonische raketten de uitbreiding van de nucleaire arsenalen van Rusland en China, Russische nucleaire dreigementen in het kader van de invasie van Oekraïne, en de uitholling van de architectuur voor wapenbeheersing in Europa.

In 2022 verdedigde de EU, samen met haar lidstaten en gelijkgestemde partners, de mondiale non-proliferatie- en ontwapeningsarchitectuur voor massavernietigingswapens (MVW). Enkele dagen na het begin ervan veroordeelde de EU de Russische aanvalsoorlog en de gevolgen ervan tijdens de Ontwapeningsconferentie. De EU nam tijdens de tiende toetsingsconferentie over het Verdrag inzake de niet-verspreiding van kernwapens actief deel aan de onderhandelingen over een slotdocument, waarover geen consensus kon worden bereikt omdat Rusland, als enige, daartegen opponeerde. De EU droeg bij tot het succes van de negende toetsingsconferentie over het Verdrag inzake biologische wapens door overeenstemming te bereiken over een slotdocument en een besluit tot oprichting van een werkgroep van deskundigen, teneinde een mechanisme te ontwikkelen voor de evaluatie en beoordeling van wetenschappelijke en technologische ontwikkelingen die relevant zijn voor het verdrag, en de verificatiewerkzaamheden, naast andere belangrijke aspecten, te hervatten.

Wat conventionele wapens betreft, droeg de EU bij aan de werkzaamheden van de belangrijkste multilaterale fora ter voorkoming en beteugeling van de illegale handel in deze wapens (Wapenhandelsverdrag, actieprogramma van de Verenigde Naties ter voorkoming, bestrijding en uitbanning van de illegale handel in handvuurwapens en lichte wapens, Verdrag inzake het verbod op antipersoneelmijnen). De EU bleef in verschillende regio's van de wereld projecten voor capaciteitsopbouw op het gebied van fysieke beveiliging, voorraadbeheer, markering, registratie of tracering uitvoeren. Meer bepaald bleef de EU in 2022 met Oekraïne samenwerken met betrekking tot de dreigingen als gevolg van de omleiding van en de illegale handel in handvuurwapens en lichte wapens (SALW).

De EU bleef de multilaterale uitvoercontroleregelingen krachtig verdedigen als essentieel element in de strijd tegen proliferatie, en droeg bij tot de internationale inspanningen ter beheersing van opkomende technologieën met potentieel effect op ontwapening. Bij al deze werkzaamheden voerde de EU een permanente dialoog met derde landen en werkte zij nauw samen met het maatschappelijk middenveld. De EU bleef intussen ook horizontale prioriteiten bevorderen, zoals het ondersteunen en stimuleren van gendergelijkheid en het versterken van de positie van vrouwen in het gehele domein van non-proliferatie en ontwapening.

INLEIDING

In dit verslag wordt vermeld welke vooruitgang in 2022 is geboekt bij de uitvoering van de Strategie van de EU ter bestrijding van de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens, die de Europese Raad in december 2003 heeft aangenomen (doc. 15708/03), aangevuld met de "nieuwe actielijnen voor de Europese Unie in de strijd tegen de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens en de overbrengingsmiddelen daarvoor", zoals bekrachtigd door de Raad op 8-9 december 2008 (doc. 17172/08). Volledigheidshalve wordt ook aandacht besteed aan andere aspecten met betrekking tot conventionele wapens.

In dit verslag wordt geen volledigheid nagestreefd en ligt de nadruk op de belangrijkste ontwikkelingen.

Onder leiding van de hoge vertegenwoordiger voor buitenlandse zaken en veiligheidsbeleid draagt de Europese Dienst voor extern optreden (EDED), samen met de lidstaten en de Europese Commissie, actief bij aan deze gezamenlijke inspanning. De speciale gezant van de EU voor non-proliferatie en ontwapening en haar team werken samen met derde landen, internationale organisaties en het maatschappelijk middenveld om de mondiale wapenvoorraden af te bouwen, te voorkomen dat deze voorraden naar criminelen en terroristen worden omgeleid, en om de ontwikkeling van nieuwe agentia voor biologische wapens en nieuwe technologieën te reguleren.

Zowel de Subgroep ontwapening en non-proliferatie (CONOP) als de Subgroep export van conventionele wapens (COARM) van de Groep non-proliferatie en wapenuitvoer van de Raad speelt een cruciale rol bij het coördineren van de standpunten van de EU, het handhaven van internationale overeenkomsten en het bevorderen van de inspanningen op het gebied van non-proliferatie en ontwapening. De EU-delegaties in Wenen, Genève en New York vertegenwoordigen de EU in fora op het gebied van non-proliferatie en ontwapening, stellen tientallen EU-verklaringen op en coördineren deze, en organiseren nevenevenementen om de doelstellingen van de EU te bevorderen, waarmee zij bijdragen aan de beleidsvorming.

NUCLEAIRE KWESTIES

In 2022 bleef de EU zich ten volle inzetten voor haar reeds lang bestaande doelstellingen op het gebied van nucleaire ontwapening en non-proliferatie, waaronder de universalisering en de volledige, integrale en effectieve uitvoering van het Verdrag inzake de niet-verspreiding van kernwapens (Non-proliferatieverdrag — NPV), de inwerkingtreding en universalisering van het Alomvattend Kernstopverdrag (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty — CTBT), en de onmiddellijke opening en spoedige afronding van de onderhandelingen, tijdens de ontwapeningsconferentie, over een splijtstofstopverdrag om de productie van splijtbare materialen voor kernwapens of andere nucleaire explosiemiddelen te verbieden. Ook de totstandbrenging van een zone in het Midden-Oosten die vrij is van massavernietigingswapens en de overbrengingsmiddelen daarvoor, bleven een prioriteit. Ook sprak de EU haar krachtige steun uit voor de werkzaamheden van werkgroep I van de VN-Ontwapeningscommissie inzake nucleaire aangelegenheden.

Het gedrag van Rusland in de context van zijn agressie tegen Oekraïne, die een ernstige schending vormt van het internationaal recht en van de veiligheidsgaranties die het met het Memorandum van Boedapest van 1994 aan Oekraïne had gegeven, heeft ernstige gevolgen gehad voor de multilaterale werkzaamheden op dit gebied, onder meer wat betreft ontwapening, non-proliferatie en vreedzaam gebruik. De EU en haar lidstaten hebben, in overleg met gelijkgestemde partners, Ruslands nucleaire dreigementen, desinformatie en flagrante minachting van de veiligheid en beveiliging in en rond nucleaire faciliteiten in Oekraïne aangeklaagd, en hebben met de rest van de internationale gemeenschap samengewerkt om de internationale regeling op dit gebied in stand te houden en verder te consolideren. De EU veroordeelde ook de opheffing van de niet-nucleaire status van Belarus als nog een zorgwekkende ontwikkeling die bijdraagt tot onaantvaardbare pogingen om de op regels gebaseerde Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur te herdefiniëren.

Verdrag inzake de niet-verspreiding van kernwapens

Het Verdrag inzake de niet-verspreiding van kernwapens (Non-Proliferatieverdrag — NPV) blijft voor de EU de hoeksteen van de mondiale nucleaire non-proliferatieregeling, de wezenlijke fundering voor verdere nucleaire ontwapening, overeenkomstig artikel VI van het NPV, en een belangrijk element voor de ontwikkeling van vreedzame toepassingen van kernenergie, overeenkomstig artikel IV van het NPV. Alle EU-lidstaten zijn partij bij het NPV.

Na driemaal te zijn uitgesteld als gevolg van de COVID-19-pandemie, vond van 1 tot en met 26 augustus 2022 in New York de tiende toetsingsconferentie van het NPV plaats. De EU nam actief deel aan de toetsingsconferentie door zes verklaringen af te leggen, deel te nemen aan de onderhandelingen in de drie hoofdcomités, het optreden van haar lidstaten te coördineren, werkdocumenten in te dienen ⁽¹⁾ en nevenevenementen te organiseren ⁽²⁾ ter bevordering van de politieke doelstellingen die zijn vastgelegd in de op 15 november 2021 goedgekeurde conclusies van de Raad over de tiende toetsingsconferentie van de partijen bij het Verdrag inzake de niet-verspreiding van kernwapens (NPV). Het gaat daarbij met name om de toezegging nucleaire ontwapening te bevorderen overeenkomstig artikel VI van het NPV, steun voor een intensievere dialoog ter bevordering van verdere vooruitgang op het gebied van ontwapening, de voordelen van concrete werkzaamheden op het gebied van strategische en nucleaire risicobeperking, de waarde van multilaterale samenwerking ter

⁽¹⁾ De EU diende twee werkdocumenten in voor de toetsingsconferentie: "Priorities of the European Union for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" ("Prioriteiten van de Europese Unie voor de tiende Toetsingsconferentie van de partijen bij het Verdrag inzake de niet-verspreiding van kernwapens") en "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" ("Alomvattend Kernstopverdrag voor de tiende Toetsingsconferentie van de partijen bij het Verdrag inzake de niet-verspreiding van kernwapens").

⁽²⁾ De volgende nevenevenementen werden georganiseerd of mede georganiseerd door de EU: "Reinforcing the global nuclear security architecture: Universalization of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)" ("Versterking van de mondiale nucleaire veiligheidsarchitectuur: universalisering van het Internationaal Verdrag ter bestrijding van daden van nucleair terrorisme (ICSANT)"), met het Bureau van de Verenigde Naties voor terrorismebestrijding (UNOCT); "European Union Support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its Organization" ("Steun van de Europese Unie voor het Alomvattend Kernstopverdrag (CTBT) en de organisatie ervan"); "Safeguarding in a regional arrangement" ("Waarborging in het kader van een regionale regeling"), en "Narratives on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone: Historical accounts, drivers, and themes" ("Narratief over de zone in het Midden-Oosten die vrij is van massavernietigingswapens: historisch relaas, actoren en thema's"), met het VN-Instituut voor Ontwapeningsonderzoek (UNIDIR).

bevordering van de verificatie van nucleaire ontwapening, en de onmiddellijke opening en spoedige afronding van de onderhandelingen, tijdens de Ontwapeningsconferentie, over een verdrag tot vaststelling van een verbod op de productie van splijtbare materialen voor kernwapens of andere nucleaire explosiemiddelen. Voorts veroordeelde de EU de flagrante schending door Rusland van het Memorandum van Boedapest, zijn roekeloze bedreigingen van het gebruik van kernwapens en andere onverantwoordelijke daden tegen de nucleaire veiligheid en beveiliging in Oekraïne, met name de illegale inbeslagneming van de kerncentrale van Zaporizja, als schadelijk voor het NPV.

Ondanks de inspanningen van de EU en haar lidstaten, gelijkgestemde partners en andere staten die partij zijn, die inhoudelijke besprekingen hebben gevoerd om het belang van het NPV te bevestigen, de uitvoering ervan te evalueren en toekomstige acties vast te stellen, kon geen definitief consensusdocument worden aangenomen omdat Rusland zich als enige had verzet tegen verwijzingen in de tekst naar de Oekraïense kerncentrale in Zaporizja. Er is overeengekomen dat de volgende NPV-toetsingsconferentie in 2026 in New York zal plaatsvinden, dat de vergaderingen van de voorbereidende commissie in 2023 in Wenen, in 2024 in Genève en in 2025 in New York zullen plaatsvinden, en dat er een werkgroep voor de verdere versterking van het toetsingsproces zal worden opgericht.

De IAEA (Internationale Organisatie voor Atoomenergie)

De EU hecht groot belang aan het technische, onafhankelijke en onpartijdige werk van de Internationale Organisatie voor Atoomenergie (IAEA) in het kader van haar mandaat op het gebied van zowel nucleaire non-proliferatie als vreedzaam gebruik van nucleaire technologie. De EU steunt de IAEA en haar lidstaten op verschillende manieren. De EU en de lidstaten geven niet alleen politieke steun maar behoren tot de grootste donoren van de IAEA en haar Fonds voor technische samenwerking. Daarnaast heeft de EU sinds 2003 de activiteiten van de IAEA via acht opeenvolgende besluiten van de Raad met meer dan 60 miljoen EUR ondersteund. Het laatste van die besluiten dat nog van kracht is, is Besluit (GBVB) 2020/1656 van de Raad van 6 november 2020 betreffende steun van de Unie voor activiteiten van de Internationale Organisatie voor Atoomenergie (IAEA) op het gebied van nucleaire veiligheid en ter uitvoering van de EU-strategie tegen de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens ⁽³⁾ ("IAEA VIII"). Het voorziet in krachtige financiële steun voor het Marie Skłodowska-Curie-beurzenprogramma van de IAEA, dat jonge vrouwen wil aanmoedigen om te studeren en te werken op het gebied van nucleaire wetenschappen en technologie, nucleaire veiligheid en beveiliging, non-proliferatie en nucleair recht.

Gezien de zware gevolgen die de Russische agressie tegen Oekraïne heeft gehad voor de nucleaire veiligheid en beveiliging werd in 2022 een bedrag van 2,2 miljoen EUR uit de begroting van Besluit (GBVB) 2020/1656 herschikt voor bijstand aan Oekraïne om de handhaving van zijn nucleaireveiligheidsregeling te waarborgen ⁽⁴⁾.

Het IAEA-waarborgensstelsel is een fundamenteel onderdeel van de nucleaire non-proliferatieregeling, en de verificatieactiviteiten van de Organisatie spelen een onmisbare rol bij de uitvoering van het NPV. De EU steunt de versterking van het IAEA-waarborgensstelsel, blijft van mening dat de integrale-waarborgovereenkomsten, samen met het aanvullend protocol, de huidige verificatienorm in het kader van het NPV vormen en blijft pleiten voor universele toetreding tot deze overeenkomsten. In 2022 waren de contacten met derde landen vooral gericht op het bevorderen van de universalisering van de integrale-waarborgovereenkomst en het aanvullend protocol daarbij, alsook van het gewijzigde protocol inzake kleine hoeveelheden.

Dankzij de nauwe samenwerking tussen Euratom en de IAEA op basis van de IAEA/Euratom-verificatieovereenkomst van 1973 kunnen in Europa doeltreffende en efficiënte waarborgen worden ingesteld.

De EU verleent actieve steun aan het IAEA-waarborgensstelsel, waaronder ook financiële steun aan het IAEA-netwerk van onderzoekslaboratoria, en aan de bevordering van het nationaal boekhoud- en controlesysteem voor kernmateriaal (SSAC) in partnerlanden. Het Europees verbond voor veiligheidscontroleonderzoek en ontwikkeling (Esarda), dat door de Europese Commissie wordt beheerd, blijft ook internationale contacten onderhouden via memoranda van overeenstemming met de Afrikaanse Commissie voor Kernenergie (Afcne) en het Aziatisch-Pacifisch Veiligheidscontrole netwerk, in nauwe samenwerking met het Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. In dat verband wordt een groot opleidings- en onderwijsproject op het gebied van nucleaire waarborgen gefinancierd met het Europees Netwerk voor nucleair onderwijs (ENEN), waaronder het allereerste academische postdoctorale programma inzake nucleaire waarborgen, een en ander in samenwerking met de IAEA. In 2022 is in samenwerking met Afcne en Finland een nieuw ambitieus EU-programma gestart om de nucleaire waarborgen in Afrika te versterken.

⁽³⁾ PB L 372 I van 9.11.2020, blz. 4.

⁽⁴⁾ PB L 257 van 5.10.2022, blz. 10.

De EU heeft voor de periode 2021-2027 in het kader van het instrument voor samenwerking op het gebied van nucleaire veiligheid 300 miljoen EUR uitgetrokken ter bevordering van nucleaire veiligheid, stralingsbescherming en de instelling van efficiënte en doeltreffende waarborgen in derde landen, onder meer in Centraal-Azië.

Het Gemeenschappelijk Centrum voor onderzoek (GCO) van de Europese Commissie en de IAEA gaven verder uitvoering aan de praktische regeling voor samenwerking op het gebied van toepassingen in de kernwetenschap, die op 15 februari 2017 werd ondertekend. Doel van de regeling is gezamenlijke activiteiten te ontwikkelen en dubbel werk te voorkomen, onder meer op gebieden als bodemwetenschappen, medische toepassingen, oceanwetenschap, nucleaire gegevens en referentiematerialen, voedselveiligheid, aardobservatie en milieumonitoring.

De EU en haar lidstaten blijven het IAEA-programma voor technische samenwerking krachtig ondersteunen, onder meer via aanzienlijke bijdragen aan het Fonds voor technische samenwerking en het initiatief inzake vreedzaam gebruik, die belangrijke instrumenten zijn voor een veilig, beveiligd en vreedzaam gebruik van nucleaire technologie en voor de verwezenlijking van de doelstellingen van de Agenda 2030 voor duurzame ontwikkeling.

De EU en de IAEA beleggen jaarlijks een vergadering van hoge ambtenaren om hun veelzijdige samenwerking te evalueren en te plannen. De jaarvergaderingen van 2020 en 2021 konden vanwege de pandemie niet plaatsvinden, maar er werd nauw contact onderhouden en de vergadering van 2022 vond plaats op 15 maart in Wenen.

Alomvattend Kernstopverdrag

De inwerkingtreding en universalisering van het Alomvattend Kernstopverdrag (CTBT) zijn hoofddoelstellingen van de EU-strategie tegen de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens. Alle EU-lidstaten hebben blijk gegeven van hun gehechtheid aan het verdrag door het te ratificeren en door zich in afwachting van de inwerkingtreding ervan reeds aan de doelstellingen ervan te houden. Het CTBT is een sterke vertrouwenswekkende en veiligheidsbevorderende maatregel die bijdraagt tot zowel nucleaire ontwapening als non-proliferatie.

In 2022 ontplooi de EU diplomatieke activiteiten ter ondersteuning van het CTBT en riep zij in haar verklaringen in de betrokken fora en in haar bilaterale contacten met de betrokken bijlage II- en niet-bijlage II-landen herhaaldelijk op tot ratificatie van het verdrag, onder meer tijdens de "Vrienden van het CTBT"-bijeenkomst die in september 2022 plaatsvond te New York. Bevorderen van de inwerkingtreding van het CTBT is een van de acties van het initiatief van de secretaris-generaal van de VN "Securing our Common Future: an Agenda for Disarmament" (Onze gemeenschappelijke toekomst veiligstellen: een agenda voor ontwapening) dat de EU heeft besloten te ondersteunen.

De EU zet zich consistent in om de voordelen van het CTBT en de bijdragen ervan aan vrede, veiligheid, ontwapening en non-proliferatie, ook wat civiele toepassingen betreft, te bevorderen. Met de uitvoering van Besluit (GBVB) 2020/901 van de Raad van 29 juni 2020 betreffende de ondersteuning door de Unie van de activiteiten van de Voorbereidende Commissie van de Verdragsorganisatie voor een alomvattend verbod op kernproeven (CTBTO) ter versterking van haar toezichts- en verificatiecapaciteit en in het kader van de uitvoering van de strategie van de EU ter bestrijding van de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens⁽³⁾, is de EU in 2022 op politiek en financieel gebied standvastig steun blijven verlenen aan het verdrag en de organisatie ervan. De financiële steun van de EU aan het CTBT heeft bijgedragen aan het handhaven en versterken van het Internationaal Toezichtstelsel door met name ontwikkelingslanden te voorzien van technische ondersteuning en capaciteitsopbouw, en door het voor hun deskundigen gemakkelijker te maken om deel te nemen aan CTBTO-vergaderingen. De EU heeft actief deelgenomen aan de vergaderingen van de Voorbereidende Commissie van de CTBTO en aan die van de werkgroepen A en B ervan.

Nucleaire veiligheid en daarmee verband houdende kwesties

De EU benadrukt dat de nucleaire veiligheid wereldwijd verder moet worden versterkt om nucleair terrorisme te voorkomen en vreedzaam gebruik van nucleaire technologie te vergemakkelijken. De EU blijft haar volle steun geven aan het resultaat van de in februari 2020 gehouden internationale conferentie over nucleaire beveiliging (ICONS 2020). In de ministeriële verklaring van de conferentie wordt nogmaals de toezegging bevestigd om de effectieve en alomvattende nucleaire beveiliging van alle nucleair en ander radioactief materiaal en nucleaire voorzieningen te handhaven en te versterken, en wordt de centrale rol van de IAEA erkend bij het faciliteren en coördineren van de internationale samenwerking op het gebied van nucleaire beveiliging. De EU heeft een begin gemaakt met de voorbereidingen van de volgende vergadering van ICONS, die in mei 2024 zal plaatsvinden.

⁽³⁾ PB L 207 van 30.6.2020, blz. 15.

In meerdere verklaringen tijdens bijeenkomsten van de Algemene Conferentie en van de Raad van Beheer van de IAEA veroordeelde de EU in de krachtigste bewoordingen de niet-uitgelokte en ongerechtvaardigde agressie van Rusland tegen Oekraïne, die een ernstige en directe bedreiging vormt voor de nucleaire veiligheid en beveiliging en voor de verificatieactiviteiten met betrekking tot de waarborgen in Oekraïne. De EU steunde de diplomatieke activiteiten van de directeur-generaal van de IAEA om de nucleaire veiligheid en beveiliging van de nucleaire installaties van Oekraïne te waarborgen, alsook de verdere aanwezigheid van de IAEA-steun- en bijstandsmisssies in alle Oekraïense kerncentrales waaraan de EU financieel heeft bijgedragen.

De EU heeft Oekraïne zowel bilateraal als via de IAEA bijgestaan. Sinds het uitbreken van de oorlog is de EU een van de belangrijkste donoren van Oekraïne, met bijna 53 miljoen EUR aan bijstand op het gebied van nucleaire veiligheid en beveiliging, waarvan 5,6 miljoen EUR via de IAEA, met inbegrip van 2,2 miljoen EUR in het kader van de wijziging van Besluit (GBVB) 2020/1656.

In 2022 werd in het kader van het Europees instrument voor internationale samenwerking op het gebied van nucleaire veiligheid (INSC) 13 miljoen EUR vastgelegd voor Oekraïne, en nog eens 3,4 miljoen EUR voor de IAEA ter ondersteuning van onder meer de inzet van IAEA-personeel in de belangrijkste nucleaire voorzieningen in het land, de bilaterale bijstand om de toezichts- en analysecapaciteit te herstellen en de hernieuwde financiering van het Gemeenschappelijk Ondersteunend Bureau in Kiev. De EU is momenteel ook de grootste donor van de International Tsjernobyl Cooperation Account (ICCA) voor de wederopbouw van infrastructuur op het gebied van nucleaire veiligheid.

De EU vindt het belangrijk dat alle staten toetreden tot belangrijke instrumenten voor nucleaire veiligheid en beveiliging, zoals het gewijzigde Verdrag inzake de fysieke beveiliging van kernmateriaal (gewijzigd VFBK) ⁽⁶⁾, het Internationaal Verdrag ter bestrijding van daden van nucleair terrorisme (ICSANT), het Verdrag inzake nucleaire veiligheid ⁽⁷⁾ of het Gezamenlijk Verdrag inzake de veiligheid van het beheer van bestraalde splijtstof en inzake de veiligheid van het beheer van radioactief afval ⁽⁸⁾. De EU zal de staten blijven steunen bij hun inspanningen om deze verdragen volledig uit te voeren.

De EU leverde een aanzienlijke bijdrage aan en toonde zich verheugd over het op consensus gebaseerde slotdocument van de toetsingsvergadering van het gewijzigde VFBK, ondanks de ernstige politieke situatie in maart 2022. De ernstige bedreigingen voor nucleaire veiligheid en beveiliging als gevolg van de Russische agressie tegen Oekraïne werden behandeld in een op zichzelf staand document waartoe de EU het initiatief nam en dat brede steun kreeg van de staten die partij zijn.

De EU leverde in 2022 verdere steun aan de universalisering en effectieve uitvoering van het ICSANT door middel van Besluit (GBVB) 2018/1939 van de Raad ⁽⁹⁾, uitgevoerd door het Bureau van de VN voor terrorismebestrijding (UNOCT) en het Bureau van de VN voor drugs- en misdaadbestrijding (UNODC). De doelstellingen van het besluit zijn meer partijen bij het ICSANT, bewustmaking onder nationale beleidsmakers en besluitvormers, en capaciteitsopbouw, zulks ter verbetering van de nationale wetgeving en versterking van de capaciteit van nationale belanghebbenden, ook strafrechtelijk personeel, voor het onderzoeken, vervolgen en berechten van zaken van nucleair terrorisme. Samen met Canada en het UNODC sponsorde de EU op 12 december 2022 in Wenen de viering van het twintigjarig bestaan van het ICSANT.

De EU bleef steun verlenen aan het wereldwijde initiatief ter bestrijding van nucleair terrorisme (Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism — GICNT) en aan zijn missie om de mondiale capaciteit voor het voorkomen, opsporen en bestrijden van nucleair terrorisme te vergroten. De EU en haar lidstaten zijn actief betrokken bij de werkzaamheden van het GICNT, en wel op alle gebieden, te weten: nucleaire detectie, nucleair forensisch onderzoek en nucleaire respons en mitigatie.

De EU heeft in 2013 met de IAEA een praktische regeling voor samenwerking op het gebied van technische vraagstukken inzake nucleaire beveiliging ondertekend, met het oog op onder meer een betere coördinatie van de opleidings- en capaciteitsopbouwactiviteiten ter bevordering en uitvoering van een duurzame nucleairebeveiligingscultuur. Het opleidingscentrum voor nucleaire beveiliging van de EU, bedoeld voor de opsporing en bestrijding van illegale handelingen met nucleair en ander radioactief materiaal (EUSECTRA), is sinds 2013 volledig operationeel en staat ten dienste van de lidstaten van de Europese Unie en partnerlanden, waaronder verscheidene GICNT-leden. Het centrum wordt ook gebruikt voor praktische oefeningen, voornamelijk in verband met de bestrijding van nucleaire smokkel, en voor nucleaire forensische activiteiten inzake de karakterisering van onderschept nucleair materiaal. De Europese Commissie blijft tevens een belangrijke rol spelen in de Groep grensbewaking voor nucleaire beveiliging. Zij is medevoorzitter van zowel de groep als haar twee subgroepen inzake detectietechnologieën en capaciteitsopbouw.

⁽⁶⁾ Alle EU-lidstaten zijn partij bij het gewijzigde VFBK.

⁽⁷⁾ Alle EU-lidstaten zijn partij bij het Verdrag inzake nucleaire veiligheid.

⁽⁸⁾ Alle EU-lidstaten zijn partij bij het Gezamenlijk Verdrag.

⁽⁹⁾ PB L 314 van 11.12.2018, blz. 41.

Verificatieregelingen en -initiatieven

De EU is van mening dat de verdere ontwikkeling van de multilaterale verificatiecapaciteit voor nucleaire ontwapening kan bijdragen tot de verwezenlijking en het behoud van een wereld zonder kernwapens. In dit verband hebben de EU en haar lidstaten de oprichting van de VN-groep van regeringsdeskundigen inzake de verificatie van nucleaire ontwapening geheel gesteund, alsook het besluit om haar werkzaamheden in 2022 en 2023 voort te zetten om te compenseren dat een aantal zittingen niet kon plaatsvinden als gevolg van de COVID-19-pandemie. De EU heeft verder deelgenomen aan het internationaal partnerschap voor de verificatie van nucleaire ontwapening (IPNDV), dat van 27 tot en met 29 juni 2022 in Brussel zijn eerste fysieke bijeenkomst in meer dan twee jaar heeft gehouden, de tabletop-oefening JUNEX 22. Het IPNDV hield van 5 tot en met 9 december 2022 zijn plenaire vergadering in Sydney (Australië), waar de partners de vooruitgang in de derde fase van de werkzaamheden beoordeelden, waarbij zij de nadruk legden op het beoordelen van verificatieconcepten door middel van op scenario's gebaseerde toepassingen en het in kaart brengen en evalueren van technologieën die de verificatiedoelstellingen dienen.

Regionale kwesties en aspecten

Iran/JCPOA

Ondanks de politieke steun van de EU-lidstaten en de intensieve internationale diplomatieke inspanningen voor het herstel van de volledige uitvoering van het gezamenlijk alomvattend actieplan (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — JCPOA) — waaronder de onderhandelingen in Wenen, die door de hoge vertegenwoordiger van de EU als coördinator van de gezamenlijke commissie van het JCPOA werden gefaciliteerd — kon in de loop van 2022 geen overeenstemming worden bereikt. In opeenvolgende verslagen van de IAEA wordt de alarmerende versnelling gedocumenteerd van het nucleaire programma van Iran, waarbij ernstig wordt afgeweken van zijn toezeggingen in het kader van het JCPOA, met name wat betreft de uitbreiding van zijn capaciteit voor nucleaire verrijking en de productie van hoogverrijkt uranium. Wat de resterende kwesties inzake waarborgen betreft, (uraniumdeeltjes op drie niet-aangegeven locaties) heeft de Raad van Beheer van de IAEA op 8 juni en 17 november 2022 resoluties aangenomen waarin Iran ertoe wordt opgeroepen met de organisatie samen te werken.

Intussen ging de EU ook verder met de ondersteuning van de langetermijnmissie van de IAEA inzake verificatie en monitoring van de toezeggingen van Iran op nucleair gebied. De EU is met Iran blijven samenwerken op civiel nucleair gebied in het kader van bijlage III bij het JCPOA inzake nucleaire veiligheid. Deze samenwerking omvat steun voor de Iraanse autoriteit voor nucleaire regelgeving (INRA), stresstests voor de kerncentrale van Bushehr en de levering van uitrusting aan het INRA-centrum voor nucleaire veiligheid. Het overheidsopdrachtenkanaal van het JCPOA, dat de overbrenging van nucleaire producten of producten voor tweërlei gebruik naar Iran toetst, blijft operationeel.

In de conclusies van de Raad van 12 december 2022 bevestigde de EU haar gehechtheid aan, en blijvende steun voor, de volledige en doeltreffende uitvoering van een hernieuwd gezamenlijk alomvattend actieplan (JCPOA), en riep zij alle landen op de uitvoering van Resolutie 2231 (2015) van de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties te ondersteunen. De hoge vertegenwoordiger van de EU blijft zich, in zijn rol van coördinator van het JCPOA, ten volle inzetten voor samenwerking met de internationale gemeenschap om het actieplan in stand te houden en te zorgen voor volledige uitvoering ervan.

Democratische Volksrepubliek Korea (DVK)

In 2022 onderstreepte de EU dat elke lancering van een ongekend aantal ballistische raketten door de DVK een flagrante schending van de resoluties van de VN-Veiligheidsraad was en de regionale en internationale vrede en veiligheid ernstig bedreigde. In de verklaringen van de hoge vertegenwoordiger namens de EU in april en november werd de hervatting door de DVK van de lanceringen van intercontinentale ballistische raketten veroordeeld. In haar verklaringen betuigde de EU ook haar solidariteit met de Republiek Korea en Japan nadat de DVK nieuwe en oudere soorten kortereafstands-raketten had gelanceerd, waarbij zij erop wees dat sommige ervan kunnen worden gebruikt om kernkoppen te vervoeren. De EU heeft duidelijk gemaakt dat dergelijke acties, samen met de voortzetting van de activiteiten op de kerninstallaties van de DVK, nooit als legitiem zouden worden aanvaard. De EU benadrukte dat de enige weg naar duurzame vrede en veiligheid erin bestaat dat de DVK actie onderneemt om te voldoen aan haar verplichting om op volledige, verifieerbare en onomkeerbare wijze afstand te doen van al haar kernwapens, andere massavernietigingswapens, programma's inzake ballistische raketten en bestaande nucleaire programma's, en alle daarmee verband houdende activiteiten stopzet.

De EU-lidstaten bleven er bij alle leden van de Verenigde Naties, met name de leden van de Veiligheidsraad, voor pleiten om de DVK aan te sporen van koers te veranderen, waarbij zij benadrukten dat het meest doeltreffende instrument om dit te bereiken de volledige uitvoering van de sancties van de VN-Veiligheidsraad is. Aangezien de Veiligheidsraad nog steeds geen actie ondernam, ging de EU intensiever met de partners overleg plegen over andere manieren om te beperken dat

geld, kennis en componenten die kunnen worden gebruikt voor haar illegale wapenprogramma's de DVK binnenstromen. In dat verband nam de EU in april en december aanvullende beperkende maatregelen tegen Noord-Koreaanse personen en entiteiten aan. Daarbij werden, naast de 80 personen en 75 entiteiten die op grond van sancties van de VN-Veilighedsraad reeds op de lijst stonden, nog eens 73 personen en 17 entiteiten aan beperkende maatregelen van de EU onderworpen.

De EU liet geen mogelijkheid onbenut om in internationale non-proliferatiefora de DVK ertoe op te roepen zich onmiddellijk als niet-kernwapenstaat weer volledig te houden aan het NPV en de integrale-waarborgovereenkomst van de IAEA, het aanvullend protocol in werking te doen treden en het Alomvattend Kernstopverdrag te ondertekenen en te ratificeren. De EU bleef erop aandringen dat de situatie alleen met vreedzame middelen kon worden opgelost. De EU drong er bij de DVK op aan de dialoog met de belangrijkste partijen te hervatten, en herhaalde bereid te zijn een nieuw diplomatiek proces te steunen of te faciliteren dat gericht is op de volledige, verifieerbare en onomkeerbare denuclearisatie van het Koreaanse schiereiland.

Zone in het Midden-Oosten die vrij is van kernwapens en andere massavernietigingswapens

In haar streven om uitvoering te geven aan de resolutie over het Midden-Oosten die tijdens de NPV-toetsingsconferentie van 1995 werd aangenomen, werd de EU aangemoedigd door het resultaat van de derde VN-conferentie over de instelling van een zone in het Midden-Oosten die vrij is van kernwapens en andere massavernietigingswapens, die van 14 tot en met 18 november 2022 in New York plaatsvond.

Bij Besluit (GBVB) 2019/938 van de Raad ⁽¹⁰⁾ van 6 juni 2019 ter ondersteuning van een proces van vertrouwensopbouw dat moet leiden tot de instelling van een zone in het Midden-Oosten die vrij is van kernwapens en alle andere massavernietigingswapens, waarmee alle staten in de regio vrijelijk hebben ingestemd, verleende de EU in 2022 steun aan het UNIDIR-project voor een zone in het Midden-Oosten die vrij is van massavernietigingswapens. Dat project is gericht op het dichten van een belangrijke lacune in het onderzoek naar de wijze waarop de kwestie zich in de loop der tijd heeft ontwikkeld, het opbouwen van analytisch vermogen ter ondersteuning van een nieuw denken over regionale veiligheidskwesties en de zone, het verzamelen van ideeën en het uitwerken van nieuwe voorstellen voor verdere stappen, en het bevorderen van een inclusieve dialoog tussen deskundigen en beleidsmakers over regionale veiligheidskwesties en de zone. Tegen het einde van het jaar heeft de EU besprekingen aangeknoopt over een fase II van het project, met als doel haar steun voor de zone na 2022 voort te zetten.

CHEMISCHE WAPENS

Op 29 april 2022 was het 25 jaar geleden dat het verdrag tot verbod van de ontwikkeling, de productie, de aanleg van voorraden en het gebruik van chemische wapens en inzake de vernietiging van deze wapens (CWC) in werking trad. In een verklaring namens de EU herinnerde de hoge vertegenwoordiger eraan dat het gebruik van chemische wapens door wie, wanneer en in welke omstandigheden dan ook, een schending is van het internationaal recht en kan neerkomen op de ernstigste misdrijven die de internationale gemeenschap aangaan: oorlogsmisdaden en misdaden tegen de menselijkheid.

In 2022 bleef de EU zich ten volle inzetten om de proliferatie van chemische wapens tegen te gaan en de strijd tegen straffeloosheid bij het gebruik van chemische wapens te ondersteunen. De EU heeft haar krachtige politieke, diplomatieke en vrijwillige financiële steun aan de Organisatie voor het verbod van chemische wapens (Organisation of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons — OPCW), het uitvoeringsorgaan van het CWC, voortgezet. De steun uitte zich in verklaringen, demarches en vrijwillige financiële bijdragen middels besluiten van de Raad. De vrijwillige financiële bijdragen kwamen ten goede aan de kernactiviteiten van de OPCW, met name op het gebied van verificatie en capaciteitsopbouw, de activiteiten van de OPCW waarbij satellietbeelden worden verstrekt, en de actualisering van de capaciteit van de OPCW op het gebied van cyberbeveiliging en informatiebescherming. De EU en haar lidstaten bleven de grootste vrijwillige financiële donoren die de oprichting van het nieuwe laboratorium van de OPCW, het Centrum voor Chemie en Technologie, hebben ondersteund.

Op 14 november 2022 legde de EU verdere beperkende maatregelen op in verband met de vergiftiging van Aleksej Navalny en de productie van overbrengingssytemen voor chemische wapens in Syrië ⁽¹¹⁾. Eind 2022 golden er voor in totaal 25 personen en 3 entiteiten beperkende maatregelen in het kader van de EU-sanctieregeling voor chemische wapens.

⁽¹⁰⁾ PB L 149 van 7.6.2019, blz. 63.

⁽¹¹⁾ Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2022/2228 van de Raad van 14 november 2022 tot uitvoering van Verordening (EU) 2018/1542 betreffende beperkende maatregelen tegen de proliferatie en het gebruik van chemische wapens (PB L 293 I van 14.11.2022, blz. 1).

In de context van de OPCW voerde Rusland als onderdeel van zijn agressie tegen Oekraïne een campagne van desinformatie en staatspropaganda waarbij onbewezen en ongegronde aantijgingen tegen Oekraïne en anderen over chemische wapens werden verspreid. Als antwoord op de Russische desinformatie wees de EU er in haar verklaringen op dat Oekraïne onmiskenbaar een verantwoordelijk lid is van het Verdrag inzake chemische wapens en dit geheel naleeft.

BIOLOGISCHE WAPENS

Het Verdrag inzake biologische en toxinewapens (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention — BTWC) verbiedt de ontwikkeling, de productie, de verwerving, de overdracht, de aanleg van voorraden en het gebruik van biologische en toxinewapens. Het was het eerste multilaterale ontwapeningsverdrag waarbij een hele categorie massavernietigingswapens werd verboden. Alle lidstaten van de Europese Unie zijn partij bij het BTWC.

De EU en haar lidstaten hebben actief bijgedragen aan de negende toetsingsconferentie van het BTWC, die van 27 november tot en met 16 december 2022 in Genève werd gehouden. Het was een belangrijk resultaat dat de toenmalige 184 staten die partij waren het eens konden worden over een slotdocument, met name gezien de wereldwijde spanningen en de impasse in andere fora als gevolg van de Russische aanvalsoorlog tegen Oekraïne. Een van de belangrijkste resultaten was het besluit om een werkgroep op te richten die tussen 2023 en 2026 specifieke en doeltreffende maatregelen, waaronder mogelijke juridisch bindende, zal vaststellen betreffende mechanismen voor de uitvoering van samenwerking en bijstand krachtens artikel X en betreffende een wetenschappelijke en technologische adviesraad, naast hernieuwde besprekingen over naleving en verificatie, en die aanbevelingen zal doen om het verdrag in al zijn aspecten te versterken en te institutionaliseren.

In 2022 speelde de EU een actieve rol bij het bestrijden van de desinformatiecampagne van Rusland over biologische wapens, waarbij het land onder meer gebruikmaakte van de mechanismen waarin is voorzien in de artikelen V en VI van het BTWC om desinformatie te verspreiden in een poging zijn agressie tegen Oekraïne te rechtvaardigen.

In overeenstemming met de EU-strategie tegen de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens en als jarenlange backer van het BTWC, heeft de EU in 2022 haar consistente steun voortgezet met de uitvoering van twee besluiten van de Raad, de financiering van Unoda-activiteiten ter ondersteuning van capaciteitsopbouw die de nationale uitvoering van het BTWC versterken, de bevordering van biobeveiligingsnetwerken in het zuidelijk halfrond, de steun voor het intersessionele programma en de voorbereidingen voor de negende toetsingsconferentie van het BTWC, de versterking van de paraatheid van de verdragsstaten om aanvallen met biologische agentia te voorkomen en erop te reageren, en instrumenten voor outreach, educatie en betrokkenheid mogelijk te maken. In 2022 gaf de EU ook verdere steun aan het Unoda-initiatief “Youth for Biosecurity”. Een ander belangrijk aspect van de EU-steun hield verband met de universalisering van het verdrag. In 2022 droeg de EU bij aan de financiering van een VN-workshop over universalisering voor Afrika en ondernam zij bij landen die nog geen partij waren bij het verdrag, een demarche ten behoeve van universalisering.

BALLISTISCHE RAKETTEN

De Haagse Gedragscode tegen de verspreiding van ballistische raketten (Hague Code of Conduct — HCoC) is het enige multilaterale instrument voor transparantie en vertrouwenswekkende maatregelen dat betrekking heeft op ballistische raketten. Staten die de HCoC onderschrijven, verbinden zich er vrijwillig toe voorafgaand kennis te geven van de lancering van ballistische raketten en ruimtelanceervoertuigen, en een jaarlijkse verklaring in te dienen over hun beleid inzake ballistische raketten en ruimtelanceervoertuigen.

De EU is sterk voorstander van de HCoC sinds de instelling ervan. Alle EU-lidstaten hebben zich bij de gedragscode aangesloten en de EU zoekt regelmatig contact met landen die dit nog niet hebben gedaan om aan de verdere universalisering ervan bij te dragen. Momenteel hebben 144 VN-lidstaten de gedragscode onderschreven. Via een aantal opeenvolgende Raadsbesluiten financiert de EU sinds 2008 outreachactiviteiten, nevenevenementen, onderzoekspapers, deskundigenvergaderingen en regionale bewustmakingsseminars in verband met de HCoC. Deze activiteiten worden uitgevoerd door de in Parijs gevestigde Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (stichting voor strategisch onderzoek), met gewoonlijk ook een inbreng van het voorzitterschap van de Haagse Gedragscode. In 2022 werd een nieuw besluit van de Raad opgesteld, waarbij de EU-steun met een nieuwe actie werd verlengd tot 2026 ⁽¹²⁾. De belangrijkste doelstellingen van de actie zijn het bevorderen van de universaliteit, de volledige uitvoering en een betere integratie van de HCoC teneinde de verspreiding van ballistische raketten te helpen beteugelen.

⁽¹²⁾ Het besluit werd op 17 januari 2023 vastgesteld als Besluit (GBVB) 2023/124 van de Raad (PB L 16 van 18.1.2023, blz. 36).

De 21e jaarvergadering van de HCoC in Wenen van 30 en 31 mei 2022 vond plaats tegen de achtergrond van de grootschalige militaire invasie van Oekraïne door Rusland. In die vergadering herhaalden de EU en haar lidstaten hun krachtige steun voor de HCoC en voor de universalisering, de volledige uitvoering en de efficiënte werking ervan ⁽¹³⁾. In tegenstelling tot de vorige jaarvergaderingen kwam er geen persbericht van de landen die de HCoC hebben onderschreven.

In 2022 bood de 20e verjaardag van de HCoC de EU de gelegenheid om de code nog sterker onder internationale aandacht te brengen, onder meer door versterkte contacten met de landen die de code nog niet hebben onderschreven ⁽¹⁴⁾. De EU, Nederland en Frankrijk vierden deze dag door op 1 juni in Wenen een internationaal outreachevenement over de HCoC te organiseren en in november een transparantiebezoek aan de Europese lanceerbasis in Kourou in Frans-Guyana te organiseren — een belangrijke transparantiemaatregel van de HCoC.

RESOLUTIE 1540 VAN DE VEILIGHEIDSRAAD VAN DE VERENIGDE NATIES

De EU beschouwt Resolutie 1540 van de VN-Veiligheidsraad als een centrale pijler van de internationale non-proliferatiearchitectuur, een essentieel onderdeel van de wereldwijde inspanningen om de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens, ook onder terroristen en andere niet-overheidsactoren, te voorkomen.

De bescherming tegen de verspreiding van materiaal en knowhow moet niet alleen via nationale wetgeving gebeuren maar ook grens- en sectoroverschrijdend worden uitgevoerd en gemonitord. De EU werkt samen met partnerlanden opdat zij beter in staat zijn om zich aan de bepalingen van Resolutie 1540 te houden, en steunt de VN-agentschappen bij hun werkzaamheden ter bevordering van begrip en naleving.

De EU was actief betrokken bij het open overleg in het kader van de alomvattende toetsing van Resolutie 1540 van de VN-Veiligheidsraad, dat van 31 mei tot en met 2 juni 2022 in New York plaatsvond. De EU was ingenomen met het nieuwe tienjarige mandaat voor het Comité, dat is vastgelegd in Resolutie 2663 (2022) van 30 november 2022, en met het besluit dat het Comité zijn interne richtsnoeren over aangelegenheden betreffende zijn deskundigengroep zal herzien. De EU was verheugd dat in de nieuwe Resolutie 2663 (2022) voor het eerst de nadruk wordt gelegd op de betekenisvolle participatie van vrouwen om de werkzaamheden van het Comité verder te versterken.

De EU-steun voor de uitvoering van Resolutie 1540 van de VN-Veiligheidsraad door de VN-lidstaten omvat met name het volgende:

- Het EU-initiatief voor chemische, biologische, radiologische en nucleaire (CBRN) excellentiecentra biedt aanzienlijke bijstand om de risico's van accidentele, natuurlijke of criminele incidenten in partnerlanden te beperken. Dit behoefte- en vraaggestuurde initiatief versterkt het veiligheidsbeheer van alle soorten risico's, zowel op nationaal als op regionaal niveau. Met een begroting van bijna 150 miljoen USD voor 2021-2028 ondersteunen de CBRN-excellentiecentra capaciteitsopbouw ook door middel van grensoverschrijdende oefeningen in realtime met 64 landen.
- De EU helpt staten CBRN-risico's te beperken door middel van het EU-programma voor wederzijdse controle door partners op de uitvoer van goederen voor tweërlei gebruik, dat erop gericht is het risico van verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens te verminderen door de internationale samenwerking inzake controles op de handel in producten voor tweërlei gebruik te versterken en de nationale en regionale capaciteit te verbeteren.
- De EU-steun uit de GBVB-begroting aan andere staten die specifiek verband houdt met de uitvoering van Resolutie 1540, wordt sinds 2006 verstrekt via twee gemeenschappelijke optredens van de Raad en vier GBVB-besluiten van de Raad (zie bijlage II). Dankzij deze steun zijn er heel wat minder landen die geen verslag hebben ingediend of hebben nagelaten de naar aanleiding van het indienen van onvolledige verslagen door het Comité 1540 verlangde aanvullende informatie te verstrekken. In 2022 bedroeg deze steun in totaal bijna 9 miljoen EUR.
- De EU helpt derde landen hun verplichtingen op grond van Resolutie 1540 na te komen door multilaterale non-proliferatieverdragen uit te voeren. Deze steun uit de GBVB-begroting vindt plaats via bilaterale samenwerkings- en bijstandspartnerschappen en steun aan de VN en regionale organisaties. Deze steun voor non-proliferatie-inspanningen is met name gericht op het BTWC, het CWC, het NPV, het mechanisme van de secretaris-generaal van de VN voor het onderzoeken van vermeend gebruik van chemische en biologische wapens (UNSGM) en de HCoC.

⁽¹³⁾ Verklaring van de EU tijdens de 21^e jaarvergadering van de Haagse Gedragscode tegen de verspreiding van ballistische raketten, uitgebracht op 30 mei 2022.

⁽¹⁴⁾ EU bundelt krachten tegen proliferatie ballistische raketten.

- Ook moet worden gewezen op het belang van uitvoercontroles in het kader van Resolutie 1540 van de VN-Veiligheidsraad om de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens te voorkomen. In de resolutie worden de staten ertoe opgeroepen doeltreffende nationale controles op uitvoer en overlading in te stellen, te ontwikkelen en in stand te houden voor wat betreft materiaal voor nucleaire, chemische of biologische wapens of de overbrengingsmiddelen daarvoor, en gezamenlijk op te treden om de illegale handel in dit materiaal te voorkomen. De EU neemt actief deel aan alle multilaterale regelingen voor controle op de uitvoer van massavernietigingswapens en aan de werkzaamheden van het initiatief van de G7 voor een mondiaal partnerschap tegen de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens.

CONVENTIONELE WAPENS

Handvuurwapens en lichte wapens

Overeenkomstig haar strategie van 2018 tegen illegale vuurwapens, handvuurwapens en lichte wapens (SALW) en munitie daarvoor, “Wapens beveiligen, burgers beschermen”, bleef de EU zich in 2022 ten volle inzetten voor het voorkomen en beteugelen van de illegale handel in SALW en munitie daarvoor en voor het bevorderen van verantwoordingsplicht en verantwoordelijkheid met betrekking tot de legale handel in die wapens.

In 2022 zette de EU verschillende klassieke SALW-beheersingsprojecten voort, met het accent op vrijwillige civiele ontwapeningscampagnes, inzameling en vernietiging van overtollige SALW en munitie, fysieke beveiliging en voorraadbeheer voor SALW en munitie, en capaciteitsopbouw voor markering, registratie en traceren. De meeste van deze projecten hebben een regionale reikwijdte en werden uitgevoerd met de hulp van regionale organisaties.

Het met diverse wapens ondersteunen van Oekraïne bij het verdedigen van zijn nationale soevereiniteit en territoriale integriteit tegen de illegale en niet-uitgelokte Russische militaire agressie, was een politieke prioriteit en een strategische noodzaak voor de EU en haar lidstaten. De EU-lidstaten waren het erover eens dat de uitvoer van militaire uitrusting naar Oekraïne volledig in overeenstemming is met de wettelijke verplichtingen die voortvloeien uit Gemeenschappelijk Standpunt 2008/944/GBVB inzake wapenuitvoer en met de verplichtingen op grond van het Wapenhandelsverdrag (WHV), alsmede met de initiële elementen van de Wassenaar Arrangement, waarin is bepaald dat “deze regeling geen afbreuk doet aan het recht van staten om legitieme middelen te verwerven waarmee zij zich kunnen verdedigen overeenkomstig artikel 51 van het Handvest van de Verenigde Naties”. Deze normen verbieden de uitvoer naar een agressor, niet naar een staat die het slachtoffer is van externe agressie. Gezien de vele ernstige inbreuken door Rusland op de Verdragen van Genève, waaronder aanvallen op burgers en burgerobjecten, zouden wapenoverdrachten aan Rusland niet toegestaan zijn op grond van het WHV. De EU heeft er bij alle staten die partij zijn bij het WHV voortdurend op aangedrongen af te zien van overdrachten aan Rusland.

De registratie van SALW en andere militaire uitrusting is een nationale verantwoordelijkheid. Militaire uitrusting, wapens en munitie die in het kader van de Europese Vredesfaciliteit door de EU-lidstaten worden geleverd, zijn zorgvuldig geregistreerd door de EDEO, op basis van het door de Oekraïense autoriteiten ondertekende en door de uitvoerende actoren van de EU-lidstaten verstrekte leveringsbevestigingscertificaat. Voorts werken de EU en Oekraïne al geruime tijd samen rond de dreiging die uitgaat van omleiding van en illegale handel in SALW. In 2022 waren de belangrijkste door de EU gefinancierde projecten ter ondersteuning van de bestrijding door Oekraïne van de illegale handel in SALW, munitie en explosieven de Besluiten (GBVB) 2018/1788 ⁽¹⁵⁾ en (GBVB) 2019/2111 ⁽¹⁶⁾ van de Raad, met het Seesac (UNDP) als belangrijkste uitvoerder, Besluit (GBVB) 2019/2009 van de Raad ⁽¹⁷⁾, met de OVSE als belangrijkste uitvoerder, en Besluit (GBVB) 2019/2191 van de Raad ⁽¹⁸⁾, ter ondersteuning van iTrace IV.

Oekraïne werd in het EU-actieplan 2020-2025 inzake illegale vuurwapenhandel aangemerkt als een cruciale regio voor specifieke acties op extern niveau. In dat kader had Oekraïne deelgenomen aan de laatste ministeriële conferentie EU-Westelijke Balkan in september 2021 over de bestrijding van de illegale handel in vuurwapens in Zuidoost-Europa, waarbij uitvoering werd gegeven aan de specifieke acties voor Zuidoost-Europa van het genoemde actieplan, met inbegrip van de routekaart voor alomvattende SALW-beheersing, alsook aan de ministeriële conferentie over de nationale contactpunten voor vuurwapens.

In 2022 bleef de EU, in overeenstemming met de regionale prioriteiten van de EU-SALW-strategie, steun verlenen aan de partners van de Westelijke Balkan via de Besluiten (GBVB) 2018/1788 en (GBVB) 2019/2111, met het Seesac (UNDP) als belangrijkste uitvoerder. De Westelijke Balkan blijft de grootste ontvanger van regionale steun van de EU voor de

⁽¹⁵⁾ PB L 293 van 20.11.2018, blz. 11.

⁽¹⁶⁾ PB L 318 van 10.12.2019, blz. 147.

⁽¹⁷⁾ PB L 312 van 3.12.2019, blz. 42.

⁽¹⁸⁾ PB L 330 van 20.12.2019, blz. 53.

beheersing van conventionele wapens. De uitvoering van de routekaart voor de Westelijke Balkan tegen illegale wapenhandel bleef een prioriteit van de EU. Bovendien is die routekaart met zijn succesvolle regionale aanpak een blauwdruk geworden voor andere regionale initiatieven op het gebied van beheersing van conventionele wapens.

De EU nam actief deel aan de 8e tweejaarlijkse bijeenkomst van staten over het VN-actieprogramma ter voorkoming, bestrijding en uitbanning van de illegale handel in handvuurwapens en lichte wapens in al zijn aspecten (New York, 27 juni-1 juli 2022). De EU bracht verklaringen uit over de drie inhoudelijke agendapunten en nam actief deel aan het overleg over het slotdocument.

Dankzij het werkdocument dat de EU vóór de bijeenkomst had ingediend, konden veel EU-doelstellingen in het slotdocument worden verwerkt. Over het door de EU en de meerderheid van de deelnemende staten gesteunde standpunt met betrekking tot kwesties als de integratie van munitie in het toepassingsgebied van het actieprogramma, de formulering over de open technische deskundigengroep, en een verwijzing naar “synergieën” tussen het actieprogramma en het WHV en het Vuurwapenprotocol werd echter geen consensus bereikt.

Sinds 2013 steunt de EU iTrace, een mondiaal mechanisme voor rapportage inzake illegale SALW en andere illegale conventionele wapens en munitie in conflictgebieden. Tijdens de periode die het verslag bestrijkt, verrichte iTrace veldoperaties in conflictgebieden in het Midden-Oosten, West- en Oost-Afrika, de Golf, Centraal-Azië en Oekraïne, daarbij steun verlenend voor de inspanningen om de illegale handel in wapens en munitie te ontwrichten. Bij de operaties in Oekraïne werden Russische en Iraanse geavanceerde wapensystemen uitvoerig gedocumenteerd en getraceerd.

Het ondersteunen en bevorderen van gendergelijkheid en empowerment van vrouwen nam een centrale plaats in in het EU-beleid, zowel intern als in de betrekkingen met derde landen. In overeenstemming met haar SALW-strategie houdt de EU systematisch rekening met de genderdimensie bij het ontwerpen van nieuwe projecten inzake bestrijding van wapengeweld en SALW-beheersing in het algemeen. Daarnaast bleef de EU de ontwikkeling van een internationaal erkend systeem voor de validering van wapen- en munitiebeheer ter voorkoming van illegale proliferatie ondersteunen.

Ook bleef de Unie via diverse politieke dialogen inzetten op de universalisering en effectieve uitvoering van het WHV. De EU handhaafde haar financiële steun voor het steunprogramma voor de uitvoering van het WHV door landen in Afrika, Latijns-Amerika en Zuidoost- en Centraal-Azië technische bijstand te verlenen bij de versterking van hun nationale systemen in overeenstemming met de WHV-vereisten, en zette haar steun aan het WHV-secretariaat voort. De EU bleef ook inzetten op effectieve controle op de wapenuitvoer tussen landen in Zuid- en Oost-Europa, de Kaukasus, het Midden-Oosten en Noord-Afrika, en Centraal-Azië.

Antipersoneelmijnen

In 2022 bleef de EU bijdragen aan de menselijke veiligheid door steun te verlenen voor de uitvoering van het Actieplan van Oslo 2020-2024 dat tijdens de vierde toetsingsconferentie van het Verdrag inzake het verbod van het gebruik, de aanleg van voorraden, de productie en de overdracht van antipersoneelmijnen en inzake de vernietiging van deze wapens (1997) is aangenomen door de staten die partij zijn. Bij Besluit 2021/257 van de Raad ^(¹⁹) streefde de EU de volgende doelstellingen na: a) ondersteunen van de inspanningen van de staten die partij zijn om uitvoering te geven aan aspecten inzake onderzoek en opruiming en inzake voorlichting over en beperking van de risico's van mijnen van het Actieplan van Oslo; b) ondersteunen van de inspanningen van de staten die partij zijn om uitvoering te geven aan aspecten inzake slachtofferhulp van het Actieplan van Oslo; c) bevorderen van de universalisering van het verdrag en bevorderen van normen tegen het gebruik, de aanleg van voorraden, de productie en de overdracht van antipersoneelmijnen, en over de vernietiging ervan; d) ondersteunen van de inspanningen van de staten die partij zijn die antipersoneelmijnen voor toegelaten doeleinden aanhouden, om hun rapportagevermogen te vergroten, om ervoor te zorgen dat het aantal aangehouden mijnen het strikt noodzakelijke minimumaantal niet overschrijdt, en om alternatieven voor op scherp gestelde antipersoneelmijnen ten behoeve van training en onderzoek te verkennen, en e) blijf geven van de niet-aflatende inzet van de EU en haar lidstaten voor het verdrag, alsook van hun vaste wil om samen te werken met en bijstand te verlenen aan de staten die partij zijn die ondersteuning nodig hebben om hun toezeggingen in het kader van het verdrag gestand te doen, en aldus de voortrekkersrol versterken die de Unie speelt bij het nastreven van het doel van het verdrag, namelijk voorgoed voorkomen dat antipersoneelmijnen nog leed veroorzaken en slachtoffers maken.

Ter gelegenheid van de 25e verjaardag van de ondertekening van het Verdrag inzake het verbod op antipersoneelmijnen en het grote succes van dat verdrag heeft de gemeenschap die het verbod op mijnen steunt, waaronder de staten die partij zijn, internationale organisaties, het maatschappelijk middenveld, overlevenden van ongevallen met landmijnen en mijnopruimers tijdens de 20e vergadering van de staten die partij zijn, blijf gegeven van haar sterke vastberadenheid om de wereld uiterlijk in 2025 mijnvrij te maken. Dat doel wordt, door de COVID-19-pandemie, een forse daling van de mondiale financiering voor mijnbestrijding en brede veiligheidsuitdagingen — waaronder het recente gebruik van antipersoneelmijnen door Rusland in Oekraïne — moeilijker te bereiken, ook al ontbreekt het niet aan engagement.

⁽¹⁹⁾ PB L 58 van 19.2.2021, blz. 41.

De EU is een van de grootste donoren op het gebied van mijnopruijing, slachtofferhulp en ondersteuning van de uitvoering van het Actieplan van Oslo. Op de EU-steun werd de aandacht gevestigd in vier EU-verklaringen, en de EU werd erkend als de belangrijkste partner bij het ondersteunen van de re-integratie van slachtoffers van landmijnen in het dagelijks leven, met name via projecten in Colombia, Guinee-Bissau, Bosnië en Herzegovina en Cambodja.

UITVOERCONTROLEREGELINGEN

De EU staat volledig achter de bestaande multilaterale uitvoercontroleregelingen (Australiëgroep, controleregime voor de uitvoer van rakettechnologie en -onderdelen, Groep van Nucleaire Exportlanden, Wassenaar Arrangement en Comité-Zangger)⁽²⁰⁾. Zij benadrukt hun cruciale rol bij het voorkomen van de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens en hun overbrengingsmiddelen, het uitvoeren van de embargo's van de VN-Veiligheidsraad en het bevorderen van transparantie en verantwoordelijkheid bij de overdracht van conventionele wapens en goederen en technologieën voor tweërlei gebruik, waarmee destabiliserende accumulaties worden voorkomen. De EU draagt bij tot de volledige uitvoering van sterke non-proliferatiemechanismen waarin de verdragen en de resoluties van de VN-Veiligheidsraad voorzien door wereldwijd robuuste uitvoercontroles en daarmee verband houdende wetgeving te bevorderen. De EU verleent ook brede steun aan partnerlanden bij het opzetten of verbeteren van hun eigen uitvoercontrolesystemen ter uitvoering van Resolutie 1540 van de VN-Veiligheidsraad, via de CBRN-kenniscentra en het EU P2P-programma van het WHV. Multilaterale uitvoercontroleregelingen bevorderen de legitieme overdracht van goederen en technologieën voor tweërlei gebruik die essentieel zijn voor de internationale samenwerking op het gebied van vreedzaam gebruik.

Tegen deze achtergrond bleef de EU zich in de Eerste Commissie van de AVVN verzetten tegen de Chinese resolutie getiteld "Bevordering van internationale samenwerking inzake vreedzaam gebruik in de context van de internationale veiligheid", onder meer door in de aanloop naar de betreffende stemming in dialoog te treden met mondiale partners en te vergaderen met regionale groepen van VN-lidstaten. De EU beschouwt de resolutie als een poging om uitvoercontroleregelingen te ondermijnen: uitvoercontroles die noodzakelijk en vereist zijn op grond van juridisch bindende internationale instrumenten voor non-proliferatiedoeleinden, worden ten onrechte afgedaan als "onnodige beperkingen" op vreedzaam gebruik. Voor de bewering dat de bestaande uitvoercontroles en multilaterale uitvoercontroleregelingen inzake non-proliferatie vreedzaam gebruik of duurzame ontwikkeling in de weg staan, bestaat geen bewijs.

Groep van Nucleaire Exportlanden

De Groep van Nucleaire Exportlanden (Nuclear Suppliers Group — NSG) tracht bij te dragen tot de non-proliferatie van kernwapens door de uitvoering van twee reeksen richtsnoeren: een voor de uitvoer van kernwapens en een voor de uitvoer van nucleair materiaal. Deze richtsnoeren worden door elke deelnemende regering uitgevoerd overeenkomstig haar nationale wetgeving en praktijken inzake vergunningsvereisten. Alle EU-lidstaten zijn deelnemende regering van het NSG. De Europese Commissie neemt deel als waarnemer.

De beraadslagingen binnen de groep zijn vertrouwelijk. De EU nam actief deel aan de plenaire vergadering van 2022 (Warschau, 23-24 juni) met vertegenwoordigers van de Europese Commissie (TRADE/JRC) en de EDEO. Voor het eerst in de geschiedenis van de NSG werd geen publieke verklaring aangenomen.

Australiëgroep

De Australiëgroep is een groep van gelijkgestemde landen die de uitvoercontroles voor chemische stoffen, biologische agentia en aanverwante technologieën voor tweërlei gebruik wil harmoniseren. De groep telt 43 leden, waaronder de EU en alle EU-lidstaten.

De beraadslagingen binnen de groep zijn vertrouwelijk. In 2022 hield de groep voor het eerst sinds de COVID-19-pandemie weer fysieke vergaderingen. De EU nam actief deel aan de besprekingen tijdens de plenaire vergadering van de groep in Parijs, van 4 tot en met 8 juli. Daar ging het onder meer over de dreiging van het gebruik door Rusland van chemische en biologische wapens en van Russische aanvallen op of in de nabijheid van civiele biologische en chemische installaties in Oekraïne. Er was ook gedeelde bezorgdheid over de ongefundeerde beweringen van Rusland over chemische en biologische wapens, waarbij het onder meer Oekraïne en de Verenigde Staten viseerde.

⁽²⁰⁾ De EU neemt deel aan de Australiëgroep en is permanent waarnemer in het Comité-Zangger. De Europese Commissie is waarnemer in de Groep van Nucleaire Exportlanden. Tegelijkertijd zorgt de EU in de genoemde vijf uitvoercontroleregelingen voor politieke coördinatie van de standpunten van de EU-lidstaten die eraan deelnemen, onder meer met het oog op het afleggen van verklaringen namens de EU.

Controleregime voor de uitvoer van rakettechnologie en -onderdelen

Het controleregime voor de uitvoer van rakettechnologie en -onderdelen (Missile Technology Control Regime — MTCR) is een informele en vrijwillige groepering van landen die samen streven naar non-proliferatie van onbemande overbrengingsmiddelen voor massavernietigingswapens, en die hun uitvoervergunningverlening met het oog op voorkoming van proliferatie trachten te coördineren. Het MTCR speelt een cruciale rol bij de bestrijding van de proliferatie van ballistische raketten, kruisraketten en technologieën voor onbemande luchtvaartuigen. Momenteel zijn 18 EU-lidstaten lid van het MTCR. Een kwestie van fundamenteel belang voor de EU in de MTCR-context is het feit dat de toetreding van negen EU-lidstaten geblokkeerd is: Cyprus, Estland, Kroatië, Letland, Litouwen, Malta, Roemenië, Slovenië en Slowakije. De gecentraliseerde reeks EU-uitvoercontroleregels in het kader van de EU-uitvoercontroleverordening geeft uitvoering aan de MTCR-richtsnoeren en -controlelijsten en zorgt ervoor dat deze effectief worden toegepast in alle EU-lidstaten, ook in de lidstaten die nog geen lid zijn van het MTCR.

De beraadslagingen binnen het MTCR zijn vertrouwelijk. De EU is er altijd voorstander van geweest dat het MTCR krachtige publieke signalen afgeeft aangaande de internationale bezorgdheid over de lancering van ballistische raketten en de significante ontwikkeling van rakettechnologie door met name Iran en de Democratische Volksrepubliek Korea. De plenaire vergadering van het MTCR vond in 2022 plaats in Montreux, van 17 tot en met 21 oktober, onder Zwitsers voorzitterschap. Er werd na de vergadering geen publieke verklaring van het MTCR gepubliceerd. Op 8 november 2022 werd door de MTCR-partners wel een “Boodschap ter gelegenheid van de 35e verjaardag van het MTCR” gepubliceerd.

Wassenaar Arrangement

De Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is ingesteld om bij te dragen aan de regionale en internationale veiligheid en stabiliteit door transparantie en verantwoordelijkheid te bevorderen bij overdrachten van conventionele wapens en goederen en technologieën voor tweërlei gebruik. De deelnemende staten passen uitvoercontroles toe op alle items die zijn opgenomen op de lijst van goederen en technologieën voor tweërlei gebruik en de munitielijst, die zij regelmatig evalueren, teneinde ongeoorloofde overdrachten of heroverdrachten van die items te voorkomen.

Beide lijsten vormen de basis van respectievelijk de EU-controlelijst tweërlei gebruik en de gemeenschappelijke EU-lijst van militaire goederen, die regelmatig door de Raad worden bijgewerkt naar aanleiding van besluiten in het kader van de WA. De deelnemende staten trachten er via hun nationale beleid voor te zorgen dat overdrachten van deze items niet bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling of versterking van militaire vermogens die deze doelstellingen ondermijnen, dat ze niet worden misbruikt om dergelijke vermogens te ondersteunen en dat de items niet in handen vallen van terroristen. De deelnemende staten wisselen ook regelmatig informatie uit en moeten hun wapenoverdrachten en overdrachten/weigeringen van overdracht van bepaalde goederen en technologieën voor tweërlei gebruik aan bestemmingen die buiten de regeling vallen, regelmatig melden. Aan de WA nemen 42 landen deel, waarvan 26 EU-lidstaten.

De beraadslagingen binnen de WA zijn vertrouwelijk. In 2022 vond de plenaire vergadering van de WA in Wenen plaats, op 30 november en 1 december. Wegens de COVID-19-pandemie was het de eerste plenaire vergadering sinds 2019. De vergadering stemde in met actualiserings van de beide controlelijsten van de regeling.

OPKOMENDE TECHNOLOGIEËN

In 2022 bleef de EU haar inzicht in opkomende technologieën met een potentieel effect op de internationale veiligheid en ontwapening verder ontwikkelen en bleef zij deelnemen aan internationale inspanningen om deze technologieën te beheersen en de mogelijke risico's ervan te beheren.

In 2022 stelde de EU twee besluiten van de Raad vast op dit specifieke gebied:

- via Besluit (GBVB) 2022/2269 van de Raad van 18 november 2022 betreffende Uniesteun voor de uitvoering door het Unoda en het SIPRI van een gezamenlijk project “Bevordering van verantwoorde innovatie op het gebied van artificiële intelligentie met het oog op vrede en veiligheid” steunt de EU een grotere betrokkenheid van de civiele gemeenschap inzake artificiële intelligentie (AI) bij het verminderen van de risico's die omleiding en misbruik van civiel AI-onderzoek en civiele AI-innovatie door onverantwoordelijke actoren met zich mee kunnen brengen voor de internationale vrede en veiligheid;
- met Besluit (GBVB) 2022/2320 van de Raad van 25 november 2022 betreffende Uniesteun voor de uitvoering van een project “De weg vrijmaken voor innovatie: ontsluitingstechnologie en internationale veiligheid” wordt steun verleend voor het werk dat het UNIDIR verricht in het kader van zijn veiligheids- en technologieprogramma, teneinde de kennis over en het inzicht in nieuwe en opkomende technologieën die van belang zijn voor de internationale veiligheid te vergroten.

De EU bleef zich bewust van de noodzaak ervoor te zorgen dat alle wapens, ook op het gebied van opkomende technologieën, in overeenstemming zijn met het internationaal recht, en met name met het internationaal humanitair recht, rekening houdend met relevante ethische overwegingen. De EU bleef het standpunt uitdragen dat de verantwoordelijkheid voor besluiten over het gebruik van wapens onverminderd bij de mens moet liggen, en dat de menselijke verantwoordingsplicht te allen tijde en gedurende de gehele levenscyclus van een wapensysteem moet worden gehandhaafd.

In 2022 nam de EU verder deel aan de Groep regeringsdeskundigen inzake dodelijke autonome wapensystemen (Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems — LAWS), in het kader van het Verdrag inzake het verbod of de beperking van het gebruik van bepaalde conventionele wapens (CWV). De EU steunde het werk van deze groep aangaande een tweeledige aanpak van de regulering van LAWS, waarbij een onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen wapensystemen op basis van opkomende LAWS-technologieën die niet kunnen worden gebruikt conform de regels en beginselen van het internationaal humanitair recht, en systemen die autonome kenmerken bevatten maar wel kunnen worden gebruikt conform het internationaal humanitair recht. De EU was teleurgesteld dat er, ondanks aanzienlijke conceptuele vooruitgang, in 2022 geen overeenstemming kon worden bereikt over een inhoudelijk verslag voor de staten die partij zijn bij het CWV.

SAMENWERKING MET DENKTANKS EN NGO'S

Op grond van Besluit 2010/430/GBVB van de Raad ⁽²¹⁾ van 26 juli 2010 wordt de uitvoering van de EU-strategie ter bestrijding van de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens actief ondersteund door het EU-Consortium non-proliferatie en ontwapening (EUNPDC), dat in januari 2011 met zijn werkzaamheden begon. De derde fase van het EUNPDC-project werd uitgevoerd van 18 mei 2018 tot en met 17 mei 2022 in het kader van Besluit (GBVB) 2018/299 van de Raad ⁽²²⁾. Op 11 april 2022 stelde de Raad Besluit (GBVB) 2022/597 ⁽²³⁾ vast, waarbij de EU-steun voor de activiteiten van het consortium werd verlengd voor de periode 2022-2025, door voort te bouwen op de verwezenlijkingen tot dusver en door nieuwe projecten toe te voegen.

De activiteiten van het consortium leverden een aanzienlijke bijdrage aan de beleidsvorming van de EU op het gebied van non-proliferatie en ontwapening en aan een grotere zichtbaarheid van de EU ten aanzien van derde landen en het maatschappelijk middenveld. Het consortium biedt een platform voor informele contacten tussen beroepsbeoefenaars en stimuleert de dialoog tussen belanghebbenden. Met zijn activiteiten hielp het consortium een groter bewustzijn te creëren omtrent de uitdagingen in verband met massavernietigingswapens en conventionele wapens, en verkende het in dat verband oplossingen. Het consortium put uit een uitgebreid netwerk van 109 denktanks en onderzoeksinstituten in heel Europa, met leden uit alle EU-lidstaten, maar ook uit Noorwegen, Servië, Zwitserland, Turkije, Oekraïne en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. In 2022 sloten drie instellingen zich bij het netwerk aan.

Bij zijn werkzaamheden ter verwezenlijking van de doelstellingen van het besluit van de Raad legt het consortium bijzondere nadruk op het mainstreamen van een genderperspectief en op het stimuleren van de volgende generatie onderzoekers en praktijkmensen op het gebied van non-proliferatie en ontwapening, alsook op het dichten van de lacunes tussen natuurwetenschappen en sociale wetenschappen, tussen beleidsmakers en de academische wereld, en tussen de academische wereld en beleidsonderzoeksinstituten. Het consortium onderstreept zijn inzet voor deze prioriteiten door bewustmakingscursussen over non-proliferatie te organiseren voor master- en postdoctoraalstudenten natuur- en ingenieurswetenschappen en door het Young Women and Next Generation Initiative en het daarbij horende Young Women in Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Mentorship Programme te implementeren, wat ook outreachbezoeken aan Europese universiteiten en aan thematische webinars omvat. Het consortium zorgde in al zijn evenementen voor een divers deelnemers- en sprekersveld wat betreft gender, leeftijd, expertisegebied en geografische vertegenwoordiging.

Als gevolg van de COVID-19-pandemie vonden sommige evenementen plaats in virtuele of in hybride vorm. In 2022 organiseerde het consortium de volgende evenementen ter uitvoering van verschillende aspecten van Besluit (GBVB) 2018/299 en Besluit (GBVB) 2022/597:

- een inleidende cursus voor master- en postdoctoraalstudenten IT en ingenieurswetenschappen over de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens: “De verspreiding van kernwapens: geschiedenis, bedreigingen en oplossingen” (23-25 februari);
- seminars over “Opkomende technologieën” (24 februari); “Versterking van de genderfocus bij ontwapening en non-proliferatie” (30 maart); “Niet-nucleaire wapens en strategische stabiliteit in Europa: theorie en praktijk” (29 april); “Veiligheid, kernwapens en de impact van de oorlog in Oekraïne” (5 mei), en “Oorlog in Oekraïne: de impact op de internationale veiligheidsarchitectuur, non-proliferatie, ontwapening, wapenbeheersing, uitvoercontroles” (16-17 mei);

⁽²¹⁾ PB L 202 van 4.8.2010, blz. 5.

⁽²²⁾ PB L 56 van 28.2.2018, blz. 46.

⁽²³⁾ PB L 114 van 12.4.2022, blz. 75.

- de 11e EU-raadplegingsbijeenkomst, met EU-ambtenaren en Europese deskundigen (14-15 september);
- het 3e bezoek aan Brussel van het fellowshipprogramma van de VN over ontwapening (14-16 september);
- de 6e jaarvergadering van het Europees netwerk van onafhankelijke denktanks inzake non-proliferatie en ontwapening (8 november);
- de 11e EU-conferentie inzake non-proliferatie en ontwapening (14-15 november);
- een Next Generation-workshop (14 november);
- een inleidende cursus voor master- en postdoctoraalstudenten ingenieurswetenschappen over “Trajecten voor de non-proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens en voor ontwapening” (6-8 december).

De volgende activiteiten in verband met het Young Women and Next Generation Initiative werden in 2022 uitgevoerd:

- de lancering van de tweede editie van het Young Women in Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Mentorship Programme (15 september) (programma liep tot en met 15 mei 2023);
- een gerichte vaardighedenworkshop voor jonge vrouwen als onderdeel van de outreachactiviteiten voor de volgende generatie (17 februari);
- een outreachevenement van het Young Women and Next Generation Initiative over “Werken bij internationale organisaties: tips en inzichten voor de volgende generatie — het BWC en de OPCW” (31 maart);
- een outreachbezoek aan de Universiteit van Turijn rond het thema “Non-Proliferatie en ontwapening: huidige uitdagingen en volgende stappen” (5 mei);
- een outreachbezoek aan de Roma Tre-universiteit om het werk van het EUNDPC te promoten (10 oktober);
- een evenement over “Participatiemogelijkheden in wapenbeheersing, ontwapening en non-proliferatie voor jonge beroepsbeoefenaars en studenten” (19 oktober);
- een vaardighedenworkshop “Opiniestukken schrijven over nucleaire thema’s” (18 november).

Het consortium bracht in 2022 een maandelijks nieuwsbrief en vier EU-discussienota’s over non-proliferatie en ontwapening uit ⁽²⁴⁾. Op het gebied van opleiding waren er e-learningcursussen over non-proliferatie en ontwapening en EU-beleid, en werd steun verleend voor zeven non-proliferatie- en ontwapeningsstages bij leden van het netwerk.

DIALOOG EN SAMENWERKING MET DERDE LANDEN

Overeenkomstig haar beleid en de conclusies van de Raad van 2003 bleef de EU voortwerken aan het mainstreamen van toezeggingen op het gebied van de non-proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens in overeenkomsten met partnerlanden. In 2022 ondertekende de EU partnerschaps- en samenwerkingsovereenkomsten met Thailand ⁽²⁵⁾ en Maleisië ⁽²⁶⁾ die specifieke clausules inzake massavernietigingswapens en conventionele wapens bevatten.

⁽²⁴⁾ Beschikbaar op <https://www.nonproliferation.eu/activities/online-publishing/non-proliferation-papers/>

⁽²⁵⁾ Indo-Pacifische regio: EU en Thailand ondertekenen partnerschaps- en samenwerkingsovereenkomst — Consilium (europa.eu).

⁽²⁶⁾ Indo-Pacifische regio: EU en Maleisië ondertekenen partnerschaps- en samenwerkingsovereenkomst — Consilium (europa.eu).

Het hele jaar door bleef de EDEO met een reeks partners besprekingen voeren over non-proliferatie en ontwapening. Er vonden non-proliferatie- en ontwapeningsdialogen plaats met India en China (in februari 2022) en met Cuba (op 22 november — de dag voordien was er een seminar met vertegenwoordigers van het Cubaanse en het Europese maatschappelijk middenveld) ⁽²⁷⁾. In december 2022 werd met de Verenigde Staten een dialoog op hoog niveau over non-proliferatie en ontwapening gehouden. Daarnaast bleef er het hele jaar door informeel overleg plaatsvinden met een aantal derde landen en internationale organisaties. Voorts werden non-proliferatie- en ontwapeningskwesties verder geïntegreerd in de diverse politieke dialogen van de EU met andere partners.

Binnen de G7 werden in 2022 diverse verklaringen over non-proliferatie en ontwapening uitgebracht, onder meer door de Groep directeuren non-proliferatie van de G7 op 9 mei ⁽²⁸⁾, de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken van de G7 op 14 mei ⁽²⁹⁾ en 4 november ⁽³⁰⁾, en de leiders van de G7 in hun communiqué van 28 juni ⁽³¹⁾.

⁽²⁷⁾ Cuba: Political dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation held with EU-EDEO (europa.eu).

⁽²⁸⁾ Verklaring van de Groep directeuren non-proliferatie van de G7 (9 mei 2022) — Frans Ministerie van Europa en Buitenlandse Zaken (diplomatie.gouv.fr).

⁽²⁹⁾ 2022-05-14-g7-foreign-ministers-communique-data.pdf (g7germany.de).

⁽³⁰⁾ Verklaring van de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken van de G7 — Duits Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (auswaertiges-amt.de).

⁽³¹⁾ 2022-07-14-leaders-communique-data.pdf (g7germany.de).

BIJLAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. COUNCIL DECISIONS	22
1.1. Nuclear issues	22
1.1.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 of 10 December 2018 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)	22
1.1.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East	23
1.1.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	23
1.1.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	24
1.1.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 of 15 April 2019 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)	24
1.2. Chemical weapons	25
1.2.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 of 1 April 2019 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	25
1.2.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 of 2 June 2020 in support of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons	25
1.2.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 of 21 June 2021 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	25
1.2.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 of 25 November 2021 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through satellite imagery	26
1.3. Biological and toxin weapons	26
1.3.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	26
1.3.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2072 of 25 November 2021 in support of building resilience in biosafety and biosecurity through the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention	27

1.3.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 of 31 July 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery	27
1.3.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 of 9 December 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery	27
1.4. Ballistic missiles	28
1.4.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 of 18 December 2017 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	28
1.5. UNSCR 1540	29
1.5.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 of 11 May 2017 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery	29
1.6. Conventional weapons	29
1.6.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 of 17 December 2018 in support of gender mainstreamed policies, programmes and actions in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse, in line with the Women, Peace and Security agenda	29
1.6.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1298 of 31 July 2019 in support of an Africa-China-Europe dialogue and cooperation on preventing the diversion of arms and ammunition in Africa	30
1.6.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 of 2 December 2019 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in cooperation with OSCE	30
1.6.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2111 of 9 December 2019 in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South-East Europe reducing the threat of illicit small arms and light weapons and their ammunition	31
1.6.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 of 19 December 2019 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer ('iTrace IV')	31
1.6.6. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257 of 18 February 2021 in support of the Oslo Action Plan for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction	32
1.6.7. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1694 of 21 September 2021 in support of the universalisation, implementation and strengthening of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)	33
1.6.8. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 of 17 December 2018 in support of countering illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms, light weapons and ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean in the framework of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition 'Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens'	33
1.6.9. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1726 of 28 September 2021 in support of combating the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Member States of the League of Arab States – Phase II	34

1.6.10. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 of 7 July 2020 in support of the development of an internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standards	34
1.6.11. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2133 of 2 December 2021 in support of comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Conventional Ammunition (CA) in South-Eastern Europe	35
1.6.12. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 of 19 November 2018 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans	35
1.6.13. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/847 of 30 May 2022 in support of efforts to prevent and combat illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in the Americas	36
1.6.14. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965 of 17 October 2022 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects	36
1.7. Arms export controls	37
1.7.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 of 12 October 2020 on the promotion of effective arms export controls (COARM V)	37
1.7.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/649 of 16 April 2021 on Union support for activities of the ATT Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty	37
1.7.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2309 of 22 December 2021 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT-OP III)	37
1.8. Emerging technologies	38
1.8.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2269 of 18 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project 'Promoting Responsible Innovation in Artificial Intelligence for Peace and Security'	38
1.8.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2320 of 25 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of 'Unlocking Innovation: Enabling Technologies and International Security'	38
1.9. Collaborations with NGOs and think tanks	38
1.9.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 of 26 February 2018 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	38
1.9.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/597 of 11 April 2022 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks	39
2. COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS	40
2.1. Nuclear issues	40
2.1.1. Council Conclusions on Iran (12.12.2022)	40
2.2. Biological and toxin weapons	43
2.2.1. Council Conclusions on the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (21.3.2022)	43

3. STATEMENTS	44
3.1. General statements	44
3.1.1. Statement at the High Level Segment of Conference on Disarmament (Geneva, 1.3.2022)	44
3.1.2. EU Statement – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: General Statement (New York, 3.10.2022)	45
3.2. Nuclear issues	48
3.2.1. EU Statement – 10th Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: General Statement (New York, 1.8.2022)	48
3.2.2. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty: Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on the occasion of the closure of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties (Brussels, 29.8.2022)	50
3.2.3. EU Statement – 66th session of the General Conference (Vienna, 26.9.2022)	51
3.2.4. EU General Statement on the safety, security, and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine – 66th session of the General Conference (Vienna, 29.9.2022)	53
3.2.5. EU Statement at the 59th session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (Vienna, 21.11.2022)	54
3.2.6. EU Briefing on behalf of the High Representative – UN Security Council: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran) (New York, 19.12.2022)	56
3.3. Chemical weapons	58
3.3.1. Chemical Weapons Convention: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union to mark the 25th anniversary (Brussels, 19.4.2022)	58
3.3.2. Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare: Statement by High Representative/ Vice-President Josep Borrell (Brussels, 30.11.2022)	59
3.3.3. Statement of the European Union at the 27th Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (The Hague, 28 November 2022)	60
3.4. Biological and toxin weapons	62
3.4.1. Second Preparatory Committee for the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Geneva, 11.4.2022)	62
3.4.2. EU General Statement at the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC (Geneva, 28.11.2022)	62
3.4.3. 9th Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – Closing remarks (Geneva, 16.12.2022)	66
3.5. Ballistic missiles	67
3.5.1. DPRK: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch (Brussels, 25.3.2022)	67
3.5.2. EU Statement at the 21st Annual Regular Meeting of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) (Vienna, 20.5.2022)	67
3.5.3. DPRK: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the recent launch of multiple missiles (Brussels, 5.11.2022)	69
3.5.4. DPRK/North Korea: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (Brussels, 19.11.2022)	70

3.6. UNSCR 1540	70
3.6.1. EU Statement – UN 1540 Committee: Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540 (New York, 1.6.2022)	70
3.7. Conventional weapons	72
3.7.1. EU Statement on the consideration of the implementation of the Programme of Action – Eighth Biennial Meeting of States (New York, 27.7.2022)	72
3.7.2. EU Statement – On consideration of the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, 8th Biennial Meeting of States on the UN POA to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (New York, 28.6.2022)	74
3.7.3. EU Statement – 2022 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Geneva, 16.11.2022)	75
3.7.4. EU Statement – Twentieth meeting of the States Parties of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Geneva, 21.11.2022)	77
3.8. Export control regimes	78
3.8.1. EU Explanation of Vote – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security (New York, 3.11.2022)	78

1. COUNCIL DECISIONS

Overview of EU Council Joint Actions and Council Decisions in the field of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, including in the framework of the EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, that were in force in 2022:

1.1. NUCLEAR ISSUES

1.1.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 of 10 December 2018 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)**

Objective: With this Decision, the EU is supporting one of the key elements of the global nuclear security and anti-terrorism architecture, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

The objectives of the support are to increase the number of adherents to ICSANT, to raise awareness among national policy- and decision-makers, as well as capacity-building to help improve national legislation and to strengthen the capacity of national stakeholders, including criminal justice officials to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases of nuclear terrorism. The Council Decision aims to build synergies with ongoing EU projects in support for relevant international legal instruments, such as the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Council Decision promotes the universalisation and effective implementation of ICSANT through the development and maintenance of a password-protected website on all resources on ICSANT including examples of national legislation; the development of an e-learning module on ICSANT, to be translated into at least four UN official languages; the provision of relevant legislative assistance; capacity-building of relevant stakeholders, including criminal justice officials that could be involved in investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases involving nuclear and other radioactive material covered by ICSANT; the holding of global and regional workshops and country visits and by the collection; and the dissemination of good practices.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and United Nations Office for Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)

Budget: EUR 4 999 986

Official Journal: L 314, 11.12.2018, p. 41.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended twice:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/919 of 7 June 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 until 30 November 2022

Official Journal: L 201, 8.6.2021, p. 27.

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2185 of 8 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 until 30 June 2023

Official Journal: L 288, 9.11.2022, p. 80.

1.1.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East**

Objective:

- (a) To produce a factual narrative of efforts to establish a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (ME WMDFFZ) between 1995 and 2015 to fill an important gap in the research literature and identify lessons for future efforts.
- (b) To identify key issues, opportunities, obstacles and ideas of contemporary relevance to consideration of a ME WMDFFZ and efforts to enhance regional security cooperation.
- (c) To engage and obtain perspectives and insights from a wide community of researchers, policymakers and academics in the region on these issues and, in so doing, expand the number and diversity of participants exploring the prospects for dialogue and progress.
- (d) To facilitate dialogue among these experts with a view to fostering networks, communication and engagement that could in turn contribute to future efforts to advance regional security, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament progress in the region

Implementing Agency: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Budget: EUR 2 856 278

Official Journal: L 149, 7.6.2019, p. 63.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/753 of 16 May 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 until 10 July 2023

Official Journal: L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 15.

1.1.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective: Support the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO and in particular strengthen: (1) the capabilities of the CTBT monitoring and verification system, including radionuclide detection; and (2) the capabilities of the States Signatories to the CTBT to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the CTBT.

Implementing Agency: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

Budget: EUR 6 288 892

Official Journal: L 207, 30.6.2020, p. 15.

Duration: 36 months

1.1.4. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective:

- (a) Contribute to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security, by establishing comprehensive nuclear security guidance and, upon request, promoting the use of such guidance through peer reviews and advisory services and capacity building, including education and training.
- (b) Assist in adherence to, and implementation of, relevant international legal instruments, and in strengthening the international cooperation and coordination of assistance.
- (c) Support the IAEA mandate to play a central role and enhance international cooperation in nuclear security, in response to priorities of Member States expressed through the decisions and resolutions of the IAEA's Policy Making Organs.

Implementing Agency: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Budget: EUR 11 582 300

Official Journal: L I 372, 9.11.2020, p. 4.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1852 of 4 October 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 until 31 March 2024 and include among its purposes to assist Ukraine in ensuring the maintenance of its nuclear security regime.

Official Journal: L 257, 5.10.2022, p. 10.

1.1.5. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 of 15 April 2019 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

Objective: Support activities aimed at upholding and preserving the integrity of the NPT, through a balanced focus on the three equally important and mutually reinforcing pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 1 299 883,68

Official Journal: L 105, 16.4.2019, p. 25.

Duration: Initially 18 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1695 of 21 September 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 until 15 January 2022

Official Journal: L 334, 22.9.2021, p. 22.

1.2. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1.2.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 of 1 April 2019 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective: The Council Decision foresees a contribution to the core activities of the Organisation, notably for verification, national implementation, universalisation and the Africa programme. It also contributes substantially to the project of transforming the OPCW laboratory into a Centre of Chemistry and Technology and to the implementation of the decision by the OPCW Conference of States Parties directing the OPCW Technical Secretariat to put into place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 11 601 256

Official Journal: L 93, 2.4.2019, p. 3.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/573 of 7 April 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 until 30 April 2023

Official Journal: L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 66.

1.2.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 of 2 June 2020 in support of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons**

Objective: Support the full operationalisation of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism (UNSGM) for investigation of the alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons in view of growing apprehensions regarding the possibility of the use of biological weapons.

More specifically, the following activities are supported:

- Training of experts on the roster of the UNSGM;
- Participation of laboratories in activities to develop a network capable of supporting an UNSGM investigation into an allegation of the use of biological weapons;
- Outreach activities to ensure nominations of experts and laboratories from the Global South;
- A full field exercise (Capstone Exercise);
- Regular coordination activities/workshops with relevant organisational partners; and
- Implementation of the Secretary General's Disarmament Agenda.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 1 418 042

Official Journal: L I 172, 3.6.2020, p. 5.

Duration: 36 months

1.2.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 of 21 June 2021 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective: Upgrading ICT infrastructure in line with the OPCW's institutional business continuity framework, with a strong focus on resilience, and ensuring privileged access governance, as well as physical, logical and cryptographic information management and separation for all strategic and mission networks of the OPCW.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 2 151 823

Official Journal: L 224, 24.6.2021, p. 24.

Duration: 24 months

1.2.4. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 of 25 November 2021 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through satellite imagery**

Objective: Support the project of the OPCW to enhance its operational effectiveness through satellite imagery and imagery analysis provided by SatCen, with the following objectives:

- (a) expanding the OPCW's capacity to support OPCW-mandated activities (the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), the Fact Finding Mission (FFM), the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), etc.) through imagery analysis as a source of evidentiary substantiation or corroboration of findings; and
- (b) utilising targeted imagery analysis for areas of interest (sites, routes, etc.) in planning for OPCW-mandated missions (incidents of alleged use (IAUs), challenge inspections (CIs), technical assistance visits (TAVs), etc.) in order to increase security and confidence in verification accuracy.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 1 593 353,22

Official Journal: L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 65.

Duration: 48 months

1.3. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

1.3.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective: Providing essential follow-up and momentum to activities undertaken throughout 2016-2018 in the framework of Council Decision 2016/51/CFSP in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), supporting in particular discussions in the BTWC Meetings of Experts in 2019 and 2020, as well as preparations for the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC finally held in 2022.

The Council Decision covers the following activities: (1) Universalisation; (2) Capacity development for national implementation; (3) Fostering biosecurity networks in the Global South; (4) BTWC inter-sessional programme and Ninth Review Conference; (5) Preparedness to prevent and respond to biological attacks; and, (6) Enabling tools for outreach.

Implementing Agency: BTWC Implementation Support Unit, via the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 3 029 857,79

Official Journal: L 19, 22.1.2019, p. 11.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2033 of 19 November 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 until 4 February 2023

Official Journal: L 415, 22.11.2021, p. 29.

1.3.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2072 of 25 November 2021 in support of building resilience in biosafety and biosecurity through the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention**

Objective: Support the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) by:

- (a) strengthening biosafety and biosecurity capabilities in Africa through increased regional coordination;
- (b) capacity building for BTWC National Contact Points;
- (c) facilitating the review of developments in science and technology of relevance to the BTWC by also involving academia and industry; and
- (d) broadening the support for voluntary transparency exercises.

Implementing Agency: BTWC Implementation Support Unit, via the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 2 147 443,52

Official Journal: L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 56.

Duration: 24 months

1.3.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 of 31 July 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery**

Objective: Support three projects of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) aiming at strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The Council Decision includes the following activities:

- (a) harmonisation of existing Ukrainian regulations on biosafety and biosecurity with international standards;
- (b) establishing of the veterinary surveillance system sustainability in Ukraine; and
- (c) awareness raising, education and training for life scientists on biosafety and biosecurity.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: EUR 1 913 900

Official Journal: L 204, 2.8.2019, p. 29.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2184 of 8 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 until 14 January 2024

Official Journal: L 288, 9.11.2022, p. 78.

1.3.4. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 of 9 December 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery**

Objective:

- (a) Improve the legislative and regulatory basis of biosafety and biosecurity in the beneficiary countries, through the adoption and enforcement of appropriate effective laws which prohibit non-State actors from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes; and

- (b) Improve biosafety and biosecurity in beneficiary countries by raising awareness among relevant sectors, including through the enforcement of effective domestic measures to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and their means of delivery.

Implementing Agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: EUR 2 738 708,98

Official Journal: L 318, 10.12.2019, p. 123.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2270 of 18 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 until 20 February 2024.

Official Journal: L 300, 21.11.2022, p. 21.

1.4. BALLISTIC MISSILES

1.4.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 of 18 December 2017 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective:

- (a) Promote the subscription to the Code by an ever-larger number of States and ultimately its universality.
- (b) Support the full implementation of the Code.
- (c) Promote dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all.
- (d) Reinforce the Code's visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation.
- (e) Explore, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Register of Objects Launched in Outer Space.

Implementing Agency: Fondation pour le Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

Budget: EUR 1 878 120,05

Official Journal: L 337, 19.12.2017, p. 28.

Duration: Initially 40 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2074 of 25 November 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 until 21 January 2023

Official Journal: L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 70.

1.5. UNSCR 1540

1.5.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 of 11 May 2017 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery****Objective:**

- (a) Enhance the relevant national and regional efforts and capabilities, primarily through training, capacity-building and assistance facilitation in close coordination with other Union programmes and other actors involved in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), to ensure synergies and complementarity.
- (b) Contribute to the practical implementation of specific recommendations of both the 2009 comprehensive review on the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the outcome of the comprehensive review conducted during 2016, in particular in the areas of technical assistance, international cooperation and raising public awareness.
- (c) Support the development of voluntary UNSCR 1540 (2004) national implementation action plans upon States' request.
- (d) Promote the engagement of relevant stakeholders from industry and civil society in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004).

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 2 635 170,77

Official Journal: L 121, 12.5.2017, p. 39.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended twice:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1025 of 21 June 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 until 25 April 2022

Official Journal: L 224, 24.6.2021, p. 22.

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/574 of 7 April 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 until 25 February 2023

Official Journal: L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 67.

1.6. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

1.6.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 of 17 December 2018 in support of gender mainstreamed policies, programmes and actions in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse, in line with the Women, Peace and Security agenda****Objective:**

- (a) Contribute to international peace, security, gender equality and sustainable development by enhancing the effectiveness of small arms control measures through the promotion of approaches based on systematic gender analysis, the integration of gender perspectives and women's empowerment initiatives.
- (b) Support the implementation of the gender-relevant outcomes of the 2018 Third United Nations Conference to review progress made in the implementation of the PoA.
- (c) Contribute to the broader international policy agenda on gender equality and women's empowerment in line with the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 4 375 507,85.

Official Journal: L 322, 18.12.2018, p. 38.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2138 of 2 December 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 in support of gender mainstreamed policies, programmes and actions in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse, in line with the Women, Peace and Security agenda

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 until 31 October 2022.

Official Journal: L 432, 3.12.2021, p. 72.

1.6.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1298 of 31 July 2019 in support of an Africa-China-Europe dialogue and cooperation on preventing the diversion of arms and ammunition in Africa**

Objective: Contribute to preventing and combating the diversion of arms and ammunition in Africa by:

- (a) raising awareness of stakeholders in Africa, China and the Union on how the illicit flow of arms, particularly small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, to unauthorised actors contributes significantly towards exacerbating insecurity and violence in various parts of Africa, thereby undermining social cohesion, public security, socio-economic development and the effective functioning of state institutions;
- (b) promoting accountability and responsibility with regard to the legal arms trade and demonstrating to stakeholders in Africa, China and the Union how effective arms export control can contribute to mitigating the risk of diversion of arms into the illicit market.

Implementing Actor: Saferworld

Budget: EUR 994 007

Official Journal: L 204, 2.8.2019, p. 37.

Duration: 36 months

1.6.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 of 2 December 2019 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in cooperation with the OSCE**

Objective:

- (a) Enhance capabilities of the State Border Guard Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Fiscal Service/State Customs Service of Ukraine with respect to preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- (b) enhance supervisory capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with respect to their control of the manufacture, marking and record-keeping of weapons, ammunition and explosives corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment;
- (c) enhance operational capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the National Police of Ukraine, which reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with respect to forensics, analysis, detection, tracing, and investigation of illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- (d) enhance capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the improvement of legislative mechanisms for regulating and controlling the circulation and use of weapons, ammunition and explosives as well as raising public awareness on risks related to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment; and
- (e) enhance inter-agency coordination and cooperation resulting in developing strategic approach, data-collection and analysis in preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in Ukraine corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: EUR 5 151 579

Official Journal: L 312, 3.12.2019, p. 42.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2276 of 18 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the OSCE

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 until 23 January 2024

Official Journal: L 300, 21.11.2022, p. 42.

1.6.4. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2111 of 9 December 2019 in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South-East Europe reducing the threat of illicit small arms and light weapons and their ammunition**

Objective: Contribute to improved security in the South-East Europe region and in the Union by combatting the threat posed by illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition in and from South-East Europe, Belarus and Ukraine.

Implementing Agency: South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), via the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Budget: EUR 11 819 605,20

Official Journal: L 318, 10.12.2019, p. 147.

Duration: 48 months

1.6.5. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 of 19 December 2019 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer ('iTrace IV')**

Objective:

- (a) continued maintenance of a user-friendly global information management system on diverted or trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition ('iTrace') documented in conflict-affected areas in order to provide policymakers, conventional arms control experts, and conventional arms export control officers with relevant information to develop effective, evidence-based strategies and projects against the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition;
- (b) training and mentoring of national authorities in conflict-affected states to develop sustainable national illicit conventional arms identification and tracing capacity, encourage sustained cooperation with the iTrace project, better identify physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) priorities, more effectively articulate national arms control and law enforcement assistance requirements, notably Union-funded initiatives, such as Interpol's Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iARMS), and the activities of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), and strengthen dialogue with EU missions and initiatives;
- (c) enhanced frequency and duration of in-field research into conventional arms and their ammunition, illegally circulating in conflict-affected areas to generate iTrace data, in response to clear demands made by Member States and Union Delegations;
- (d) tailored support to Member State arms export control authorities and arms control policy makers, including repeat consultative visits by iTrace project staff to capitals of the Member States, a 24-hour help desk to provide instant advice on risk assessment and counter-diversion strategies, the maintenance of secure desktop and mobile dashboard applications to provide instant notification of post-export diversion, and the provision to Member States, on request, of post-shipment verification by iTrace project staff;

- (e) increasing awareness through outreach on the findings of the project, promoting the purpose and available functions of iTrace to international and national policy makers, conventional arms control experts and arms export licensing authorities, and enhancing international capacity to monitor the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition and related materiel, as well as to assist policy makers in identifying priority areas for international assistance and cooperation and to reduce the risk of diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition;
- (f) providing key policy issue reports, drawn from the data generated by field investigations and presented on the iTrace system, about specific areas deserving international attention, including major patterns in the trafficking of conventional arms and their ammunition, and the regional distribution of trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition, and related materiel; and
- (g) the continued tracing of conventional arms and their ammunition, with the cooperation of Member States and non-EU States, as the most effective means to establish and verify, to the fullest extent possible, the mechanisms behind the diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition to unauthorised users; tracing will be supplemented by follow up investigations focused on identifying the human, financial, and logistics networks behind illicit conventional arms transfers.

Implementing Actor: Conflict Armament Research (CAR)

Budget: EUR 5 490 981,87

Official Journal: L 330, 20.12.2019, p. 53.

Duration: 36 months

1.6.6. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257 of 18 February 2021 in support of the Oslo Action Plan for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Objective: Contribute to human security by supporting the implementation of the Oslo Action Plan 2020–2024 adopted by the States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, by:

- (a) supporting the efforts of States Parties to implement the survey and clearance and mine risk education and reduction aspects of the Oslo Action Plan;
- (b) supporting the efforts of States Parties to implement the victim assistance aspects of the Oslo Action Plan;
- (c) promoting the universalisation of the Convention and promote norms against any use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction;
- (d) supporting the efforts of States Parties that retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes to increase reporting capabilities, ensure that the number of such mines retained does not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary, and explore alternatives to live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes where possible; and
- (e) demonstrating the ongoing commitment of the Union and its Member States to the Convention and their resolve to cooperate with and extend assistance to those States Parties that need support in meeting their commitments under the Convention.

Implementing Agency: The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, represented by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

Budget: EUR 2 658 139

Official Journal: L 58, 19.2.2021, p. 41.

Duration: 48 months

1.6.7. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1694 of 21 September 2021 in support of the universalisation, implementation and strengthening of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

Objective:

- (a) Preparation for and follow-up to the Sixth CCW Review Conference;
- (b) Support for the universalisation of the CCW; and
- (c) Facilitation of discussions on under-explored, emerging and cross-cutting issues of relevance to the CCW.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 1 603 517,64

Official Journal: L 334, 22.9.2021, p. 14.

Duration: 24 months

1.6.8. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 of 17 December 2018 in support of countering illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms, light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean in the framework of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition 'Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens'

Objective:

- (a) Strengthen physical security and management systems for national military and other institutional stockpiles through improved site security measures and inventory control;
- (b) Reinforce national capabilities for destruction of seized, excess or unsafe small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition;
- (c) Enhance national SALW marking and tracing capacity and foment regional cooperation on tracing confiscated weapons and ammunition;
- (d) Improve SALW transfer mechanisms through national legislation, border controls, and regional coordination; and
- (e) Promote socially responsible behaviours in selected communities, targeting groups that are severely affected by armed violence, including the use of turn-in campaigns or other strategies designed to reduce local incidence of violent crimes.

Implementing Agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: EUR 3 000 000

Official Journal: L 322, 18.12.2018, p. 27.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1693 of 21 September 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 in support of countering illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms, light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean in the framework of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition 'Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens'

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 until 31 May 2022.

Official Journal: L 334, 22.9.2021, p. 12.

1.6.9. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1726 of 28 September 2021 in support of combating the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Member States of the League of Arab States – Phase II**

Objective: Supporting the Member States of the League of Arab States (LAS) with their national implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (the 'UN PoA') and the International Tracing Instrument, by:

- (a) sustainably building the national capacity of LAS Member States to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), combat terrorism and enhance security in post-conflict situations while fully respecting international human rights standards;
- (b) sustainably building the regional capacity of the LAS to address the same challenges;
- (c) strengthening LAS Member States' national control over SALW at key stages of their life cycle; and
- (d) enhancing the exchange of best practices and lessons learned.

Implementing Actor: Small Arms Survey (SAS), represented by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, with the assistance of the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) and in close cooperation with the LAS Secretariat.

Budget: EUR 5 991 726

Official Journal: L 344, 29.9.2021, p. 7.

Duration: 36 months

1.6.10. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 of 7 July 2020 in support of the development of an internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standards**

Objective: Support a project to study the feasibility of establishing an internationally recognised validation system for the validation of policies and practices for the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition. The project shall consist of two phases:

- (a) During Phase I, in the first year of the implementation, a feasibility study for the development of an internationally recognised Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System (AAMVS) was undertaken to investigate options for appropriate methodologies and tools for the assessment of risk and quality;
- (b) During Phase II, based on the outcome of the feasibility study of Phase I, a concept for the creation of an AAMVS shall be developed

Implementing Agency: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and its specialised agency, the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT)

Budget: EUR 1 642 109

Official Journal: L 218, 8.7.2020, p. 1.

Duration: Initially 14 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2075 of 25 November 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 in support of the development of an internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standard

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 until 30 November 2022.

Official Journal: L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 72.

1.6.11. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2133 of 2 December 2021 in support of the comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Conventional Ammunition (CA) in South-Eastern Europe

Objective: Reduce risks of illicit trafficking in, and the uncontrolled spread of, SALW in, to or from South-Eastern Europe that undermine safety and security by impeding sustainable peacebuilding and socioeconomic development as well as by contributing to a breakdown in order, fuelling terrorism and criminal violence or leading to a resumption of conflict.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: EUR 4 208 827

Official Journal: L 432, 3.12.2021, p. 36.

Duration: 36 months

1.6.12. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 of 19 November 2018 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

Objective: Support Western Balkans partners with the implementation of the 'Regional Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW/firearms and their ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024', pursuing the support of the Western Balkans partners in reaching the goals set out in the Roadmap, namely:

- (a) By 2023, ensure that arms control legislation is in place, fully harmonised with the EU regulatory framework and other related international obligations and standardised across the region.
- (b) By 2024, ensure that arms control policies and practices in the Western Balkans are evidence based and intelligence led.
- (c) By 2024, significantly reduce illicit flows of firearms, ammunition and explosives into, within and beyond the Western Balkans.
- (d) By 2024, significantly reduce the supply, demand and misuse of firearms through increased awareness, education, outreach and advocacy.
- (e) By 2024, substantially decrease the estimated number of firearms in illicit possession in the Western Balkans.
- (f) Systematically decrease the surplus and destroy seized small arms and light weapons and ammunition.
- (g) Significantly decrease the risk of proliferation and diversion of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

Implementing Agency: South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), via the United Nations Development Programme.

Budget: EUR 4 002 587,52

Official Journal: L 293, 20.11.2018, p. 11.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council decision has been amended twice:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2161 of 6 December 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 until 17 October 2022.

Official Journal: L 436, 7.12.2021, p. 46.

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1654 of 27 September 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 until 17 January 2023.

Official Journal: L 249, 27.9.2022, p. 45.

1.6.13. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/847 of 30 May 2022 in support of efforts to prevent and combat illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in the Americas**

Objective: In order to address armed violence in the Americas:

- (a) strengthen the National Firearms Regulatory Framework, considering international normative and good practices;
- (b) improve the operational capacity of national authorities to mark, trace, store, and destroy firearms;
- (c) optimise small arms control through the use of the Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA);
- (d) strengthen community resilience to gun violence and reduce access to illicit/and or unwanted firearms;
- (e) develop a Central American Firearms Roadmap to equip the countries with a practical and management tool through a regional, coordinated, and evidence based approach.

Implementing Agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: EUR 4 240 906

Official Journal: L 148, 31.5.2022, p. 40.

Duration: 36 months

1.6.14. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965 of 17 October 2022 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects**

Objective: Support the full and effective implementation of the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument, enhance international, regional and national security, contribute to the realisation of human security, and promote sustainable development through SALW control, by:

- (a) supporting forward-looking global policy developments in the context of the fourth United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action in 2024;
- (b) strengthening effective national and regional implementation of the Programme of Actions and the International Tracing Instrument; and
- (c) supporting gender-responsive SALW control policies and programmes.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 4 524 465,05

Official Journal: L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 67.

Duration: 36 months

1.7. ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS ⁽¹⁾1.7.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 of 12 October 2020 on the promotion of effective arms export controls (COARM V)****Objective:**

- (a) Promote effective controls on arms exports by third countries in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, and seek, where appropriate, complementarity and synergies with Union assistance projects in the field of export controls on dual-use goods; and
- (b) Support third countries' efforts at national and regional levels to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.

Implementing Agency: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA)**Budget:** EUR 1 377 542,73**Official Journal:** L 335, 13.10.2020, p. 3.**Duration:** Initially 24 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/848 of 30 May 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 on the promotion of effective arms export controls**Object:** Among others, extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 until 30 November 2023.**Official Journal:** L 148, 31.5.2022, p. 50.1.7.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/649 of 16 April 2021 on Union support for activities of the ATT Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty****Objective:** Support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by supporting the activities of the ATT Secretariat aimed at:

- (a) supporting States Parties to the ATT in strengthening their arms transfer control systems for the effective implementation of the ATT; and
- (b) strengthening the institutional set-up of the ATT Secretariat as the principal body to assist States Parties to the ATT in implementing the ATT.

Implementing Agency: ATT Secretariat**Budget:** EUR 1 370 000**Official Journal:** L 133, 20.4.2021, p. 59.**Duration:** 24 months1.7.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2309 of 22 December 2021 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT-OP III)****Objective:** Support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by:

- (a) reinforcing or developing arms transfer control capacities and expertise for ATT implementation in new and existing beneficiary countries, through instruments such as legal assistance and training of licensing and enforcement officials;
- (b) outreach to other countries, including non-States Parties to the ATT, with a view to supporting universalisation of the ATT at national, regional and multilateral levels.

⁽¹⁾ Detailed information on the implementation of the three Council Decisions under this section in 2022 will be made available in the *Twenty-Fifth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment* (for 2022).

Implementing Agency: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA) and Expertise France.

Budget: EUR 3 499 892,39

Official Journal: L 461, 27.12.2021, p. 78.

Duration: 36 months

1.8. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

1.8.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2269 of 18 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project ‘Promoting Responsible Innovation in Artificial Intelligence for Peace and Security’**

Objective: Support greater engagement of the civilian artificial intelligence (AI) community in mitigating the risks that the diversion and misuse of civilian AI research and innovation by irresponsible actors may pose to international peace and security, by:

- (a) generating greater understanding of how decisions in the development and diffusion of AI research and innovation can impact the risks of diversion and misuse, and in turn generate risk or opportunities for peace and security;
- (b) promoting responsible innovation processes, methods and tools which can help ensure the peaceful application of civilian innovations and the responsible dissemination of AI knowledge. To that end, the project will support capacity-building, research and engagement activities that enhance the capacity within the global civilian AI community to include and address the peace and security risks presented by the diversion and misuse of civilian AI by irresponsible actors through responsible innovation processes; and strengthen the connection between risk mitigation efforts in responsible AI in the civilian sphere with those already ongoing in the disarmament, arms control and non- proliferation community at an intergovernmental level.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), supported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Budget: EUR 1 782 285,71

Official Journal: L 300, 21.11.2022, p. 11.

Duration: 36 months

1.8.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2320 of 25 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project ‘Unlocking Innovation: Enabling Technologies and International Security’**

Objective: Support the work that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) conducts within its Security and Technology Programme (SECTEC) with a view to enhancing knowledge and understanding of new and emerging technologies with relevance for international security.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Budget: EUR 1 234 011

Official Journal: L 307, 28.11.2022, p. 142.

Duration: 24 months

1.9. COLLABORATIONS WITH NGOS AND THINK TANKS

1.9.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 of 26 February 2018 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**

Objective: For the purposes of contributing to the enhanced implementation of the EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy, which is based on the principles of effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation with third countries, to continue promoting and supporting the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think in order to further the following objectives:

- (a) to encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics;
- (b) to provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the network on issues related to non-proliferation and disarmament and to enable the representatives of Member States to participate in the network's meetings;
- (c) to constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community, in particular by providing reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;
- (d) to contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of worldwide concern; and
- (e) to contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries.

Implementing Agency: The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, based on the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP).

Budget: EUR 4 507 004,70

Official Journal: L 56, 28.2.2018, p. 46.

Duration: Initially 42 months. However, this Council Decision was amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/648 of 16 April 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 until 17 May 2022.

Official Journal: L 133, 20.4.2021, p. 57.

1.9.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/597 of 11 April 2022 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks**

Objective: Continue to promote and support the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks, in order to:

- (a) encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics;
- (b) provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the network on issues related to non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control, and to enable the representatives of Member States to participate in the meetings of the Consortium;
- (c) constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community, in particular by providing reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;

- (d) contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of worldwide concern;
- (e) contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries, including by strengthening non-proliferation and disarmament education, raising awareness of those issues among the younger generations and promoting the next generation of researchers and practitioners in this field, especially women, and in the natural and technical sciences.

Implementing Agency: The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, consisting of the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies Europe (IISS-Europe), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP).

Budget: EUR 4 700 000

Official Journal: L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 75.

Duration: 36 months

2. COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

2.1. NUCLEAR ISSUES

2.1.1. Council Conclusions on Iran (12.12.2022)

Recalling the November 2016 and February 2019 Council conclusions, the European Union reconfirms its resolute commitment to human rights in its policy towards Iran. The European Union expresses its support for the fundamental aspiration of the people of Iran for a future where their universal human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, protected and fulfilled. In this context, the European Union acknowledges the leading role of women and youth in calling for the defence of these norms and values. The European Union strongly condemns the widespread, brutal and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian authorities against peaceful protesters, including women and children, leading to the loss of hundreds of lives, in clear breach of the fundamental principles enshrined in international law. The right to peaceful assembly must be ensured. The European Union condemns restrictions on communications, including Internet shutdowns, and calls upon Iran to ensure the right to freedom of expression, including freedom to seek, receive and share information and ideas, online and offline. The European Union urges Iranian authorities to uphold their international obligations under international law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to both of which Iran is a party.

The European Union calls on the Iranian authorities to cease their widespread resort to arbitrary detentions as a means of silencing critical voices and release all those unjustly detained in relation to the exercise of their rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, including recently arrested protesters as well as children, journalists and human rights defenders. The European Union firmly condemns the widespread use of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees in Iranian prisons, reminds the Iranian authorities that the prohibition of torture is absolute under international law and reiterates its call on Iran to ratify without delay the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

The European Union strongly urges Iran to implement the relevant international treaties and agreements to which it is a party and calls upon Iran to eliminate, in law and in practice, all forms of systemic discrimination against women and girls in public and private life and to take gender-responsive measures to prevent and ensure protection for women and girls against sexual and gender-based violence in all its forms. At the same time, the European Union reiterates its firm call on the Iranian authorities to ensure the full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Iranians, including persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities.

The European Union calls on the Iranian authorities to immediately end the strongly condemnable practice of imposing and carrying out death sentences against protesters as well as to annul without delay the recent death penalty sentences that were already pronounced in the context of the ongoing protests and to provide due process to all detainees. The European Union strongly opposes the use of the death penalty at all times and in all circumstances, as an unacceptable denial of human dignity and integrity. The European Union urges Iran to pursue a consistent policy towards the abolition of capital punishment.

The persistent impunity for grave human rights violations in Iran is contributing to the increasing grievances of the population. The European Union will continue to demand that the perpetrators of violence and human rights violations be held accountable and to call on the Iranian authorities to allow for an independent investigation into the widely reported and documented human rights violations, and ensure accountability for perpetrators as also called upon by UNGA 3rd Committee Resolution of November 2022. As a first step, we call on Iran to allow free, full and unhindered access to the country for relevant UN Human Rights Special Procedures mandate holders and to fully cooperate with the independent international Fact-Finding Mission established by the Human Rights Council on 24 November 2022. The European Union will continue to use all available avenues to hold the Iranian authorities to account.

The European Union strongly rejects Iran's practice of arbitrary detention of foreign citizens, including dual nationals, and calls upon Iran to end the distressing practice of detaining innocent foreign civilians with a view to making political gains. The European Union reminds Iran of its international obligations under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and urges the Iranian authorities to abide by these obligations.

The European Union will continue to address any issue of concern, including in relation to the way the Iranian authorities are handling the ongoing protest, taking into account all options at its disposal, inclusive of additional restrictive measures.

The European Union strongly condemns and considers unacceptable any type of Iran's military support, including deliveries of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs – 'drones'), to Russia's illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, which grossly violates international law and the principles of the UN Charter. These weapons provided by Iran are being used indiscriminately by Russia against Ukrainian civilian population and infrastructure causing horrendous destruction and human suffering. In this context, the European Union recalls that any transfer of certain combat drones and missiles to or from Iran without prior permission by the UN Security Council are in violation of UNSCR 2231. The European Union continues to support the ongoing work by the UN Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of UNSCR 2231. The European Union notes with great concern the reports of Iranian weapons, including drones, being manufactured with components of international origin, including from Europe, and is considering the appropriate measures to take. The European Union strongly cautions Iran against any new deliveries of weapons to Russia, in particular any steps towards possible transfers of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, which would constitute a serious escalation. The European Union will continue to respond to all actions supporting the Russian aggression against Ukraine and hold Iran accountable including through additional restrictive measures.

The European Union reiterates its clear determination that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon, and recalls Iran's commitments in that respect and its international obligations.

The European Union is deeply concerned by the successive IAEA reports documenting the alarming acceleration of Iran's nuclear programme that gravely departs from its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments, in particular with regard to the expansion of its nuclear enrichment capacity and production of highly enriched uranium. Iran's actions, which have no credible civilian justification, carry very significant proliferation-related risks. The European Union strongly urges Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory, to return to its political commitments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation without further delay, and to resume all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures, including its Additional Protocol.

Concerning outstanding safeguards issues, the European Union recalls the resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 8 June and 17 November 2022 and calls upon Iran to urgently fulfil its legal obligations, including under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), by providing technically credible explanations and grant necessary access. Timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial. Furthermore, the European Union underscores that the JCPOA is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime.

The European Union reaffirms its commitment to, and continued support for, the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. However, the risk of a nuclear non-proliferation crisis in the region has increased as a result of Iran's nuclear trajectory. In this context, the European Union regrets that, despite political support by the EU member States and intense international diplomatic efforts to restore the full implementation of the JCPOA including negotiations in Vienna facilitated by the EU High Representative as Coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission, Iran has not made the necessary decisions and not taken the necessary steps, continues to escalate its nuclear programme and makes it increasingly difficult to reach a deal. As a key security priority the EU will continue to invest diplomatically and politically to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The EU calls on all countries to support the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Promoting peace and stability and achieving de-escalation of tensions in the wider Gulf region as well as in the broader Middle East are key priorities for the EU. The JCPOA aims to contribute in this regard. Ensuring an exclusively peaceful character of the Iranian nuclear programme could contribute to regional stability and security. Efforts to build confidence should be inclusive. While they should be region-led, the EU remains ready to engage with all actors in the region in a gradual and inclusive approach, in full transparency and with the ultimate objective to facilitate a dialogue process that can help to develop confidence-building measures and arrangements, which provide for greater security in the wider Gulf region, including maritime safety and security. The regional Baghdad Conference on Cooperation and Partnership, and its follow-up process with EU involvement, could serve as a useful example for region-led processes.

While Iran is central to security in the region, the European Union condemns Iran's continued destabilising activities in and around the Middle East. These include Iran's activities with ballistic and cruise missiles, UAVs, and transfers of such advanced weaponry to state and non-state actors. UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015) calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic technology. Such activity, including using space launch vehicles, could pave the way for the development of long-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles. All these actions constitute an important and increasing source of regional instability and risk further escalating already existing high tensions. The EU urges Iran to fully abide by UNSCR 2231 (2015).

The European Union urges Iran to cease these destabilising activities in the form of political, military or financial support, including to non-state actors, in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon. It calls upon Iran to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbours and to fully abide by all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), including UNSCR 661, 1483, 1540, 1546, 1701, 2216 and 2231.

The European Union urges Iran to stop all actions or attempts that disrupt or threaten the safety and freedom of navigation in and around maritime routes in the wider Gulf region and respect applicable international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The European Union calls upon Iran to abide by its international obligations. Against the background of the grave actions by Iran on a wide range of issues as expressed above, the European Union reaffirms its commitment to a comprehensive policy approach considering all options at its disposal: critical where necessary, and ready to engage, on the basis of mutual respect, where interests align.

2.2. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

2.2.1. **Council Conclusions on the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (21/03/2022)**

The Council welcomes the upcoming Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In line with the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of 2003, the Council reaffirms its unequivocal support for the BTWC as the legally binding global norm against biological weapons and cornerstone of international efforts to prevent biological agents or toxins from ever being developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired and used as weapons.

The Council is firmly committed to a multilateral and treaty-based approach that maintains and reinforces international peace and security. The BTWC is one of the major pillars of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

The Council recognises that the BTWC was the first Convention in 1975 to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, and reaffirms the importance of universalisation of the Convention. Since the entry into force of the Convention, 183 States have become parties to the Convention, which underlines the universal importance of the BTWC in addressing global threats. The Council calls on all remaining States that have not yet done so to join the Convention and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms.

The Council recognises the importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, also known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol, that is supplemented by the BTWC. The Council calls for the universalisation of the Geneva Protocol and commends the ratifications that have taken place since the adoption of Council Decision on EU position prepared in view of the Eighth Review Conference in 2015.

The Council recognises that biological agents and toxins are widely used for peaceful purposes in line with the BTWC provisions. At the same time, the risk of natural or accidental spread of dangerous pathogens exists. With the COVID-19 pandemic we have witnessed how quickly diseases can cross borders and how dangerous and disruptive they can be. This is why it is more urgent than ever to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation.

Taking into account this context and given the substantive work realised by States parties during the current review cycle, the Ninth Review Conference represents a unique opportunity not only to strengthen the Convention and its implementation, and to improve biosafety and biosecurity globally, but also to advance assistance, cooperation, response and preparedness of the States Parties. This Review Conference represents a timely moment to reinforce the global norm against biological weapons and to further develop the BTWC to prevent misuse of biological agents and toxins as well as of developments in science and technology while promoting their peaceful use.

The Council regrets the inevitable postponement of the Ninth Review Conference due to the global COVID-19 pandemic and stresses the major role of Review Conferences to the implementation, upholding and strengthening of the BTWC.

The Council supports the adoption by the Review Conference of forward-looking decisions and recommendations. These will provide a clear roadmap for the next review cycle, including a robust intersessional programme. The Council's priorities are:

- (a) building and sustaining confidence in compliance;
- (b) establishing a Science and Technology review;
- (c) supporting full national implementation;
- (d) operationalising Article V consultative procedures for solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective, or in the application, of the BWC;
- (e) operationalising of Article VII on assistance to States that have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention;
- (f) supporting the implementation of Article X on cooperation and assistance related to the exchange of equipment, materials and information for peaceful purposes;

- (g) promoting universal adherence to the Convention;
- (h) strengthening the BTWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and its role.

The Council welcomes the engagement by EU Member States to mobilise political will and promote implementation of the obligations and objectives of the BTWC through various initiatives during the current review cycle. The Council supports the development of practical initiatives such as the following:

- (a) scientific advisory mechanism;
- (b) set of voluntary guiding principles for scientists (Code of Conduct);
- (c) exchange platform for voluntary transparency exercises under Article IV regarding the requirement to take any national measures necessary to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological weapons within a State's territory, under its jurisdiction, or under its control;
- (d) operational database and guidelines in the framework of Article VII;
- (e) online platform dedicated to biosafety and biosecurity under Article X;
- (f) the promotion of biorisk management standards.

The EU will support relevant decisions on these initiatives at the Review Conference.

3. STATEMENTS

3.1. GENERAL STATEMENTS

3.1.1. Statement at the High Level Segment of Conference on Disarmament (Geneva, 1.3/2022)

Madam President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. Let me start my intervention with the recent quote of High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-President of the European Commission Josep Borrell: 'At this dark hour, when we see Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine and massive disinformation campaigns and information manipulation, it is essential to separate lies – invented to justify what cannot be justified – from facts. The facts are that Russia, a major nuclear power, has attacked and invaded a peaceful and democratic neighbouring country, which posed no threat to, nor provoked it. Moreover, President Putin is threatening reprisals on any other state that may come to the rescue of the people of Ukraine. Such use of force and coercion has no place in the 21st century. What President Putin is doing is not only a grave violation of international law, it is a violation of the basic principles of human co-existence. With his choice to bring war back to Europe, we see the return of the "law of the jungle" where might makes right. The target is not only Ukraine, but also the security of Europe and the whole international rules-based order, based on the UN system and international law'. The European Union condemns in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. By its illegal military actions and threats, Russia is grossly violating international law and the principles of the UN Charter and undermining European and global security and stability. The European Union underlines that this includes the right of Ukraine to choose its own destiny. Russia bears full responsibility for this act of aggression and all the destruction and loss of life it will cause. It will be held accountable for its actions.

We also strongly condemn the involvement of Belarus in this aggression against Ukraine and call on it to refrain from such action and to abide by its international obligations, including under the NPT. The deletion of the reference in Article 18 to Belarus's non-nuclear status is another worrying change, which adds to unacceptable attempts to re-define the European security architecture. Russia's military attack against Ukraine – an independent, sovereign and non-nuclear weapon State – is a flagrant violation of international law and the core principles on which the international rules-based order is built. Moreover, Russia has violated its commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on security assurances, thus disrespecting unequivocal security assurances a nuclear weapon States should honour as part of binding and agreed security arrangements. The loss of credibility of a nuclear weapon state on security assurances seriously undermines the NPT regime and the entire disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

The European Union demands that Russia immediately ceases its military actions, unconditionally withdraws all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respects Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. The European Union calls on Russia and Russia-backed armed formations to respect international humanitarian law and stop their disinformation campaign and cyber-attacks.

The EU strongly condemns threats by president Putin of using nuclear force in this war. These threats are unacceptable, provocative, dangerous and escalatory. Only last month did the Russian Federation, in the context of the P5, reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. In the interest of all humanity, Russian Federation must heed its commitments and immediately cease this nuclear brinkmanship. We stand in solidarity with the women, men and children whose lives have been affected by this unjustified and unjustifiable attack and deplore the tragic loss of life and human suffering. The European Union firmly believes that the use of force and coercion to change borders has no place in the 21st century. Tensions and conflict should be resolved exclusively through dialogue and diplomacy. The EU will continue cooperating closely with neighbours and reiterates its unwavering support for, and commitment to, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and of the Republic of Moldova. It will continue strong coordination with partners and allies, within the UN, OSCE, NATO and the G7.

Madam President,

The integrity of the rules-based international system is key to our collective security. It could be only achieved through effective multilateralism and rules-based global governance. The EU will continue to do its utmost to protect these principles and values.

The CD remains the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating body and its continued relevance is of utmost importance for the EU. While the EU and its Member States are ready to launch substantive work on all core items, we reiterate that our longstanding priority in the Conference on Disarmament is to immediately commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and we support starting such negotiations in accordance with the document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

In the meantime, we call on all States possessing nuclear weapons that have not yet done so to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on their production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Furthermore, promoting universal adherence to and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty CTBT is a top priority for the EU. All EU Member States have ratified the CTBT and are abiding by its obligations. We urge all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or further delay.

Lastly, the EU will particularly focus on promoting a successful outcome of the postponed Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The EU's support for the NPT is unwavering and we are committed to uphold and strengthen the NPT, promote its universalisation and enhance the implementation of all its obligations and the commitments undertaken during the previous review conferences.

Thank you for your attention.

3.1.2. EU Statement – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: General Statement (New York, 3.10.2022)

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, and the Republic of Moldova, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

In 2022 the paradigms of both the global and the European security architecture changed drastically. The Russian Federation has invaded the sovereign country of Ukraine. It is using wide a range of conventional weapons, as well as cyberattacks, often in a manner that does not comply with International Humanitarian Law, and is using dangerous nuclear rhetoric and reckless repeated threats to use nuclear weapons. As the Special Representative of the EU Foreign and Security Policy, Joseph Borrell emphasised in his statement from 24 February:

‘These are among the darkest hours for Europe since World War II [...]. This is not only the greatest violation of international law, it is a violation of the basic principles of human co-existence. It is costing many lives with unknown consequences ahead of us’.

The EU reiterates its strongest condemnation of the unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The Russian Federation, permanent member of the UN Security Council, is grossly violating international law, including the UN Charter, and it is severely undermining European and global security and stability. We strongly condemn the illegal referenda, which are gross violations of Ukrainian sovereignty and the UN Charter and, which took place under military coercion. The results of such actions are null and void and will not be recognised by the EU and its Member States. We firmly reject and unequivocally condemn the illegal annexation by Russia of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. We call on all states and international organisations to unequivocally reject their illegal annexation. We deplore deliberate escalatory steps by Russia, including the partial mobilisation of reservists. Moreover, Russia, as a nuclear weapon State, has violated the security guarantees of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which Ukraine received after renouncing the nuclear weapons on its territory in the wake of the USSR collapse and joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State. Russia has systemically breached the rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, especially among the civilian population. Holding Russia accountable for its violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law is key in order to fight against impunity. We also condemn Belarus for its involvement in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The European Union's reaction to this brutal act of violence was therefore immediate, proportional, strong and united, in political, diplomatic, and economic terms. In the face of this affront to humanity, the EU and its Member States recall the binding character of the UN Charter in its entirety and stress the universality of the UN's founding principles. The EU reaffirms its conviction that the major challenges of our time cannot be addressed by countries acting alone but must be tackled together through effective multilateralism and rules-based international cooperation. In achieving this we need to work in partnership with others, including civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders.

The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine also heavily impacted the arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation architecture, and hampered both multilateral and bilateral cooperation and work in this field.

The long-awaited 10th Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which took place in August, was not able to adopt a final outcome document due to Russia blocking consensus. The EU, which was strongly engaged in preparations for the Conference as well as throughout the Review Conference, deeply regrets that no consensus was achieved. Nevertheless, the legally binding obligations enshrined in the NPT and commitments from the past Review Conferences remain valid. We are looking forward to the next review cycle. It will offer yet another urgent opportunity to achieve the progress that is needed to strengthen the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT.

The EU reaffirms its resolute commitment to and continued support for the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU is increasingly concerned at Iran's continued actions inconsistent with the JCPOA and with severe, and in the case of R&D activities, irreversible proliferation implications. Some of these actions do not have any plausible civilian justification. The EU strongly urges Iran to return without delay to full JCPOA implementation, including all transparency measures. The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to achieve a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. The EU Member

States regret that Iran has chosen not to seize the diplomatic opportunity as of yet and call on Iran to accept so that the JCPOA would be fully restored. We wish to underscore that the JCPOA negotiation is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime. The EU urges Iran to cooperate in full with the IAEA without any further delay or conditionality to resolve all pending safeguards issues, in accordance with its legally binding obligations under its NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

The DPRK's unlawful launches of ballistic missiles this year threaten international and regional peace and security and warrant an appropriate response by the UN Security Council. The DPRK's declarations that it will continue to develop its unlawful nuclear and missile capabilities, that it would be prepared to engage in the first use of nuclear weapons and that it will not engage in negotiations aimed at returning to compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions are a matter of grave concern, as are reports of continued activity at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. The EU urges the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK must abandon its nuclear weapons, any other weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. The EU strongly underlines that the actions taken by the DPRK cannot confer the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the NPT or any special status whatsoever. Until the DPRK complies with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions, the EU will continue to implement strict sanctions and we urge all UN Members to fully implement all UNSC sanctions.

Furthermore, promoting universal adherence to and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a top priority for the EU. The CTBT has become an effective instrument and we reiterate our full confidence in the Treaty's verification regime, which has demonstrated its ability to provide independent and reliable data that will help to deter noncompliance with the Treaty once it enters into force, and to respond to threats to international peace and security. All EU Member States have ratified the CTBT and are abiding by its obligations. We urge all States, which have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the CTBT, to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty.

Mr. Chair,

Advancing disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control will be a vital part of the UN's 'New Agenda for Peace'. The EU will continue to support the multilateral instruments against chemical and biological weapons in order to uphold the comprehensive legal prohibitions of these categories of weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure there can be no impunity for those who use them. We are firmly committed to contributing to a successful outcome of the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC and the Fifth Review Conference of the CWC. The EU also strongly supports the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, which is the only independent international instrument for investigating alleged use of biological weapons.

The EU is committed to promoting the full application of existing international law in cyberspace and will work with international partners to prevent conflict and advance cooperation and international peace and security through the normative framework for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, the implementation of confidence building measures, and support for cyber capacity building. Regarding the work ahead of us, the EU will prioritise strengthening the existing strategic framework for conflict prevention and stability in cyberspace. In particular, the EU will work with Member States and international partners to advance the proposal of a forthcoming resolution to establish a Programme of Action to Advance Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace (Cyber PoA).

The EU will also continue to support and strengthen conventional arms control instruments as well as the multilateral export control regimes. Russia's violation of existing Confidence and Security Building Measures and conventional arms control commitments damaged the European security architecture. We will strive to universalise the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the full implementation of the Oslo Action Plan. We also fully support the humanitarian goal of the Cluster Munition Convention. The EU will further address emerging challenges including those related to lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) within the framework of the CCW, advocate responsible military use of new technologies, promote responsible space behaviours, and support efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We also call on all UN Member States to join the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and strongly encourages the full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All Its Aspects.

We especially welcome as an important achievement of international community, the conclusion of the Political Declaration Process on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences arising from the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA), in a process led by Ireland following the launch by Austria at an international conference in Vienna in 2019. The Declaration aims at reducing harm and strengthening the protection of civilians in armed conflict. This is a positive sign that the international community can still work together to achieve a tangible outcome despite the extremely challenging international circumstances.

Mr. Chair,

Gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls are important cross-cutting priorities for the EU. We commend the UN Secretary-General for the continued implementation of the entire Women, Peace and Security agenda and welcome his efforts to promote gender equality and improve women's full, active, equal, and meaningful participation and agency, including in leadership positions in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control fora.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.

3.2. NUCLEAR ISSUES

3.2.1. **EU Statement – 10th Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: General Statement (New York, 1.8.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Georgia, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

Please accept my congratulations on the assumption of your duties as the President of the 10th NPT Review Conference. Your diplomatic skills, dedicated efforts and numerous consultations supported by the NPT Review Conference Bureau members as well as UNODA, have finally allowed the Review Conference to convene, despite the difficult and unexpected circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. You can count on our full support.

The EU has contributed actively to this NPT review cycle through thematic and regional seminars, a number of working papers as well as side events. We have made proposals for concrete, future-oriented actions and EU Member States have reported on their respective measures and initiatives in their national implementation reports.

Mr. President,

The EU reiterates its strongest condemnation of the unprovoked and unjustified aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The Russian Federation's invasion of a sovereign country is a gross violation of international law, including the UN Charter and it severely undermines European and global security and stability. We also condemn Belarus for its involvement in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The EU resolutely supports Ukraine's inherent right of self-defence and the Ukrainian armed forces' efforts to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity and population in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. The EU demands that Russia immediately cease its military actions, withdraw all its troops from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. The international community will hold Russia accountable for its atrocities. The EU remains strongly committed to the fight against impunity.

Mr. President,

The Russian aggression against Ukraine and President Putin's threats of nuclear use seriously undermines and has a significant negative impact on the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. The blatant violation by Russia of the Budapest Memorandum, reckless threats of using nuclear weapons, as well as other irresponsible acts against nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, in particular the ongoing occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, are detrimental to the NPT.

Therefore, it's of utmost importance for all States Parties to the NPT, as well as the EU, to reiterate the unequivocal support for the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We are firmly convinced that a multilateral and treaty-based approach provides the best way to maintain and reinforce international peace and security.

The EU reaffirms the importance of universalising the NPT and calls on all States that have not yet done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms. The EU recognises the NPT's historic achievements in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in facilitating cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in significantly reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles in previous decades. The NPT has an enduring value and its full implementation is needed now more than ever.

The EU strongly supports all three pillars of the NPT and will continue to promote comprehensive, balanced and substantive full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. We stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT, and commitments during previous Review Conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. We are resolved to seek a safer and more secure world for all in accordance with the goals of the Treaty in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security. Ensuring the implementation of the 64 actions in the 2010 Action Plan is a collective responsibility shared by all States Parties to the NPT without exception.

In the current security environment marked by increasingly high tensions and serious proliferation crises and challenges, renewed efforts must be pursued in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The EU calls on all States concerned to abstain from any steps that would risk further escalating tensions and undermine the significant reductions achieved after the end of the Cold War. A new nuclear arms race must be avoided.

Before the Russian aggression against Ukraine, there were some welcomed developments, including the agreement reached between the United States and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty for an additional five years as well as the relaunch of the bilateral strategic stability dialogue and the restatement of the Reykjavik Summit declaration at the June 2021 summit in Geneva. The EU attaches the highest importance to the New START Treaty and regards it as a crucial contribution to international and European security. Recalling the obligation for all nuclear weapon States arising from Art. VI of the NPT, we underline that the two nuclear weapon States with the largest arsenals hold a special responsibility in the area of nuclear disarmament and arms control. The EU encourages seeking further reductions of their arsenals under the New START Treaty, including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons and further discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction, verification activities, laying the ground for even more robust future arms control agreements and reporting. We call on China to actively contribute to these processes.

The EU welcomes discussion between Presidents Biden and Xi on nuclear issues, and encourages them to establish a dialogue on strategic stability and arms control.

The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.

The EU considers the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be of crucial importance to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and its entry into force is a top priority for the Union. We call on all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without preconditions or further delay.

The EU calls for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT) and that it can support the start of the negotiations in accordance with the document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

The EU acknowledges the critical importance of existing nuclear weapon free zones for peace and security and remains committed to the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The EU notes the convening of the UN Conferences in 2019 and 2021 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and it is encouraged by their outcomes.

The EU recognises the important work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The EU stresses that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol constitute the current verification standard under the NPT and calls for their universalisation without delay.

The EU is resolved to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards, recognizes IAEA's central role in this regard and the Union's significant funding of its activities.

The EU reiterates its resolute commitment to and continued support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA is a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture, endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council through its resolution 2231 (2015). The EU supports the ongoing intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission with all relevant partners.

The EU expresses its serious concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues action to further develop its illegal nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes. The EU calls on the DPRK to take concrete steps in dismantling its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner as decided by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017). The EU urges the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

The EU reaffirms its support for the inalienable right of all Parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the NPT.

The EU underlines that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls is a top horizontal priority and believes it is important to integrate gender perspectives into discussions across the three pillars of the NPT. The EU fully supports and promotes the equal participation of women and men in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.2.2. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty: Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on the occasion of the closure of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties (Brussels, 29.8.2022)

The European Union deeply regrets that, in spite of all tireless efforts, no substantial outcome of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was reached due to Russia's unwillingness to join the consensus.

In the current severe security environment, a meaningful outcome strengthening existing norms, and through those, the rules-based international order, would have been needed more than ever.

The EU regards the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes.

We recognise its enduring value and historic achievements in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in facilitating cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in significantly reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles in previous decades.

In the current security environment, marked by increasingly high tensions due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine as well as other serious crises and challenges, renewed efforts must be pursued in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Therefore, we stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT, and commitments made at the previous Review Conferences, including concrete progress towards the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

We are resolved to seek a safer and more secure world for all in accordance with the goals of the Treaty in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security.

3.2.3. EU Statement – 66th session of the General Conference (Vienna, 26.9.2022)

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland and San Marino.

Let me congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election and thank the IAEA Director General and the Secretariat for their excellent work over the past year.

The European Union attaches great importance to the IAEA's technical, independent and impartial work across its mandate.

We are meeting in unprecedented circumstances. The European Union condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified aggression against Ukraine which is a gross violation of international law, notably the UN Charter, and severely undermines European and global security and stability.

Russia's actions pose serious and direct threats to nuclear safety and security and the Agency's safeguards verification activities in Ukraine, as highlighted in the Board resolutions adopted in March and September. We are deeply concerned that each of the seven indispensable pillars outlined by the IAEA Director General, has been compromised as a result of the Russian aggression. As stated by the Director General, a nuclear accident must not be added to the tragedy of this war.

The EU strongly supports the Agency's work to assist Ukraine, notably the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) and the Agency's continued presence at the facility. We also support the Director General's proposal to establish a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the modalities of which would still need to be agreed. We emphasise there is only one sustainable solution: The Russian Federation must stop its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all its armed forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, notably from the ZNPP, and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders.

The EU reaffirms its resolute commitment to and continued support for the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU is increasingly concerned at Iran's continued actions inconsistent with the JCPOA and with severe, and in the case of R&D activities, irreversible proliferation implications. Some of these actions do not have any plausible civilian justification. The EU strongly urges Iran to return without delay to full JCPOA implementation, including all transparency measures. The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to achieve a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. The EU Member

States regret that Iran has chosen not to seize the diplomatic opportunity and call on Iran to accept it so that the JCPOA would be fully restored. We wish to underscore that the JCPOA negotiation is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime. The EU urges Iran to cooperate in full with the IAEA without any further delay or conditionality to resolve all pending safeguards issues, in accordance with its legally binding obligations under its NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

The EU condemns the DPRK's continued engagement in nuclear and ballistic missile activities which are a matter of grave concern. It is highly regrettable that the DPRK has not taken concrete, verified action towards denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. We urge the DPRK to comply with its obligations under multiple UN Security Council Resolutions, to refrain from nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches, and to engage in a meaningful dialogue with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security. We also urge the DPRK to return to negotiations and take immediate and concrete steps towards abandoning all nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Mr. President,

The EU regrets that the 10th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could not achieve consensus on a final outcome document because of the Russian Federation blocking consensus. We will spare no efforts to continue promoting the full and effective implementation of the NPT as well as its universalisation, and will build upon the substantial discussions held tirelessly over the course of the 10th Review Conference to prepare for the new review cycle. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT. Its legally binding obligations and past commitments remain valid. The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, as agreed at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The EU also affirms its full support for the decision to establish a working group to strengthen the review cycle.

The EU supports the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and remains of the view that Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, together with the Additional Protocol, constitute the current verification standard under the NPT. We call for their universalisation without delay. The EU also urges all States, which have not yet done so, to amend their Small Quantities Protocols or apply the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in full, especially those States that are already building a nuclear power plant or a research reactor.

The EU and its Member States attach utmost importance to nuclear safety, and its continuous improvement. Over the past decades, we have established and further developed an advanced, legally-binding nuclear safety framework applicable in all EU Member States. We also provide financial and human resources to help improve nuclear safety in countries outside the EU, including through the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), with a budget of EUR 300 million.

Furthermore, the EU stresses the need to continue strengthening nuclear security worldwide in order to prevent nuclear terrorism and facilitate peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We encourage all Member States to promote a strong nuclear safety and security culture and continuously implement the highest possible nuclear safety and radiation protection standards. We recognise the IAEA's central role in facilitating international cooperation and providing technical assistance to Member States.

We reaffirm our strong political commitment to international nuclear safety and security conventions, support their implementation and call upon all States to join them. We stress the need to consider new legally-binding international rules specifically prohibiting armed attacks against any nuclear installation devoted to peaceful purposes.

Mr. President,

The EU and its Member States reaffirm their longstanding commitment to and strong support for the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and support the Agency's work in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in order to reach the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement commitments including in the context of COP27. We acknowledge that Member States pursue different approaches to ensure energy security at affordable cost and that all countries have the sovereign right to decide whether or not to include nuclear power as part of their own energy mix to collectively achieve the 2030 climate target and the Paris Agreement commitments. The EU acknowledges the role played by nuclear technologies in relation to the global efforts to limit climate change and mitigate its negative effects. The EU also welcomes the new 'Rays of Hope' initiative and the organisation of this year's Scientific Forum on this topic.

We welcome the strong commitment to gender equality and encourage the Secretariat to continue its efforts to achieve gender parity and mainstream gender in its programmes and projects. The EU is proud to be the largest donor to the IAEA's Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme.

We remain among the IAEA's largest donors and expect efficient and effective programme delivery. Given the importance of the IAEA's work, we hope the Member States will do their utmost to ensure sustainable funding for the IAEA's key activities.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.2.4. EU General Statement on the safety, security, and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine – 66th session of the General Conference (Vienna, 29.9.2022)

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and San Marino.

The European Union condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified aggression against Ukraine. It is a gross violation of international law, notably the UN Charter, and threatens peace and security in Europe and worldwide. The Russian Federation's aggression has caused immense human suffering to the Ukrainian population, massive destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and has severe global consequences for food and energy security. It has significantly increased the risk of a nuclear incident or accident, with potentially grave radiological consequences for human health and the environment in Ukraine and beyond. We condemn the Russian Federation's behaviour and nuclear safety and security threats.

Such an unprecedented situation requires a strong response from the IAEA as a multilateral body with a Statute based on the UN Charter. We therefore welcome the adoption of the IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions on 3 March and 15 September 2022 and express our full support for the Joint Statement delivered at this General Conference on the safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine.

As documented by the IAEA Director General in his recent reports, each of the seven indispensable pillars on nuclear safety and security derived from IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance has been compromised since the Russian Federation launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and illegally seized control of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone and then the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Russia's actions continue to pose serious and direct threats to Ukrainian nuclear facilities and they have impeded the Agency from fully and safely conducting safeguards verification activities in Ukraine.

The EU strongly supports the Agency's work to assist Ukraine, notably the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) and the Agency's continued presence at the facility. We also support the IAEA Director General's proposal to establish a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the modalities of which would still need to be agreed.

We emphasize, once again, that there is only one sustainable solution: The Russian Federation must stop its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, notably from the ZNPP, and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. The ZNPP must be returned to full and exclusive control of the Ukrainian authorities and remain connected to the Ukrainian electricity grid. We are grateful to the Ukrainian regulator and the operators who continue their work in the most critical circumstances.

We will never recognise the results of the illegal sham 'referenda', which have no legal validity or effect, and we remain unwavering in our support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.

We stand with Ukraine.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.2.5. **EU Statement at the 59th session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (Vienna, 21.11.2022)**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Norway, Andorra and San Marino.

The European Union reiterates in the strongest possible terms its condemnation of the unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, which constitutes a blatant violation of the UN Charter and international law, and demands that Russia immediately cease its military actions, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. We strongly condemn the Russian Federation's attempts to illegally annex Ukrainian regions, which have no legal validity or effect.

We also reiterate our call on Russia to refrain from any action that would endanger the integrity of the International Monitoring System (IMS) – including stations in the region – and data availability through the verification regime.

Moreover, Russia's irresponsible actions, as well as the continuing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, have caused significant economic pressures for many States Signatories and correspondingly have repercussions for the financial outlook of international organisations.

Mr. Chairman,

We thank the Executive Secretary for his comprehensive reports, and express our support for the recommendations contained in the reports of Working Groups A and B, as well as of the Advisory Group. We also welcome the return to a full scale Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) session, for the first time since 2019, and thank the PTS, its directors and all CTBTO staff for their resilience and efforts in ensuring business continuity for both verification and non-verification related activities to the benefit of States Signatories.

The efforts to promote and facilitate signature and ratification of the CTBT remain a top priority for the EU. All EU Member States have ratified the Treaty and consistently call upon the remaining eight Annex II States: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the USA who still need to ratify the Treaty and the DPRK, India and Pakistan who still need to sign and ratify it in order to bring it into force, to do so without any preconditions or further delay. In the meantime, it is crucial that all States fully observe the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

We warmly welcome the recent ratifications of the CTBT by Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, and fully support the efforts of the Executive Secretary to further promote and facilitate signature and ratification of the Treaty.

The EU looks forward to the upcoming Science and Diplomacy Symposium 2022 which will be another opportunity to promote the entry into force of the Treaty, based on innovative approaches. On this occasion, the EU is pleased to organise a side-event on 6 December, on promoting gender equality and empowerment of early career women in STEM.

Mr. Chairman,

The EU urges the DPRK to cease its unlawful and destabilising actions that undermine regional and international peace and security and instead engage in dialogue with relevant partners. The DPRK must comply with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions to refrain from testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Any nuclear test or other reckless action must be met with a swift, united, and robust international response.

The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We urge the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes as well as programmes to build delivery systems and other weapons of mass destruction in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner as required by UN Security Council resolutions. We urge the DPRK to return to compliance with the NPT and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement including by signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol – and signing and ratifying the CTBT. It is critical that sanctions, which target the DPRK's unlawful weapons development, remain in place while its programmes exist. The EU calls on all UN Member States to ensure the full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions to prevent the DPRK from procuring materials, knowledge and finance that support its illegal weapons programmes. The EU stands ready to support any meaningful diplomatic process and is committed to working with all relevant partners to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Chairman,

The EU would like to thank the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) for providing the final 2023 Budget update proposals, which take into account comments made by States Signatories, and supports the recommendation of Working Group A to the Commission to approve them.

The highly sophisticated CTBT verification system, the preservation of its value, continuous sustainment and recapitalisation of the IMS, and the further development of on-site inspection operational capabilities and related capacity-building activities require substantial financial input. As noted by the Executive Secretary, the current budget allocated to cover the sustainment and recapitalisation of the IMS is inadequate. A solution needs to be found urgently and be agreed for the next 2024–2025 biennium. This will require States Signatories to make tough but important choices about budget allocation.

We welcome the commitment made by the Executive Secretary to provide a detailed technology and station specific analysis as a basis for a budgetary gap determination and mitigation strategy. We encourage the PTS to launch regular discussions with States Signatories on this issue and on the 2024–2025 Programme and Budget more broadly, as soon as possible. We also encourage the PTS to continue its important operations, including building, certifying, operating and repairing IMS stations.

Moreover, it is crucial for the operation of the verification regime of the Treaty, and for the wider organisation's financial health, that all States demonstrate their political commitment and honour their legal obligation to pay their assessed contributions, on time and in full.

The EU, materialising its full commitment to the Treaty and its implementation, has so far contributed 29.5 million Euros to support CTBTO monitoring and verification activities. These funds are being used to improve the auxiliary seismic station network, to strengthen on-site inspection and noble gas monitoring capabilities, and to provide technical assistance to countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean region, allowing them to participate fully in the CTBTO's verification regime. The EU has already commenced consultations with the PTS regarding its next voluntary contribution through EU Council Decision IX.

We have noted with interest the proposal of a Funding mechanism for the 2025 Integrated Field Exercise (IFE). Since the Commission has approved an exercise programme culminating in an IFE, it is clear that adequate resources will need to be identified. In this regard, we welcome the related draft decision which includes an opt-out possibility with respect to national legal constraints by some States.

Mr. Chairman,

Background studies using mobile monitoring systems have been going on for years to improve the performance of the verification regime and ensure the correct detection of events. This activity is part of, and helps carry out the mandate of the PTS. We look forward to the swift appointment of a new team of co-facilitators and fully support the continuation and finalisation of discussions on this topic.

Regarding the development of guidelines for holding non-scheduled sessions of the Commission, while we reiterate our support for the 2019 GRULAC proposal, we thank Ambassador Duarte of Brazil for his efforts and for the new version of his proposal, which includes many positive elements. We look forward to advancing discussions with a view to finalising this issue.

As for appointments to the Advisory Group, we encourage States to ensure that they nominate experts of high-recognised standing and experience in financial matters at the international level. We welcome the nominations of Mr Matheus Pires Uller from Brazil and Ms Yue Ping from the People's Republic of China and can support them.

On the draft decision on possible procedures for the appointment of the Chairperson and Vice-Chairpersons of the Advisory Group, we consider that the current draft needs further consideration and revision, and stand ready to engage in further consultations as appropriate.

In conclusion Mr. Chairman,

We wish to express our deep appreciation to you and to the Vice-Chairs for ably steering the Commission during this year, and reiterate our full support and cooperation for a constructive and successful 59th Session of the Commission. The EU stands ready to support your efforts to fill current vacancies in the Commission and its subsidiary bodies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3.2.6. EU Briefing on behalf of the High Representative – UN Security Council: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran) (New York, 19.12.2022)

Mr. President,

It is an honour to have again the opportunity to address the Council in this session on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr Josep Borrell, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the JCPOA).

My first expression of gratitude goes to Secretary-General António Guterres and to the Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of Resolution 2231 and in particular the report prepared for today's discussion. I also want to thank Ireland as the Facilitator of Resolution 2231 and the work done to keep members informed of the current state of play.

I would like also to underscore the important role of the IAEA as the sole impartial and independent international organisation mandated by the Security Council to monitor and verify the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation commitments under the JCPOA.

Last June, we described the intense negotiations efforts to restore the JCPOA undertaken by all JCPOA participants, and the United States, since April 2021. Following this process and based on all the key positions of the participants in negotiations, the EU High Representative had been able to put forward in early August a compromise text that reflects his understanding of the most realistic equilibrium in view of a deal. The text lays down the necessary steps for the US to return to the JCPOA and for Iran to resume the full implementation of all its JCPOA commitments. However, since then, new developments have added significant new layers of complications that makes it increasingly difficult to reach a deal. Nevertheless, the coordinator remains in close contact with all JCPOA participants and the United States on this issue.

Mr. President,

Since the discussion on the previous report of the UN Secretariat on the implementation of the UNSCR 2231, the IAEA documented thoroughly the alarming further acceleration of Iran's nuclear programme that gravely departs from its JCPOA commitments. IAEA DG's reports of 10, 22 and 29 November documented the expansion of Iran's nuclear enrichment operations and capacity. This includes more enrichment of uranium at the level of 60 % in two facilities and more cascades of advanced centrifuges going to operation while others are being installed.

Let me also recall that Iran's unilateral decision in June 2022 that all Agency's JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment be removed from operation has further aggravated existing concerns related to the fact that from 23 February 2021 onwards, the IAEA's verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran's decision to stop the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol.

Furthermore, Iran, which conditioned a deal on the restoration of the JCPOA on the settlement of the 'outstanding safeguards issues', needs to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

We continue to recognise that Iran has faced and continues facing very serious negative economic consequences following the US's withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of previously lifted US unilateral sanctions which we deeply regret. Since our last discussion in June, the US has imposed additional nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, including in the area of oil and petrochemicals. The restoration of the JCPOA remains the only way for Iran to reap the full benefits of the JCPOA and reach its full economic potential as it will result in a comprehensive sanctions' lifting that will encourage greater cooperation by the entire international community with Iran.

I recall in this context that the EU has lifted all its nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions since the JCPOA Implementation Day and this remains the case. But let me also clarify that EU measures relating to the unacceptable repression of protests in Iran over the past months and Iran's military support to Russia are outside the JCPOA.

Mr. President,

In addition to the advancement of the nuclear programme of Iran, the European Union is indeed extremely worried about Iran's military support to Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine including through deliveries of drones. The EU will continue to respond to this, as necessary, not least as this also affects the implementation of SCR 2231.

On 12 December last, the Council of the European Union recalled that any transfer of certain combat drones and missiles to or from Iran without prior permission by the UN Security Council is in violation of Resolution 2231. On this occasion, the EU reaffirmed its support to the ongoing work by the UN Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Resolution. The EU also recalled that Resolution 2231 calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic technology.

Mr. President,

The process to conclude a deal and bring the JCPOA back on track has been seriously challenged by the various developments over the last few months as described earlier.

However, I shall be straightforward: the High Representative does not see any sustainable alternative. To echo the statement made by the UN Secretary-General in his report, let me reaffirm here that diplomacy and restoring the JCPOA's full implementation is still the best option for preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. This is also instrumental to the security of the whole region and remains in our fundamental common interest.

For almost two years, the Agency has been deprived of an essential part of its knowledge of Iran's activities on the entirety of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle. Let me recall that the Additional Protocol to Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which substantially strengthened legal capacities of the IAEA in terms of verification, is only made applicable under a fully implemented JCPOA. Moreover, while the agreement is in the shadow, Iran's programme runs quickly with irreversible proliferation implications in particular in the field of research and development. The combination of continued nuclear progress by Iran and decreasing visibility over its programme raises more concerns than ever.

The Procurement Channel, another benefit of the JCPOA, continues to be fully operational. It remains a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism. It gives assurances to Member States and the private sector that transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods and services are fully in line with Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA.

For all these reasons, on 12 December, the Council of the EU reaffirmed its commitment to, and continued support for, the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. It called on all countries to support the implementation of Resolution 2231. The EU also underscored that the JCPOA is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the Non-proliferation Treaty, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime.

Drawing on this unambiguous support from the Foreign Ministers from the 27 EU countries, the High Representative is determined to continue working with the international community towards a full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. He joins his voice to that of the UN Secretary-General to encourage all parties to intensify diplomatic efforts to this end.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.3. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

3.3.1. **Chemical Weapons Convention: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union to mark the 25th anniversary (Brussels, 19.4.2022)**

On 29 April 2022, we mark the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). With 193 States Parties, the Convention today enshrines the international norm against the use of chemical weapons.

Since it entered into force, 99 % of the world's declared chemical weapons stocks have been verifiably destroyed under the control of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, despite the tangible progress, the re-emergence of use of chemical weapons is one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.

In recent years, the world has witnessed the horrific use of chemical weapons in Syria, causing hundreds of victims, including children. In 2020, a toxic nerve agent 'Novichok' was used in the assassination attempt on the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny in the territory of the Russian Federation. Chemical weapons have also been used in Malaysia in 2017 to assassinate Kim Jeung-On's half-brother Kim Jeung-Nam, and in the United Kingdom in 2018 in the attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, which resulted in the death of a British citizen.

The European Union reiterates its strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic and its failure to respect its international obligations under the Convention, as substantiated through comprehensive and thorough investigations carried out by the United Nations and the OPCW. The European Union and its Member States will continue to work at national and international levels in order to address chemical weapons attacks and other atrocities committed in the Syrian Arab Republic.

The European Union also reiterates its strong concern that the Russian Federation has still not reacted to international calls to fully cooperate with the OPCW to ensure an impartial international investigation on the attempt to assassinate the Russian opposition politician, Alexei Navalny. The poisoning of Mr. Navalny in Russia by a military chemical nerve agent of the 'Novichok' group in August 2020 (a substance developed by Russia), has been confirmed, beyond doubt, by specialised laboratories in Germany, France and Sweden, as well as by the OPCW. The European Union has condemned the poisoning in the strongest possible terms.

The use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances constitutes a violation of international law and can amount to the most serious crimes of international concern – war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The EU supports collective efforts to ensure accountability for perpetrators of chemical attacks through the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons.

Impunity for the use of chemical weapons must not and will not be tolerated. Under its chemical weapons sanctions regime, the EU has imposed restrictive measures against multiple Russian and Syrian individuals and entities for their involvement in chemical weapons attacks.

The pace of developments in science and technology are both a challenge and an opportunity to foster peaceful uses of chemistry. The transformation of the OPCW laboratory into a Centre for Chemistry and Technology (CCT) will be key to strengthen the Convention and enhance the Organisation's capacity to perform its core tasks of verification, inspection and capacity building. In this context, the European Union reiterates its full confidence in the OPCW Technical Secretariat, its professionalism, impartiality and well-established technical expertise.

On this important anniversary, the European Union and its Member States reaffirm their unwavering support for the CWC and for the work of the OPCW. The OPCW's diligence, professionalism and impartiality while addressing the use of chemical weapons offer a vital first step towards accountability and an end to impunity. Any use of chemical weapons is an affront to international law on which we all depend for our security and wellbeing.

The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

3.3.2. **Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare: Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell (Brussels, 30.11.2022)**

25 years ago, the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force with one purpose: to put an end and eliminate chemical weapons once and for all. Today it is the global norm against chemical weapons.

Since 1997, over 99 % of chemical weapon stockpiles declared have been verifiably destroyed. Yet chemical weapons remain one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.

Despite the progress made, we are still witness to the horrific consequences of these heinous weapons. In Syria, they have caused hundreds of victims, including children. In August 2020, a military grade nerve agent 'Novichok' was used in the assassination attempt on the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny in the territory of the Russian Federation. Chemical weapons have also been used in Malaysia in 2017 to assassinate Kim Jeung-On's half-brother Kim Jeung-Nam, and in the United Kingdom in 2018 in the attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, which resulted in the death of a British citizen.

No one should use chemical weapons, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances.

In view of the continued threat posed by the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, the EU has applied restrictive measures against 25 individuals and three entities.

We will continue supporting the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, independently and impartially.

On this day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare, we remember those who have died and suffered because of the use of chemical weapons. We recall that the use of chemical weapons is a violation of international law and can amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Those responsible must and will be held accountable. We will continue to fight against impunity and working towards full accountability for those responsible at national and international levels.

Background

Under its regime of restrictive measures dedicated to fighting the proliferation and use of chemical weapons and their precursors, the European Union has imposed restrictive measures on persons and entities in Russia linked to the Salisbury attack in 2018 and the poisoning of Mr Navalny in 2020. In Syria, the EU has imposed restrictive measures on entities and persons responsible for development and use of chemical weapons, in particular for the attacks that took place in August 2013 in Ghouta, March 2017 in Ltamenah and 2018 in Douma. Moreover, the European Union continues its active participation in the Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons.

3.3.3. **Statement of the European Union at the 27th Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (The Hague, 28 November 2022)**

Mr. Chairperson,

Mr. Director-General,

Distinguished delegates,

I have the honour of speaking on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries Albania, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro and Ukraine, the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, and the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the EEA (European Economic Area) align themselves with this statement.

Andorra, Monaco and San Marino also associate themselves with this statement.

The European Union (EU) would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Bård Ivar Svendsen of Norway, Chairperson of the 26th Conference of States Parties, and Ambassador Ziad Al Atiyah of Saudi Arabia, Chairperson of the Executive Council, for their efforts and outstanding performance in fulfilling their duties. We also warmly congratulate Ambassador Vusumuzi Madonsela of South Africa for his election as the Chairperson of the 27th Conference of States Parties. I would like to assure him of our full support in steering the work of the Conference.

We also take this opportunity to commend the leadership of OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias, and reiterate our full confidence in the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS), its professionalism, impartiality and well-established technical expertise in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and tasks assigned by the States Parties. The European Union recalls that on 13 October 2022 the United Nations General Assembly First Committee reaffirmed its strong support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW in the resolution on the implementation of the CWC (A/C.1/77/L.55) prepared annually by Poland.

Mr. Chairperson,

The year of 2022 has completely changed the paradigm of global, as well as European security architecture. Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is an attack on our common principles and it grossly violates the UN Charter. The EU resolutely condemns the Russian aggression and demands that Russia withdraws all its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine. Moreover, as part of its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has engaged in a campaign of disinformation and state-controlled propaganda in spreading unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations against Ukraine and others regarding chemical weapons programmes. It is well established that Ukraine is a responsible member of, and in full compliance with the Chemical weapons Convention.

The Syrian regime's failure to respect its international obligations under the Convention is substantiated through comprehensive and thorough investigations carried out by all the established mechanisms, notably the Joint UN – OPCW Investigation Mechanism (JIM), the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) as well as the Investigation and Identification team (IIT). We commend the Director-General's continuous efforts to engage with Syria. Unfortunately, there is no progress reported to the Council in any of the open issues. We urge Syria to act constructively, as there is no alternative to cooperation, as explicitly required by the UNSCR 2118 and the respective decisions by the Conference of States Parties.

The EU has condemned in the strongest possible terms the poisoning of the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny in August 2020 with a military grade nerve agent of the 'Novichok' group. We continue to urge the Russian Federation to provide substantial answers to the questions posed by 45 States Parties in the framework of Art. IX and to ensure without further delay the disclosure of the circumstances of the assassination attempt against Mr. Navalny.

The European Union remains fully committed to counter the proliferation of chemical weapons and to support the fight against impunity for the use of chemical weapons. On 14 November 2022, the EU imposed further restrictive measures linked to the poisoning of Mr Navalny and the production of chemical weapons delivery systems in Syria. Measures under the EU's chemical weapons sanctions regime now apply to a total of 25 individuals and three entities.

Mr. Chairperson,

The EU supports the Director-General's proposed revision of the programme and budget for 2023 that enables the OPCW to continue its vital work including cooperation and assistance projects. In this context, the EU calls upon all States Parties to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time.

The EU has noted with great concern that the Technical Secretariat will face a high turnover in the Inspectorate Division in 2023, affecting its operational capacity. This situation underlines the need for amending the OPCW Tenure Policy to help maintain key expertise required to ensure the continued implementation of the Convention. As an interim measure, a new decision on re-hiring of inspectors is warranted.

The EU strongly believes that gender equality and mainstreaming of gender are and should continue to be an integral part of the work of the OPCW and implementation of the CWC. A wide diversity of views is essential for decision-making and in helping us tackle the challenges we face with greater effectiveness. We commend the Director-General and the Technical Secretariat for the work they have carried out thus far and look forward to further progress towards gender equality in the Organisation, including through the enhancement of gender mainstreaming in all areas of the Technical Secretariat's work.

I would like to reiterate the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, ranging from chemical industry to think tanks, civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations, in the OPCW work, and their meaningful and broadest possible participation in the Conference of States Parties, including the Fifth Review Conference.

Mr. Chairperson,

The Fifth Review Conference will be an opportunity to consider how to strengthen implementation of the Convention as a key instrument of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Achieving a common vision on countering the re-emergence of chemical weapons and safeguarding the global non-use norm is a shared responsibility of all States Parties. The work programme of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) allows all delegations to effectively express their priorities on relevant topics for the future of our Organisation. The EU and its Member States actively and constructively contribute to the discussions, and we encourage all States Parties to engage in this preparatory process. In this context, I would like to express our gratitude to the Chairperson, Ambassador Lauri Kuusing of Estonia, for leading the work in an open and inclusive manner, with the goal of building consensus.

I would kindly ask you to consider this statement as an official document of the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties and post it on the OPCW external server and public website.

Thank you.

3.4. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

3.4.1. **Second Preparatory Committee for the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Geneva, 11.4.2022)**

Mr. Vice-Chair,

I speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries Turkey, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine, and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

In the context of Article X, the EU strongly encourages local and regional ownership to ensure long-term sustainability of activities, stronger partnerships between donors and beneficiary States, and further coordination among donors. Developing national action plans, with the involvement of relevant agencies and stakeholders, and enhancing international, regional and sub-regional cooperation will help to achieve effective and sustainable outcomes. We support in particular further South-South cooperation for detecting, reporting and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease, or biological weapons attacks.

The EU has a long history of providing support to cooperation and assistance relevant for Article X. Currently the EU provides, through a number of Council Decisions, nearly EUR 10 million in support of assistance and capacity-building projects in third countries, including improving legislative and regulatory basis of biosafety and biosecurity, awareness-raising among relevant sectors as well as enhancing infectious disease surveillance, detection and control.

At the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC, the EU will support proposals further strengthening the implementation of Article X.

More specifically, the EU will support the proposal made by France, Senegal and Togo to establish an online platform dedicated to biosafety and biosecurity under Article X.

The EU will furthermore support initiatives to develop biorisk management standards within the life sciences community. Biorisk management standards can play a complementary and supportive role in the implementation of the obligations of the BTWC. We therefore encourage States Parties to provide assistance, where appropriate, for the implementation of biorisk management standards in life science institutions in accordance with Article X.

3.4.2. **EU General Statement at the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC (Geneva, 28.11.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova and the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this declaration.

Let me start by congratulating you, Ambassador Bencini, for your nomination as President of this Review Conference and by commending you for your efforts in preparation of this very important meeting. We have full confidence in your capacity to guide us through the deliberations as we strive for a successful outcome. You can count of the EU's support in this endeavour.

The EU is firmly committed to a multilateral and treaty-based approach that maintains and reinforces international peace and security. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is one of the major pillars of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. It embodies the important and legally-binding norm that the development, production, stockpiling and usage of biological agents and toxins as weapons is unacceptable.

The EU recognises that biological agents and toxins are widely used for peaceful purposes in line with the BTWC provisions. At the same time, the risk of natural or accidental spread of dangerous pathogens exists. With the COVID-19 pandemic we have witnessed how quickly diseases can cross borders and how dangerous and disruptive they can be. This is why it is more urgent than ever to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation.

Taking into account this context and given the substantive work realised by States Parties during the current review cycle, the Ninth Review Conference represents a unique opportunity not only to strengthen the Convention and its implementation, and to improve biosafety and biosecurity globally, but also to advance assistance, cooperation, response and preparedness of the States Parties.

As a long-term supporter of the BTWC, the EU is firmly committed to contributing to the success of the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC. Our primary aim is to adopt forward-looking decisions and recommendations, which will provide a clear roadmap for the next review cycle, based on a productive intersessional programme.

As part of this strong commitment to a successful Ninth Review Conference, the EU has provided substantial support to this end. In particular, I would like to mention the series of EU-sponsored Regional Workshops for Europe and the Middle East, the Americas, Asia and Africa that were organised by the ISU in preparation for the Review Conference. The goal of these workshops was to increase common understanding of key issues and challenges and to facilitate building consensus on the need for, and measures required for, reinforcement of the Convention. The report of these Regional Workshops will be presented during a side event on 1 December. I would also like to note that the EU is sponsoring 28 delegates from 25 States to participate in this Review Conference.

The EU Position on the Ninth Review Conference has been submitted to the Review Conference as a Working Paper. It includes a broad range of specific measures supported by the EU with a view to strengthening the BTWC. This statement will only emphasise certain priority issues while we remain ready to provide further information on EU position on all topics, as appropriate, during the upcoming deliberations.

Mr. President,

The European Union regards verification as a central element of a complete and effective disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including within the BTWC. The EU reiterates its readiness to explore the issue of verification in greater depth, taking into account the developments in science and technology relevant to the Convention as well as the evolution of the threat. In this regard, the EU encourages the Review Conference to take action on near-term, concrete measures that would immediately strengthen the BTWC while negotiating further measures to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation in the upcoming intersessional period, including on increasing transparency and enhancing assurance in compliance. We call on States Parties to approach these issues in a constructive and ambitious manner and welcome concrete proposals.

Taking into account the rapid developments in life sciences and in technology relevant to the Convention, the EU furthermore supports the Ninth Review Conference in delegating certain decision-making powers to the Meeting of States Parties.

The EU also supports the concrete implementation of Article X of the BTWC through the numerous assistance programmes the EU and its Member States have undertaken. We consider international cooperation and assistance for peaceful purposes in the framework of the BTWC one of the most important aspects of the Convention, especially considering the experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Further action to enhance international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, on promoting capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases is of utmost importance. We stand ready to explore relevant initiatives aiming at reinforcing biosafety and biosecurity.

In addition, the EU supports the promotion of biorisk management standards as a concrete measure to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity at the international level.

Furthermore, the EU supports a Science & Technology Review Process based on more frequent and focused assessments of relevant scientific and technological developments, which may have implications for the BTWC. Such a Review Process has gathered widespread support since the Eighth Review Conference and its establishment is urgent and necessary to keep pace with advancements. The EU specifically supports the establishment of a dedicated board of experts and scientists. Such a mechanism could help identify emerging risks of potential misuse of technologies and expertise in dual use research and their potential relevance to the goals and objectives of the BTWC. The EU also supports the adoption of a voluntary code of conduct for scientists as an element in this process, as well as the establishment of a science and technology officer position within the ISU.

The EU also supports the operationalisation of Article VII, regarding assistance to States Parties that have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention. Building on agreements reached at the Eighth Review Conference, which supported 'the establishment of a database open to all States Parties to facilitate assistance under the framework of Article VII' as well as the establishment of guidelines for seeking assistance under Article VII, we particularly support the proposal by France and India to establish such a database.

Another priority of the European Union and its Member States is universal adherence to the Convention. We are pleased that since the Eight Review Conference in 2016, six States have joined the Convention: Samoa, Palestine, Niue, Central African Republic, Tanzania and Namibia. We furthermore call on all States not party to the Convention to adhere thereto without further delay. We encourage them to participate as observers in formal BTWC meetings and to implement, on a voluntary basis, its provisions. In line with this priority, the EU has carried out, in the run up to this Review Conference, demarches on universal adherence to the BTWC with States not party to the Convention.

We welcome the fact that in 2021 a record number of reports on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) was submitted by States Parties. We strongly encourage all States Parties to use EU-funded assistance tools such as the CBM guide and the electronic CBM facility to submit their annual CBM reports to the ISU. The EU furthermore recalls its long-standing support to further confidence building measures such as peer reviews, voluntary visits and other initiatives that contribute to enhance transparency.

At the same time, we also encourage States Parties to participate in peer review initiatives and voluntary visits to relevant facilities and other transparency and confidence-building initiatives. It is important to note that these initiatives are not designed to be substitutes for a legally-binding verification mechanism, but to strengthen national implementation and thereby the BTWC.

The assistance the ISU provides to States Parties for the implementation of their Treaty obligations and to the intersessional work programme is invaluable. The EU continues to support the strengthening of the ISU's role.

Timely and full contributions to the BTWC budget are the essential requirement for the functioning and strengthening of the Convention, including for convening regular meetings and sustaining the ISU. Once again, we call on all States to fulfil their financial obligations under the Convention and to pay their assessed contributions on time and in full. We urge States Parties in arrears to pay their dues without further delay.

Mr President,

Since 2006, the European Union has provided substantial financial support of circa EUR 12 million to BTWC core activities. The two Council Decisions that are being implemented by the ISU provide approximately EUR 5 million in support of the BTWC. The latest decision was adopted in November 2021 and it provides EUR 2 million support notably to activities in Africa in the context of the Global Partnership Signature Initiative strengthening Biosecurity in Africa. There will be several side events on projects conducted as part of European Union support to the BTWC.

Moreover, the EU is a staunch supporter of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons, the UNSGM. Currently we provide EUR 1,4 million in support of UNODA's efforts to further operationalise and strengthen this mechanism, which is the only existing international independent mechanism for investigating alleged use of biological weapons.

In this context, I also wish to also mention the important EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative that aims at enhancing the institutional capacity of partner countries to mitigate CBRN risks, whether deliberate, accidental, or natural in origin. Under this initiative, more than 90 projects have been funded, with one third of them addressing biological security amounting in overall to EUR 85 million. There will be a Side Event today (28 November) at 13:00 presenting the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence.

Mr President,

The EU underlines that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls is an important horizontal priority for the Union and emphasises the importance to integrate gender perspectives into discussions in the BTWC. Furthermore, as a firm supporter of Action 36 of United Nations Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament, which focuses on the 'Full and Equal Participation of Women in Decision-Making Processes', the EU fully supports and promotes the equal participation of women and men in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and encourages women's participation at the BTWC Review Conference.

We also support disarmament and non-proliferation education, to which the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, the European network of independent think tanks, is contributing with various activities. In line with the EU Youth Strategy, the EU also encourages the inclusion of youth in the debate relating to the BTWC. To that end, the EU recalls that on 21 January 2019 it adopted a Decision that provides funding in support of a project aimed at providing capacity-development opportunities for young policymakers, scientists and academics from the Global South engaged in fields related to the BTWC. A side event on the presentation of the recommendations of the Youth for Biosecurity initiative partners for the Review Conference will take place on 30 November.

Mr President,

We note that Russia has invoked procedures under Article V and Article VI of the Convention. Regrettably, this long-awaited Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC takes place at a time when Russia's unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine rages on, and Ukraine's civilian population and civilian infrastructure is being deliberately targeted and destroyed. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's aggression, which grossly violates international law and the UN Charter, and undermines international peace and security. As part of its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has been engaged in a campaign of disinformation in spreading unsubstantiated and unfounded claims, among other things, regarding alleged development of biological weapons in Ukraine.

Articles V and VI are crucial in ensuring confidence in compliance with the BTWC. They should therefore be invoked only on a well-founded basis. Efforts to misrepresent or undermine legitimate health related research and capacity building, including for strengthened biosafety and biosecurity, only weaken the Convention and undermine international cooperation for peaceful purposes under Article X. This includes important efforts to prevent, detect and control possible outbreaks of disease, which the European Union strongly supports.

The processes under Article V and VI have been concluded. Any further discussion here on the allegations would only prove the lack of good faith towards this Review Conference's goals. The States Parties should focus on the important task ahead of us: to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation, to ensure the Convention remains responsive to S&T developments, and to pave the way towards a productive intersessional period.

Mr President,

Allow me to assure you once again that the European Union and its Member States have a strong interest in a successful Ninth Review Conference and will spare no effort to this effect.

Thank you.

3.4.3. 9th Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – Closing remarks (Geneva, 16.12.2022)

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova, the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Canada align themselves with this declaration.

At the outset, we wish to express our appreciation for your leadership, tireless determination, diplomatic skills and dedicated efforts throughout the last three weeks. We also commend the significant work of your team, the Chairs of the Committee of the Whole and the Drafting Committee, all the facilitators, and the whole Implementation Support Unit.

As a long-term supporter of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), we have actively contributed to the success of the Ninth Review Conference. We have clearly reaffirmed our aspiration to adopt forward-looking decisions and recommendations, which would facilitate full and effective implementation of this important Convention, which relevance has been underscored by the disruptive pandemic of COVID-19.

We are pleased to see that a future-oriented package, although limited in its ambitions, has been adopted. But at the same time we regret that a few countries decided to take hostage the much larger aspirations of a wide membership of the BTWC across all three regional groups. The majority of States Parties not only aimed at addressing current challenges and significantly strengthening the convention but also at meeting today's needs through advancing assistance, cooperation, response and preparedness of the States Parties.

In particular, we welcome the establishment of a Working Group to strengthen the effectiveness and to improve the implementation of the Convention in all its aspects, the decision to develop a mechanism for international cooperation and assistance and for the review of scientific and technological developments. This opens a new opportunity to move this global norm into the 21st century. This is especially important in view of the current security environment marked by mistrust, increasingly high tensions and serious proliferation crises and challenges.

We deeply regret that despite the commendable efforts by you, Mr. President, the Chairs of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee, and all the facilitators, in lengthy negotiations over the past three weeks, it has not been possible to achieve consensus on a progressive Final Declaration that would advance commitments of the States Parties to the purposes of the Preamble and all the provisions of the Convention. We missed the unique opportunity to make tangible progress in all aspects of the Convention.

Moreover, we regret that in the Final Document we could not take into account the lessons learned of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The EU remains firmly committed to a multilateral and treaty-based approach that maintains and reinforces international peace and security. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is one of the major pillars of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. It embodies the important legally-binding norm that the development, production, stockpiling and usage of biological agents and toxins as weapons is prohibited. It is our hope that in a not very distant future there will be another occasion to join forces and work together with the whole international community to advance our common objective of strengthening this Convention and its implementation.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.5. BALLISTIC MISSILES

3.5.1. **DPRK: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch (Brussels, 25.3.2022)**

The EU strongly condemns the launch by the DPRK of an intercontinental ballistic missile on 24 March. This is a violation of multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions and a serious threat to international and regional peace and security. The EU calls on the DPRK to refrain from any further action that could increase international or regional tensions. The DPRK must comply with UN Security Council resolutions by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and cease immediately all related activities. The DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear weapons state. The EU calls on all UN Members to take action to implement in full the UN Security Council sanctions. The EU stands ready to implement and complement if necessary any action that could be taken by the UN Security Council in response to this event. The DPRK's blatant violations of international law divert resources from its own people, prevent its economic development and undermine the welfare of its people. The EU urges the DPRK to cease destabilising actions, respect international law, and resume dialogue with relevant partners. The EU stands ready to support any meaningful diplomatic process.

Ahead of the tenth NPT Review Conference, the EU insists that the DPRK returns to compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and brings into force the Additional Protocol. At the same time, the EU urges Pyongyang to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, The Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

3.5.2. **EU Statement at the 21st Annual Regular Meeting of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) (Vienna, 20.5.2022)**

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Norway, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Andorra and San Marino.

This year's Annual Regular Meeting takes place while one Subscribing State is conducting a full scale military invasion against another Subscribing State. The European Union condemns in the strongest possible terms this unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. The Russian invasion is a blatant violation of the UN Charter. It shows complete and utter disrespect for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Ukraine. Russia bears full responsibility for this act of aggression and for all the human suffering, loss of life and destruction it is causing. Russia will be held accountable for its actions.

We demand an immediate and unconditional termination of the Russian military invasion, and a complete withdrawal of all Russian forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine. We remain deeply concerned over recorded flights of Russian cruise missiles over Ukrainian territory, including over the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). We call on Russia to immediately cease such reckless actions, which pose a serious and direct threat to safety and security, significantly raise the risk of a nuclear accident and endanger the civilian population of Ukraine, neighbouring states and the entire international community.

Chair,

The HCoC is the only multilateral instrument aiming at both preventing ballistic missile proliferation and increasing transparency for the benefit of the Subscribers. The EU and its Member States reaffirm their strong support for the HCoC by actively promoting the universalisation, full implementation and efficient functioning of

the Code. We call on all UN Member States that have not yet done so, to subscribe to the Code. This will help build confidence, encourage restraint and create more peace and security for all. In this regard, the EU has actively engaged in diplomatic outreach to UN Member States that have not yet subscribed to the Code.

Since 2008, the EU has continued to provide significant political and financial support for the Code, a number of outreach events and meetings having taken place in cooperation with the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). In the framework of the current EU Council Decision, we have accomplished seven expert missions, eleven regional seminars, thirteen outreach events and published a number of papers related to the Code.

Chair,

The EU and its Member States remain gravely concerned by the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in particular the pursuit by several countries of concern of ballistic missile programmes in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. We call for the immediate dismantlement of such programmes, which are a source of mistrust and contribute to regional instability.

Since the last HCoC Annual Regular Meeting, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has launched a number of ballistic missiles, including yet another an intercontinental ballistic missile on 24 May 2022. The repeated ballistic missile launches by the DPRK represent a grave threat to regional and international peace and security and violate multiple UN Security Council Resolutions. We urge the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons and delivery systems programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to fully comply with all its international obligations and commitments. In particular, we call on the DPRK to comply with Security Council resolutions demanding that it shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation and to cease all activities linked to a ballistic missile programme. Until this happens, the EU and its Member States will continue to strictly enforce existing sanctions and call on all other States to do the same. Furthermore, the EU and its Member States recall that all UN Member States are obliged to implement the restrictions targeting the DPRK's illegal activities, as imposed by the UN Security Council, and should do their utmost to curb proliferation of goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile-related programmes, including the transfer of dual-used items and their financing.

The EU remains resolutely committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts undertaken within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to facilitate a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. Full and verified implementation of Iran's nuclear-related commitments will enable the international community to receive the necessary assurances. It is high time for Iran to seize the opportunity currently on the table to bring negotiations which started in Vienna more than fourteen months ago to a successful conclusion.

The EU urges Iran to refrain from any ballistic missile activities that are inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2231, notably its Annex B which calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology. Iran's space programme in particular is enabling it to test technology that is essential to the development of ballistic missiles, including future long-range delivery systems, as demonstrated again with Iran's announcement on 8 March of a launch of a military satellite. We urge Iran to cease all these activities and fully abide by UNSCR 2231 (2015). The EU continues to fully apply UNSCR 2231 provisions which prohibit the export of missile-related items to and from Iran unless authorised by the UN Security Council, and calls upon Iran to fully respect all relevant UN Security Council resolutions related to the transfer of missiles and relevant material and technology to state and non-state actors. We deplore the missile attack by the IRGC on Erbil on 13 March 2022 and reiterate our long-standing serious concern about the regional military build-up.

Since December 2012, the Syrian regime has launched numerous ballistic missiles, ranging from liquid-propellant Scud-based missiles but also more accurate and more operational solid-propellant Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs). The Syrian activities related to missile technology, along with strong indications of technical and financial support from third countries and resulting proliferation of missile technologies from the Syrian soil to non-state actors in the region, constitute a source of concern for the international community.

These developments in countries that are currently not subscribing to the Hague Code of Conduct only further highlight the importance of universalisation of the Code, which we will continue to promote through various activities funded under the EU Council Decision.

Chair,

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the Code and the EU, the Netherlands and France, with the support of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, organise an outreach event on 1 June, in Vienna, in order to mark this important occasion and discuss the further universalisation of the Code. In four sessions, experts and diplomats working on the Code will share their views on a number of relevant issues, from negotiating the Code back in 2002 to discussing its relevance today. This event will constitute a key milestone in the run-up to the vote on the biannual UNGA resolution in support of the Code, at the end of this year.

Let me conclude by warmly welcoming Nigeria's Ambassador Umar as the new Chair for 2022 to 2023 and expressing our gratitude to Ambassador Ainchil of Argentina for all the work and efforts undertaken during his HCoC chairmanship. We also thank Austria for its efficient support to the Code as the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) in Vienna.

The EU would also like to assure you of our full support and cooperation for the issuance of a communiqué by this Annual Regular Meeting which should help to increase awareness and mobilise further international support for the HCoC.

Thank you Chair.

3.5.3. DPRK: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the recent launch of multiple missiles (Brussels, 5.11.2022)

The EU strongly condemns the significant increase of illegal missile launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), including, an intercontinental ballistic missile and the short-range ballistic missile that landed south of the Northern Limit Line.

These actions represent a dangerous escalation in the DPRK's repeated violation of UN Security Council resolutions. The unprecedented number of DPRK ballistic missiles launched in 2022 represents an alarming illustration of its intention to continue undermining the global non-proliferation regime. This poses a grave threat to all nations and undermines international and regional peace and security.

The DPRK's actions demand a resolute and united response by the international community. The EU calls on all UN Member States, especially Members of the UN Security Council, to ensure the full implementation of sanctions to prevent the DPRK from procuring materials, knowledge and finance that support its illegal weapons programmes.

The DPRK must immediately comply with UN Security Council resolutions by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and cease all related activities.

The EU stresses yet again that the illegal actions taken by the DPRK cannot and will never confer upon it the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the NPT or any other special status in this regard. The EU urges the DPRK to return immediately to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The EU expresses its full solidarity with Japan and the Republic of Korea and reiterates its call on the DPRK to cease its aggressive and destabilising actions, respect international law and resume dialogue with all relevant parties. The only route to sustainable peace and security lies in dialogue. The EU reiterates its readiness to support a meaningful diplomatic process aimed at building peace and security and pursuing complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

The candidate countries Türkiye, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova, the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this declaration.

3.5.4. DPRK/North Korea: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (Brussels, 19.11.2022)

The EU strongly condemns the DPRK's launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile that landed in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone on 18 November. The EU is deeply concerned by such dangerous, illegal and reckless action.

Pyongyang's continuing efforts to develop ever more menacing means to deliver weapons of mass destruction threatens all countries. The EU urges the DPRK to immediately stop destabilising actions that violate United Nations Security Council resolutions and raise international and regional tensions.

The EU calls upon the DPRK to comply with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions. The DPRK must abandon all its nuclear weapons, any other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and cease immediately all related activities.

The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is critical that the United Nations Security Council responds in an appropriate manner in order to address the growing threat the DPRK poses to international peace and security. The EU recalls the duty for all UN Members to take action to fully implement sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council.

The EU insists that the DPRK returns to full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon State and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and brings into force the Additional Protocol. At the same time, the EU urges Pyongyang to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The EU expresses its solidarity with Japan and the Republic of Korea and once again urges the DPRK to resume meaningful dialogue with all the main parties concerned. The EU stands ready to support any meaningful diplomatic process and is committed to working with all relevant partners to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

3.6. UNSCR 1540

3.6.1. EU Statement – UN 1540 Committee: Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540 (New York, 1.6.2022)

Mr Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

Let me start by congratulating you, Ambassador de la Fuente Ramírez and your team for organising these Open Consultations as a part of the Comprehensive Review on the status of Implementation of Resolution 1540. It is an essential step towards a meaningful and inclusive review process. I would also like to thank the members of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts for their work on the review.

Mr Chairman,

Security Council Resolution 1540 is a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture, a key part of the global efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, including to terrorists and other non-state actors.

The EU Member states are at the forefront of implementing the provisions of Resolution 150 in national legislation. However, the protection against proliferation of materials and know-how only works if it is executed and monitored across borders and sectors. That is why we work with partner countries to strengthen their capacity to adhere to the provisions of

Resolution 1540 and support the UN agencies in their work to promote understanding and compliance. Let me underline that the implementation of Resolution 1540 is not only about non-proliferation; it also encourages and strengthens a wide range of other goals: border control, trade and export control, environmental protection and public health. The unfolding of Russia's unjustified war against Ukraine has thrown a light on the broader relevance of this regime and exposed the vulnerability of chemical, biological and nuclear facilities and the vital importance of ensuring control and monitoring.

We are encouraged to see that the Group of Experts has registered progress in implementing the provisions of Resolution 1540 in national legislation. With the voluntary cooperation and sharing of know-how and best practices promoted by the Group of Experts, the necessary frameworks and mechanisms to ensure enforcement are also established. We are and will remain strong supporters of this work.

Mr Chairman,

The Comprehensive Review provides an important opportunity to take stock of the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and discuss how the regime can be adjusted: build on what is working and address new challenges.

An essential element of the 1540 regime is the 2011 decision to establish a Group of Experts. The nine group members have undertaken important work to monitor implementation and, just as importantly, support and assist member states in raising awareness, coordinating assistance, and identifying and sharing best practices. The importance of the Group of Experts' active outreach should be underlined and emphasised in the next mandate.

The development of new technologies to produce and deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction is moving quickly. To remain relevant and effective, the next mandate needs to reflect scientific advances in nuclear, chemical and biological research and related technological developments.

Also, the provisions to counter proliferation financing have to be strengthened as recommended by the Financial Actions Task Force.

Finally, the Women, Peace and Security agenda should also be considered in the new mandate. The Secretary-General's 'Agenda for Disarmament' points out that empowering women and ensuring their equal and meaningful participation in disarmament and arms control decision-making processes can lead to more inclusive, effective and sustainable policy outcomes.

Mr Chairman,

The EU and its Member States will remain strong and active supporters of the full and universal implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540. The provisions of the Resolution are implemented through national legislation and, as a regional organisation based on tight trade relations, the establishment of EU-wide regional preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks and security policy, emphasising cross-border and cross-sectoral cooperation. The aim is to ensure the legitimate commercial exchange and peaceful use of sensitive materials and technologies while keeping them safe from criminal and terrorist actors. Importantly, the EU helps others implement the 1540 obligations through bilateral cooperation and assistance partnerships and support to the UN and regional organisations.

Firstly, we currently provide a total of over UDE 48 million in support of non-proliferation efforts globally through international organisations, most importantly UNODA, OSCE, IAEA, OPCW and OAS. The aim is notably to help partner countries develop relevant regulatory frameworks; improve the safety and security of their biological and chemical laboratories and to raise awareness of their scientists.

Secondly, the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence Initiative provides significant assistance to mitigate risks from accidental, natural or criminal incidents in partner countries. This needs- and demand-driven initiative strengthens all-hazards security governance, both at national and regional levels. With a budget of almost USD 180 million in 2021–2028, the CBRN Centres of Excellence support capacity building through real-time, large-scale cross-border exercises with 62 countries.

Thirdly, the EU also helps States mitigate CBRN risks through the EU Partner-to-Partner Export Control Programme for Dual-Use Goods, which focuses on reducing the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by strengthening international cooperation in the field of dual-use trade controls and strengthening national and regional capacity.

Finally, the EU remains a strong supporter of the implementation of the conventions and regimes and initiatives related to non-proliferation and disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction, most importantly the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), UN Secretary General's Mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons (UNSGM), the Hague Code of Conduct as well as the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr Chairman,

The EU and its Member States will continue to actively contribute to the universal implementation of Resolution 1540 through national programmes and our expansive help and assistance to other countries, bilaterally and through international and regional organisations. The new mandate should strengthen what works best and adjust with a view to new challenges, risks, and vulnerabilities to ensure that the 1540 regime remains a relevant and effective instrument.

Thank you.

3.7. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

3.7.1. **EU Statement on the consideration of the implementation of the Programme of Action – Eighth Biennial Meeting of States (New York, 27.7.2022)**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area as well as the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

Allow me first to congratulate you on your appointment as chairperson. The European Union (EU) welcomes the transparent and inclusive way you have steered preparations for this meeting.

Mr. Chair,

We convene here today amid Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, which has increased global insecurity. Nations from every corner of the world have united at the UN General Assembly in calling for peace, demanding that Russia immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraws from the territory of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders, demanding civilian protection and humanitarian access in Ukraine.

Russia, bears full responsibility for the loss of life, the human suffering and all the destruction it causes in Ukraine. The EU fully acknowledges Ukraine's right to self-defence and the Ukrainian armed forces' efforts to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity and population in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. We commend the Ukrainian people's strength, courage and resistance to withstand Russia's aggression and we stand with them in firm solidarity.

Mr. Chair,

The diversion, illicit trade and unauthorised use of small arms and light weapons continues to constitute a serious impediment for peace, growth, development, and security in the world. Ever since its adoption in 2001, the EU has actively promoted the implementation of the UN Programme of Action (UN PoA) to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects. The EU considers that the UN PoA continues to provide an effective framework for states valid and effective strategy to consider, commit to, and implement activities to address such impediments.

In order to further strengthen its action against the destabilising accumulation and spread of SALW and their ammunition, the Council of the European Union on 19 November 2018 adopted the EU strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition 'Securing arms, protecting citizens'.

With regard to the implementation of the UN PoA, the EU supports the inclusion of the following elements in the outcome document of the BMS8.

BMS8 should promote the exchange of information between states on identified diversion in order to expose and cut off arms trafficking channels, and in order to improve the capacity for risk assessment in the context of arms export control (link with Article 11 of Arms Trade Treaty). The prevention of diversion of small arms to unauthorised actors constitutes an undeniable link between the UN PoA and the Arms Trade Treaty, especially with the first programmed meeting of the Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF) during CSP8. The EU deplores that some states deny this link, thereby remaining blind for the synergies between the UN PoA and the ATT. The EU would like to see BMS8 recognise that the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol contribute to the implementation of the UN PoA, which is supported by synergies with international instruments with similar objectives.

States should underline their commitment to promote national implementation by means of, where appropriate, dedicated interagency coordination bodies, national action plans and strategies, national points of contact, national legislation, including penal clauses, regulations, administrative procedures and record-keeping. The monitoring of the relevant aspects of the SALW life cycle including manufacturing and marking, trade, export control, safe and secure stockpiling and disposal is also critical.

States should confirm their commitment to transparency by sharing national points of contact for the UN PoA, submitting their biennial reports on the status of the UN PoA and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) implementation, by including SALW in their reports for the UN Register of Conventional Arms, and by promoting synergies on that matter with other related international instruments such as the Arms Trade Treaty.

Controlling the export and import of arms is an important tool in the fight against illicit SALW. The risk of SALW diversion can significantly be reduced by effective arms export control and risk assessment prior to authorising a transfer. The use of authenticated end-user agreements, as supported by the UN PoA, should be promoted.

BMS8 should confirm that, in line with the 2030 Agenda, including SDG Targets 16.1 and 16.4. that are shared objectives with the UN PoA, sustainable development cannot be realised without peace and security and that peace and security will be at risk without sustainable development. Curbing the illicit trade in SALW and ammunition is crucial in this regard.

The EU supports BMS8 discussions on increasing the measurability of the impact of cooperation and assistance in SALW control. We should promote and support the implementation of standards and best practices for the handling and stockpiling of small arms and ammunition, such as the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (Mosaic) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). The application of new technologies should be considered with a view to improved Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM).

SALW-control should be promoted in bilateral and interregional security cooperation, including cross-border cooperation and information sharing between law enforcement and customs agencies. Regional and sub-regional organisations have an important role in assisting states in their implementation of the UN PoA. BMS8 should reiterate the important role played by researchers, civil society and industry in the UN PoA related activities. Civil society plays an essential role in increasing accountability and transparency in conventional arms control as well as informing and shaping all levels of decision-making.

In the outcome document, States should underscore the importance of a gender sensitive approach to SALW-control, acknowledge the differing impacts of armed violence on women, men, girls and boys, and, with the aim of improving their effectiveness, promote a strong role of women in the implementation of the UN PoA and gender mainstreaming in SALW control actions. The EU would like to see a reference to UNSCR 1325 of 2000 on Women, Peace and Security in the BMS8 outcome document, and in this regard a special reference to UNSCR 2242 of 2015 that specifically encourages empowering of women with the efforts related to the fight against illicit SALW.

BMS8 should address the issue of illicit manufacture through illicit reactivation of deactivated firearms and the illicit conversion of blank firearms. They should consider the establishment of an international standard for irreversible deactivation and a standard for manufacturing norms for blank firearms, with a view to rendering impossible this source of illicit firearms.

The scope of the UN PoA must include preventing, combatting and eradicating the illicit trade in ammunition. In this context, we welcome the work of the Open-ended working group (OEWG) on conventional ammunition in the context of UNGA Resolution 76/233 of 24 December 2021 and we look forward to building upon the outcomes of this body in the implementation of safe and secure management of ammunition over its whole life-cycle with a focus on preventing diversion and unintended explosions.

BMS8 should highlight the role of the UN PoA in the fight against terrorism. The EU supports the reference to Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (Manpads) to be included in the outcome document as these weapons pose a very specific risk when diverted into unauthorised hands.

The outcome document should also address the growing importance of internet and online transactions, including the intangible transfer of technology and design, with regard to the illicit trade in SALW and their parts and components.

BMS8 should call for increasing capacities to monitor and enforce arms embargoes, i.a. by supporting the work of UN panels that monitor arms embargoes. UN and regional peace support missions should improve exchange of information on illicit flows of SALW with UN panel of experts when present in the same region.

Finally, BMS8 should also pay attention to addressing illicit SALW in conflict-affected areas, i.a. by encouraging the involvement where appropriate, of UN and regional peace support operations in the collecting, recording, tracing and destruction of illicit SALW and their ammunition, and support national capacities to track and trace the origins of illicit SALW and ammunition. This should also include taking account of SALW and ammunition in post-conflict reconstruction programmes and Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes in particular.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

3.7.2. EU Statement – On consideration of the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, 8th Biennial Meeting of States on the UN POA to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (New York, 28.6.2022)

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area as well as the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

The EU welcomes today's opportunity to assess the state of play in the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). The EU is a convinced supporter of the ITI. We consider it as one of the most important achievements of the UN Programme of Action and an essential tool in the fight against diversion, un-authorised re-export and the illicit trade in SALW.

The ITI provides the only global standard on how and where to mark SALW. Through the ITI all States have committed themselves to mandatory marking and record-keeping of SALW and to cooperate internationally with the tracing of seized and collected illicit SALW. The ITI is therefore a unique and essential component of the capacity of states to identify and fight arms trafficking. It is the responsibility of this Biennial Meeting to make sure that the ITI can continue to deliver this essential contribution, also in the light of developments in manufacture, technology and design of SALW.

In relation to this, the EU is concerned that the ITI does not properly address the developments in manufacture, technology and design of SALW like modular and polymer frame weapons. The EU therefore wants BMS8 to agree on the establishment of an Open-Ended Technical Expert Group and on its modalities, to ensure the effectiveness and applicability of the ITI in the light of developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design.

The absence of a global standard on how and where to mark modular weapons risks gradually undermining the capacity to trace these weapons if there is no agreement on what constitutes the essential component which should bear the marking. This process should also reflect other implications of developments in SALW technology and design, including increased use of polymers, 3D-printed weapons, and developments in marking, recordkeeping and tracing.

Given the limited space that is fit for durable marking on SALW with polymer frames, the increased use of polymer frames complicates the application of markings that are required or recommended by the ITI, including import markings. The EU is therefore of the view that the outcome document should promote import marking, if possible, at time of manufacture.

Developments in SALW technology and design do not only pose challenges for the implementation of the ITI. They also offer opportunities for more effective marking, recordkeeping and tracing, and hence more secure control of SALW in general.

The EU and its Member States have been flagging this issue since BMS4 in 2010, already eleven years ago. The issue is real and well documented. All stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies and industry, have flagged it since many years. It is our responsibility to start this process at BMS8.

Finally, the EU promotes the tracing of SALW in conflict affected areas. Conflict tracing can contribute to the identification and containment of illicit arms flows and trafficking channels into conflict zones and to the reduction of violence. UN and regional peace support operations may take up a role in the collection, recording, tracing and destruction of illicit SALW and their ammunition, in accordance with their mandates and resources, where possible, in cooperation with UN expert groups in charge of monitoring UN arms embargoes. Conflict tracing can also be supported through capacity development for local security and law enforcement agencies for tracing and investigation, in combination with promotion of the iARMS database of Interpol and other relevant databases; and by supporting initiatives such as iTrace by Conflict Armament Research.

States should call for increasing capacities to monitor and enforce arms embargoes, inter alia by supporting the work of UN panels that monitor arms embargoes.

Thank you, Mr. Chair

3.7.3. **EU Statement – 2022 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Geneva, 16.11.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine and the potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

I would like to begin by congratulating Poland on its assumption of the Presidency of the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties and assure you of the EU's full support. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank France for its skilful chairing of the Review Conference last year.

The EU recalls that the CCW and its Protocols are an essential and integral part of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and reiterates the commitment of the European Union and its Member States to respect and comply fully with IHL, as well as to continue implementing fully the EU Guidelines on the promotion of compliance with IHL. The EU emphasises the importance of the universalisation of the Convention and its Protocols, which remains a top priority and supports all efforts to this end. We call upon all countries that have not yet done so to join them as soon as possible.

The EU underlines that the CCW is a unique international forum gathering diplomatic, legal and military expertise. In light of the particular challenges of weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, this expertise has previously led to the adoption of prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific weapons, such as incendiary weapons, as codified in Protocol III, as well as to prohibitions on the use of specific weapons, such as reflected in Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons. The Convention offers, inter alia, a flexible way to respond to new developments in weapons technologies and to support the implementation of an essential part of IHL, which contributes to preventing and reducing the suffering of both civilians and combatants

In addition, we need to underline the importance of transparency and confidence building in the implementation of the CCW and its Protocols and encourage High Contracting Parties to complete detailed reports on a regular basis. We are also fully committed to mainstreaming a gender perspective into all disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control efforts, including by promoting women's meaningful participation in the CCW and other disarmament fora.

In this context, the EU welcomes the work done over the past years by the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and acknowledges its substantial contribution and ongoing efforts to find common understanding of this complex issue. The EU underlines that the CCW is the relevant international forum in this regard, and that we expect it to deliver results, given that the topic of Lethal Autonomous weapons systems is an important topic that should be addressed taking into account operational, legal, technological aspects and bearing in mind ethical perspectives. The EU emphasises that it is important that the GGE continue its efforts, according to its mandate, building on past achievements to allow for progress. We need, therefore, to address these issues with urgency as the research and development of new weapons technologies progresses at a rapid pace.

The EU remains committed to pursue its efforts in the GGE with a view to ensuring that the outcome reflects the necessity of compliance with International Law, in particular International Humanitarian Law, taking into account relevant ethical considerations. Human beings must make the decisions with regard to the use of lethal force, exert control over weapons systems that they use and remain accountable for decisions over the use of force in order to ensure compliance with International Law, in particular International Humanitarian Law across the life cycle of these weapon systems. We believe that a two-tier or dual track approach to weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS merits further consideration. This approach is based on the prohibition of systems that cannot be used in compliance with IHL, and the regulation of other types of systems featuring autonomy in order to ensure the compliance with the rules and principles of IHL.

The EU remains deeply concerned about the continued severe global impact of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and their indiscriminate use and effects, in particular in the perpetration of terrorist acts and the use of IEDs by non-state actors. In this context, we welcome the updated political Declaration on IEDs adopted last year by the High Contracting Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II and remain in full support of the relevant United Nations General Assembly Resolutions.

The EU highlights the humanitarian impact and the heavy consequences on social and economic development caused by the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM). While acknowledging that MOTAPM are legitimate weapons, Parties are obliged to ensure that they are used in accordance with IHL, including by taking all feasible precautions, to protect civilians from the effects of these weapons. The EU urges States Parties to further discuss how to ensure compliance with Amended Protocol II, also with respect to MOTAPM. MOTAPM should therefore remain on the CCW agenda in order to ensure that High Contracting Parties can continue to consider the matter in a constructive and transparent manner.

The EU remains concerned about the reported use of incendiary weapons against civilians or against targets located within a concentration of civilians, their indiscriminate use causing cruel effects and unacceptable suffering. We call on all States not yet party to join Protocol III of the Convention, which prohibits in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons and we urge all States to fully comply with its provisions. We regret that Protocol III issues were removed from the CCW agenda because of the opposition by one High Contracting Party and we request to have them back next year. Our work is based on the clear understanding that appropriate time has to be allocated to allow a structured debate on the implementation of the Convention and all of its Protocols.

Mr. President,

We face one of the most significant challenges to global peace and security. Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression is an affront to everything we work for here. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's gross violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions as well as the use of other explosive weapons, such as rockets and artillery shells or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) directed against civilians in Ukraine. The EU actively supports the work of the International Criminal Court in ensuring accountability for the most serious international crimes.

We recall that the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine confirmed in its report of 18 October to the UN General Assembly (A/77/533) that war crimes, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed in Ukraine since 24 February 2022 by in particular Russian armed forces.

We demand the Russian Federation to immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.

I thank you, Mr. President.

3.7.4. EU Statement – Twentieth meeting of the States Parties of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Geneva, 21.11.2022)

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The candidate countries North Macedonia and Montenegro and the potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina align themselves with this declaration.

At the outset, allow me to congratulate you, Ambassador Alvaro Enrique Ayala Melendez of Colombia, for assuming the Presidency of the Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. I wish to also acknowledge all efforts of your predecessor Ambassador Arango Olmos and her team for skilfully steering the preparations for this important meeting.

Over the last 25 years, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, has become a success story of multilateral diplomacy with a total of 164 countries bound by the global norm it established. Since then, considerable progress has been made to stop the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines. By virtue of this joint multilateral effort, significantly fewer people have been injured or killed because of an anti-personnel mine.

This remarkable result could not have been achieved without the devotion and commitment of the mine ban community, in particular the commitment of survivors and civil society, who work globally and in mine affected countries, often risking their own lives. The EU is fully committed to ensuring the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society, based on respect for human rights, gender equality, inclusion and non-discrimination.

With all its Member States being parties to the Convention, the EU is strongly united in upholding the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. The EU continues to be fully committed to strengthen the ban against anti-personnel mines and to achieve a world free of anti-personnel mines, and free of any new victims. Furthermore, it is of utmost importance that we continue our collective efforts in order to meet the obligations under the Convention; to achieve the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, the clearance of mine-contaminated land, provide mine risk education assistance to mine victims and sustainable national capacities. The MSP represents a key platform to share information on progress made and maintain the momentum towards the full implementation of the Oslo Action Plan.

The EU is also committed to mainstreaming a gender perspective into its mine action work and we continue to support the work of stakeholders in mine action to integrate gender perspective and take diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities into their humanitarian mine action policies.

While we celebrate this anniversary, this year we are witnessing a significant challenge to this norm. In this respect, the EU deplores the alleged use of anti-personnel mines by Myanmar, a terrible assault on collective international efforts banning this weapon. Moreover, the EU condemns the continued use in ongoing conflicts, in particular in Ukraine.

We condemn Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. This war of aggression is not only a blatant violation of international law but also a humanitarian catastrophe for Ukraine and its people brought about by the Russian Federation in flagrant disrespect for international humanitarian law and human rights law. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's use of anti-personnel landmines and we call for immediate cease of use of this insidious weapon in Ukraine.

We call on Russia to immediately stop its military activities and demand the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders. The EU also calls on all stakeholders to refrain from the production, stockpiling, trade in and transfer of anti-personnel mines and strongly condemn their use anywhere, at any time, by any actors, whether States or non-States actors.

In conclusion, we invite all partners to renew efforts to eliminate the violent impact of anti-personnel mines and explosive ordnance. The EU remains committed to mine action and will continue to be dedicated to assist in achieving our common goals from Colombia to Cambodia and elsewhere to achieve an anti-personnel mine free world. Let us step up our efforts to ensure the rigorous implementation of the Ottawa Convention.

In conclusion, we expect from this meeting the reaffirmation that human life, human dignity and human rights are at the core of our work. We thank the entire international community and we are pleased to partner with the UN entities, the ICRC, GICHD, international and regional organisations and civil society. We extend our special appreciation to the Implementation support Unit of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention for excellently implementing the EU's projects and for their dedication and invaluable work in the implementation of the Conventions' goals.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.8. EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES

3.8.1. **EU Explanation of Vote – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security (New York, 3.11.2022)**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Member States of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and the Republic of Moldova, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, San Marino and Canada align themselves with this statement.

The EU calls upon States to vote against the Chinese draft resolution L.56 submitted to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, titled 'Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the context of International Security'.

This resolution further builds last year's Resolution 76/234. And despite the fact that divergent views and serious concerns were expressed since the adoption of that resolution, there is no reflection of these concerns in the draft text.

This resolution continues to suggest a false dichotomy between peaceful uses of nuclear, chemical and biological materials on one hand, and export control regimes and other non-proliferation measures on the other.

We recall that a number of export control regimes and related arrangements have been established to contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. These include the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Wassenaar Arrangement and Zangger Committee. These multilateral regimes contribute to the enhancement of international peace and security by preventing the diversion of sensitive materials, technology and equipment to end-users of concern. They further contribute to the implementation of treaty obligations on non-proliferation and UN Security Council resolutions. The export control regimes are setting clear guidelines and control lists, which give the exporting states necessary assurances to export sensitive products to trusted recipients.

Export control regimes are open to membership based on transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria. All States can adhere to, and benefit from, the guidelines of the regimes and apply the control lists, as they are public documents available on the regimes' websites. Outreach is also conducted through the regimes to non-Participating States in order to inform them about changes in the control lists, address membership issues and answer other questions non-Participating States might have. Specific topics, including those with regard to peaceful uses, can be raised on these occasions. Individual trade restrictions can always be addressed bilaterally and/or through the appropriate multilateral bodies. The EU fully supports this transparency.

The EU is concerned with the unfounded suggestion that export control measures and regimes put 'undue restrictions' on exports of sensitive items. This assertion is not based on facts. Unfortunately, this negative approach to export controls could ultimately undermine international trade as well as scientific and technological cooperation, which requires robust and trustworthy export controls.

The draft implies export control authorities of UN Member States do not exercise their task correctly, considering that export control decisions fall within the national competence of States, based on their national, regional and international obligations. In mentioning 'undue restrictions', the draft resolution disregards the content of the report of the UN Secretary-General (A/77/96), in which no evidence or facts have been presented to support the claim that existing export controls are excessive or undue. The report also highlighted that there are no findings in the comprehensive review of UNSC Resolution 1540 that 'undue restrictions' through export controls would inhibit sustainable development. Furthermore, in contributions to the report no suggestions were submitted for concrete initiatives outside the existing frameworks whereas this draft resolution keeps the way open to the creation of a new framework on peaceful uses, which would be parallel to the one already existing.

On the contrary, the report contained, in the submissions, various initiatives to strengthen the IAEA, BTWC, and CWC frameworks. These initiatives should be addressed in the frameworks of these respective instruments.

The EU fully supports international cooperation on peaceful uses and already actively promotes it, for instance by supporting the role of the IAEA or of the OPCW in third countries and financing concrete projects in support of peaceful uses. The EU and its Member States are the largest donor of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology that will provide better training facilities for developing countries. The EU and its Member States are also among the largest contributors to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme. Many countries have benefited from these EU-funded projects. The EU is providing widespread support to partner countries in setting up or enhancing their own export control systems, as required by UNSC Resolution 1540 in order to prevent illicit exports of sensitive goods to non-state actors, through the CBRN Centres of Excellence in 64 countries and the EU P2P export control outreach programme.

Given the important contribution of multilateral export control regimes to international peace and security as well as facilitating legitimate trade and international cooperation, this framework must not be undermined. Unfortunately, we do not see an impartial and balanced approach in this draft, and therefore call upon States to vote against the resolution

In addition and on top of what has been said, we would like to recall that the main sponsor is a member of export control regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which puts the motivation of this initiative into question.
