



**Metinė pažangos ataskaita dėl Europos Sąjungos kovos su masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimu
strategijos įgyvendinimo (2022 m.)**

(C/2023/383)

TURINYS

SANTRAUKA	1
ĮVADAS	2
BRANDUOLINIAI KLAUSIMAI	3
Branduolinio ginklo neplatinimo sutartis	3
Tarptautinė atominės energijos agentūra	4
Visuotinio branduolinių bandymų uždraudimo sutartis	5
Branduolinis saugumas ir susiję klausimai	5
Tikrinimo režimai ir iniciatyvos	7
Regioniniai klausimai ir aspektai	7
CHEMINIS GINKLAS	8
BIOLOGINIAI GINKLAI	9
BALISTINĖS RAKETOS	9
JUNGTINIŲ TAUTŲ SAUGUMO TARYBOS REZOLIUCIJA 1540	10
ĮPRASTINIAI GINKLAI	11
Šaulių ir lengvieji ginklai	11
Priešpėstinės minos	12
EKSPORTO KONTROLĖS REŽIMAI	13
Branduolinių tiekėjų grupė	13
Australijos grupė	13
MTCR	14
Vasenaro susitarimas	14
BESIFORMUOJANČIOS TECHNOLOGIJOS	14
BENDRADARBIAVIMAS SU IDĖJŲ KALVĖMIS IR NVO	15
DIALOGAS IR BENDRADARBIAVIMAS SU TREČIOSIOMIS VALSTYBĖMIS	16

SANTRAUKA

2022 m. tarptautinis ginklų neplatinimo ir nusiginklavimo režimas patyrė vis didesnę įtampą. Po dvejus metus trukusio sutrikdymo, kurį sukėlė COVID-19 pandemija, pradėjus vėl reguliariai rengti daugiašalių forumų susitikimus, Rusijos pradėtas neteisėtas agresijos karas prieš Ukrainą, kuriuo šiurkščiai pažeidžiama tarptautinė teisė ir JT Chartijos principai, dar labiau sumažino subjektų tarpusavio pasitikėjimą ir padarė tiesioginį ir didelį poveikį visoms priemonėms ir mechanizms. Skleisdama dezinformaciją, vis labiau naudodama savo agresyvią retoriką, blokuodama konsensusą arba atsisakydama įsipareigojimų įgyvendinti esamas priemones (priklausomai nuo konkretaus atvejo), Rusija per visus 2022 m. labai prisidėjo prie tarptautinių ginklų neplatinimo ir nusiginklavimo mechanizmų ardymo, todėl šie mechanizmai susidūrė su didžiausiais per keletą dešimtmečių iššūkiais.

Susidūrusi su šia sudėtinga ir daug dėmesio reikalaujančia situacija, ES ir toliau nepaliaujamai taikė pagrindinius principus, nustatytus esamuose strateginiuose dokumentuose, pavyzdžiui, Visuotinėje ES užsienio ir saugumo politikos strategijoje (dok. 10715/16), ES kovos su masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimu strategijoje (dok. 15708/03) ar naujose veiksmų kryptyse (dok. 17172/08), t. y. šiuos principus:

- veiksmingas daugiašališkumas, užtikrinant pasaulinės ginklų neplatinimo ir nusiginklavimo architektūros centrinių vaidmenį ir jos visuotinio taikymo propagavimą, šiuo tikslu vykdanč diplomatinius veiksmus ir teikiant finansinę paramą trečiosioms valstybėms ir tarptautinėms organizacijoms;
- glaudus bendradarbiavimas su valstybėmis siekiant stiprinti tarptautinį ginklų neplatinimo režimą;
- ginklų neplatinimo klausimų nagrinėjimas ES dvišaliuose dialogo politiniuose ir ginklų neplatinimo bei nusiginklavimo klausimais susitikimuose, taip pat mažiau formaliuose pasitarimuose ir
- veiksmingas ir papildomas visų turimų priemonių ir finansinių išteklių naudojimas siekiant paremti ES užsienio politikos tikslus.

2022 m. ES ir toliau didino savo strateginį dėmesį ginklų neplatinimui ir nusiginklavimui – kovo 21 d. priėmė ES saugumo ir gynybos strateginį kėlodį (dok. 7371/22). Pagal jį ES ir jos valstybės narės įsipareigoja, *inter alia*, palaikyti, remti ir toliau plėtoti nusiginklavimo, ginklų neplatinimo ir ginklų kontrolės sistemą, atsižvelgdamos į pasaulinius ir regioninius iššūkius, laikydamosi su partneriais suderinto požiūrio. Strateginiame kėlodyje tarp šių iššūkių nurodytos KLDK ir Irano branduolinės programos, kartotinis cheminio ginklo naudojimas, naujų pažangių balistinių, sparnuotųjų ir hipergarsinių raketų kūrimas ir dislokavimas, Rusijos ir Kinijos branduolinių arsenalų plėtojimas, Rusijos branduoliniai grasinimai jos invazijos į Ukrainą kontekste ir Europos ginklų kontrolės architektūros ardymas.

Per visus 2022 m. ES kartu su savo valstybėmis narėmis ir bendraminčiais partneriais gynė pasaulinę masinio naikinimo ginklų (MNG) neplatinimo ir nusiginklavimo šioje srityje architektūrą. Praėjus vos kelioms dienoms nuo Rusijos agresijos karo pradžios, Nusiginklavimo konferencijoje ES pasmerkė šį karą ir jo poveikį. ES aktyviai dalyvavo derybose dėl galutinio baigiamojo dokumento Branduolinio ginklo neplatinimo sutarties dešimtojoje peržiūros konferencijoje, tačiau joje nepavyko pasiekti konsensuso dėl to, kad jam prieštaravo vienintelė dalyvė – Rusija. ES prisidėjo prie to, kad Biologinių ginklų konvencijos devintojoje peržiūros konferencijoje pavyko sėkmingai susitarti dėl baigiamojo dokumento ir sprendimo įsteigti ekspertų darbo grupę, kad būtų sukurtas mechanizmas, kurį taikant būtų peržiūrėti ir įvertinti su konvencija susiję mokslo ir technologijų pokyčiai, taip pat atnaujintas su tikrinimu susijęs darbas, be kitų pagrindinių aspektų.

Įprastinių ginklų klausimu ES prisidėjo prie darbo pagrindiniuose daugiašaliuose forumuose, kurių paskirtis – užkirsti kelią neteisėtai prekybai jais ir ją pažaboti (Sutartis dėl prekybos ginklais, Jungtinių Tautų veiksmų programa dėl neteisėtos prekybos šaulių ir lengvaisiais ginklais (SLG) prevencijos, kovos su ja ir jos panaikinimo, Konvencija dėl priešpėstinių minų uždraudimo). Ji toliau vykdė pajėgumų stiprinimo projektus, susijusius su fiziniu saugumu, atsargų valdymu, ženkliniu, registravimu ar atsekamumu keliuose pasaulio regionuose. Visų pirma 2022 m. ES toliau bendradarbiavo su Ukraina grėsmių, kylančių dėl SLG nukreipimo ir neteisėtos prekybos jais, klausimais.

ES toliau tvirtai gynė daugiašalius eksporto kontrolės režimus, nes jie yra gyvybiškai svarbus kovos su ginklų platinimu elementas, ir prisidėjo prie tarptautinių pastangų valdyti besiformuojančias technologijas, kurios potencialiai gali turėti įtakos nusiginklavimui. Visose šiose darbo kryptyse ES palaikė nuolatinį dialogą su trečiosiomis valstybėmis ir glaudžiai bendradarbiavo su pilietine visuomene. Ji taip pat toliau propagavo kompleksinius prioritetus, pavyzdžiui, paramą lyčių lygybei bei su ja susijusią pažangą ir moterų įgalėjimą visoje ginklų neplatinimo ir nusiginklavimo sferoje.

IVADAS

Šioje ataskaitoje apžvelgiama pažanga, padaryta 2022 m. įgyvendinant 2003 m. gruodžio mėn. Europos Vadovų Tarybos priimtą ES kovos su masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimu strategiją (dok. 15708/03), kurią papildė 2008 m. gruodžio 8–9 d. Tarybos patvirtintos „Naujos Europos Sąjungos veiksmų kryptys kovojant su masinio naikinimo ginklų ir jų siuntimo į taikinių sistemų platinimu“ (dok. 17172/08). Siekiant išsamumo trumpai aptariami ir kiti su įprastiniais ginklais susiję aspektai.

Ši ataskaita nėra baigtinė, joje daugiausia dėmesio skiriama pagrindiniams pokyčiams.

Vadovaujant vyriausiajam įgaliotiniui užsienio reikalams ir saugumo politikai, prie šių bendrų pastangų aktyviai prisideda Europos išorės veiksmų tarnyba (EIVT) kartu su valstybėmis narėmis ir Europos Komisija. ES specialioji pasiuntinė ginklų neplatinto ir nusiginklavimo klausimais ir jos komanda dirba su trečiosiomis valstybėmis, tarptautinėmis organizacijomis ir pilietine visuomene, kad būtų sumažintos pasaulinės ginklų atsargos, užkirstas kelias jų nukreipimui nusikaltėliams ir teroristams ir reglamentuojamas naujų su ginklais susijusių medžiagų ir technologijų kūrimas.

Tarybos Ginklų neplatinto ir eksporto darbo grupė, tiek nusiginklavimo ir ginklų neplatinto (CONOP), tiek įprastinės ginkluotės eksporto (COARM) pogrupiuose, atlieka gyvybiškai svarbų vaidmenį derindama ES pozicijas, palaikydama tarptautinius susitarimus ir skatindama pastangas ginklų neplatinto ir nusiginklavimo srityje. ES delegacijos Vienoje, Ženevoje ir Niujorke atstovauja Europos Sąjungai ginklų neplatinto ir nusiginklavimo forumuose, rengia ir derina dešimtis ES pareiškimų, taip pat organizuoja gretutinius renginius, skirtus ES tikslams propaguoti, prisidedamos prie politikos formavimo.

BRANDUOLINIAI KLAUSIMAI

2022 m. laikotarpiu ES išliko visapusiškai įsipareigojusi siekti savo ilgalaikių tikslų branduolinio nusiginklavimo ir branduolinio ginklo neplatinto sferoje, įskaitant Branduolinio ginklo neplatinto sutarties (NPT) visuotinį ir visapusišką, visišką ir veiksmingą įgyvendinimą, Visuotinio branduolinių bandymų uždraudimo sutarties (CTBT) įsigaliojimą ir visuotinį, taip pat tikslo Nusiginklavimo konferencijoje nedelsiant pradėti ir greitai užbaigti derybas dėl Daliųjų medžiagų gamybos nutraukimo sutarties (FMCT), kad būtų uždrausta branduoliniams ginklams arba kitiems branduoliniams sprogtamiesiems įtaisams skirtų daliųjų medžiagų gamyba. Prioritetas taip pat toliau buvo teikiamas teritorijos be masinio naikinimo ginklų ir jų siuntimo į taikinių priemonių sukūrimui Artimuosiuose Rytuose. Galiausiai, ne mažiau svarbu yra tai, kad ES tvirtai rėmė JT Nusiginklavimo komisijos I darbo grupės branduolinių klausimų klausimais darbą.

Rusijos elgesys jos agresijos prieš Ukrainą kontekste, šiurkščiai pažeidžiant tarptautinę teisę, įskaitant saugumo garantijas, kurias ji suteikė Ukrainai pagal 1994 m. Budapešto memorandumą, padarė didelį neigiamą poveikį daugiašaliam darbui šioje srityje, įskaitant nusiginklavimą, ginklų neplatinto ir technologijų naudojimą taikiems tikslams. ES ir jos valstybės narės, koordinuodamos veiksmus su bendraminčiais partneriais, smerkė Rusijos branduolinius grasinimus, jos skleidžiamą dezinformaciją ir akivaizdų saugos ir saugumo Ukrainoje esančiuose branduolinės energetikos objektuose ir aplink juos nepaisymą ir dirbo su likusia tarptautine bendruomene dėdamos pastangas išsaugoti ir toliau stiprinti tarptautinį režimą šioje srityje. ES taip pat pasmerkė tai, kad pakeistas Baltarusijos, kaip nebranduolinės valstybės, statusas – tai dar vienas nerimą keliantis pokytis, prisidedantis prie nepriimtinių mėginimų iš naujo apibrėžti taisyklėmis grindžiamą Europos saugumo architektūrą.

Branduolinio ginklo neplatinto sutartis

ES nuomone, Branduolinio ginklo neplatinto sutartis (NPT) tebėra pasaulinio branduolinio ginklo neplatinto režimo kertinis akmuo, esminis pagrindas siekiant branduolinio nusiginklavimo pagal NPT VI straipsnį ir svarbus elementas toliau plėtojant branduolinės energijos naudojimą taikiems tikslams pagal NPT IV straipsnį. Visos ES valstybės narės yra jos šalys.

2022 m. rugpjūčio 1–26 d. Niujorke įvyko NPT dešimtoji peržiūros konferencija; dėl COVID-19 pandemijos ji buvo tris kartus atidėta. ES šioje peržiūros konferencijoje aktyviai dalyvavo: padarė šešis pareiškimus, įsitraukė į derybas trijuose pagrindiniuose komitetuose, koordinavo savo valstybių narių veiksmus, pateikė darbinis dokumentus ⁽¹⁾ ir organizavo gretutinius renginius ⁽²⁾, kad būtų aktyviau įgyvendinami politiniai tikslai, išdėstyti 2021 m. lapkričio 15 d. patvirtintose Tarybos išvadose dėl Branduolinio ginklo neplatinto sutarties (NPT) šalių dešimtosios peržiūros konferencijos. Tai, be kita ko, įsipareigojimas skatinti branduolinį nusiginklavimą pagal NPT VI straipsnį, parama intensyvesniam dialogui siekiant skatinti tolesnę pažangą nusiginklavimo srityje, konkretaus darbo, susijusio su strateginės ir branduolinės rizikos mažinimu, teikiama nauda, daugiašalio bendradarbiavimo skatinant branduolinio nusiginklavimo tikrinimą vertė ir tai, kad Nusiginklavimo konferencijoje turi būti nedelsiant pradėtos ir greitai užbaigtos derybos dėl Daliųjų medžiagų, skirtų

⁽¹⁾ Peržiūros konferencijai ES pateikė du darbinis dokumentus: „Europos Sąjungos prioritetai Branduolinio ginklo neplatinto sutarties šalių dešimtojoje peržiūros konferencijoje“ ir „Visuotinio branduolinių bandymų uždraudimo sutartis rengiantis Branduolinio ginklo neplatinto sutarties šalių dešimtajai peržiūros konferencijai“.

⁽²⁾ ES organizavo arba bendrai organizavo šiuos gretutinius renginius: „Pasaulinės branduolinio saugumo architektūros stiprinimas: Tarptautinės konvencijos dėl kovos su branduolinio terorizmo veiksmais (ICSANT) visuotinimas“, kartu su Jungtinių Tautų kovos su terorizmu biuru (UNOCT); „Europos Sąjungos parama Visuotinio branduolinių bandymų uždraudimo sutarčiai (CTBT) ir jos organizacijai“; „Apsaugos užtikrinimas regioniniu susitarimu“ ir „Naratyvai dėl Artimųjų Rytų teritorijos be masinio naikinimo ginklų: istorinės sąskaitos, veiksniai ir temos“, kartu su JT Nusiginklavimo tyrimų institutu (UNIDIR).

naudoti branduoliniuose ginkluose arba kituose sprogstamuosiuose užtaisuose, gamybos nutraukimo sutarties. Be to, ES pasmerkė tai, kad Rusija akiplėšiškai pažeidė Budapešto memorandumą, jos beprotiškus grąsinimus panaudoti branduolinius ginklus, taip pat kitus neatsakingus veiksmus, nukreiptus prieš branduolinę saugą ir saugumą Ukrainoje, visų pirma neteisėtą Zaporizijos atominės elektrinės užgrobimą – tai kenkia NPT įgyvendinimui.

Nepaisant ES ir jos valstybių narių, bendraminčių partnerių ir kitų valstybių NPT šalių, dalyvavusių esminėse diskusijose, kuriose siekta dar kartą patvirtinti NPT svarbą, peržiūrėti jos įgyvendinimą ir nustatyti būsimus veiksmus, pastangų, galutinio konsensuso dokumento nepavyko priimti, nes dėl tekste pateiktų nuorodų į Ukrainos Zaporizijos atominę elektrinę jam prieštaravo vienintelė dalyvė – Rusija. Susitarta, kad kita NPT peržiūros konferencija įvyks 2026 m. Niujorke, Parengiamojo komiteto sesijos bus surengtos 2023 m. Vienoje, 2024 m. Ženevoje ir 2025 m. Niujorke, taip pat bus įsteigta tolesnio peržiūros proceso stiprinimo darbo grupė.

Tarptautinė atominės energijos agentūra

ES teikia didelę svarbą Tarptautinės atominės energijos agentūros (TATENA) techniniam, nepriklausomam ir nešališkam darbui pagal visus jos įgaliojimus, apimančius tiek branduolinio ginklo neplatinimą, tiek branduolinių technologijų naudojimą taikiems tikslams. ES remia TATENA ir jos valstybes nares įvairiais būdais. Be politinės paramos, ES ir jos valstybės narės yra vienos didžiausių paramos šiai Agentūrai, įskaitant jos Techninio bendradarbiavimo fondą, teikėjų. Be to, nuo 2003 m. aštuoniais iš eilės priimtais Tarybos sprendimais ES parėmė TATENA veiklą daugiau kaip 60 mln. EUR suma. Naujausias iš tų sprendimų – šiuo metu galiojantis 2020 m. lapkričio 6 d. Tarybos sprendimas (BUSP) 2020/1656 ⁽¹⁾ dėl Sąjungos paramos TATENA veiklai branduolinio saugumo srityse ir įgyvendinant ES kovos su masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimu strategiją („TATENA VIII“). Pagal jį, be kita ko, numatyta tvirta finansinė parama TATENA Marie Skłodowskos-Curie stipendijų programai, kuria siekiama skatinti jaunas moteris studijuoti ir dirbti branduolinių mokslų ir technologijų, branduolinės saugos ir saugumo, branduolinio ginklo neplatinimo ir branduolinės energetikos teisės srityse.

2022 m. dėl didelio neigiamo Rusijos agresijos prieš Ukrainą poveikio branduolinei saugai ir saugumui 2,2 mln. EUR iš Sprendimo (BUSP) 2020/1656 biudžeto buvo perskirstyta *pagalbai Ukrainai užtikrinant jos branduolinio saugumo režimo išlaikymą* ⁽²⁾.

TATENA saugos garantijų sistema yra esminė branduolinio ginklo neplatinimo režimo sudedamoji dalis ir šios agentūros vykdomai tikrinimo veiklai tenka nepakeičiamas vaidmuo įgyvendinant NPT. ES remia TATENA saugos garantijų sistemos stiprinimą, toliau laikosi nuomonės, kad visapusiškų saugos garantijų susitarimai kartu su papildomu protokolu yra dabartinis tikrinimo standartas pagal NPT, ir toliau ragina visuotinai jų laikytis. 2022 m. vykdant informavimo veiklą trečiosiose valstybėse daugiausia dėmesio skirta Visapusiškų saugos garantijų susitarimo ir jo papildomo protokolo, taip pat iš dalies pakeisto mažų kiekių protokolo (SQP) visuotinio skatinimui.

Glaudus Euratomo ir TATENA bendradarbiavimas, grindžiamas 1973 m. TATENA ir Euratomo susitarimu, sudaro sąlygas Europoje įgyvendinti veiksmingas ir efektyvias saugos garantijas.

ES aktyviai remia TATENA saugos garantijų sistemą, įskaitant finansinę paramą TATENA analitinių laboratorijų tinklui, taip pat valstybinės branduolinių medžiagų apskaitos ir kontrolės sistemos (SSAC) skatinimą valstybėse partnerėse. Europos Komisijos administruojama Europos apsaugos priemonių tyrimo ir plėtos asociacija (ESARDA) taip pat tęsia tarptautinę informavimo veiklą pagal susitarimo memorandumus su Afrikos branduolinės energijos reikalų komisija (AFCONE) ir Azijos ir Ramiojo vandenyno valstybių saugos garantijų tinklu, glaudžiai bendradarbiaudama su Branduolinių medžiagų tvarkymo institutu. Pagal šią sistemą, bendradarbiaujant su TATENA, kartu su Europos branduolinio švietimo tinklu (ENEN) finansuojamas didelis branduolinės saugos garantijų srities mokymo ir švietimo projektas, įskaitant pačią pirmą akademinę branduolinės saugos garantijų trečiosios pakopos studijų programą. 2022 m., bendradarbiaujant su AFCONE ir Suomija, pradėta įgyvendinti nauja plataus užmojo ES programa, kuria siekiama sustiprinti branduolinės saugos garantijas Afrikoje.

⁽¹⁾ OL L 372 I, 2020 11 9, p. 4.

⁽²⁾ OL L 257, 2022 10 5, p. 10.

2021–2027 m. laikotarpiu pagal bendradarbiavimo branduolinės saugos srityje priemonę ES skyrė 300 mln. EUR branduolinei saugai, radiacinei saugai ir veiksmingų bei efektyvių saugos garantijų taikymui trečiojoje valstybėje, be kita ko, Vidurinės Azijos regione, skatinti.

Europos Komisijos Jungtinis tyrimų centras (JTC) ir TATENA ir toliau įgyvendino 2017 m. vasario 15 d. pasirašytą „Praktinę bendradarbiavimo branduolinių mokslų taikmenų srityje tvarką“, kuria siekiama plėtoti bendrą veiklą ir išvengti pastangų dubliavimosi, *inter alia*, tokiose srityse kaip dirvotyra, medicinos taikmenos, vandenynų mokslas, branduoliniai duomenys ir pamatinės medžiagos, maisto sauga, Žemės stebėjimas ir aplinkos monitoringas.

ES ir jos valstybės narės toliau tvirtai remia TATENA techninio bendradarbiavimo programą, be kita ko, teikdamos didelius įnašus, skirtus Techninio bendradarbiavimo fondui ir Taikaus naudojimo būdų iniciatyvai – tai yra svarbios priemonės, kuriomis siekiama sudaryti sąlygas saugiai, patikimai ir taikiai naudoti branduolines technologijas ir padėti pasiekti Darnaus vystymosi darbotvarkės iki 2030 m. tikslus.

ES ir TATENA kasmet reguliariai rengia vyresniųjų pareigūnų susitikimus, kuriuose peržiūrimas ir planuojamas jų plataus masto bendradarbiavimas. Nors 2020 m. ir 2021 m. metinių susitikimų nepavyko surengti dėl pandemijos, buvo ir toliau palaikomi glaudūs ryšiai ir kovo 15 d. Vienoje įvyko 2022 m. vyresniųjų pareigūnų susitikimas.

Visuotinio branduolinių bandymų uždraudimo sutartis

Itin svarbūs ES kovos su masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimu strategijos tikslai – Visuotinio branduolinių bandymų uždraudimo sutarties (CTBT) įsigaliojimas ir visuotinimas. Visos ES valstybės narės pademonstravo išipareigojimą šios Sutarties atžvilgiu – jos ją ratifikavo ir iki jos įsigaliojimo jau laikėsi jos tikslų. CTBT yra tvirta pasitikėjimo ir saugumo stiprinimo priemonė, kuria prisidedama tiek prie branduolinio nusiginklavimo, tiek prie branduolinio ginklo neplatavimo.

2022 m. ES vykdė diplomatinę veiklą CTBT remti ir savo pareiškimuose susijusių forumų metu, taip pat palaikydama dvišalius ryšius su atitinkamomis II priede nurodytomis ir II priede nenurodytomis valstybėmis ne kartą ragino ratifikuoti Sutartį, be kita ko, 2022 m. rugsėjo mėn. Niujorke įvykusiame CTBT draugų grupės susitikime. Skatinimas užtikrinti, kad CTBT įsigaliotų, yra vienas iš veiksmų, nurodytų JT generalinio sekretoriaus dokumente „Mūsų bendros ateities užtikrinimas: nusiginklavimo darbotvarkė“, kurį ES nusprendė remti.

ES nuosekliai propaguoja CTBT naudą ir indėlį į taiką, saugumą, nusiginklavinimą ir ginklų neplatavinimą, be kita ko, ją taikant civilinėms reikmėms. Įgyvendinant Tarybos sprendimą (BUSP) 2020/901 dėl Sąjungos paramos Visuotinio branduolinių bandymų uždraudimo sutarties organizacijos (CTBTO) parengiamosios komisijos veiklai siekiant stiprinti jos stebėsenos bei tikrinimo pajėgumus ir įgyvendinti ES kovos su masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimu strategiją ⁽¹⁾. ES teikiama finansinė parama CTBT prisideda prie Tarptautinės stebėsenos sistemos (TSS) palaikymo ir stiprinimo teikiant techninę paramą, stiprinant pajėgumus ir sudarant palankesnes sąlygas ekspertams dalyvauti CTBTO susitikimuose, visų pirma besivystančių šalių atžvilgiu. ES aktyviai dalyvavo CTBTO parengiamosios komisijos ir jos A ir B darbo grupių posėdžiuose.

Branduolinis saugumas ir susiję klausimai

ES pabrėžia, jog reikia toliau stiprinti branduolinį saugumą visame pasaulyje, kad būtų užkirstas kelias branduoliniam terorizmui ir sudarytos palankesnės sąlygos branduolinių technologijų naudojimui taikiems tikslams. ES ir toliau visiškai pritaria 2020 m. vasario mėn. įvykusios Tarptautinės branduolinio saugumo konferencijos (ICONS 2020) rezultatams. Jos ministrų deklaracijoje pakartojamas išipareigojimas išlaikyti ir stiprinti veiksmingą ir visapusišką visų branduolinių ir kitų radioaktyviųjų medžiagų bei objektų branduolinį saugumą ir pripažįstamas esminis TATENA vaidmuo sudarant palankesnes sąlygas tarptautiniam bendradarbiavimui branduolinio saugumo srityje ir jį koordinuojant. ES pradėjo pasirengimą kitam ICONS susitikimui, įvyksiančiam 2024 m. gegužės mėn.

⁽¹⁾ OL L 207, 2020 6 30, p. 15.

Daugeliu pareiškimų TATENA generalinėje konferencijoje ir valdytojų taryboje ES itin griežtai pasmerkė neišprovokuotą ir nepateisinamą Rusijos agresiją prieš Ukrainą, kuri kelia dideles ir tiesiogines grėsmę branduolinei saugai bei saugumui ir saugumo garantijų tikrinimo veiklai Ukrainoje. ES rėmė TATENA generalinio direktoriaus diplomatinę veiklą, kuria siekta užtikrinti Ukrainos branduolinės energetikos objektų branduolinę saugą ir saugumą, taip pat tolesnį TATENA paramos ir pagalbos misijų vykdymą visose Ukrainos atominėse elektrinėse – prie šių misijų ES prisidėjo finansais.

ES padėjo Ukrainai tiek dvišaliu pagrindu, tiek pasitelkdama TATENA. Nuo karo pradžios ES yra viena iš pagrindinių paramos Ukrainai teikėjų: ji suteikė jai beveik 53 mln. EUR vertės su branduoline sauga ir branduoliniu saugumu susijusios pagalbos, iš kurių 5,6 mln. EUR suteikta per TATENA, įskaitant 2,2 mln. EUR pagal Sprendimo (BUSP) 2020/1656 dalinį pakeitimą.

2022 m. pagal Europos tarptautinio bendradarbiavimo branduolinės saugos srityje priemonę (INSC) Ukrainai buvo išipareigota skirti 13 mln. EUR, taip pat papildomą 3,4 mln. EUR sumą skirti TATENA, kad būtų remiamas, *inter alia*, TATENA darbuotojų nusiuntimas į pagrindinius šalies branduolinės energetikos objektus, dvišalė pagalba siekiant atkurti stebėsenos ir analitinius pajėgumus, taip pat atnaujintas finansavimas Jungtiniam paramos biurui Kyjive. Šiuo metu ES taip pat yra didžiausia paramos Tarptautinei Černobylio bendradarbiavimo sąskaitai (ICCA), skirtai su branduoline sauga susijusiai infrastruktūrai atkurti, teikėja.

ES mano, jog svarbu, kad visos valstybės prisijungtų prie pagrindinių branduolinės saugos ir branduolinio saugumo dokumentų, pavyzdžiui, iš dalies pakeistos Branduolinių medžiagų fizinės saugos konvencijos (A/CPPNM) ⁽⁶⁾, Tarptautinės konvencijos dėl kovos su branduolinio terorizmo veiksmais (ICSANT), Branduolinės saugos konvencijos (CNS) ⁽⁷⁾ ar Jungtinės panaudoto kuro ir radioaktyviųjų atliekų tvarkymo saugos konvencijos (JC) ⁽⁸⁾. ES ir toliau rems valstybių pastangas visapusiškai įgyvendinti šias konvencijas.

ES svariai prisidėjo rengiant A/CPPNM peržiūros susitikimo bendru sutarimu grindžiamą baigiamąjį dokumentą – jis buvo parengtas nepaisant sunkios politinės padėties 2022 m. kovo mėn. – ir palankiai jį įvertino. Didelės grėsmės branduolinei saugai ir saugumui, kylančios dėl Rusijos agresijos prieš Ukrainą, buvo aptartos ES iniciuotame atskirame dokumente, kurį plačiai palaikė valstybės šalys.

2022 m. ES toliau rėmė ICSANT visuotinimą ir veiksmingą įgyvendinimą Tarybos sprendimu (BUSP) 2018/1939 ⁽⁹⁾, kurį įgyvendina JT kovos su terorizmu biuras (UNOCT) ir JT narkotikų kontrolės ir nusikalstamumo prevencijos biuras (UNODC). Šiuo Sprendimu siekiama padidinti prie ICSANT prisijungusių šalių skaičių, padidinti nacionalinės politikos rengėjų ir nacionalinius sprendimus priimančių asmenų informuotumą, taip pat sustiprinti pajėgumus ir taip padėti patobulinti nacionalinės teisės aktus ir sustiprinti nacionalinių suinteresuotųjų subjektų, įskaitant baudžiamosios justicijos pareigūnus, pajėgumą atlikti tyrimus, vykdyti baudžiamąjį persekiojimą ir priimti sprendimus branduolinio terorizmo byloje. ES kartu su Kanada ir UNDOC parėmė 2022 m. gruodžio 12 d. Vienoje įvykusį ICSANT 20 metų sukakčiai paminėti skirtą renginį.

ES toliau rėmė Pasaulinę kovos su branduoliniu terorizmu iniciatyvą (GICNT) ir jos misiją – stiprinti pajėgumus pasauliniu lygmeniu siekiant užkirsti kelią branduoliniam terorizmui, nustatyti jo grėsmę ir į ją reaguoti. ES ir jos valstybės narės aktyviai dalyvauja GICNT darbe visose srityse: branduolinių medžiagų aptikimo, branduolinės ekspertizės ir reagavimo bei poveikio švelninimo.

2013 m. ES su TATENA pasirašė praktinę bendradarbiavimo branduolinio saugumo techniniais klausimais tvarką, kuria, be kitų tikslų, siekiama gerinti mokymo ir pajėgumų stiprinimo veiklos koordinavimą skatinant ir įgyvendinant tvarią branduolinio saugumo kultūros praktiką. ES branduolinio saugumo mokymo centras (EUSECTRA), kurio užduotis – padėti aptikti neteisėtus veiksmus, susijusius su branduolinėmis bei kitomis radioaktyviosiomis medžiagomis, ir į juos reaguoti, veikia visu pajėgumu nuo 2013 m.; jo paslaugomis naudojasi Europos Sąjungos valstybės narės ir valstybės partnerės, tarp kurių yra kelios GICNT narės. Centre taip pat organizuojamos praktinės pratybos, daugiausia kovos su branduolinių medžiagų kontrabanda srityje, ir vykdoma branduolinė ekspertizė sulaikytų branduolinių medžiagų savybėms nustatyti. Europos Komisija taip pat toliau atlieka svarbų vaidmenį Sienų stebėsenos darbo grupėje (BMWG) siekiant branduolinio saugumo. Ji yra BMWG ir dviejų jos pogrupių – aptikimo technologijų ir pajėgumų stiprinimo klausimais – bendrapiimininkė.

⁽⁶⁾ Visos ES valstybės narės yra A/CPPNM šalys.

⁽⁷⁾ Visos ES valstybės narės yra CNS šalys.

⁽⁸⁾ Visos ES valstybės narės yra JC šalys.

⁽⁹⁾ OL L 314, 2018 12 11, p. 41.

Tikrinimo režimai ir iniciatyvos

ES mano, kad tolesnis daugiašalių branduolinio nusiginklavimo tikrinimo pajėgumų plėtojimas galėtų padėti sukurti ir išlaikyti pasaulį be branduolinių ginklų. Šiame kontekste ES ir jos valstybės narės visiškai pritarė JT vyriausybinių ekspertų grupės branduolinio nusiginklavimo tikrinimo klausimais sukūrimui, taip pat sprendimui, kad jos darbas būtų tęsiamas 2022 m. ir 2023 m., siekiant atidėti sesijas, kurių nepavyko surengti dėl COVID-19 pandemijos. ES toliau dalyvavo Tarptautinėje partnerystėje branduolinio nusiginklavimo tikrinimo srityje (IPNDV); 2022 m. birželio 27–29 d. po daugiau kaip dvejų metų pertraukos Briuselyje surengtas jos pirmasis fizinis susitikimas – JUNEX 22 stalo pratybos. 2022 m. gruodžio 5–9 d. Sidnėjyje (Australija) surengta IPNDV plenarinė sesija, kurioje partneriai įvertino trečiajame darbo etape padarytą pažangą, o daugiausia dėmesio skyrė tikrinimo koncepcijų vertinimui naudojant scenarijais grindžiamas programas ir technologijas, kurios padeda siekti tikrinimo tikslų, nustatymui ir vertinimui.

Regioniniai klausimai ir aspektai

Iranas / BVVP

Nepaisant ES valstybių narių politinės paramos ir intensyvių tarptautinių diplomatinių pastangų, kad būtų vėl pradėtas visapusiškai įgyvendinti Bendrą visapusišką veiksmų planą (BVVP), įskaitant derybas Vienoje, padedant ES vyriausiajam įgaliotiniui kaip BVVP jungtinės komisijos koordinatoriui, 2022 m. susitarimo pasiekti nepavyko. Viena po kitos pateiktose TATENA ataskaitose nurodyta, jog nerimą kelia tai, kad sparčiau įgyvendinama Irano branduolinė programa, smarkiai nukrypstant nuo BVVP priimtų jo išipareigojimų, visų pirma didinami Irano branduolinio sodrinimo pajėgumai ir gaminamas labai prisodrintas uranas. Kalbant apie likusius neišspręstus saugos garantijų klausimus (trijose nedeklaruotose vietose aptikta urano dalelių), 2022 m. birželio 8 d. ir lapkričio 17 d. TATENA valdytojų taryba priėmė rezoliucijas, kuriose Iranas raginamas bendradarbiauti su šia agentūra.

Tuo tarpu ES taip pat toliau rėmė ilgalaikę TATENA misiją tikrinti ir stebėti, kaip Iranas vykdo savo išipareigojimus branduolinėje srityje. ES toliau bendradarbiavo su Iranu civilinėje branduolinėje srityje pagal BVVP III priedą branduolinės saugos klausimais. Toks bendradarbiavimas apima paramą Irano branduolinės saugos reguliavimo institucijai (INRA), Bušehro atominės elektrinės testavimą nepalankiausiomis sąlygomis ir įrangos tiekimą Irano INRA Branduolinės saugos centrui. BVVP viešųjų pirkimų kanalas, kuriame peržiūrimas branduolinių ar dvejopo naudojimo prekių perdavimas Iranui, veikia toliau.

2022 m. gruodžio 12 d. Tarybos išvadose ES dar kartą patvirtino esanti išipareigojusi visapusiškai ir veiksmingai įgyvendinti atkurtą BVVP ir toliau remti jo įgyvendinimą ir paragino visas šalis remti Jungtinių Tautų Saugumo Tarybos rezoliucijos 2231 (2015) įgyvendinimą. ES vyriausiasis įgaliotinis, kaip BVVP koordinatorius, tebėra visapusiškai išipareigojęs bendradarbiauti su tarptautine bendruomene, kad būtų išsaugotas BVVP ir užtikrintas visapusiškas jo įgyvendinimas.

Korėjos Liaudies Demokratinė Respublika (KLDK)

2022 m. ES ne kartą pabrėžė, kad kiekviena KLDK paleista balistinė raketa (o jų skaičius yra beprecedentis) yra akivaizdus JT Saugumo Tarybos rezoliucijų pažeidimas ir didelė grėsmė regioninei ir tarptautinei taikai ir saugumui. Balandžio ir lapkričio mėn. vyriausiojo įgaliotinio pareiškimuose ES vardu pasmerkta tai, kad KLDK vėl pradėjo leisti tarpžemynines balistines raketas. ES pareiškimuose taip pat išreikštas solidarumas su Korėjos Respublika ir Japonija atsižvelgiant į tai, kad KLDK paleido naujų ir senesnių rūšių trumpojo nuotolio raketas, ir teigiama, kad kai kurios iš jų galėtų būti naudojamos branduolinėms kovinėms galvutėms siųsti į taikinių. ES aiškiai nurodė, kad tokie veiksmai kartu su KLDK branduolinių objektų vietose tęsiama veikla niekada nebus laikomi teisėtais. ES tvirtai nurodė, kad vienintelis kelias į tvarią taiką ir saugumą – KLDK turi imtis veiksmų, kad įvykdytų savo išipareigojimą visiškai, patikrinamai ir negrįžtamai atsisakyti visų savo branduolinių ginklų, kitų masinio naikinimo ginklų, balistinių raketų programų ir esamų branduolinių programų ir nutraukti visą susijusią veiklą.

ES valstybės narės toliau skatino visas Jungtinių Tautų nares, ypač Saugumo Tarybos nares, primygtinai raginti KLDK keisti veiklos kryptį ir pabrėžė, kad veiksmingiausia priemonė šiam tikslui pasiekti yra visiškas JT Saugumo Tarybos sankcijų įgyvendinimas. Kadangi Saugumo Taryba ir toliau nesiėmė veiksmų, ES aktyviau konsultavosi su partneriais dėl kitų būdų, kaip apriboti finansų, žinių ir komponentų srautus į KLDK, kurie galėtų būti panaudoti jos neteisėtoms ginklų

programoms remti. Atsižvelgdama į tai, balandžio ir gruodžio mėn. ES priėmė papildomas ribojamąsias priemones KLDK asmenims ir subjektams. Be 80 asmenų ir 75 subjektų, įtrauktų į JT Saugumo Tarybos sankcijų sąrašą, ES ribojamosios priemonės buvo pradėtos taikyti 73 asmenims ir 17 subjektų.

ES visapusiškai pasinaudojo galimybėmis tarptautiniuose ginklų neplatavimo forumuose paraginti KLDK nedelsiant vėl pradėti visapusiškai laikytis NPT kaip branduolinio ginklo neturinčiai valstybei ir TATENA visapusišką saugos garantijų susitarimo, užtikrinti, kad įsigaliojūt Papildomas protokolai, taip pat pasirašyti ir ratifikuoti Visuotinio branduolinių bandymų uždraudimo sutartį. ES toliau primygtinai teigė, kad padėti galima išspręsti tik taikiomis priemonėmis. ES paragino KLDK atnaujinti dialogą su pagrindinėmis šalimis ir pakartojo esanti pasirengusi remti naują diplomatijos procesą, kurio tikslas – visiškas, patikrinamas ir negrįžtamas branduolinio ginklo atsiskyrimas Korėjos pusiasalyje, arba sudaryti palankesnes sąlygas tokiam procesui.

Artimųjų Rytų teritorija be branduolinių ir kitų masinio naikinimo ginklų

ES yra pasiryžusi siekti, kad būtų įgyvendinta 1995 m. NPT peržiūros konferencijoje priimta Rezoliucija dėl Artimųjų Rytų, ir jai pasitikėjimo suteikė 2022 m. lapkričio 14–18 d. Niujorke įvykusios trečiosios JT konferencijos dėl Artimųjų Rytų teritorijos be branduolinių ir kitų masinio naikinimo ginklų sukūrimo rezultatai.

Įgyvendindama 2019 m. birželio 6 d. Tarybos sprendimą (BUSP) 2019/938⁽¹⁰⁾, kuriuo remiamas pasitikėjimo stiprinimo procesas siekiant sukurti teritoriją be branduolinių ir visų kitų masinio naikinimo ginklų Artimuosiuose Rytuose, dėl kurios laisvai susitartų visos regiono valstybės, 2022 m. ES rėmė UNIDIR Artimųjų Rytų teritorijos be masinio naikinimo ginklų projektą, kuriuo siekiama užpildyti svarbią tyrimų spragą, susijusią su tuo, kaip šis klausimas kito laikui bėgant, kurti analitinius gebėjimus remti naują požiūrį į regioninio saugumo problemas ir tokią teritoriją, rinkti idėjas ir rengti naujus pasiūlymus dėl tolesnių veiksmų, ir skatinti įtrauktų ekspertų ir politikos formuotojų dialogą regioninio saugumo problemų ir tokios teritorijos klausimais. Iki metų pabaigos ES pradėjo diskusijas dėl projekto II etapo, kuriuo siekiama toliau teikti paramą teritorijos kūrimui ir po 2022 m.

CHEMINIS GINKLAS

2022 m. balandžio 29 d. paminėtos 25-osios Konvencijos dėl cheminio ginklo kūrimo, gamybos, kaupimo ir panaudojimo uždraudimo bei jo sunaikinimo (CWC) įsigaliojimo metinės. ES vardu paskelbtoje deklaracijoje vyriausiasis įgaliotinis priminė, kad cheminio ginklo naudojimas (kad ir kas jį panaudotų) bet kur, bet kuriuo metu ir bet kokiomis aplinkybėmis pažeidžia tarptautinę teisę ir gali prilygti sunkiausiems tarptautinį susirūpinimą keliantiems nusikaltimams – karo nusikaltimams ir nusikaltimams žmoniškumui.

2022 m. ES toliau visomis priemonėmis kovojo su cheminio ginklo platinimu ir remti kovą su nebaudžiamumu už cheminio ginklo naudojimą. ES toliau teikė tvirtą politinę, diplomatinę ir savanorišką finansinę paramą Cheminio ginklo uždraudimo organizacijai (OPCW) – CWC įgyvendinančiam organui. Paramos formos – pareiškimai, demaršai ir savanoriški finansiniai įnašai pagal Tarybos sprendimus. Savanoriški finansiniai įnašai buvo skiriami pagrindinei OPCW veiklai, visų pirma tikrinimo ir pajėgumų stiprinimo, OPCW operacijų teikiant palydovinę vaizdinę informaciją, taip pat OPCW kibernetinio saugumo ir informacijos apsaugos pajėgumų atnaujinimo srityse. ES ir jos valstybės narės ir toliau buvo didžiausių savanoriškų finansinių įnašų teikėjos, remiančios naujos OPCW laboratorijos – Chemijos ir technologijų centro – steigimą.

2022 m. lapkričio 14 d. ES nustatė papildomas ribojamąsias priemones, susijusias su Aleksejaus Navalno apnuodijimu ir cheminio ginklo siuntimo į taikinį sistemų gamyba Sirijoje⁽¹¹⁾. 2022 m. pabaigoje priemonės pagal ES sankcijų už cheminių ginklų režimą buvo taikomos iš viso 25 asmenims ir 3 subjektams.

⁽¹⁰⁾ OL L 149, 2019 6 7, p. 63.

⁽¹¹⁾ 2022 m. lapkričio 14 d. Tarybos įgyvendinimo reglamentas (ES) 2022/2228, kuriuo įgyvendinamas Reglamentas (ES) 2018/1542 dėl ribojamųjų kovos su cheminio ginklo platinimu ir naudojimu priemonių (OL L 293 I, 2022 11 14, p. 1).

OPCW kontekste Rusija, vykdydama agresiją prieš Ukrainą, kartu vykdė dezinformacijos ir valstybės kontroliuojamos propagandos kampaniją, skleisdama nemotyvuotus ir nepagrįstus tvirtinimus apie Ukrainą ir kitus subjektus dėl cheminio ginklo programų. Kovodama su Rusijos dezinformacija ES savo pareiškimuose priminė, kad yra patikimai nustatyta, jog Ukraina yra atsakinga Cheminio ginklo uždraudimo konvencijos narė ir visapusiškai jos laikosi.

BIOLOGINIAI GINKLAI

Biologinių ir toksinių ginklų konvencija (BTWC) draudžiama kurti, gaminti, išigyti, perduoti, kaupti ir naudoti biologinius ir toksinius ginklus. Tai buvo pirmoji daugiašalė nusiginklavimo sutartis, kuria uždrausta visa masinio naikinimo ginklų kategorija. Visos ES valstybės narės yra BTWC šalys.

ES ir jos valstybės narės aktyviai prisidėjo prie 2022 m. lapkričio 27 d.–gruodžio 16 d. Ženevoje įvykusios devintosios BTWC peržiūros konferencijos. Tai, kad 184 valstybės, kurios tuo metu buvo Konvencijos šalys, sugebėjo susitarti dėl galutinio dokumento, buvo svarbus laimėjimas, visų pirma atsižvelgiant į pasaulinę įtampą ir aklavietę kituose forumuose Rusijos agresijos karo prieš Ukrainą kontekste. Vienas iš pagrindinių rezultatų buvo sprendimas įsteigti darbo grupę, kuri 2023–2026 m. laikotarpiu identifikuos konkrečias ir veiksmingas priemones, įskaitant galimas teisiškai privalomas priemones, susijusias su bendradarbiavimo ir pagalbos pagal X straipsnį įgyvendinimo mechanizmais ir Mokslo ir technologijų patariamąją tarybą, taip pat atnaujins diskusijas dėl reikalavimų laikymosi ir tikrinimo ir pateiks rekomendacijų, kaip sustiprinti ir įtvirtinti Konvenciją visais jos aspektais.

2022 m. ES atliko aktyvų vaidmenį kovojant su Rusijos dezinformacijos kampanija biologinių ginklų srityje, kuri apėmė BTWC V ir VI straipsniuose numatytų mechanizmų naudojimą siekiant skleisti dezinformaciją bandant pateisinti savo agresiją prieš Ukrainą.

Laikydamosi ES kovos su masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimu strategijos ir būdama ilgalaikė BTWC rėmėja, 2022 m. ES toliau nuosekliai teikė paramą įgyvendindama du Tarybos sprendimus – finansuodama UNODA veiklą, kuria remiamas pajėgumų stiprinimas siekiant stiprinti BTWC įgyvendinimą nacionaliniu lygmeniu, propaguodama biologinio saugumo tinklus globaliuosiuose Pietuose, remdama laikotarpio tarp konferencijų programą ir pasirengimą devintajai peržiūros konferencijai, stiprindama valstybių, kurios yra Konvencijos šalys, pasirengimą užkirsti kelią išpuoliams, kuriuose naudojamos biologinės medžiagos, ir į juos reaguoti, taip pat sudarydama sąlygas informavimo, švietimo ir angažavimosi priemonėms. 2022 m. ES taip pat toliau rėmė UNODA iniciatyvą „Jaunimas už biologinį saugumą“. Dar vienas svarbus ES paramos aspektas buvo susijęs su Konvencijos visuotinimu. 2022 m. ES padėjo finansuoti Afrikai skirtą JT seminarą dėl visuotinimo ir surengė ES visuotinimo demaršą, skirtą valstybėms, kurios dar nebuvo Konvencijos šalys.

BALISTINĖS RAKETOS

Hagos kovos su balistinių raketų platinimu elgesio kodeksas (HCOC) yra vienintelė daugiašalė skaidrumo ir pasitikėjimo stiprinimo priemonė, susijusi su balistinėmis raketomis. Valstybės, prisijungusios prie HCOC, savanoriškai įsipareigoja teikti išankstinius pranešimus apie balistinių raketų ir nešančiųjų raketų paleidimą ir kasmet pateikti deklaraciją dėl savo politikos, susijusios su balistinėmis raketomis ir nešančiosiomis raketomis.

ES tvirtai remia HCOC nuo pat jo parengimo. Prie jo prisijungė visos ES valstybės narės, o ES reguliariai palaiko ryšius su prie jo neprisijungusiomis valstybėmis, remdama tolesnį jo visuotinimą. Šiuo metu prie šio kodekso yra prisijungusios 144 JT valstybės narės. Pagal kelius vienas paskui kitą priimtus Tarybos sprendimus ES nuo 2008 m. finansuoja informavimo apie HCOC veiklą, gretutinius renginius, mokslinių tyrimų dokumentus, ekspertų susitikimus ir regioninius informuotumo didinimo seminarus. Šią veiklą vykdo Paryžiuje įsteigtas strateginių tyrimų centras „*Fondation pour la recherche stratégique*“ ir paprastai joje taip pat dalyvauja HCOC susitikimams pirmininkaujanti valstybė. 2022 m. buvo parengtas naujas Tarybos sprendimas, kuriuo ES parama pratęsiama naujais veiksmais iki 2026 m. ⁽¹²⁾ Pagrindiniai veiksmų tikslai – skatinti visuotinį taikymą, visapusišką įgyvendinimą ir geresnį Hagos elgesio kodekso įtraukimą į pastangas pažaboti balistinių raketų platinimą.

⁽¹²⁾ 2023 m. sausio 17 d. Taryba jį priėmė kaip Tarybos sprendimą (BUSP) 2023/124 (OL L 16, 2023 1 18, p. 36).

2022 m. gegužės 30–31 d. Vienoje surengtas 21-asis metinis eilinis Hagos elgesio kodekso susitikimas vyko Rusijos plataus masto karinės invazijos į Ukrainą kontekste. Susitikime ES ir jos valstybės narės dar kartą patvirtino tvirtai remiančios HCOC, jo visuotinimą, visapusišką įgyvendinimą ir veiksmingą veikimą⁽¹³⁾. Skirtingai nei ankstesniuose metiniuose eiliniuose susitikimuose, prie HCOC prisijungusios valstybės pranešimo spaudai nepaskelbė.

2022 m., minint Hagos kovos su balistinių raketų platinimu elgesio kodekso (HCOC) 20-ąsias metines, ES turėjo progą pritraukti daugiau tarptautinės bendruomenės dėmesio kodeksui, be kita ko, aktyviau informuodama valstybes, kurios vis dar nėra prie jo prisijungusios.⁽¹⁴⁾ ES, Nyderlandai ir Prancūzija šią sukaktį paminėjo birželio 1 d. Vienoje surengdami tarptautinį informavimo apie HCOC renginį, o lapkričio mėn. surengdami skaidrumo vizitą į paleidimo į kosmosą kompleksą (vieną iš pagrindinių skaidrumo priemonių pagal HCOC): apsilankė Europos kosmodrome Kuru (Prancūzijos Gvianoje).

JUNGTINIŲ TAUTŲ SAUGUMO TARYBOS REZOLIUCIJA 1540

ES laikosi nuomonės, kad Saugumo Tarybos rezoliucija 1540 yra vienas iš pagrindinių tarptautinės ginklų neplatinimo architektūros ramsčių – viena iš pagrindinių pasaulinių pastangų užkirsti kelią masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimui, be kita ko, teroristams ir kitiems nevalstybiniais subjektams, dalių.

Apsauga nuo medžiagų ir praktinės patirties platinimo turi būti įgyvendinama ne tik nacionalinės teisės aktais, bet ir turi būti vykdoma ir stebima tarpvalstybiniu mastu ir įvairiuose sektoriuose. ES bendradarbiauja su valstybėmis partnerėmis, kad sustiprintų jų gebėjimus laikytis Rezoliucijos 1540 nuostatų, ir remia JT agentūrų darbą skatinant supratimą ir reikalavimų laikymąsi.

ES aktyviai dalyvavo 2022 m. gegužės 31 d.–birželio 2 d. Niujorke surengtose atvirose konsultacijose dėl JT ST rezoliucijos 1540 visapusiškos peržiūros. ES palankiai įvertino tai, kad 2022 m. lapkričio 30 d. priimta Rezoliucija 2663 (2022) Komitetui suteikti nauji dešimties metų įgaliojimai, ir sprendimą, kad Komitetas peržiūrės savo vidaus gaires klausimais, susijusiais su jo ekspertų grupe. ES palankiai įvertino tai, kad naujojoje Rezoliucijoje 2663 (2022) pirmą kartą pabrėžiamas prasmingas moterų dalyvavimas siekiant toliau stiprinti Komiteto darbą.

ES parama JT ST rezoliucijos 1540 įgyvendinimui JT valstybėse narėse visų pirma apima šiuos aspektus:

- ES cheminių, biologinių, radioaktyvių bei branduolinių medžiagų (ChBRB) kompetencijos centrų iniciatyva teikiama didelė pagalba siekiant sumažinti atsitiktinio, gamtinio ar nusikalstamo pobūdžio incidentų keliamą riziką valstybėse partnerėse. Šia poreikiais ir paklausa grindžiama iniciatyva stiprinamas visus pavojus apimantis saugumo valdymas tiek nacionaliniu, tiek regioniniu lygmenimis. ChBRB kompetencijos centrai, kuriems 2021–2028 m. laikotarpiui skirtas beveik 150 mln. USD biudžetas, remia pajėgumų stiprinimą, be kita ko, realiuoju laiku vykdam tarpvalstybines pratybas su 64 šalimis.
- ES padeda valstybėms mažinti ChBRB riziką vykdydama ES partnerystės principu grindžiamą dvejopo naudojimo prekių eksporto kontrolės programą, kurioje daugiausia dėmesio skiriama masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimo rizikos mažinimui stiprinant tarptautinį bendradarbiavimą prekybos dvejopo naudojimo prekėmis kontrolės srityje ir stiprinant nacionalinius bei regioninius pajėgumus.
- ES parama iš BUSP biudžeto kitoms valstybėms, konkrečiai susijusi su Rezoliucijos 1540 įgyvendinimu, nuo 2006 m. teikiama pagal du Tarybos bendruosius veiksmus ir keturis BUSP srities Tarybos sprendimus (žr. II priedą). Ši parama padėjo sumažinti ataskaitų ir papildomos informacijos, kurios reikėjo 1540 komitetui dėl pateiktų neišsamių ataskaitų, nepateikusių valstybių skaičių. 2022 m. pabaigoje ši parama iš viso sudarė beveik 9 mln. EUR.
- ES padeda trečiosioms valstybėms įgyvendinti jų pareigas pagal Rezoliuciją 1540, joms įgyvendinant daugiašales ginklų neplatinimo sutartis. Ši parama iš BUSP biudžeto teikiama vykdam dvišalį bendradarbiavimą ir pagalbos partnerystės ir teikiant paramą JT ir regioninėms organizacijoms. Šia parama ginklų neplatinimo pastangoms daugiausia dėmesio skiriama Biologinių ir toksinių ginklų konvencijai (BTWC), Cheminio ginklo uždraudimo konvencijai (CWC), Branduolinio ginklo neplatinimo sutarčiai (NPT), JT generalinio sekretoriaus įtariamo cheminio ginklo ir biologinių ginklų naudojimo tyrimo mechanizmui (UNSGM) ir Hagos elgesio kodeksui.

⁽¹³⁾ ES pareiškimas 21-ajame metiniame eiliniame Hagos kovos su balistinių raketų platinimu elgesio kodekso (HCOC) susitikime, pateiktas 2022 m. gegužės 30 d.

⁽¹⁴⁾ ES prisijungė prie pastangų spręsti balistinių raketų platinimo problemą.

- JT ST rezoliucijos 1540 kontekste taip pat vertėtų pabrėžti eksporto kontrolės svarbą siekiant užkirsti kelią masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimui. Rezoliucijoje valstybės raginamos nustatyti, plėtoti ir išlaikyti tinkamą veiksmingą nacionalinę medžiagų, susijusių su branduoliniais, cheminiais ar biologiniais ginklais arba jų siuntimo į taikinių priemonėmis, eksporto ir perkrovimo kontrolę ir imtis bendradarbiavimo veiksmų siekiant užkirsti kelią neteisėtai prekybai jais. ES aktyviai dalyvauja visuose daugiašaliuose eksporto kontrolės režimuose, susijusiuose su MNG, taip pat G7 visuotinės partnerystės iniciatyvos, skirtos kovai su masinio naikinimo ginklų plitimu, veikloje.

IPRASTINIAI GINKLAI

Šaulių ir lengvieji ginklai

Laikydamosi savo 2018 m. kovos su neteisėtais šaunamaisiais ginklais, šaulių ir lengvaisiais ginklais ir jų šaudmenimis strategijos „Saugoti ginklus – ginti piliečius“, 2022 m. ES ir toliau vykdė visokeriopus veiksmus siekdama užkirsti kelią neteisėtai prekybai šaulių ir lengvaisiais ginklais bei jų šaudmenimis ir ją pažaboti, taip pat skatinti atskaitomybę ir atsakomybę už teisėtą prekybą jais.

2022 m. ES toliau vykdė kelis įprastinius ŠLG kontrolės projektus, daugiausia dėmesio skirdama savanoriškomis civilinio nusiginklavimo kampanijoms, ŠLG ir šaudmenų pertekliaus surinkimui ir sunaikinimui, ŠLG bei šaudmenų fiziniam saugumui ir atsargų valdymui, taip pat ženklavimo, registravimo ir atsekamumo pajėgumų stiprinimui. Dauguma šių projektų yra regioninio masto ir buvo įgyvendinami padedant regioninėms organizacijoms.

ES ir jos valstybių narių politinis prioritetas ir strateginė būtinybė buvo parama Ukrainai, skirta ginti jos nacionalinį suverenitetą ir teritorinį vientisumą nuo neteisėtos ir neišprovokuotos Rusijos karinės agresijos, tiekiant Ukrainai įvairių rūšių ginklus. ES valstybės narės susitarė, kad karinės įrangos eksportas į Ukrainą visiškai atitinka teisinius įpareigojimus, kylančius iš Bendrosios pozicijos 2008/944/BUSP dėl ginklų eksporto, ir įpareigojimus pagal Sutartį dėl prekybos ginklais, taip pat Vasenaro susitarimo pradinius elementus, kuriuose nustatyta, kad šis susitarimas nepažeis valstybių teisių įgyti teisėtų priemonių, kuriomis jos galėtų apsiginti pagal Jungtinių Tautų Chartijos 51 straipsnį. Šiomis normomis draudžiama eksportuoti į agresorių, o ne į valstybę, nukentėjusią nuo išorės agresijos. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad Rusija dideliu mastu šiurkščiai pažeidžia Ženevos konvencijas, įskaitant išpuolius prieš gyventojus ir civilinius objektus, ginklų perdavimas Rusijai pagal Sutartį dėl prekybos ginklais (SPG) būtų neleidžiamas. ES nuolat ragino visas valstybes, kurios yra SPG Šalys, neperduoti Rusijai jokių ginklų.

ŠLG ir kitos karinės įrangos registravimas yra nacionalinė atsakomybė. EIVT, remdamasi Ukrainos valdžios institucijų pasirašytu ir ES valstybių narių įgyvendinančiųjų subjektų pateiktu pristatymo patikrinimo sertifikatu, apdairiai registravo karinę įrangą, ginklus ir šaudmenis, kuriuos pagal Europos taikos priemonę teikė ES valstybės narės. Be to, ES ir Ukraina bendradarbiavo grėsmių, kylančių dėl ŠLG nukreipimo ir neteisėtos prekybos jais, srityje; šis bendradarbiavimas vykdomas ilgą laiką. 2022 m. pagrindiniai ES finansuojami projektai, kuriais remiamos Ukrainos pastangos kovoti su neteisėta prekyba ŠLG, šaudmenimis ir sprogmenimis, yra ES Tarybos sprendimai (BUSP) 2018/1788 ⁽¹⁵⁾ ir (BUSP) 2019/2111 ⁽¹⁶⁾, kurių pagrindinis įgyvendintojas yra SEESAC (UNDP), Tarybos sprendimas (BUSP) 2019/2009 ⁽¹⁷⁾, kurio pagrindinė įgyvendintoja yra ESBO, ir Tarybos sprendimas (BUSP) 2019/2191 ⁽¹⁸⁾, kuriuo remiamas „iTrace IV“.

2020–2025 m. ES kovos su neteisėta prekyba šaunamaisiais ginklais veiksmų plane Ukraina buvo nurodyta kaip vienas iš pagrindinių regionų, kuriame turi būti vykdomi konkretūs veiksmai išorės lygmeniu. Tame kontekste Ukraina dalyvavo paskutinėje 2021 m. rugsėjo mėn. įvykusioje ES ir Vakarų Balkanų ministrų konferencijoje dėl kovos su prekyba šaunamaisiais ginklais Pietryčių Europoje, kurioje įgyvendinami konkretūs ES kovos su neteisėta prekyba šaunamaisiais ginklais veiksmų plano veiksmai, skirti Pietryčių Europai, įskaitant visapusiškos ŠLG kontrolės veiksmų gairių įgyvendinimą, taip pat plano dėl šaunamųjų ginklų nacionalinių ryšių punktų įgyvendinimą.

2022 m. laikydamosi ES ŠLG strategijoje nustatytų regioninių prioritetų ES toliau rėmė Vakarų Balkanų partnerius, pasitelkdama ES Sprendimus (BUSP) 2018/1788 ir (BUSP) 2019/2111, kurių pagrindinis įgyvendintojas yra SEESAC (UNDP). Vakarų Balkanai išlieka didžiausi ES regioninės paramos įprastinių ginklų kontrolei gavėjai. Vakarų Balkanų veiksmų gairių dėl kovos su neteisėta prekyba ginklais įgyvendinimas išliko vienu iš ES prioritetų. Be to, sėkmingas

⁽¹⁵⁾ OL L 293, 2018 11 20, p. 11.

⁽¹⁶⁾ OL L 318, 2019 12 10, p. 147.

⁽¹⁷⁾ OL L 312, 2019 12 3, p. 42.

⁽¹⁸⁾ OL L 330, 2019 12 20, p. 53.

regioninių veiksmų gairių metodas Vakarų Balkanuose tapo prototipu kitoms regioninėms įprastinės ginkluotės kontrolės iniciatyvoms.

ES aktyviai dalyvavo 8-ajame kas dvejus metus vykstančiame valstybių susitikime dėl JT veiksmų programos dėl neteisėtos prekybos šaunių ir lengvaisiais ginklais visų aspektų prevencijos, kovos su ja ir jos panaikinimo (2022 m. birželio 27 d.– liepos 1 d., Niujorkas). ES padarė pareiškimus dėl visų trijų dalykinių darbotvarkės punktų ir aktyviai dalyvavo konsultacijose dėl baigiamojo dokumento.

Darbinio dokumentu, kurį ES pateikė prieš susitikimą, buvo sudarytos galimybės baigiamajame dokumente atsižvelgti į daugelį ES tikslų. Tačiau ES ir daugumos dalyvaujančių valstybių palaikoma pozicija dėl tokių klausimų kaip šaudmenų įtraukimas į veiksmų programos taikymo sritį, formuluotė dėl neribotos sudėties techninių ekspertų darbo grupės ir nuoroda į veiksmų programos bei Sutarties dėl prekybos ginklais ir Protokolo dėl šaunamųjų ginklų „sinergiją“ nesulaukė bendro sutarimo.

Nuo 2013 m. ES remia *iTrace* – pasaulinį ataskaitų apie neteisėtus ŠLG ir kitus neteisėtus įprastinius ginklus bei šaudmenis konfliktų paveiktose zonose teikimo mechanizmą. Ataskaitiniu laikotarpiu pagal *iTrace* vykdytos operacijos konfliktų zonose Artimuosiuose Rytuose, Vakarų ir Rytų Afrikoje, Persijos įlankoje, Vidurinėje Azijoje ir Ukrainoje, padėdamas pastangoms sutrikdyti neteisėtą prekybą ginklais ir šaudmenimis. Operacijose Ukrainoje buvo visapusiškai dokumentuotos ir atsektos Rusijos ir Irano pažangiosios ginklų sistemos.

Lyčių lygybės ir moterų įgalėjimo rėmimas ir skatinimas yra ES politikos pagrindas tiek namuose, tiek užsienyje. Laikydamosi savo ŠLG strategijos, ES sistemingai integruoja lyčių aspektą rengdama naujus projektus, susijusius su kova su ginkluotuoju smurtu ir ŠLG kontrole apskritai. Be to, ES toliau rėmė tarptautiniu mastu pripažintos ginklų ir šaudmenų valdymo patvirtinimo sistemos rengimą siekiant užkirsti kelią neteisėtam platinimui.

Sąjunga, vesdama įvairius politinius dialogus, taip pat toliau propagavo SPG visuotinimą ir veiksmingą įgyvendinimą. ES toliau teikė finansinę paramą Sutarties įgyvendinimo rėmimo programai, teikdama techninę pagalbą Afrikos, Lotynų Amerikos ir Pietryčių bei Vidurinės Azijos šalims, kad jos stiprintų savo nacionalines sistemas pagal Sutarties reikalavimus, ir toliau teikė paramą SPG sekretariatui. ES taip pat toliau propagavo veiksmingas ginklų eksporto kontrolės priemones Pietų ir Rytų Europos, Kaukazo, Artimųjų Rytų ir Šiaurės Afrikos, taip pat Vidurinės Azijos valstybėse.

Priešpėstinės minos

2022 m. ES toliau prisidėjo prie žmonių saugumo remdama 2020–2024 m. Oslo veiksmų plano, kurį valstybės, Konvencijos šalys, priėmė 1997 m. Konvencijos dėl priešpėstinių minų naudojimo, kaupimo, gamybos ir perdavimo uždraudimo ir dėl jų sunaikinimo ketvirtojoje peržiūros konferencijoje, įgyvendinimą. Tarybos sprendimu (BUSP) 2021/257 ⁽¹⁾ ES siekė šių tikslų: a) remti valstybių, Konvencijos šalių, pastangas įgyvendinti Oslo veiksmų plano aspektus, susijusius su paieška ir išminavimu, švietimu apie minų keliamą riziką ir tos rizikos mažinimą; b) remti valstybių, Konvencijos šalių, pastangas įgyvendinti Oslo veiksmų plano aspektus, susijusius su pagalba aukoms; c) skatinti Konvencijos visuotinimą ir propaguoti taisykles, nukreiptas prieš priešpėstinių minų naudojimą, kaupimą, gamybą ir perdavimą, ir susijusias su jų sunaikinimu; d) remti valstybių, Konvencijos šalių, kurios yra išlaikiosios priešpėstinės minos leidžiamais tikslais, pastangas didinant ataskaitų teikimo pajėgumus, užtikrinant, kad tokių išlaikomų minų skaičius neviršytų neišvengiamai būtino mažiausio skaičiaus, ir nagrinėjant kovinių priešpėstinių minų alternatyvas mokymo ir mokslinių tyrimų tikslais, kai įmanoma; ir e) rodyti nuolatinį ES ir jos valstybių narių įsipareigojimą įgyvendinti Konvenciją ir pasiryžimą bendradarbiauti su tomis valstybėmis, Konvencijos šalimis, kurioms reikalinga pagalba siekiant laikytis savo įsipareigojimų pagal Konvenciją, ir teikti joms didesnę paramą, tuo būdu didinant ES vadovaujamą vaidmenį siekiant Konvencijos pagrindinio tikslo – galutinai užbaigti priešpėstinių minų sukeltas kančias ir išvengti jų aukų.

Minint 25-ąsias Konvencijos dėl priešpėstinių minų uždraudimo pasirašymo metines ir džiaugiantis jos didele sėkme, minų uždraudimo bendruomenė, įskaitant valstybes, Konvencijos šalis, tarptautines organizacijas, pilietinę visuomenę, po priešpėstinių minų sprogimo išgyvenusius asmenis ir išminavimo operatorius, 20-ajame valstybių, Konvencijos šalių, susitikime parodė tvirtą pasiryžimą pasiekti tikslą, kad iki 2025 m. pasaulyje nebeliktų minų. Dėl COVID-19 pandemijos, gerokai sumažėjusio pasaulinio kovos su minomis finansavimo ir plataus masto saugumo iššūkių, įskaitant tai, kad Rusija pastaruoju metu Ukrainoje naudojo priešpėstines minas, šis tikslas tampa sunkiau pasiekiamas, nors įsipareigojimas tebegalioja.

⁽¹⁾ OL L 58, 2021 2 19, p. 41.

ES yra viena didžiausių paramos išminavimo, pagalbos aukoms ir Oslo veiksmų plano įgyvendinimo srityje teikėjų. Be ES paramos propagavimo keturiais ES pareiškimais, ES buvo pripažinta svarbiausia partnere remiant priešpėstinių minų aukų reintegraciją į kasdienį gyvenimą, visų pirma vykdamas projektus Kolumbijoje, Bisau Gvinėjoje, Bosnijoje ir Hercegovinoje ir Kambodžoje.

EKSPORTO KONTROLĖS REŽIMAI

ES visapusiškai remia esamus daugiašalius eksporto kontrolės režimus (Australijos grupę, Raketų technologijų kontrolės režimą, Branduolinių tiekėjų grupę, Vasenaro susitarimą ir Zangger komitetą) ⁽²⁰⁾. Ji pabrėžia jų lemiamą vaidmenį užkertant kelią MNG ir jų siuntimo į taikinių priemonių platinimui, įgyvendinant JT ST embargus ir skatinant skaidrumą bei didesnę atsakomybę perduodant įprastinius ginklus ir dvejopo naudojimo prekes bei technologijas, taip užkertant kelią destabilizuojančioms sanauptom. ES padeda visapusiškai įgyvendinti tvirtus ginklų neplatavimo mechanizmus pagal Sutartis ir JT ST rezoliucijas propaguodama visame pasaulyje stiprias eksporto kontrolės priemones ir susijusius teisės aktus. ES taip pat teikia plataus masto paramą valstybėms partnerėms kuriant arba tobulinant savo pačių eksporto kontrolės sistemas, kad būtų įgyvendinta JT ST rezoliucija 1540, pasitelkiant ChBRB kompetencijos centrus ir ES P2P SPG programą. Daugiašaliai eksporto kontrolės režimai puoselėja teisėtą dvejopo naudojimo prekių ir technologijų, kurios yra esmingai svarbios tarptautiniam bendradarbiavimui taikaus naudojimo srityje, perdavimą.

Turėdama tai omenyje, JT Generalinės Asamblėjos Pirmajame komitete ES toliau prieštaravo Kinijos rezoliucijai „Tarptautinio bendradarbiavimo, susijusio su taikiu naudojimui tarptautinio saugumo kontekste, skatinimas“, be kita ko, vykdydama pasaulinę informavimo veiklą ir susitikdama su JT valstybių narių regioninėmis grupėmis prieš balsavimą. ES šią rezoliuciją laiko bandymu pakenkti eksporto kontrolės režimams tas eksporto kontrolės priemones, kurios yra būtinos ir privalomos pagal teisiškai privalomus tarptautinius dokumentus ginklų neplatavimo tikslais, klaidingai pavadinant „nepagrįstais apribojimais“ taikiems tikslams naudoti. Nėra įrodymų, patvirtinančių teiginį, kad esamos ginklų neplatavimo eksporto kontrolės priemonės ir daugiašaliai eksporto kontrolės režimai yra netinkamai naudojami pakenkiant naudojimui taikiems tikslams arba kad jie stabdo darnų vystymąsi.

Branduolinių tiekėjų grupė

Branduolinių tiekėjų grupė (NSG) siekia prisidėti prie branduolinių ginklų neplatavimo įgyvendindama du branduolinio eksporto ir su branduoline veikla susijusio eksporto gairių rinkinius; juos įgyvendina kiekviena dalyvaujanti vyriausybė pagal savo nacionalinės teisės aktus ir praktiką licencijavimo reikalavimų srityje. Visos ES valstybės narės yra NSG dalyvaujančiosios vyriausybės. Europos Komisija dalyvauja kaip stebėtoja.

NSG viduje vykstančiuose svarstymuose turi būti užtikrinamas konfidencialumas. ES aktyviai dalyvavo 2022 m. plenariniame susitikime (birželio 23–24 d., Varšuva) su Europos Komisijos (TRADE/JRC) ir EIVT atstovais. Pirmą kartą NSG istorijoje nebuvo priimta viešo pareiškimo.

Australijos grupė

Australijos grupė (AG) yra bendraminčių šalių bendramintė grupė, siekianti suderinti cheminių medžiagų, biologinių veiksmų ir susijusių dvejopo naudojimo technologijų eksporto kontrolės priemones. Ją sudaro 43 nariai, įskaitant ES ir visas ES valstybes nares.

AG viduje vykstančiuose svarstymuose turi būti užtikrinamas konfidencialumas. 2022 m. po COVID-19 pandemijos AG atnaujino fizinius posėdžius. ES aktyviai dalyvavo liepos 4–8 d. Paryžiuje įvykusiame AG plenariniame susitikime, be kita ko, diskusijose dėl grėsmės, kad Rusija panaudos cheminių ginklų ir biologinius ginklus išpuoliams prieš Ukrainos civilinius biologinius ir chemijos objektus ir netoli jų, taip pat dėl bendro susirūpinimo dėl nepagrįstų Rusijos teiginių apie cheminių ginklų ir biologinius ginklus, įskaitant pareiškimus prieš Ukrainą ir Jungtines Amerikos Valstijas.

⁽²⁰⁾ ES yra Australijos grupės narė ir nuolatinė stebėtoja Zangger komitete. Europos Komisija yra stebėtoja Branduolinių tiekėjų grupėje. Tuo pat metu visuose penkiuose eksporto kontrolės režimuose ES politiniu lygmeniu koordinuoja juose dalyvaujančių ES valstybių narių pozicijas, pavyzdžiui, kad būtų pateikti pareiškimai ES vardu.

MTCR

Raketų technologijų kontrolės režimas (MTCR) yra neformali ir savanoriška asociacija, vienijanti šalis, kurios laikosi vienuodų tikslų dėl nepilotuojamų pristatymo sistemų, galinčių pristatyti masinio naikinimo ginklą, neplatavimo ir siekia koordinuoti nacionalines eksporto licencijavimo pastangas, kad būtų užkirstas kelias platinimui. MTCR atlieka labai svarbų vaidmenį kovojant su balistinių raketų, sparnuotųjų raketų ir bepiločių orlaivių technologijų platinimu. Šiuo metu MTCR narės yra 18 ES valstybių narių. ES itin svarbus klausimas MTCR kontekste yra tai, kad blokuojamas devynių ES valstybių narių prisijungimas: Kroatijos, Kipro, Estijos, Latvijos, Lietuvos, Maltos, Rumunijos, Slovakijos ir Slovėnijos prisijungimas. Vienu bendru ES eksporto kontrolės taisyklių rinkiniu pagal ES eksporto kontrolės reglamentą įgyvendinamos MTCR gairės ir kontrolės sąrašai ir užtikrinama, kad jie būtų veiksmingai taikomi visose ES valstybėse narėse, įskaitant tas, kurios dar nėra MTCR narės.

MTCR viduje vykstančiuose svarstymuose turi būti užtikrinamas konfidencialumas. ES visada pritaria tam, kad būtų priimti griežti MTCR vieši pareiškimai, atspindintys tarptautiniu mastu kilusį susirūpinimą visų pirma dėl Irano ir KLDK įvykdytų balistinių raketų paleidimų ir reikšmingo raketų technologijų plėtojimo šiose šalyse. 2022 m. MTCR plenarinis susitikimas įvyko spalio 17–21 d. Montrė pirmininkaujant Šveicarijai. Po susitikimo MTCR viešo pareiškimo nebuvo paskelbta. 2022 m. lapkričio 8 d. buvo paskelbtas MTCR partnerių priimtas Pareiškimas Raketų kontrolės režimo 35-ųjų metų progai.

Vaseno susitarimas

Vaseno susitarimas (VS) buvo sudarytas siekiant prisidėti prie regioninio ir tarptautinio saugumo ir stabilumo skatinant skaidrumą ir didesnę atsakomybę įprastinių ginklų ir dvejojo naudojimo prekių bei technologijų perdavimo procese. Dalyvaujančios valstybės taiko eksporto kontrolės priemones visiems gaminiams, nurodytiems Dvejojo naudojimo prekių ir technologijų sąraše bei Šaudmenų sąraše, kuriuos jos reguliariai peržiūri, siekdamos užkirsti kelią neleistinam tų gaminių perdavimui ar pakartotiniam perdavimui.

Abu sąrašai sudaro atitinkamai ES dvejojo naudojimo prekių kontrolės sąrašo ir ES bendrojo karinės įrangos sąrašo, kuriuos Taryba reguliariai atnauja pagal VS sprendimus, pagrindą. Dalyvaujančios valstybės savo nacionaline politika siekia užtikrinti, kad šių gaminių perdavimai neprisidėtų prie karinių pajėgumų, kurie kenkia šiems tikslams, plėtojimo ar stiprinimo ir kad jie nebūtų nukreipiami tokiems pajėgumams remti, ir kad jų neįsigytų teroristai. Dalyvaujančios valstybės taip pat reguliariai keičiasi informacija ir privalo reguliariai pranešti apie savo ginklų perdavimus ir tam tikrų dvejojo naudojimo prekių bei technologijų perdavimus ir (arba) atsisakymus perduoti į paskirties vietas, kurioms netaikomas šis susitarimas. Vaseno susitarime dalyvauja 42 valstybės, įskaitant 26 ES valstybes nares.

VE viduje vykstančiuose svarstymuose turi būti užtikrinamas konfidencialumas. 2022 m. lapkričio 30 d. ir gruodžio 1 d. Vienoje įvyko VS plenarinis susitikimas – pirmasis po 2019 m. dėl COVID-19 pandemijos. Jame susitarta dėl abiejų šio režimo kontrolės sąrašų atnaujinimo.

BESIFORMUOJANČIOS TECHNOLOGIJOS

2022 m. ES toliau plėtojo savo supratimą apie besiformuojančias technologijas, kurios potencialiai gali daryti poveikį tarptautiniam saugumui ir nusiginklavimui, ir toliau dalyvavo tarptautinėse pastangose jas valdyti ir valdyti galimą riziką, kurią jos gali kelti.

2022 m. ES priėmė du Tarybos sprendimus šioje konkrečioje srityje:

- 2022 m. lapkričio 18 d. Tarybos sprendimu (BUSP) 2022/2269 dėl Sąjungos paramos UNODA ir SIPRI įgyvendinamam bendram projektui „Atsakingų inovacijų skatinimas dirbtinio intelekto srityje siekiant taikos ir saugumo“ ES remia didesnę civilinės dirbtinio intelekto (DI) bendruomenės angažavimąsi mažinant riziką, kurią neatsakingų subjektų vykdomas civilinių DI srities mokslinių tyrimų ir inovacijų nukreipimas bei netinkamas naudojimas gali kelti tarptautinei taikai ir saugumui.
- 2022 m. lapkričio 25 d. Tarybos sprendimu (BUSP) 2022/2320 dėl Sąjungos paramos projekto „Inovacijų potencialo išnaudojimas: didelio poveikio technologijos ir tarptautinis saugumas“ įgyvendinimui remiamas UNIDIR atliekamas darbas pagal jos Saugumo ir technologijų programą, siekiant stiprinti žinias ir supratimą apie naujas ir besiformuojančias technologijas, kurios yra svarbios tarptautiniam saugumui.

Būtinybė užtikrinti, kad visi ginklai, be kita ko, besiformuojančių technologijų srityje, atitiktų tarptautinę teisę, visų pirma tarptautinę humanitarinę teisę (THT), atsižvelgiant į atitinkamus etinius aspektus, ir toliau buvo ES rūpestis. ES toliau propagavo savo poziciją, kad turėtų būti išlaikyta žmogaus atsakomybė už sprendimus dėl ginklų naudojimo ir kad visada ir per visą ginklų sistemos gyvavimo ciklą privalo būti išsaugota žmogaus atskaitomybė.

2022 m. ES toliau dalyvavo Vyriausybinių ekspertų grupės (VEG) autonominių mirtinų ginklų sistemų klausimais veikloje pagal Konvenciją dėl tam tikrų įprastinių ginklų naudojimo uždraudimo arba apribojimo (CCW). ES rėmė VEG vystomą darbą, susijusį su dviejų pakopų požiūriu į autonominių mirtinų ginklų sistemų reguliavimą, atskiriant ginklų sistemas, grindžiamas besiformuojančiomis technologijomis autonominių mirtinų ginklų sistemų srityje, kurios negali būti naudojamos pagal THT normas ir principus, ir sistemas, kurios turi autonominių savybių, tačiau gali būti naudojamos pagal THT. ES buvo nusivylusi tuo, kad, nepaisant reikšmingos konceptualios pažangos, 2022 m. nepavyko susitarti dėl jokios esminės ataskaitos CCW valstybėms šalims.

BENDRADARBIAVIMAS SU IDĖJŲ KALVĖMIS IR NVO

Remdamasis 2010 m. liepos 26 d. Tarybos sprendimu 2010/430/BUSP ⁽²¹⁾, ES konsorciumas masinio naikinimo ginklų neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo klausimais (EUNPDC), pradėjęs veikti 2011 m. sausio mėn., aktyviai rėmė ES kovos su masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimu strategijos įgyvendinimą. Trečiasis EUNPDC projekto etapas buvo įgyvendinamas nuo 2018 m. gegužės 18 d. iki 2022 m. gegužės 17 d. pagal ES Tarybos sprendimą (BUSP) 2018/299 ⁽²²⁾. 2022 m. balandžio 11 d. Taryba priėmė Sprendimą (BUSP) 2022/597 ⁽²³⁾, kuriuo dar labiau išplečiama ES parama konsorciumo veiklai 2022–2025 m. laikotarpiu, remiantis ligšioliniais pasiekimais ir papildant juos naujais projektais.

Konsorciumo veikla gerokai padėjo formuoti ES politiką ginklų neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo srityse ir padidinti ES matomumą trečiųjų valstybių ir pilietinės visuomenės atžvilgiu. Konsorciumas sudaro sąlygas specialistams palaikyti neformalius ryšius ir skatina įvairių suinteresuotųjų subjektų dialogą. Jo veikla padėjo didinti informuotumą apie masinio naikinimo ginklų ir įprastinių ginklų keliamus iššūkius, taip pat buvo nagrinėjamos galimybės tuos iššūkius įveikti. Jis remiasi plačiu tinklu, apimančiu 109 idėjų kalves ir mokslinių tyrimų centrų visoje Europoje, įskaitant narius iš visų ES valstybių narių, taip pat iš Norvegijos, Serbijos, Šveicarijos, Turkijos ir Jungtinės Karalystės. 2022 m. prie tinklo prisijungė trys institutai.

Siekdamas Tarybos sprendimo tikslų, konsorciumas ypatingą dėmesį skiria lyčių aspekto integravimui ir naujos kartos mokslo darbuotojų bei praktikuojančių specialistų ginklų neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo srityse skatinimui, taip pat atotrūkių tarp gamtos mokslų ir socialinių mokslų, tarp politikos formuotojų ir akademinės bendruomenės bei tarp akademinės bendruomenės ir politikos mokslinių tyrimų institutų panaikinimui. Vykdydamas savo išsipareigojimą įgyvendinti šiuos prioritetus, konsorciumas rengia informuotumo apie ginklų neplatavimą mokymo kursus antrosios ir trečiosios pakopos gamtos ir inžinerijos mokslų studentams ir įgyvendina „Naujos kartos ir jaunų moterų veiklos ir mentorystės programą“, kuri taip pat apima informavimo vizitų į Europos universitetus ir internetinių seminarų teminiais klausimais organizavimą. Visuose konsorciumo renginiuose buvo užtikrinta dalyvių ir pranešėjų įvairovė lyties, amžiaus, praktinės patirties ir geografinio atstovavimo atžvilgiu.

Dėl COVID-19 pandemijos sukeltų aplinkybių kai kurie renginiai vyko virtualioje erdvėje arba mišriu formatu. 2022 m., įgyvendindamas įvairius Tarybos sprendimo (BUSP) 2018/299 ir Sprendimo (BUSP) 2022/597 aspektus, konsorciumas organizavo šiuos renginius:

- įvadinį kovos su masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimu kursą IT ir inžinerijos sričių antrosios ir trečiosios pakopos studentams „Branduolinių ginklų plitimas. Istorija, grėsmės ir sprendiniai“ (vasario 23–25 d.);
- seminarus temomis „Besiformuojančios technologijos“ (vasario 24 d.); „Dėmesio lyčių aspektui nusiginklavimo ir ginklų neplatavimo srityje didinimas“ (kovo 30 d.); „Nebranduoliniai ginklai ir strateginis stabilumas Europoje. Teorija ir praktika“ (balandžio 29 d.); „Saugumas, branduoliniai ginklai ir karo Ukrainoje poveikis“ (gegužės 5 d.); ir „Karas Ukrainoje. Poveikis tarptautinio saugumo architektūrai, ginklų neplatavimui, nusiginklavimui, ginklų kontrolei ir eksporto kontrolei“ (gegužės 16–17 d.)

⁽²¹⁾ OL L 202, 2010 8 4, p. 5.

⁽²²⁾ OL L 56, 2018 2 28, p. 46.

⁽²³⁾ OL L 114, 2022 4 12, p. 75.

- 11-ąją ES konsultacinį susitikimą, subūrusį ES pareigūnus ir europinius ekspertus (rugsėjo 14–15 d.);
- 3-ąją JT Nusiginklavimo programos dalyvių vizitą į Briuselį (rugsėjo 14–16 d.);
- 6-ąją metų Europos ginklų neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo nepriklausomų mokslinių institutų tinklo susitikimą (lapkričio 8 d.);
- 11-ąją ES konferenciją ginklų neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo klausimais (lapkričio 14–15 d.);
- „Naujos kartos“ praktinį seminarą (lapkričio 14 d.);
- įvadinį kovos su masinio naikinimo ginklų platinimu kursas inžinerinių disciplinų antrosios ir trečiosios pakopos studentams „MNG neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo keliai“ (gruodžio 6–8 d.)

2022 m. buvo vykdoma ši veikla, susijusi su Jaunų moterų ir naujos kartos iniciatyva:

- rugsėjo 15 d. pradėta antroji jaunų moterų mentorystės programos laida (kuri vykdyta iki 2023 m. gegužės 15 d.);
- tikslinis įgūdžių ugdymo praktinis seminaras, skirtas jaunos moterims, vykdamas informavimo veiklą naujai kartai (vasario 17 d.);
- Jaunų moterų ir naujos kartos iniciatyvos informavimo renginys „Darbas tarptautinėse organizacijose. Patarimai ir išvalgos naujai kartai. BWC ir OPCW“ (kovo 31 d.);
- informacinis vizitas į Turino universitetą „Ginklų neplatavimas ir nusiginklavimas. Dabartiniai iššūkiai ir tolesni veiksmai“ (gegužės 5 d.);
- informacinis vizitas į Romos Tre universitetą siekiant propaguoti EUNPDC darbą (spalio 10 d.);
- renginys „Angažavimosi galimybės ginklų kontrolės, nusiginklavimo ir ginklų neplatavimo srityse jauniems specialistams ir studentams“ (spalio 19 d.);
- įgūdžių ugdymo praktinis seminaras „Autorinių vedamųjų straipsnių branduoline tema rašymas“ (lapkričio 18 d.).

2022 m. konsorciūmas leido mėnesinį informacinį biuletinį, taip pat paskelbė keturis ES dokumentus ginklų neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo klausimais ⁽²⁴⁾. Mokymo veikla apėmė e. mokymo kursus ginklų neplatavimo bei nusiginklavimo ir ES politikos klausimais, taip pat paramą septynioms stažuotėms ginklų neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo srityje tinklui priklausančiose įstaigose.

DIALOGAS IR BENDRADARBIAVIMAS SU TREČIOSIOMIS VALSTYBĖMIS

Laikydamosi MNG neplatavimo politikos ir 2003 m. Tarybos išvadų, ES toliau dėjo pastangas, kad į susitarimus su valstybėmis partnerėmis būtų integruoti išpareigojimai dėl MNG neplatavimo. 2022 m. ES pasirašė partnerystės ir bendradarbiavimo susitarimus su Tailandu ⁽²⁵⁾ ir Malaizija ⁽²⁶⁾, į kuriuos įtrauktos specialios nuostatos dėl masinio naikinimo ginklų ir įprastinių ginklų.

⁽²⁴⁾ Galima susipažinti: <https://www.nonproliferation.eu/activities/online-publishing/non-proliferation-papers/>.

⁽²⁵⁾ Indijos ir Ramiojo vandenynų regionas: Europos Sąjunga ir Tailandas pasirašė partnerystės ir bendradarbiavimo susitarimą (europa.eu).

⁽²⁶⁾ Indijos ir Ramiojo vandenynų regionas: Europos Sąjunga ir Malaizija pasirašė partnerystės ir bendradarbiavimo susitarimą.

Visus metus EIVT toliau dalyvavo dialoguose ginklų neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo klausimais su įvairiais partneriais. 2022 m. vasario mėn. buvo surengti dialogai ginklų neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo klausimais su Indija ir Kinija, o lapkričio 22 d. – su Kuba (prieš tai lapkričio 21 d. įvyko seminaras su Kubos ir Europos pilietinės visuomenės atstovais) ⁽²⁷⁾. 2022 m. gruodžio mėn. buvo surengtas aukšto lygio dialogas ginklų neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo klausimais su JAV. Be to, visus metus toliau vyko neformalios konsultacijos su įvairiomis trečiosiomis valstybėmis ir tarptautinėmis organizacijomis. Ginklų neplatavimo ir nusiginklavimo klausimai ir toliau buvo įtraukiami į įvairius ES politinius dialogus su kitais partneriais.

2022 m. G7 kontekste buvo paskelbti keli pareiškimai, susiję su ginklų neplatavimu ir nusiginklavimu, įskaitant gegužės 9 d. G7 už ginklų neplatavimo klausimus atsakingų direktorių grupės pareiškimą ⁽²⁸⁾, gegužės 14 d. ⁽²⁹⁾ bei lapkričio 4 d. G7 užsienio reikalų ministrų pareiškimą ⁽³⁰⁾ ir birželio 28 d. G7 vadovų komunikatą ⁽³¹⁾.

⁽²⁷⁾ Kuba: su ES surengtas politinis dialogas nusiginklavimo ir ginklų neplatavimo klausimais | EIVT (europa.eu).

⁽²⁸⁾ G7 už ginklų neplatavimo klausimus atsakingų direktorių grupės pareiškimas (2022 m. gegužės 9 d.) – Europos ir užsienio reikalų ministerija (diplomatie.gouv.fr).

⁽²⁹⁾ 2022-05-14-g7-foreign-ministers-communique-data.pdf (g7germany.de).

⁽³⁰⁾ G7 užsienio reikalų ministrų pareiškimas – Federalinė užsienio reikalų ministerija (auswaertiges-amt.de).

⁽³¹⁾ 2022-07-14-leaders-communique-data.pdf (g7germany.de).

PRIEDAS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. COUNCIL DECISIONS	22
1.1. Nuclear issues	22
1.1.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 of 10 December 2018 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)	22
1.1.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East	23
1.1.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	23
1.1.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	24
1.1.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 of 15 April 2019 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)	24
1.2. Chemical weapons	25
1.2.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 of 1 April 2019 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	25
1.2.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 of 2 June 2020 in support of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons	25
1.2.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 of 21 June 2021 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	25
1.2.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 of 25 November 2021 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through satellite imagery	26
1.3. Biological and toxin weapons	26
1.3.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	26
1.3.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2072 of 25 November 2021 in support of building resilience in biosafety and biosecurity through the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention	27

1.3.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 of 31 July 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery	27
1.3.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 of 9 December 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery	27
1.4. Ballistic missiles	28
1.4.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 of 18 December 2017 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	28
1.5. UNSCR 1540	29
1.5.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 of 11 May 2017 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery	29
1.6. Conventional weapons	29
1.6.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 of 17 December 2018 in support of gender mainstreamed policies, programmes and actions in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse, in line with the Women, Peace and Security agenda	29
1.6.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1298 of 31 July 2019 in support of an Africa-China-Europe dialogue and cooperation on preventing the diversion of arms and ammunition in Africa	30
1.6.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 of 2 December 2019 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in cooperation with OSCE	30
1.6.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2111 of 9 December 2019 in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South-East Europe reducing the threat of illicit small arms and light weapons and their ammunition	31
1.6.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 of 19 December 2019 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer ('iTrace IV')	31
1.6.6. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257 of 18 February 2021 in support of the Oslo Action Plan for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction	32
1.6.7. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1694 of 21 September 2021 in support of the universalisation, implementation and strengthening of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)	33
1.6.8. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 of 17 December 2018 in support of countering illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms, light weapons and ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean in the framework of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition 'Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens'	33
1.6.9. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1726 of 28 September 2021 in support of combating the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Member States of the League of Arab States – Phase II	34

1.6.10. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 of 7 July 2020 in support of the development of an internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standards	34
1.6.11. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2133 of 2 December 2021 in support of comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Conventional Ammunition (CA) in South-Eastern Europe	35
1.6.12. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 of 19 November 2018 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans	35
1.6.13. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/847 of 30 May 2022 in support of efforts to prevent and combat illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in the Americas	36
1.6.14. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965 of 17 October 2022 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects	36
1.7. Arms export controls	37
1.7.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 of 12 October 2020 on the promotion of effective arms export controls (COARM V)	37
1.7.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/649 of 16 April 2021 on Union support for activities of the ATT Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty	37
1.7.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2309 of 22 December 2021 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT-OP III)	37
1.8. Emerging technologies	38
1.8.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2269 of 18 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project 'Promoting Responsible Innovation in Artificial Intelligence for Peace and Security'	38
1.8.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2320 of 25 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of 'Unlocking Innovation: Enabling Technologies and International Security'	38
1.9. Collaborations with NGOs and think tanks	38
1.9.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 of 26 February 2018 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	38
1.9.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/597 of 11 April 2022 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks	39
2. COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS	40
2.1. Nuclear issues	40
2.1.1. Council Conclusions on Iran (12.12.2022)	40
2.2. Biological and toxin weapons	43
2.2.1. Council Conclusions on the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (21.3.2022)	43

3. STATEMENTS	44
3.1. General statements	44
3.1.1. Statement at the High Level Segment of Conference on Disarmament (Geneva, 1.3.2022)	44
3.1.2. EU Statement – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: General Statement (New York, 3.10.2022)	45
3.2. Nuclear issues	48
3.2.1. EU Statement – 10th Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: General Statement (New York, 1.8.2022)	48
3.2.2. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty: Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on the occasion of the closure of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties (Brussels, 29.8.2022)	50
3.2.3. EU Statement – 66th session of the General Conference (Vienna, 26.9.2022)	51
3.2.4. EU General Statement on the safety, security, and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine – 66th session of the General Conference (Vienna, 29.9.2022)	53
3.2.5. EU Statement at the 59th session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (Vienna, 21.11.2022)	54
3.2.6. EU Briefing on behalf of the High Representative – UN Security Council: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran) (New York, 19.12.2022)	56
3.3. Chemical weapons	58
3.3.1. Chemical Weapons Convention: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union to mark the 25th anniversary (Brussels, 19.4.2022)	58
3.3.2. Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare: Statement by High Representative/ Vice-President Josep Borrell (Brussels, 30.11.2022)	59
3.3.3. Statement of the European Union at the 27th Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (The Hague, 28 November 2022)	60
3.4. Biological and toxin weapons	62
3.4.1. Second Preparatory Committee for the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Geneva, 11.4.2022)	62
3.4.2. EU General Statement at the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC (Geneva, 28.11.2022)	62
3.4.3. 9th Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – Closing remarks (Geneva, 16.12.2022)	66
3.5. Ballistic missiles	67
3.5.1. DPRK: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch (Brussels, 25.3.2022)	67
3.5.2. EU Statement at the 21st Annual Regular Meeting of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) (Vienna, 20.5.2022)	67
3.5.3. DPRK: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the recent launch of multiple missiles (Brussels, 5.11.2022)	69
3.5.4. DPRK/North Korea: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (Brussels, 19.11.2022)	70

3.6. UNSCR 1540	70
3.6.1. EU Statement – UN 1540 Committee: Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540 (New York, 1.6.2022)	70
3.7. Conventional weapons	72
3.7.1. EU Statement on the consideration of the implementation of the Programme of Action – Eighth Biennial Meeting of States (New York, 27.7.2022)	72
3.7.2. EU Statement – On consideration of the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, 8th Biennial Meeting of States on the UN POA to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (New York, 28.6.2022)	74
3.7.3. EU Statement – 2022 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Geneva, 16.11.2022)	75
3.7.4. EU Statement – Twentieth meeting of the States Parties of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Geneva, 21.11.2022)	77
3.8. Export control regimes	78
3.8.1. EU Explanation of Vote – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security (New York, 3.11.2022)	78

1. COUNCIL DECISIONS

Overview of EU Council Joint Actions and Council Decisions in the field of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, including in the framework of the EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, that were in force in 2022:

1.1. NUCLEAR ISSUES

1.1.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 of 10 December 2018 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)**

Objective: With this Decision, the EU is supporting one of the key elements of the global nuclear security and anti-terrorism architecture, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

The objectives of the support are to increase the number of adherents to ICSANT, to raise awareness among national policy- and decision-makers, as well as capacity-building to help improve national legislation and to strengthen the capacity of national stakeholders, including criminal justice officials to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases of nuclear terrorism. The Council Decision aims to build synergies with ongoing EU projects in support for relevant international legal instruments, such as the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Council Decision promotes the universalisation and effective implementation of ICSANT through the development and maintenance of a password-protected website on all resources on ICSANT including examples of national legislation; the development of an e-learning module on ICSANT, to be translated into at least four UN official languages; the provision of relevant legislative assistance; capacity-building of relevant stakeholders, including criminal justice officials that could be involved in investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases involving nuclear and other radioactive material covered by ICSANT; the holding of global and regional workshops and country visits and by the collection; and the dissemination of good practices.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and United Nations Office for Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)

Budget: EUR 4 999 986

Official Journal: L 314, 11.12.2018, p. 41.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended twice:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/919 of 7 June 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 until 30 November 2022

Official Journal: L 201, 8.6.2021, p. 27.

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2185 of 8 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 until 30 June 2023

Official Journal: L 288, 9.11.2022, p. 80.

1.1.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East**

Objective:

- (a) To produce a factual narrative of efforts to establish a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (ME WMDFFZ) between 1995 and 2015 to fill an important gap in the research literature and identify lessons for future efforts.
- (b) To identify key issues, opportunities, obstacles and ideas of contemporary relevance to consideration of a ME WMDFFZ and efforts to enhance regional security cooperation.
- (c) To engage and obtain perspectives and insights from a wide community of researchers, policymakers and academics in the region on these issues and, in so doing, expand the number and diversity of participants exploring the prospects for dialogue and progress.
- (d) To facilitate dialogue among these experts with a view to fostering networks, communication and engagement that could in turn contribute to future efforts to advance regional security, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament progress in the region

Implementing Agency: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Budget: EUR 2 856 278

Official Journal: L 149, 7.6.2019, p. 63.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/753 of 16 May 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 until 10 July 2023

Official Journal: L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 15.

1.1.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective: Support the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO and in particular strengthen: (1) the capabilities of the CTBT monitoring and verification system, including radionuclide detection; and (2) the capabilities of the States Signatories to the CTBT to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the CTBT.

Implementing Agency: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

Budget: EUR 6 288 892

Official Journal: L 207, 30.6.2020, p. 15.

Duration: 36 months

1.1.4. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective:

- (a) Contribute to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security, by establishing comprehensive nuclear security guidance and, upon request, promoting the use of such guidance through peer reviews and advisory services and capacity building, including education and training.
- (b) Assist in adherence to, and implementation of, relevant international legal instruments, and in strengthening the international cooperation and coordination of assistance.
- (c) Support the IAEA mandate to play a central role and enhance international cooperation in nuclear security, in response to priorities of Member States expressed through the decisions and resolutions of the IAEA's Policy Making Organs.

Implementing Agency: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Budget: EUR 11 582 300

Official Journal: L I 372, 9.11.2020, p. 4.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1852 of 4 October 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 until 31 March 2024 and include among its purposes to assist Ukraine in ensuring the maintenance of its nuclear security regime.

Official Journal: L 257, 5.10.2022, p. 10.

1.1.5. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 of 15 April 2019 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

Objective: Support activities aimed at upholding and preserving the integrity of the NPT, through a balanced focus on the three equally important and mutually reinforcing pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 1 299 883,68

Official Journal: L 105, 16.4.2019, p. 25.

Duration: Initially 18 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1695 of 21 September 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 until 15 January 2022

Official Journal: L 334, 22.9.2021, p. 22.

1.2. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1.2.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 of 1 April 2019 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective: The Council Decision foresees a contribution to the core activities of the Organisation, notably for verification, national implementation, universalisation and the Africa programme. It also contributes substantially to the project of transforming the OPCW laboratory into a Centre of Chemistry and Technology and to the implementation of the decision by the OPCW Conference of States Parties directing the OPCW Technical Secretariat to put into place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 11 601 256

Official Journal: L 93, 2.4.2019, p. 3.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/573 of 7 April 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 until 30 April 2023

Official Journal: L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 66.

1.2.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 of 2 June 2020 in support of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons**

Objective: Support the full operationalisation of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism (UNSGM) for investigation of the alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons in view of growing apprehensions regarding the possibility of the use of biological weapons.

More specifically, the following activities are supported:

- Training of experts on the roster of the UNSGM;
- Participation of laboratories in activities to develop a network capable of supporting an UNSGM investigation into an allegation of the use of biological weapons;
- Outreach activities to ensure nominations of experts and laboratories from the Global South;
- A full field exercise (Capstone Exercise);
- Regular coordination activities/workshops with relevant organisational partners; and
- Implementation of the Secretary General's Disarmament Agenda.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 1 418 042

Official Journal: L I 172, 3.6.2020, p. 5.

Duration: 36 months

1.2.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 of 21 June 2021 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective: Upgrading ICT infrastructure in line with the OPCW's institutional business continuity framework, with a strong focus on resilience, and ensuring privileged access governance, as well as physical, logical and cryptographic information management and separation for all strategic and mission networks of the OPCW.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 2 151 823

Official Journal: L 224, 24.6.2021, p. 24.

Duration: 24 months

1.2.4. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 of 25 November 2021 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through satellite imagery**

Objective: Support the project of the OPCW to enhance its operational effectiveness through satellite imagery and imagery analysis provided by SatCen, with the following objectives:

- (a) expanding the OPCW's capacity to support OPCW-mandated activities (the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), the Fact Finding Mission (FFM), the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), etc.) through imagery analysis as a source of evidentiary substantiation or corroboration of findings; and
- (b) utilising targeted imagery analysis for areas of interest (sites, routes, etc.) in planning for OPCW-mandated missions (incidents of alleged use (IAUs), challenge inspections (CIs), technical assistance visits (TAVs), etc.) in order to increase security and confidence in verification accuracy.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 1 593 353,22

Official Journal: L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 65.

Duration: 48 months

1.3. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

1.3.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective: Providing essential follow-up and momentum to activities undertaken throughout 2016-2018 in the framework of Council Decision 2016/51/CFSP in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), supporting in particular discussions in the BTWC Meetings of Experts in 2019 and 2020, as well as preparations for the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC finally held in 2022.

The Council Decision covers the following activities: (1) Universalisation; (2) Capacity development for national implementation; (3) Fostering biosecurity networks in the Global South; (4) BTWC inter-sessional programme and Ninth Review Conference; (5) Preparedness to prevent and respond to biological attacks; and, (6) Enabling tools for outreach.

Implementing Agency: BTWC Implementation Support Unit, via the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 3 029 857,79

Official Journal: L 19, 22.1.2019, p. 11.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2033 of 19 November 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 until 4 February 2023

Official Journal: L 415, 22.11.2021, p. 29.

1.3.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2072 of 25 November 2021 in support of building resilience in biosafety and biosecurity through the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Objective: Support the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) by:

- (a) strengthening biosafety and biosecurity capabilities in Africa through increased regional coordination;
- (b) capacity building for BTWC National Contact Points;
- (c) facilitating the review of developments in science and technology of relevance to the BTWC by also involving academia and industry; and
- (d) broadening the support for voluntary transparency exercises.

Implementing Agency: BTWC Implementation Support Unit, via the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 2 147 443,52

Official Journal: L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 56.

Duration: 24 months

1.3.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 of 31 July 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Objective: Support three projects of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) aiming at strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The Council Decision includes the following activities:

- (a) harmonisation of existing Ukrainian regulations on biosafety and biosecurity with international standards;
- (b) establishing of the veterinary surveillance system sustainability in Ukraine; and
- (c) awareness raising, education and training for life scientists on biosafety and biosecurity.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: EUR 1 913 900

Official Journal: L 204, 2.8.2019, p. 29.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2184 of 8 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 until 14 January 2024

Official Journal: L 288, 9.11.2022, p. 78.

1.3.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 of 9 December 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Objective:

- (a) Improve the legislative and regulatory basis of biosafety and biosecurity in the beneficiary countries, through the adoption and enforcement of appropriate effective laws which prohibit non-State actors from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes; and

- (b) Improve biosafety and biosecurity in beneficiary countries by raising awareness among relevant sectors, including through the enforcement of effective domestic measures to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and their means of delivery.

Implementing Agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: EUR 2 738 708,98

Official Journal: L 318, 10.12.2019, p. 123.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2270 of 18 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 until 20 February 2024.

Official Journal: L 300, 21.11.2022, p. 21.

1.4. BALLISTIC MISSILES

1.4.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 of 18 December 2017 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Objective:

- (a) Promote the subscription to the Code by an ever-larger number of States and ultimately its universality.
- (b) Support the full implementation of the Code.
- (c) Promote dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all.
- (d) Reinforce the Code's visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation.
- (e) Explore, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Register of Objects Launched in Outer Space.

Implementing Agency: Fondation pour le Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

Budget: EUR 1 878 120,05

Official Journal: L 337, 19.12.2017, p. 28.

Duration: Initially 40 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2074 of 25 November 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 until 21 January 2023

Official Journal: L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 70.

1.5. UNSCR 1540

1.5.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 of 11 May 2017 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery****Objective:**

- (a) Enhance the relevant national and regional efforts and capabilities, primarily through training, capacity-building and assistance facilitation in close coordination with other Union programmes and other actors involved in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), to ensure synergies and complementarity.
- (b) Contribute to the practical implementation of specific recommendations of both the 2009 comprehensive review on the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the outcome of the comprehensive review conducted during 2016, in particular in the areas of technical assistance, international cooperation and raising public awareness.
- (c) Support the development of voluntary UNSCR 1540 (2004) national implementation action plans upon States' request.
- (d) Promote the engagement of relevant stakeholders from industry and civil society in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004).

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 2 635 170,77

Official Journal: L 121, 12.5.2017, p. 39.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended twice:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1025 of 21 June 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 until 25 April 2022

Official Journal: L 224, 24.6.2021, p. 22.

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/574 of 7 April 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 until 25 February 2023

Official Journal: L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 67.

1.6. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

1.6.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 of 17 December 2018 in support of gender mainstreamed policies, programmes and actions in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse, in line with the Women, Peace and Security agenda****Objective:**

- (a) Contribute to international peace, security, gender equality and sustainable development by enhancing the effectiveness of small arms control measures through the promotion of approaches based on systematic gender analysis, the integration of gender perspectives and women's empowerment initiatives.
- (b) Support the implementation of the gender-relevant outcomes of the 2018 Third United Nations Conference to review progress made in the implementation of the PoA.
- (c) Contribute to the broader international policy agenda on gender equality and women's empowerment in line with the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 4 375 507,85.

Official Journal: L 322, 18.12.2018, p. 38.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2138 of 2 December 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 in support of gender mainstreamed policies, programmes and actions in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse, in line with the Women, Peace and Security agenda

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 until 31 October 2022.

Official Journal: L 432, 3.12.2021, p. 72.

1.6.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1298 of 31 July 2019 in support of an Africa-China-Europe dialogue and cooperation on preventing the diversion of arms and ammunition in Africa**

Objective: Contribute to preventing and combating the diversion of arms and ammunition in Africa by:

- (a) raising awareness of stakeholders in Africa, China and the Union on how the illicit flow of arms, particularly small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, to unauthorised actors contributes significantly towards exacerbating insecurity and violence in various parts of Africa, thereby undermining social cohesion, public security, socio-economic development and the effective functioning of state institutions;
- (b) promoting accountability and responsibility with regard to the legal arms trade and demonstrating to stakeholders in Africa, China and the Union how effective arms export control can contribute to mitigating the risk of diversion of arms into the illicit market.

Implementing Actor: Saferworld

Budget: EUR 994 007

Official Journal: L 204, 2.8.2019, p. 37.

Duration: 36 months

1.6.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 of 2 December 2019 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in cooperation with the OSCE**

Objective:

- (a) Enhance capabilities of the State Border Guard Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Fiscal Service/State Customs Service of Ukraine with respect to preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- (b) enhance supervisory capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with respect to their control of the manufacture, marking and record-keeping of weapons, ammunition and explosives corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment;
- (c) enhance operational capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the National Police of Ukraine, which reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with respect to forensics, analysis, detection, tracing, and investigation of illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- (d) enhance capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the improvement of legislative mechanisms for regulating and controlling the circulation and use of weapons, ammunition and explosives as well as raising public awareness on risks related to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment; and
- (e) enhance inter-agency coordination and cooperation resulting in developing strategic approach, data-collection and analysis in preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in Ukraine corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: EUR 5 151 579

Official Journal: L 312, 3.12.2019, p. 42.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2276 of 18 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the OSCE

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 until 23 January 2024

Official Journal: L 300, 21.11.2022, p. 42.

1.6.4. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2111 of 9 December 2019 in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South-East Europe reducing the threat of illicit small arms and light weapons and their ammunition**

Objective: Contribute to improved security in the South-East Europe region and in the Union by combatting the threat posed by illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition in and from South-East Europe, Belarus and Ukraine.

Implementing Agency: South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), via the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Budget: EUR 11 819 605,20

Official Journal: L 318, 10.12.2019, p. 147.

Duration: 48 months

1.6.5. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 of 19 December 2019 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer ('iTrace IV')**

Objective:

- (a) continued maintenance of a user-friendly global information management system on diverted or trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition ('iTrace') documented in conflict-affected areas in order to provide policymakers, conventional arms control experts, and conventional arms export control officers with relevant information to develop effective, evidence-based strategies and projects against the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition;
- (b) training and mentoring of national authorities in conflict-affected states to develop sustainable national illicit conventional arms identification and tracing capacity, encourage sustained cooperation with the iTrace project, better identify physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) priorities, more effectively articulate national arms control and law enforcement assistance requirements, notably Union-funded initiatives, such as Interpol's Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iARMS), and the activities of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), and strengthen dialogue with EU missions and initiatives;
- (c) enhanced frequency and duration of in-field research into conventional arms and their ammunition, illegally circulating in conflict-affected areas to generate iTrace data, in response to clear demands made by Member States and Union Delegations;
- (d) tailored support to Member State arms export control authorities and arms control policy makers, including repeat consultative visits by iTrace project staff to capitals of the Member States, a 24-hour help desk to provide instant advice on risk assessment and counter-diversion strategies, the maintenance of secure desktop and mobile dashboard applications to provide instant notification of post-export diversion, and the provision to Member States, on request, of post-shipment verification by iTrace project staff;

- (e) increasing awareness through outreach on the findings of the project, promoting the purpose and available functions of iTrace to international and national policy makers, conventional arms control experts and arms export licensing authorities, and enhancing international capacity to monitor the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition and related materiel, as well as to assist policy makers in identifying priority areas for international assistance and cooperation and to reduce the risk of diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition;
- (f) providing key policy issue reports, drawn from the data generated by field investigations and presented on the iTrace system, about specific areas deserving international attention, including major patterns in the trafficking of conventional arms and their ammunition, and the regional distribution of trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition, and related materiel; and
- (g) the continued tracing of conventional arms and their ammunition, with the cooperation of Member States and non-EU States, as the most effective means to establish and verify, to the fullest extent possible, the mechanisms behind the diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition to unauthorised users; tracing will be supplemented by follow up investigations focused on identifying the human, financial, and logistics networks behind illicit conventional arms transfers.

Implementing Actor: Conflict Armament Research (CAR)

Budget: EUR 5 490 981,87

Official Journal: L 330, 20.12.2019, p. 53.

Duration: 36 months

1.6.6. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257 of 18 February 2021 in support of the Oslo Action Plan for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction**

Objective: Contribute to human security by supporting the implementation of the Oslo Action Plan 2020–2024 adopted by the States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, by:

- (a) supporting the efforts of States Parties to implement the survey and clearance and mine risk education and reduction aspects of the Oslo Action Plan;
- (b) supporting the efforts of States Parties to implement the victim assistance aspects of the Oslo Action Plan;
- (c) promoting the universalisation of the Convention and promote norms against any use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction;
- (d) supporting the efforts of States Parties that retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes to increase reporting capabilities, ensure that the number of such mines retained does not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary, and explore alternatives to live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes where possible; and
- (e) demonstrating the ongoing commitment of the Union and its Member States to the Convention and their resolve to cooperate with and extend assistance to those States Parties that need support in meeting their commitments under the Convention.

Implementing Agency: The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, represented by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

Budget: EUR 2 658 139

Official Journal: L 58, 19.2.2021, p. 41.

Duration: 48 months

1.6.7. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1694 of 21 September 2021 in support of the universalisation, implementation and strengthening of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

Objective:

- (a) Preparation for and follow-up to the Sixth CCW Review Conference;
- (b) Support for the universalisation of the CCW; and
- (c) Facilitation of discussions on under-explored, emerging and cross-cutting issues of relevance to the CCW.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 1 603 517,64

Official Journal: L 334, 22.9.2021, p. 14.

Duration: 24 months

1.6.8. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 of 17 December 2018 in support of countering illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms, light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean in the framework of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition 'Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens'

Objective:

- (a) Strengthen physical security and management systems for national military and other institutional stockpiles through improved site security measures and inventory control;
- (b) Reinforce national capabilities for destruction of seized, excess or unsafe small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition;
- (c) Enhance national SALW marking and tracing capacity and foment regional cooperation on tracing confiscated weapons and ammunition;
- (d) Improve SALW transfer mechanisms through national legislation, border controls, and regional coordination; and
- (e) Promote socially responsible behaviours in selected communities, targeting groups that are severely affected by armed violence, including the use of turn-in campaigns or other strategies designed to reduce local incidence of violent crimes.

Implementing Agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: EUR 3 000 000

Official Journal: L 322, 18.12.2018, p. 27.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1693 of 21 September 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 in support of countering illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms, light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean in the framework of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition 'Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens'

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 until 31 May 2022.

Official Journal: L 334, 22.9.2021, p. 12.

1.6.9. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1726 of 28 September 2021 in support of combating the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Member States of the League of Arab States – Phase II**

Objective: Supporting the Member States of the League of Arab States (LAS) with their national implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (the 'UN PoA') and the International Tracing Instrument, by:

- (a) sustainably building the national capacity of LAS Member States to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), combat terrorism and enhance security in post-conflict situations while fully respecting international human rights standards;
- (b) sustainably building the regional capacity of the LAS to address the same challenges;
- (c) strengthening LAS Member States' national control over SALW at key stages of their life cycle; and
- (d) enhancing the exchange of best practices and lessons learned.

Implementing Actor: Small Arms Survey (SAS), represented by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, with the assistance of the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) and in close cooperation with the LAS Secretariat.

Budget: EUR 5 991 726

Official Journal: L 344, 29.9.2021, p. 7.

Duration: 36 months

1.6.10. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 of 7 July 2020 in support of the development of an internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standards**

Objective: Support a project to study the feasibility of establishing an internationally recognised validation system for the validation of policies and practices for the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition. The project shall consist of two phases:

- (a) During Phase I, in the first year of the implementation, a feasibility study for the development of an internationally recognised Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System (AAMVS) was undertaken to investigate options for appropriate methodologies and tools for the assessment of risk and quality;
- (b) During Phase II, based on the outcome of the feasibility study of Phase I, a concept for the creation of an AAMVS shall be developed

Implementing Agency: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and its specialised agency, the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT)

Budget: EUR 1 642 109

Official Journal: L 218, 8.7.2020, p. 1.

Duration: Initially 14 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2075 of 25 November 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 in support of the development of an internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standard

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 until 30 November 2022.

Official Journal: L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 72.

1.6.11. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2133 of 2 December 2021 in support of the comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Conventional Ammunition (CA) in South-Eastern Europe

Objective: Reduce risks of illicit trafficking in, and the uncontrolled spread of, SALW in, to or from South-Eastern Europe that undermine safety and security by impeding sustainable peacebuilding and socioeconomic development as well as by contributing to a breakdown in order, fuelling terrorism and criminal violence or leading to a resumption of conflict.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: EUR 4 208 827

Official Journal: L 432, 3.12.2021, p. 36.

Duration: 36 months

1.6.12. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 of 19 November 2018 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

Objective: Support Western Balkans partners with the implementation of the 'Regional Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW/firearms and their ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024', pursuing the support of the Western Balkans partners in reaching the goals set out in the Roadmap, namely:

- (a) By 2023, ensure that arms control legislation is in place, fully harmonised with the EU regulatory framework and other related international obligations and standardised across the region.
- (b) By 2024, ensure that arms control policies and practices in the Western Balkans are evidence based and intelligence led.
- (c) By 2024, significantly reduce illicit flows of firearms, ammunition and explosives into, within and beyond the Western Balkans.
- (d) By 2024, significantly reduce the supply, demand and misuse of firearms through increased awareness, education, outreach and advocacy.
- (e) By 2024, substantially decrease the estimated number of firearms in illicit possession in the Western Balkans.
- (f) Systematically decrease the surplus and destroy seized small arms and light weapons and ammunition.
- (g) Significantly decrease the risk of proliferation and diversion of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

Implementing Agency: South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), via the United Nations Development Programme.

Budget: EUR 4 002 587,52

Official Journal: L 293, 20.11.2018, p. 11.

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council decision has been amended twice:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2161 of 6 December 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 until 17 October 2022.

Official Journal: L 436, 7.12.2021, p. 46.

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1654 of 27 September 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 until 17 January 2023.

Official Journal: L 249, 27.9.2022, p. 45.

1.6.13. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/847 of 30 May 2022 in support of efforts to prevent and combat illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in the Americas**

Objective: In order to address armed violence in the Americas:

- (a) strengthen the National Firearms Regulatory Framework, considering international normative and good practices;
- (b) improve the operational capacity of national authorities to mark, trace, store, and destroy firearms;
- (c) optimise small arms control through the use of the Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA);
- (d) strengthen community resilience to gun violence and reduce access to illicit/and or unwanted firearms;
- (e) develop a Central American Firearms Roadmap to equip the countries with a practical and management tool through a regional, coordinated, and evidence based approach.

Implementing Agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: EUR 4 240 906

Official Journal: L 148, 31.5.2022, p. 40.

Duration: 36 months

1.6.14. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965 of 17 October 2022 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects**

Objective: Support the full and effective implementation of the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument, enhance international, regional and national security, contribute to the realisation of human security, and promote sustainable development through SALW control, by:

- (a) supporting forward-looking global policy developments in the context of the fourth United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action in 2024;
- (b) strengthening effective national and regional implementation of the Programme of Actions and the International Tracing Instrument; and
- (c) supporting gender-responsive SALW control policies and programmes.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 4 524 465,05

Official Journal: L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 67.

Duration: 36 months

1.7. ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS ⁽¹⁾1.7.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 of 12 October 2020 on the promotion of effective arms export controls (COARM V)****Objective:**

- (a) Promote effective controls on arms exports by third countries in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, and seek, where appropriate, complementarity and synergies with Union assistance projects in the field of export controls on dual-use goods; and
- (b) Support third countries' efforts at national and regional levels to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.

Implementing Agency: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA)

Budget: EUR 1 377 542,73

Official Journal: L 335, 13.10.2020, p. 3.

Duration: Initially 24 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/848 of 30 May 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 on the promotion of effective arms export controls

Object: Among others, extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 until 30 November 2023.

Official Journal: L 148, 31.5.2022, p. 50.

1.7.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/649 of 16 April 2021 on Union support for activities of the ATT Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty**

Objective: Support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by supporting the activities of the ATT Secretariat aimed at:

- (a) supporting States Parties to the ATT in strengthening their arms transfer control systems for the effective implementation of the ATT; and
- (b) strengthening the institutional set-up of the ATT Secretariat as the principal body to assist States Parties to the ATT in implementing the ATT.

Implementing Agency: ATT Secretariat

Budget: EUR 1 370 000

Official Journal: L 133, 20.4.2021, p. 59.

Duration: 24 months

1.7.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2309 of 22 December 2021 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT-OP III)**

Objective: Support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by:

- (a) reinforcing or developing arms transfer control capacities and expertise for ATT implementation in new and existing beneficiary countries, through instruments such as legal assistance and training of licensing and enforcement officials;
- (b) outreach to other countries, including non-States Parties to the ATT, with a view to supporting universalisation of the ATT at national, regional and multilateral levels.

⁽¹⁾ Detailed information on the implementation of the three Council Decisions under this section in 2022 will be made available in the *Twenty-Fifth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment* (for 2022).

Implementing Agency: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA) and Expertise France.

Budget: EUR 3 499 892,39

Official Journal: L 461, 27.12.2021, p. 78.

Duration: 36 months

1.8. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

1.8.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2269 of 18 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project ‘Promoting Responsible Innovation in Artificial Intelligence for Peace and Security’**

Objective: Support greater engagement of the civilian artificial intelligence (AI) community in mitigating the risks that the diversion and misuse of civilian AI research and innovation by irresponsible actors may pose to international peace and security, by:

- (a) generating greater understanding of how decisions in the development and diffusion of AI research and innovation can impact the risks of diversion and misuse, and in turn generate risk or opportunities for peace and security;
- (b) promoting responsible innovation processes, methods and tools which can help ensure the peaceful application of civilian innovations and the responsible dissemination of AI knowledge. To that end, the project will support capacity-building, research and engagement activities that enhance the capacity within the global civilian AI community to include and address the peace and security risks presented by the diversion and misuse of civilian AI by irresponsible actors through responsible innovation processes; and strengthen the connection between risk mitigation efforts in responsible AI in the civilian sphere with those already ongoing in the disarmament, arms control and non- proliferation community at an intergovernmental level.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), supported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Budget: EUR 1 782 285,71

Official Journal: L 300, 21.11.2022, p. 11.

Duration: 36 months

1.8.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2320 of 25 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project ‘Unlocking Innovation: Enabling Technologies and International Security’**

Objective: Support the work that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) conducts within its Security and Technology Programme (SECTEC) with a view to enhancing knowledge and understanding of new and emerging technologies with relevance for international security.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Budget: EUR 1 234 011

Official Journal: L 307, 28.11.2022, p. 142.

Duration: 24 months

1.9. COLLABORATIONS WITH NGOS AND THINK TANKS

1.9.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 of 26 February 2018 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**

Objective: For the purposes of contributing to the enhanced implementation of the EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy, which is based on the principles of effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation with third countries, to continue promoting and supporting the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think in order to further the following objectives:

- (a) to encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics;
- (b) to provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the network on issues related to non-proliferation and disarmament and to enable the representatives of Member States to participate in the network's meetings;
- (c) to constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community, in particular by providing reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;
- (d) to contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of worldwide concern; and
- (e) to contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries.

Implementing Agency: The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, based on the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP).

Budget: EUR 4 507 004,70

Official Journal: L 56, 28.2.2018, p. 46.

Duration: Initially 42 months. However, this Council Decision was amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/648 of 16 April 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 until 17 May 2022.

Official Journal: L 133, 20.4.2021, p. 57.

1.9.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/597 of 11 April 2022 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks**

Objective: Continue to promote and support the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks, in order to:

- (a) encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics;
- (b) provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the network on issues related to non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control, and to enable the representatives of Member States to participate in the meetings of the Consortium;
- (c) constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community, in particular by providing reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;

- (d) contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of worldwide concern;
- (e) contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries, including by strengthening non-proliferation and disarmament education, raising awareness of those issues among the younger generations and promoting the next generation of researchers and practitioners in this field, especially women, and in the natural and technical sciences.

Implementing Agency: The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, consisting of the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies Europe (IISS-Europe), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP).

Budget: EUR 4 700 000

Official Journal: L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 75.

Duration: 36 months

2. COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

2.1. NUCLEAR ISSUES

2.1.1. Council Conclusions on Iran (12.12.2022)

Recalling the November 2016 and February 2019 Council conclusions, the European Union reconfirms its resolute commitment to human rights in its policy towards Iran. The European Union expresses its support for the fundamental aspiration of the people of Iran for a future where their universal human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, protected and fulfilled. In this context, the European Union acknowledges the leading role of women and youth in calling for the defence of these norms and values. The European Union strongly condemns the widespread, brutal and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian authorities against peaceful protesters, including women and children, leading to the loss of hundreds of lives, in clear breach of the fundamental principles enshrined in international law. The right to peaceful assembly must be ensured. The European Union condemns restrictions on communications, including Internet shutdowns, and calls upon Iran to ensure the right to freedom of expression, including freedom to seek, receive and share information and ideas, online and offline. The European Union urges Iranian authorities to uphold their international obligations under international law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to both of which Iran is a party.

The European Union calls on the Iranian authorities to cease their widespread resort to arbitrary detentions as a means of silencing critical voices and release all those unjustly detained in relation to the exercise of their rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, including recently arrested protesters as well as children, journalists and human rights defenders. The European Union firmly condemns the widespread use of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees in Iranian prisons, reminds the Iranian authorities that the prohibition of torture is absolute under international law and reiterates its call on Iran to ratify without delay the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

The European Union strongly urges Iran to implement the relevant international treaties and agreements to which it is a party and calls upon Iran to eliminate, in law and in practice, all forms of systemic discrimination against women and girls in public and private life and to take gender-responsive measures to prevent and ensure protection for women and girls against sexual and gender-based violence in all its forms. At the same time, the European Union reiterates its firm call on the Iranian authorities to ensure the full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Iranians, including persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities.

The European Union calls on the Iranian authorities to immediately end the strongly condemnable practice of imposing and carrying out death sentences against protesters as well as to annul without delay the recent death penalty sentences that were already pronounced in the context of the ongoing protests and to provide due process to all detainees. The European Union strongly opposes the use of the death penalty at all times and in all circumstances, as an unacceptable denial of human dignity and integrity. The European Union urges Iran to pursue a consistent policy towards the abolition of capital punishment.

The persistent impunity for grave human rights violations in Iran is contributing to the increasing grievances of the population. The European Union will continue to demand that the perpetrators of violence and human rights violations be held accountable and to call on the Iranian authorities to allow for an independent investigation into the widely reported and documented human rights violations, and ensure accountability for perpetrators as also called upon by UNGA 3rd Committee Resolution of November 2022. As a first step, we call on Iran to allow free, full and unhindered access to the country for relevant UN Human Rights Special Procedures mandate holders and to fully cooperate with the independent international Fact-Finding Mission established by the Human Rights Council on 24 November 2022. The European Union will continue to use all available avenues to hold the Iranian authorities to account.

The European Union strongly rejects Iran's practice of arbitrary detention of foreign citizens, including dual nationals, and calls upon Iran to end the distressing practice of detaining innocent foreign civilians with a view to making political gains. The European Union reminds Iran of its international obligations under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and urges the Iranian authorities to abide by these obligations.

The European Union will continue to address any issue of concern, including in relation to the way the Iranian authorities are handling the ongoing protest, taking into account all options at its disposal, inclusive of additional restrictive measures.

The European Union strongly condemns and considers unacceptable any type of Iran's military support, including deliveries of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs – 'drones'), to Russia's illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, which grossly violates international law and the principles of the UN Charter. These weapons provided by Iran are being used indiscriminately by Russia against Ukrainian civilian population and infrastructure causing horrendous destruction and human suffering. In this context, the European Union recalls that any transfer of certain combat drones and missiles to or from Iran without prior permission by the UN Security Council are in violation of UNSCR 2231. The European Union continues to support the ongoing work by the UN Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of UNSCR 2231. The European Union notes with great concern the reports of Iranian weapons, including drones, being manufactured with components of international origin, including from Europe, and is considering the appropriate measures to take. The European Union strongly cautions Iran against any new deliveries of weapons to Russia, in particular any steps towards possible transfers of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, which would constitute a serious escalation. The European Union will continue to respond to all actions supporting the Russian aggression against Ukraine and hold Iran accountable including through additional restrictive measures.

The European Union reiterates its clear determination that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon, and recalls Iran's commitments in that respect and its international obligations.

The European Union is deeply concerned by the successive IAEA reports documenting the alarming acceleration of Iran's nuclear programme that gravely departs from its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments, in particular with regard to the expansion of its nuclear enrichment capacity and production of highly enriched uranium. Iran's actions, which have no credible civilian justification, carry very significant proliferation-related risks. The European Union strongly urges Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory, to return to its political commitments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation without further delay, and to resume all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures, including its Additional Protocol.

Concerning outstanding safeguards issues, the European Union recalls the resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 8 June and 17 November 2022 and calls upon Iran to urgently fulfil its legal obligations, including under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), by providing technically credible explanations and grant necessary access. Timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial. Furthermore, the European Union underscores that the JCPOA is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime.

The European Union reaffirms its commitment to, and continued support for, the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. However, the risk of a nuclear non-proliferation crisis in the region has increased as a result of Iran's nuclear trajectory. In this context, the European Union regrets that, despite political support by the EU member States and intense international diplomatic efforts to restore the full implementation of the JCPOA including negotiations in Vienna facilitated by the EU High Representative as Coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission, Iran has not made the necessary decisions and not taken the necessary steps, continues to escalate its nuclear programme and makes it increasingly difficult to reach a deal. As a key security priority the EU will continue to invest diplomatically and politically to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The EU calls on all countries to support the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Promoting peace and stability and achieving de-escalation of tensions in the wider Gulf region as well as in the broader Middle East are key priorities for the EU. The JCPOA aims to contribute in this regard. Ensuring an exclusively peaceful character of the Iranian nuclear programme could contribute to regional stability and security. Efforts to build confidence should be inclusive. While they should be region-led, the EU remains ready to engage with all actors in the region in a gradual and inclusive approach, in full transparency and with the ultimate objective to facilitate a dialogue process that can help to develop confidence-building measures and arrangements, which provide for greater security in the wider Gulf region, including maritime safety and security. The regional Baghdad Conference on Cooperation and Partnership, and its follow-up process with EU involvement, could serve as a useful example for region-led processes.

While Iran is central to security in the region, the European Union condemns Iran's continued destabilising activities in and around the Middle East. These include Iran's activities with ballistic and cruise missiles, UAVs, and transfers of such advanced weaponry to state and non-state actors. UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015) calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic technology. Such activity, including using space launch vehicles, could pave the way for the development of long-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles. All these actions constitute an important and increasing source of regional instability and risk further escalating already existing high tensions. The EU urges Iran to fully abide by UNSCR 2231 (2015).

The European Union urges Iran to cease these destabilising activities in the form of political, military or financial support, including to non-state actors, in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon. It calls upon Iran to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbours and to fully abide by all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), including UNSCR 661, 1483, 1540, 1546, 1701, 2216 and 2231.

The European Union urges Iran to stop all actions or attempts that disrupt or threaten the safety and freedom of navigation in and around maritime routes in the wider Gulf region and respect applicable international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The European Union calls upon Iran to abide by its international obligations. Against the background of the grave actions by Iran on a wide range of issues as expressed above, the European Union reaffirms its commitment to a comprehensive policy approach considering all options at its disposal: critical where necessary, and ready to engage, on the basis of mutual respect, where interests align.

2.2. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

2.2.1. **Council Conclusions on the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (21/03/2022)**

The Council welcomes the upcoming Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In line with the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of 2003, the Council reaffirms its unequivocal support for the BTWC as the legally binding global norm against biological weapons and cornerstone of international efforts to prevent biological agents or toxins from ever being developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired and used as weapons.

The Council is firmly committed to a multilateral and treaty-based approach that maintains and reinforces international peace and security. The BTWC is one of the major pillars of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

The Council recognises that the BTWC was the first Convention in 1975 to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, and reaffirms the importance of universalisation of the Convention. Since the entry into force of the Convention, 183 States have become parties to the Convention, which underlines the universal importance of the BTWC in addressing global threats. The Council calls on all remaining States that have not yet done so to join the Convention and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms.

The Council recognises the importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, also known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol, that is supplemented by the BTWC. The Council calls for the universalisation of the Geneva Protocol and commends the ratifications that have taken place since the adoption of Council Decision on EU position prepared in view of the Eighth Review Conference in 2015.

The Council recognises that biological agents and toxins are widely used for peaceful purposes in line with the BTWC provisions. At the same time, the risk of natural or accidental spread of dangerous pathogens exists. With the COVID-19 pandemic we have witnessed how quickly diseases can cross borders and how dangerous and disruptive they can be. This is why it is more urgent than ever to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation.

Taking into account this context and given the substantive work realised by States parties during the current review cycle, the Ninth Review Conference represents a unique opportunity not only to strengthen the Convention and its implementation, and to improve biosafety and biosecurity globally, but also to advance assistance, cooperation, response and preparedness of the States Parties. This Review Conference represents a timely moment to reinforce the global norm against biological weapons and to further develop the BTWC to prevent misuse of biological agents and toxins as well as of developments in science and technology while promoting their peaceful use.

The Council regrets the inevitable postponement of the Ninth Review Conference due to the global COVID-19 pandemic and stresses the major role of Review Conferences to the implementation, upholding and strengthening of the BTWC.

The Council supports the adoption by the Review Conference of forward-looking decisions and recommendations. These will provide a clear roadmap for the next review cycle, including a robust intersessional programme. The Council's priorities are:

- (a) building and sustaining confidence in compliance;
- (b) establishing a Science and Technology review;
- (c) supporting full national implementation;
- (d) operationalising Article V consultative procedures for solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective, or in the application, of the BWC;
- (e) operationalising of Article VII on assistance to States that have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention;
- (f) supporting the implementation of Article X on cooperation and assistance related to the exchange of equipment, materials and information for peaceful purposes;

- (g) promoting universal adherence to the Convention;
- (h) strengthening the BTWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and its role.

The Council welcomes the engagement by EU Member States to mobilise political will and promote implementation of the obligations and objectives of the BTWC through various initiatives during the current review cycle. The Council supports the development of practical initiatives such as the following:

- (a) scientific advisory mechanism;
- (b) set of voluntary guiding principles for scientists (Code of Conduct);
- (c) exchange platform for voluntary transparency exercises under Article IV regarding the requirement to take any national measures necessary to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological weapons within a State's territory, under its jurisdiction, or under its control;
- (d) operational database and guidelines in the framework of Article VII;
- (e) online platform dedicated to biosafety and biosecurity under Article X;
- (f) the promotion of biorisk management standards.

The EU will support relevant decisions on these initiatives at the Review Conference.

3. STATEMENTS

3.1. GENERAL STATEMENTS

3.1.1. Statement at the High Level Segment of Conference on Disarmament (Geneva, 1.3/2022)

Madam President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. Let me start my intervention with the recent quote of High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-President of the European Commission Josep Borrell: 'At this dark hour, when we see Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine and massive disinformation campaigns and information manipulation, it is essential to separate lies – invented to justify what cannot be justified – from facts. The facts are that Russia, a major nuclear power, has attacked and invaded a peaceful and democratic neighbouring country, which posed no threat to, nor provoked it. Moreover, President Putin is threatening reprisals on any other state that may come to the rescue of the people of Ukraine. Such use of force and coercion has no place in the 21st century. What President Putin is doing is not only a grave violation of international law, it is a violation of the basic principles of human co-existence. With his choice to bring war back to Europe, we see the return of the "law of the jungle" where might makes right. The target is not only Ukraine, but also the security of Europe and the whole international rules-based order, based on the UN system and international law'. The European Union condemns in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. By its illegal military actions and threats, Russia is grossly violating international law and the principles of the UN Charter and undermining European and global security and stability. The European Union underlines that this includes the right of Ukraine to choose its own destiny. Russia bears full responsibility for this act of aggression and all the destruction and loss of life it will cause. It will be held accountable for its actions.

We also strongly condemn the involvement of Belarus in this aggression against Ukraine and call on it to refrain from such action and to abide by its international obligations, including under the NPT. The deletion of the reference in Article 18 to Belarus's non-nuclear status is another worrying change, which adds to unacceptable attempts to re-define the European security architecture. Russia's military attack against Ukraine – an independent, sovereign and non-nuclear weapon State – is a flagrant violation of international law and the core principles on which the international rules-based order is built. Moreover, Russia has violated its commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on security assurances, thus disrespecting unequivocal security assurances a nuclear weapon States should honour as part of binding and agreed security arrangements. The loss of credibility of a nuclear weapon state on security assurances seriously undermines the NPT regime and the entire disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

The European Union demands that Russia immediately ceases its military actions, unconditionally withdraws all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respects Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. The European Union calls on Russia and Russia-backed armed formations to respect international humanitarian law and stop their disinformation campaign and cyber-attacks.

The EU strongly condemns threats by president Putin of using nuclear force in this war. These threats are unacceptable, provocative, dangerous and escalatory. Only last month did the Russian Federation, in the context of the P5, reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. In the interest of all humanity, Russian Federation must heed its commitments and immediately cease this nuclear brinkmanship. We stand in solidarity with the women, men and children whose lives have been affected by this unjustified and unjustifiable attack and deplore the tragic loss of life and human suffering. The European Union firmly believes that the use of force and coercion to change borders has no place in the 21st century. Tensions and conflict should be resolved exclusively through dialogue and diplomacy. The EU will continue cooperating closely with neighbours and reiterates its unwavering support for, and commitment to, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and of the Republic of Moldova. It will continue strong coordination with partners and allies, within the UN, OSCE, NATO and the G7.

Madam President,

The integrity of the rules-based international system is key to our collective security. It could be only achieved through effective multilateralism and rules-based global governance. The EU will continue to do its utmost to protect these principles and values.

The CD remains the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating body and its continued relevance is of utmost importance for the EU. While the EU and its Member States are ready to launch substantive work on all core items, we reiterate that our longstanding priority in the Conference on Disarmament is to immediately commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and we support starting such negotiations in accordance with the document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

In the meantime, we call on all States possessing nuclear weapons that have not yet done so to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on their production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Furthermore, promoting universal adherence to and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty CTBT is a top priority for the EU. All EU Member States have ratified the CTBT and are abiding by its obligations. We urge all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or further delay.

Lastly, the EU will particularly focus on promoting a successful outcome of the postponed Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The EU's support for the NPT is unwavering and we are committed to uphold and strengthen the NPT, promote its universalisation and enhance the implementation of all its obligations and the commitments undertaken during the previous review conferences.

Thank you for your attention.

3.1.2. **EU Statement – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: General Statement (New York, 3.10.2022)**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, and the Republic of Moldova, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

In 2022 the paradigms of both the global and the European security architecture changed drastically. The Russian Federation has invaded the sovereign country of Ukraine. It is using wide a range of conventional weapons, as well as cyberattacks, often in a manner that does not comply with International Humanitarian Law, and is using dangerous nuclear rhetoric and reckless repeated threats to use nuclear weapons. As the Special Representative of the EU Foreign and Security Policy, Joseph Borrell emphasised in his statement from 24 February:

‘These are among the darkest hours for Europe since World War II [...]. This is not only the greatest violation of international law, it is a violation of the basic principles of human co-existence. It is costing many lives with unknown consequences ahead of us’.

The EU reiterates its strongest condemnation of the unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The Russian Federation, permanent member of the UN Security Council, is grossly violating international law, including the UN Charter, and it is severely undermining European and global security and stability. We strongly condemn the illegal referenda, which are gross violations of Ukrainian sovereignty and the UN Charter and, which took place under military coercion. The results of such actions are null and void and will not be recognised by the EU and its Member States. We firmly reject and unequivocally condemn the illegal annexation by Russia of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. We call on all states and international organisations to unequivocally reject their illegal annexation. We deplore deliberate escalatory steps by Russia, including the partial mobilisation of reservists. Moreover, Russia, as a nuclear weapon State, has violated the security guarantees of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which Ukraine received after renouncing the nuclear weapons on its territory in the wake of the USSR collapse and joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State. Russia has systemically breached the rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, especially among the civilian population. Holding Russia accountable for its violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law is key in order to fight against impunity. We also condemn Belarus for its involvement in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The European Union’s reaction to this brutal act of violence was therefore immediate, proportional, strong and united, in political, diplomatic, and economic terms. In the face of this affront to humanity, the EU and its Member States recall the binding character of the UN Charter in its entirety and stress the universality of the UN’s founding principles. The EU reaffirms its conviction that the major challenges of our time cannot be addressed by countries acting alone but must be tackled together through effective multilateralism and rules-based international cooperation. In achieving this we need to work in partnership with others, including civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders.

The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine also heavily impacted the arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation architecture, and hampered both multilateral and bilateral cooperation and work in this field.

The long-awaited 10th Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which took place in August, was not able to adopt a final outcome document due to Russia blocking consensus. The EU, which was strongly engaged in preparations for the Conference as well as throughout the Review Conference, deeply regrets that no consensus was achieved. Nevertheless, the legally binding obligations enshrined in the NPT and commitments from the past Review Conferences remain valid. We are looking forward to the next review cycle. It will offer yet another urgent opportunity to achieve the progress that is needed to strengthen the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT.

The EU reaffirms its resolute commitment to and continued support for the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU is increasingly concerned at Iran’s continued actions inconsistent with the JCPOA and with severe, and in the case of R&D activities, irreversible proliferation implications. Some of these actions do not have any plausible civilian justification. The EU strongly urges Iran to return without delay to full JCPOA implementation, including all transparency measures. The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to achieve a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. The EU Member

States regret that Iran has chosen not to seize the diplomatic opportunity as of yet and call on Iran to accept so that the JCPOA would be fully restored. We wish to underscore that the JCPOA negotiation is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime. The EU urges Iran to cooperate in full with the IAEA without any further delay or conditionality to resolve all pending safeguards issues, in accordance with its legally binding obligations under its NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

The DPRK's unlawful launches of ballistic missiles this year threaten international and regional peace and security and warrant an appropriate response by the UN Security Council. The DPRK's declarations that it will continue to develop its unlawful nuclear and missile capabilities, that it would be prepared to engage in the first use of nuclear weapons and that it will not engage in negotiations aimed at returning to compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions are a matter of grave concern, as are reports of continued activity at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. The EU urges the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK must abandon its nuclear weapons, any other weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. The EU strongly underlines that the actions taken by the DPRK cannot confer the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the NPT or any special status whatsoever. Until the DPRK complies with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions, the EU will continue to implement strict sanctions and we urge all UN Members to fully implement all UNSC sanctions.

Furthermore, promoting universal adherence to and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a top priority for the EU. The CTBT has become an effective instrument and we reiterate our full confidence in the Treaty's verification regime, which has demonstrated its ability to provide independent and reliable data that will help to deter noncompliance with the Treaty once it enters into force, and to respond to threats to international peace and security. All EU Member States have ratified the CTBT and are abiding by its obligations. We urge all States, which have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the CTBT, to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty.

Mr. Chair,

Advancing disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control will be a vital part of the UN's 'New Agenda for Peace'. The EU will continue to support the multilateral instruments against chemical and biological weapons in order to uphold the comprehensive legal prohibitions of these categories of weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure there can be no impunity for those who use them. We are firmly committed to contributing to a successful outcome of the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC and the Fifth Review Conference of the CWC. The EU also strongly supports the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, which is the only independent international instrument for investigating alleged use of biological weapons.

The EU is committed to promoting the full application of existing international law in cyberspace and will work with international partners to prevent conflict and advance cooperation and international peace and security through the normative framework for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, the implementation of confidence building measures, and support for cyber capacity building. Regarding the work ahead of us, the EU will prioritise strengthening the existing strategic framework for conflict prevention and stability in cyberspace. In particular, the EU will work with Member States and international partners to advance the proposal of a forthcoming resolution to establish a Programme of Action to Advance Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace (Cyber PoA).

The EU will also continue to support and strengthen conventional arms control instruments as well as the multilateral export control regimes. Russia's violation of existing Confidence and Security Building Measures and conventional arms control commitments damaged the European security architecture. We will strive to universalise the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the full implementation of the Oslo Action Plan. We also fully support the humanitarian goal of the Cluster Munition Convention. The EU will further address emerging challenges including those related to lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) within the framework of the CCW, advocate responsible military use of new technologies, promote responsible space behaviours, and support efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We also call on all UN Member States to join the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and strongly encourages the full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All Its Aspects.

We especially welcome as an important achievement of international community, the conclusion of the Political Declaration Process on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences arising from the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA), in a process led by Ireland following the launch by Austria at an international conference in Vienna in 2019. The Declaration aims at reducing harm and strengthening the protection of civilians in armed conflict. This is a positive sign that the international community can still work together to achieve a tangible outcome despite the extremely challenging international circumstances.

Mr. Chair,

Gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls are important cross-cutting priorities for the EU. We commend the UN Secretary-General for the continued implementation of the entire Women, Peace and Security agenda and welcome his efforts to promote gender equality and improve women's full, active, equal, and meaningful participation and agency, including in leadership positions in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control fora.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.

3.2. NUCLEAR ISSUES

3.2.1. **EU Statement – 10th Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: General Statement (New York, 1.8.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Georgia, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

Please accept my congratulations on the assumption of your duties as the President of the 10th NPT Review Conference. Your diplomatic skills, dedicated efforts and numerous consultations supported by the NPT Review Conference Bureau members as well as UNODA, have finally allowed the Review Conference to convene, despite the difficult and unexpected circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. You can count on our full support.

The EU has contributed actively to this NPT review cycle through thematic and regional seminars, a number of working papers as well as side events. We have made proposals for concrete, future-oriented actions and EU Member States have reported on their respective measures and initiatives in their national implementation reports.

Mr. President,

The EU reiterates its strongest condemnation of the unprovoked and unjustified aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The Russian Federation's invasion of a sovereign country is a gross violation of international law, including the UN Charter and it severely undermines European and global security and stability. We also condemn Belarus for its involvement in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The EU resolutely supports Ukraine's inherent right of self-defence and the Ukrainian armed forces' efforts to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity and population in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. The EU demands that Russia immediately cease its military actions, withdraw all its troops from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. The international community will hold Russia accountable for its atrocities. The EU remains strongly committed to the fight against impunity.

Mr. President,

The Russian aggression against Ukraine and President Putin's threats of nuclear use seriously undermines and has a significant negative impact on the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. The blatant violation by Russia of the Budapest Memorandum, reckless threats of using nuclear weapons, as well as other irresponsible acts against nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, in particular the ongoing occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, are detrimental to the NPT.

Therefore, it's of utmost importance for all States Parties to the NPT, as well as the EU, to reiterate the unequivocal support for the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We are firmly convinced that a multilateral and treaty-based approach provides the best way to maintain and reinforce international peace and security.

The EU reaffirms the importance of universalising the NPT and calls on all States that have not yet done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms. The EU recognises the NPT's historic achievements in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in facilitating cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in significantly reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles in previous decades. The NPT has an enduring value and its full implementation is needed now more than ever.

The EU strongly supports all three pillars of the NPT and will continue to promote comprehensive, balanced and substantive full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. We stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT, and commitments during previous Review Conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. We are resolved to seek a safer and more secure world for all in accordance with the goals of the Treaty in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security. Ensuring the implementation of the 64 actions in the 2010 Action Plan is a collective responsibility shared by all States Parties to the NPT without exception.

In the current security environment marked by increasingly high tensions and serious proliferation crises and challenges, renewed efforts must be pursued in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The EU calls on all States concerned to abstain from any steps that would risk further escalating tensions and undermine the significant reductions achieved after the end of the Cold War. A new nuclear arms race must be avoided.

Before the Russian aggression against Ukraine, there were some welcomed developments, including the agreement reached between the United States and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty for an additional five years as well as the relaunch of the bilateral strategic stability dialogue and the restatement of the Reykjavik Summit declaration at the June 2021 summit in Geneva. The EU attaches the highest importance to the New START Treaty and regards it as a crucial contribution to international and European security. Recalling the obligation for all nuclear weapon States arising from Art. VI of the NPT, we underline that the two nuclear weapon States with the largest arsenals hold a special responsibility in the area of nuclear disarmament and arms control. The EU encourages seeking further reductions of their arsenals under the New START Treaty, including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons and further discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction, verification activities, laying the ground for even more robust future arms control agreements and reporting. We call on China to actively contribute to these processes.

The EU welcomes discussion between Presidents Biden and Xi on nuclear issues, and encourages them to establish a dialogue on strategic stability and arms control.

The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.

The EU considers the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be of crucial importance to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and its entry into force is a top priority for the Union. We call on all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without preconditions or further delay.

The EU calls for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT) and that it can support the start of the negotiations in accordance with the document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

The EU acknowledges the critical importance of existing nuclear weapon free zones for peace and security and remains committed to the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The EU notes the convening of the UN Conferences in 2019 and 2021 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and it is encouraged by their outcomes.

The EU recognises the important work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The EU stresses that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol constitute the current verification standard under the NPT and calls for their universalisation without delay.

The EU is resolved to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards, recognizes IAEA's central role in this regard and the Union's significant funding of its activities.

The EU reiterates its resolute commitment to and continued support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA is a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture, endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council through its resolution 2231 (2015). The EU supports the ongoing intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission with all relevant partners.

The EU expresses its serious concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues action to further develop its illegal nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes. The EU calls on the DPRK to take concrete steps in dismantling its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner as decided by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017). The EU urges the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

The EU reaffirms its support for the inalienable right of all Parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the NPT.

The EU underlines that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls is a top horizontal priority and believes it is important to integrate gender perspectives into discussions across the three pillars of the NPT. The EU fully supports and promotes the equal participation of women and men in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.2.2. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty: Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on the occasion of the closure of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties (Brussels, 29.8.2022)

The European Union deeply regrets that, in spite of all tireless efforts, no substantial outcome of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was reached due to Russia's unwillingness to join the consensus.

In the current severe security environment, a meaningful outcome strengthening existing norms, and through those, the rules-based international order, would have been needed more than ever.

The EU regards the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes.

We recognise its enduring value and historic achievements in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in facilitating cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in significantly reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles in previous decades.

In the current security environment, marked by increasingly high tensions due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine as well as other serious crises and challenges, renewed efforts must be pursued in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Therefore, we stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT, and commitments made at the previous Review Conferences, including concrete progress towards the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

We are resolved to seek a safer and more secure world for all in accordance with the goals of the Treaty in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security.

3.2.3. **EU Statement – 66th session of the General Conference (Vienna, 26.9.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland and San Marino.

Let me congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election and thank the IAEA Director General and the Secretariat for their excellent work over the past year.

The European Union attaches great importance to the IAEA's technical, independent and impartial work across its mandate.

We are meeting in unprecedented circumstances. The European Union condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified aggression against Ukraine which is a gross violation of international law, notably the UN Charter, and severely undermines European and global security and stability.

Russia's actions pose serious and direct threats to nuclear safety and security and the Agency's safeguards verification activities in Ukraine, as highlighted in the Board resolutions adopted in March and September. We are deeply concerned that each of the seven indispensable pillars outlined by the IAEA Director General, has been compromised as a result of the Russian aggression. As stated by the Director General, a nuclear accident must not be added to the tragedy of this war.

The EU strongly supports the Agency's work to assist Ukraine, notably the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) and the Agency's continued presence at the facility. We also support the Director General's proposal to establish a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the modalities of which would still need to be agreed. We emphasise there is only one sustainable solution: The Russian Federation must stop its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all its armed forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, notably from the ZNPP, and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders.

The EU reaffirms its resolute commitment to and continued support for the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU is increasingly concerned at Iran's continued actions inconsistent with the JCPOA and with severe, and in the case of R&D activities, irreversible proliferation implications. Some of these actions do not have any plausible civilian justification. The EU strongly urges Iran to return without delay to full JCPOA implementation, including all transparency measures. The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to achieve a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. The EU Member

States regret that Iran has chosen not to seize the diplomatic opportunity and call on Iran to accept it so that the JCPOA would be fully restored. We wish to underscore that the JCPOA negotiation is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime. The EU urges Iran to cooperate in full with the IAEA without any further delay or conditionality to resolve all pending safeguards issues, in accordance with its legally binding obligations under its NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

The EU condemns the DPRK's continued engagement in nuclear and ballistic missile activities which are a matter of grave concern. It is highly regrettable that the DPRK has not taken concrete, verified action towards denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. We urge the DPRK to comply with its obligations under multiple UN Security Council Resolutions, to refrain from nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches, and to engage in a meaningful dialogue with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security. We also urge the DPRK to return to negotiations and take immediate and concrete steps towards abandoning all nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Mr. President,

The EU regrets that the 10th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could not achieve consensus on a final outcome document because of the Russian Federation blocking consensus. We will spare no efforts to continue promoting the full and effective implementation of the NPT as well as its universalisation, and will build upon the substantial discussions held tirelessly over the course of the 10th Review Conference to prepare for the new review cycle. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT. Its legally binding obligations and past commitments remain valid. The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, as agreed at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The EU also affirms its full support for the decision to establish a working group to strengthen the review cycle.

The EU supports the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and remains of the view that Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, together with the Additional Protocol, constitute the current verification standard under the NPT. We call for their universalisation without delay. The EU also urges all States, which have not yet done so, to amend their Small Quantities Protocols or apply the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in full, especially those States that are already building a nuclear power plant or a research reactor.

The EU and its Member States attach utmost importance to nuclear safety, and its continuous improvement. Over the past decades, we have established and further developed an advanced, legally-binding nuclear safety framework applicable in all EU Member States. We also provide financial and human resources to help improve nuclear safety in countries outside the EU, including through the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), with a budget of EUR 300 million.

Furthermore, the EU stresses the need to continue strengthening nuclear security worldwide in order to prevent nuclear terrorism and facilitate peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We encourage all Member States to promote a strong nuclear safety and security culture and continuously implement the highest possible nuclear safety and radiation protection standards. We recognise the IAEA's central role in facilitating international cooperation and providing technical assistance to Member States.

We reaffirm our strong political commitment to international nuclear safety and security conventions, support their implementation and call upon all States to join them. We stress the need to consider new legally-binding international rules specifically prohibiting armed attacks against any nuclear installation devoted to peaceful purposes.

Mr. President,

The EU and its Member States reaffirm their longstanding commitment to and strong support for the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and support the Agency's work in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in order to reach the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement commitments including in the context of COP27. We acknowledge that Member States pursue different approaches to ensure energy security at affordable cost and that all countries have the sovereign right to decide whether or not to include nuclear power as part of their own energy mix to collectively achieve the 2030 climate target and the Paris Agreement commitments. The EU acknowledges the role played by nuclear technologies in relation to the global efforts to limit climate change and mitigate its negative effects. The EU also welcomes the new 'Rays of Hope' initiative and the organisation of this year's Scientific Forum on this topic.

We welcome the strong commitment to gender equality and encourage the Secretariat to continue its efforts to achieve gender parity and mainstream gender in its programmes and projects. The EU is proud to be the largest donor to the IAEA's Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme.

We remain among the IAEA's largest donors and expect efficient and effective programme delivery. Given the importance of the IAEA's work, we hope the Member States will do their utmost to ensure sustainable funding for the IAEA's key activities.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.2.4. **EU General Statement on the safety, security, and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine – 66th session of the General Conference (Vienna, 29.9.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and San Marino.

The European Union condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified aggression against Ukraine. It is a gross violation of international law, notably the UN Charter, and threatens peace and security in Europe and worldwide. The Russian Federation's aggression has caused immense human suffering to the Ukrainian population, massive destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and has severe global consequences for food and energy security. It has significantly increased the risk of a nuclear incident or accident, with potentially grave radiological consequences for human health and the environment in Ukraine and beyond. We condemn the Russian Federation's behaviour and nuclear safety and security threats.

Such an unprecedented situation requires a strong response from the IAEA as a multilateral body with a Statute based on the UN Charter. We therefore welcome the adoption of the IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions on 3 March and 15 September 2022 and express our full support for the Joint Statement delivered at this General Conference on the safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine.

As documented by the IAEA Director General in his recent reports, each of the seven indispensable pillars on nuclear safety and security derived from IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance has been compromised since the Russian Federation launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and illegally seized control of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone and then the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Russia's actions continue to pose serious and direct threats to Ukrainian nuclear facilities and they have impeded the Agency from fully and safely conducting safeguards verification activities in Ukraine.

The EU strongly supports the Agency's work to assist Ukraine, notably the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) and the Agency's continued presence at the facility. We also support the IAEA Director General's proposal to establish a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the modalities of which would still need to be agreed.

We emphasize, once again, that there is only one sustainable solution: The Russian Federation must stop its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, notably from the ZNPP, and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. The ZNPP must be returned to full and exclusive control of the Ukrainian authorities and remain connected to the Ukrainian electricity grid. We are grateful to the Ukrainian regulator and the operators who continue their work in the most critical circumstances.

We will never recognise the results of the illegal sham 'referenda', which have no legal validity or effect, and we remain unwavering in our support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.

We stand with Ukraine.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.2.5. **EU Statement at the 59th session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (Vienna, 21.11.2022)**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Norway, Andorra and San Marino.

The European Union reiterates in the strongest possible terms its condemnation of the unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, which constitutes a blatant violation of the UN Charter and international law, and demands that Russia immediately cease its military actions, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. We strongly condemn the Russian Federation's attempts to illegally annex Ukrainian regions, which have no legal validity or effect.

We also reiterate our call on Russia to refrain from any action that would endanger the integrity of the International Monitoring System (IMS) – including stations in the region – and data availability through the verification regime.

Moreover, Russia's irresponsible actions, as well as the continuing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, have caused significant economic pressures for many States Signatories and correspondingly have repercussions for the financial outlook of international organisations.

Mr. Chairman,

We thank the Executive Secretary for his comprehensive reports, and express our support for the recommendations contained in the reports of Working Groups A and B, as well as of the Advisory Group. We also welcome the return to a full scale Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) session, for the first time since 2019, and thank the PTS, its directors and all CTBTO staff for their resilience and efforts in ensuring business continuity for both verification and non-verification related activities to the benefit of States Signatories.

The efforts to promote and facilitate signature and ratification of the CTBT remain a top priority for the EU. All EU Member States have ratified the Treaty and consistently call upon the remaining eight Annex II States: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the USA who still need to ratify the Treaty and the DPRK, India and Pakistan who still need to sign and ratify it in order to bring it into force, to do so without any preconditions or further delay. In the meantime, it is crucial that all States fully observe the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

We warmly welcome the recent ratifications of the CTBT by Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, and fully support the efforts of the Executive Secretary to further promote and facilitate signature and ratification of the Treaty.

The EU looks forward to the upcoming Science and Diplomacy Symposium 2022 which will be another opportunity to promote the entry into force of the Treaty, based on innovative approaches. On this occasion, the EU is pleased to organise a side-event on 6 December, on promoting gender equality and empowerment of early career women in STEM.

Mr. Chairman,

The EU urges the DPRK to cease its unlawful and destabilising actions that undermine regional and international peace and security and instead engage in dialogue with relevant partners. The DPRK must comply with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions to refrain from testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Any nuclear test or other reckless action must be met with a swift, united, and robust international response.

The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We urge the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes as well as programmes to build delivery systems and other weapons of mass destruction in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner as required by UN Security Council resolutions. We urge the DPRK to return to compliance with the NPT and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement including by signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol – and signing and ratifying the CTBT. It is critical that sanctions, which target the DPRK's unlawful weapons development, remain in place while its programmes exist. The EU calls on all UN Member States to ensure the full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions to prevent the DPRK from procuring materials, knowledge and finance that support its illegal weapons programmes. The EU stands ready to support any meaningful diplomatic process and is committed to working with all relevant partners to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Chairman,

The EU would like to thank the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) for providing the final 2023 Budget update proposals, which take into account comments made by States Signatories, and supports the recommendation of Working Group A to the Commission to approve them.

The highly sophisticated CTBT verification system, the preservation of its value, continuous sustainment and recapitalisation of the IMS, and the further development of on-site inspection operational capabilities and related capacity-building activities require substantial financial input. As noted by the Executive Secretary, the current budget allocated to cover the sustainment and recapitalisation of the IMS is inadequate. A solution needs to be found urgently and be agreed for the next 2024–2025 biennium. This will require States Signatories to make tough but important choices about budget allocation.

We welcome the commitment made by the Executive Secretary to provide a detailed technology and station specific analysis as a basis for a budgetary gap determination and mitigation strategy. We encourage the PTS to launch regular discussions with States Signatories on this issue and on the 2024–2025 Programme and Budget more broadly, as soon as possible. We also encourage the PTS to continue its important operations, including building, certifying, operating and repairing IMS stations.

Moreover, it is crucial for the operation of the verification regime of the Treaty, and for the wider organisation's financial health, that all States demonstrate their political commitment and honour their legal obligation to pay their assessed contributions, on time and in full.

The EU, materialising its full commitment to the Treaty and its implementation, has so far contributed 29.5 million Euros to support CTBTO monitoring and verification activities. These funds are being used to improve the auxiliary seismic station network, to strengthen on-site inspection and noble gas monitoring capabilities, and to provide technical assistance to countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean region, allowing them to participate fully in the CTBTO's verification regime. The EU has already commenced consultations with the PTS regarding its next voluntary contribution through EU Council Decision IX.

We have noted with interest the proposal of a Funding mechanism for the 2025 Integrated Field Exercise (IFE). Since the Commission has approved an exercise programme culminating in an IFE, it is clear that adequate resources will need to be identified. In this regard, we welcome the related draft decision which includes an opt-out possibility with respect to national legal constraints by some States.

Mr. Chairman,

Background studies using mobile monitoring systems have been going on for years to improve the performance of the verification regime and ensure the correct detection of events. This activity is part of, and helps carry out the mandate of the PTS. We look forward to the swift appointment of a new team of co-facilitators and fully support the continuation and finalisation of discussions on this topic.

Regarding the development of guidelines for holding non-scheduled sessions of the Commission, while we reiterate our support for the 2019 GRULAC proposal, we thank Ambassador Duarte of Brazil for his efforts and for the new version of his proposal, which includes many positive elements. We look forward to advancing discussions with a view to finalising this issue.

As for appointments to the Advisory Group, we encourage States to ensure that they nominate experts of high-recognised standing and experience in financial matters at the international level. We welcome the nominations of Mr Matheus Pires Uller from Brazil and Ms Yue Ping from the People's Republic of China and can support them.

On the draft decision on possible procedures for the appointment of the Chairperson and Vice-Chairpersons of the Advisory Group, we consider that the current draft needs further consideration and revision, and stand ready to engage in further consultations as appropriate.

In conclusion Mr. Chairman,

We wish to express our deep appreciation to you and to the Vice-Chairs for ably steering the Commission during this year, and reiterate our full support and cooperation for a constructive and successful 59th Session of the Commission. The EU stands ready to support your efforts to fill current vacancies in the Commission and its subsidiary bodies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3.2.6. EU Briefing on behalf of the High Representative – UN Security Council: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran) (New York, 19.12.2022)

Mr. President,

It is an honour to have again the opportunity to address the Council in this session on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr Josep Borrell, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the JCPOA).

My first expression of gratitude goes to Secretary-General António Guterres and to the Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of Resolution 2231 and in particular the report prepared for today's discussion. I also want to thank Ireland as the Facilitator of Resolution 2231 and the work done to keep members informed of the current state of play.

I would like also to underscore the important role of the IAEA as the sole impartial and independent international organisation mandated by the Security Council to monitor and verify the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation commitments under the JCPOA.

Last June, we described the intense negotiations efforts to restore the JCPOA undertaken by all JCPOA participants, and the United States, since April 2021. Following this process and based on all the key positions of the participants in negotiations, the EU High Representative had been able to put forward in early August a compromise text that reflects his understanding of the most realistic equilibrium in view of a deal. The text lays down the necessary steps for the US to return to the JCPOA and for Iran to resume the full implementation of all its JCPOA commitments. However, since then, new developments have added significant new layers of complications that makes it increasingly difficult to reach a deal. Nevertheless, the coordinator remains in close contact with all JCPOA participants and the United States on this issue.

Mr. President,

Since the discussion on the previous report of the UN Secretariat on the implementation of the UNSCR 2231, the IAEA documented thoroughly the alarming further acceleration of Iran's nuclear programme that gravely departs from its JCPOA commitments. IAEA DG's reports of 10, 22 and 29 November documented the expansion of Iran's nuclear enrichment operations and capacity. This includes more enrichment of uranium at the level of 60 % in two facilities and more cascades of advanced centrifuges going to operation while others are being installed.

Let me also recall that Iran's unilateral decision in June 2022 that all Agency's JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment be removed from operation has further aggravated existing concerns related to the fact that from 23 February 2021 onwards, the IAEA's verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran's decision to stop the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol.

Furthermore, Iran, which conditioned a deal on the restoration of the JCPOA on the settlement of the 'outstanding safeguards issues', needs to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

We continue to recognise that Iran has faced and continues facing very serious negative economic consequences following the US's withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of previously lifted US unilateral sanctions which we deeply regret. Since our last discussion in June, the US has imposed additional nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, including in the area of oil and petrochemicals. The restoration of the JCPOA remains the only way for Iran to reap the full benefits of the JCPOA and reach its full economic potential as it will result in a comprehensive sanctions' lifting that will encourage greater cooperation by the entire international community with Iran.

I recall in this context that the EU has lifted all its nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions since the JCPOA Implementation Day and this remains the case. But let me also clarify that EU measures relating to the unacceptable repression of protests in Iran over the past months and Iran's military support to Russia are outside the JCPOA.

Mr. President,

In addition to the advancement of the nuclear programme of Iran, the European Union is indeed extremely worried about Iran's military support to Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine including through deliveries of drones. The EU will continue to respond to this, as necessary, not least as this also affects the implementation of SCR 2231.

On 12 December last, the Council of the European Union recalled that any transfer of certain combat drones and missiles to or from Iran without prior permission by the UN Security Council is in violation of Resolution 2231. On this occasion, the EU reaffirmed its support to the ongoing work by the UN Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Resolution. The EU also recalled that Resolution 2231 calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic technology.

Mr. President,

The process to conclude a deal and bring the JCPOA back on track has been seriously challenged by the various developments over the last few months as described earlier.

However, I shall be straightforward: the High Representative does not see any sustainable alternative. To echo the statement made by the UN Secretary-General in his report, let me reaffirm here that diplomacy and restoring the JCPOA's full implementation is still the best option for preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. This is also instrumental to the security of the whole region and remains in our fundamental common interest.

For almost two years, the Agency has been deprived of an essential part of its knowledge of Iran's activities on the entirety of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle. Let me recall that the Additional Protocol to Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which substantially strengthened legal capacities of the IAEA in terms of verification, is only made applicable under a fully implemented JCPOA. Moreover, while the agreement is in the shadow, Iran's programme runs quickly with irreversible proliferation implications in particular in the field of research and development. The combination of continued nuclear progress by Iran and decreasing visibility over its programme raises more concerns than ever.

The Procurement Channel, another benefit of the JCPOA, continues to be fully operational. It remains a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism. It gives assurances to Member States and the private sector that transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods and services are fully in line with Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA.

For all these reasons, on 12 December, the Council of the EU reaffirmed its commitment to, and continued support for, the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. It called on all countries to support the implementation of Resolution 2231. The EU also underscored that the JCPOA is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the Non-proliferation Treaty, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime.

Drawing on this unambiguous support from the Foreign Ministers from the 27 EU countries, the High Representative is determined to continue working with the international community towards a full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. He joins his voice to that of the UN Secretary-General to encourage all parties to intensify diplomatic efforts to this end.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.3. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

3.3.1. **Chemical Weapons Convention: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union to mark the 25th anniversary (Brussels, 19.4.2022)**

On 29 April 2022, we mark the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). With 193 States Parties, the Convention today enshrines the international norm against the use of chemical weapons.

Since it entered into force, 99 % of the world's declared chemical weapons stocks have been verifiably destroyed under the control of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, despite the tangible progress, the re-emergence of use of chemical weapons is one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.

In recent years, the world has witnessed the horrific use of chemical weapons in Syria, causing hundreds of victims, including children. In 2020, a toxic nerve agent 'Novichok' was used in the assassination attempt on the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny in the territory of the Russian Federation. Chemical weapons have also been used in Malaysia in 2017 to assassinate Kim Jeung-On's half-brother Kim Jeung-Nam, and in the United Kingdom in 2018 in the attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, which resulted in the death of a British citizen.

The European Union reiterates its strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic and its failure to respect its international obligations under the Convention, as substantiated through comprehensive and thorough investigations carried out by the United Nations and the OPCW. The European Union and its Member States will continue to work at national and international levels in order to address chemical weapons attacks and other atrocities committed in the Syrian Arab Republic.

The European Union also reiterates its strong concern that the Russian Federation has still not reacted to international calls to fully cooperate with the OPCW to ensure an impartial international investigation on the attempt to assassinate the Russian opposition politician, Alexei Navalny. The poisoning of Mr. Navalny in Russia by a military chemical nerve agent of the 'Novichok' group in August 2020 (a substance developed by Russia), has been confirmed, beyond doubt, by specialised laboratories in Germany, France and Sweden, as well as by the OPCW. The European Union has condemned the poisoning in the strongest possible terms.

The use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances constitutes a violation of international law and can amount to the most serious crimes of international concern – war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The EU supports collective efforts to ensure accountability for perpetrators of chemical attacks through the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons.

Impunity for the use of chemical weapons must not and will not be tolerated. Under its chemical weapons sanctions regime, the EU has imposed restrictive measures against multiple Russian and Syrian individuals and entities for their involvement in chemical weapons attacks.

The pace of developments in science and technology are both a challenge and an opportunity to foster peaceful uses of chemistry. The transformation of the OPCW laboratory into a Centre for Chemistry and Technology (CCT) will be key to strengthen the Convention and enhance the Organisation's capacity to perform its core tasks of verification, inspection and capacity building. In this context, the European Union reiterates its full confidence in the OPCW Technical Secretariat, its professionalism, impartiality and well-established technical expertise.

On this important anniversary, the European Union and its Member States reaffirm their unwavering support for the CWC and for the work of the OPCW. The OPCW's diligence, professionalism and impartiality while addressing the use of chemical weapons offer a vital first step towards accountability and an end to impunity. Any use of chemical weapons is an affront to international law on which we all depend for our security and wellbeing.

The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

3.3.2. **Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare: Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell (Brussels, 30.11.2022)**

25 years ago, the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force with one purpose: to put an end and eliminate chemical weapons once and for all. Today it is the global norm against chemical weapons.

Since 1997, over 99 % of chemical weapon stockpiles declared have been verifiably destroyed. Yet chemical weapons remain one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.

Despite the progress made, we are still witness to the horrific consequences of these heinous weapons. In Syria, they have caused hundreds of victims, including children. In August 2020, a military grade nerve agent 'Novichok' was used in the assassination attempt on the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny in the territory of the Russian Federation. Chemical weapons have also been used in Malaysia in 2017 to assassinate Kim Jeung-On's half-brother Kim Jeung-Nam, and in the United Kingdom in 2018 in the attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, which resulted in the death of a British citizen.

No one should use chemical weapons, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances.

In view of the continued threat posed by the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, the EU has applied restrictive measures against 25 individuals and three entities.

We will continue supporting the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, independently and impartially.

On this day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare, we remember those who have died and suffered because of the use of chemical weapons. We recall that the use of chemical weapons is a violation of international law and can amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Those responsible must and will be held accountable. We will continue to fight against impunity and working towards full accountability for those responsible at national and international levels.

Background

Under its regime of restrictive measures dedicated to fighting the proliferation and use of chemical weapons and their precursors, the European Union has imposed restrictive measures on persons and entities in Russia linked to the Salisbury attack in 2018 and the poisoning of Mr Navalny in 2020. In Syria, the EU has imposed restrictive measures on entities and persons responsible for development and use of chemical weapons, in particular for the attacks that took place in August 2013 in Ghouta, March 2017 in Ltamenah and 2018 in Douma. Moreover, the European Union continues its active participation in the Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons.

3.3.3. **Statement of the European Union at the 27th Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (The Hague, 28 November 2022)**

Mr. Chairperson,

Mr. Director-General,

Distinguished delegates,

I have the honour of speaking on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries Albania, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro and Ukraine, the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, and the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the EEA (European Economic Area) align themselves with this statement.

Andorra, Monaco and San Marino also associate themselves with this statement.

The European Union (EU) would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Bård Ivar Svendsen of Norway, Chairperson of the 26th Conference of States Parties, and Ambassador Ziad Al Atiyah of Saudi Arabia, Chairperson of the Executive Council, for their efforts and outstanding performance in fulfilling their duties. We also warmly congratulate Ambassador Vusumuzi Madonsela of South Africa for his election as the Chairperson of the 27th Conference of States Parties. I would like to assure him of our full support in steering the work of the Conference.

We also take this opportunity to commend the leadership of OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias, and reiterate our full confidence in the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS), its professionalism, impartiality and well-established technical expertise in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and tasks assigned by the States Parties. The European Union recalls that on 13 October 2022 the United Nations General Assembly First Committee reaffirmed its strong support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW in the resolution on the implementation of the CWC (A/C.1/77/L.55) prepared annually by Poland.

Mr. Chairperson,

The year of 2022 has completely changed the paradigm of global, as well as European security architecture. Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is an attack on our common principles and it grossly violates the UN Charter. The EU resolutely condemns the Russian aggression and demands that Russia withdraws all its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine. Moreover, as part of its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has engaged in a campaign of disinformation and state-controlled propaganda in spreading unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations against Ukraine and others regarding chemical weapons programmes. It is well established that Ukraine is a responsible member of, and in full compliance with the Chemical weapons Convention.

The Syrian regime's failure to respect its international obligations under the Convention is substantiated through comprehensive and thorough investigations carried out by all the established mechanisms, notably the Joint UN – OPCW Investigation Mechanism (JIM), the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) as well as the Investigation and Identification team (IIT). We commend the Director-General's continuous efforts to engage with Syria. Unfortunately, there is no progress reported to the Council in any of the open issues. We urge Syria to act constructively, as there is no alternative to cooperation, as explicitly required by the UNSCR 2118 and the respective decisions by the Conference of States Parties.

The EU has condemned in the strongest possible terms the poisoning of the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny in August 2020 with a military grade nerve agent of the 'Novichok' group. We continue to urge the Russian Federation to provide substantial answers to the questions posed by 45 States Parties in the framework of Art. IX and to ensure without further delay the disclosure of the circumstances of the assassination attempt against Mr. Navalny.

The European Union remains fully committed to counter the proliferation of chemical weapons and to support the fight against impunity for the use of chemical weapons. On 14 November 2022, the EU imposed further restrictive measures linked to the poisoning of Mr Navalny and the production of chemical weapons delivery systems in Syria. Measures under the EU's chemical weapons sanctions regime now apply to a total of 25 individuals and three entities.

Mr. Chairperson,

The EU supports the Director-General's proposed revision of the programme and budget for 2023 that enables the OPCW to continue its vital work including cooperation and assistance projects. In this context, the EU calls upon all States Parties to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time.

The EU has noted with great concern that the Technical Secretariat will face a high turnover in the Inspectorate Division in 2023, affecting its operational capacity. This situation underlines the need for amending the OPCW Tenure Policy to help maintain key expertise required to ensure the continued implementation of the Convention. As an interim measure, a new decision on re-hiring of inspectors is warranted.

The EU strongly believes that gender equality and mainstreaming of gender are and should continue to be an integral part of the work of the OPCW and implementation of the CWC. A wide diversity of views is essential for decision-making and in helping us tackle the challenges we face with greater effectiveness. We commend the Director-General and the Technical Secretariat for the work they have carried out thus far and look forward to further progress towards gender equality in the Organisation, including through the enhancement of gender mainstreaming in all areas of the Technical Secretariat's work.

I would like to reiterate the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, ranging from chemical industry to think tanks, civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations, in the OPCW work, and their meaningful and broadest possible participation in the Conference of States Parties, including the Fifth Review Conference.

Mr. Chairperson,

The Fifth Review Conference will be an opportunity to consider how to strengthen implementation of the Convention as a key instrument of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Achieving a common vision on countering the re-emergence of chemical weapons and safeguarding the global non-use norm is a shared responsibility of all States Parties. The work programme of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) allows all delegations to effectively express their priorities on relevant topics for the future of our Organisation. The EU and its Member States actively and constructively contribute to the discussions, and we encourage all States Parties to engage in this preparatory process. In this context, I would like to express our gratitude to the Chairperson, Ambassador Lauri Kuusing of Estonia, for leading the work in an open and inclusive manner, with the goal of building consensus.

I would kindly ask you to consider this statement as an official document of the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties and post it on the OPCW external server and public website.

Thank you.

3.4. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

3.4.1. **Second Preparatory Committee for the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Geneva, 11.4.2022)**

Mr. Vice-Chair,

I speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries Turkey, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine, and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

In the context of Article X, the EU strongly encourages local and regional ownership to ensure long-term sustainability of activities, stronger partnerships between donors and beneficiary States, and further coordination among donors. Developing national action plans, with the involvement of relevant agencies and stakeholders, and enhancing international, regional and sub-regional cooperation will help to achieve effective and sustainable outcomes. We support in particular further South-South cooperation for detecting, reporting and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease, or biological weapons attacks.

The EU has a long history of providing support to cooperation and assistance relevant for Article X. Currently the EU provides, through a number of Council Decisions, nearly EUR 10 million in support of assistance and capacity-building projects in third countries, including improving legislative and regulatory basis of biosafety and biosecurity, awareness-raising among relevant sectors as well as enhancing infectious disease surveillance, detection and control.

At the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC, the EU will support proposals further strengthening the implementation of Article X.

More specifically, the EU will support the proposal made by France, Senegal and Togo to establish an online platform dedicated to biosafety and biosecurity under Article X.

The EU will furthermore support initiatives to develop biorisk management standards within the life sciences community. Biorisk management standards can play a complementary and supportive role in the implementation of the obligations of the BTWC. We therefore encourage States Parties to provide assistance, where appropriate, for the implementation of biorisk management standards in life science institutions in accordance with Article X.

3.4.2. **EU General Statement at the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC (Geneva, 28.11.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova and the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this declaration.

Let me start by congratulating you, Ambassador Bencini, for your nomination as President of this Review Conference and by commending you for your efforts in preparation of this very important meeting. We have full confidence in your capacity to guide us through the deliberations as we strive for a successful outcome. You can count of the EU's support in this endeavour.

The EU is firmly committed to a multilateral and treaty-based approach that maintains and reinforces international peace and security. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is one of the major pillars of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. It embodies the important and legally-binding norm that the development, production, stockpiling and usage of biological agents and toxins as weapons is unacceptable.

The EU recognises that biological agents and toxins are widely used for peaceful purposes in line with the BTWC provisions. At the same time, the risk of natural or accidental spread of dangerous pathogens exists. With the COVID-19 pandemic we have witnessed how quickly diseases can cross borders and how dangerous and disruptive they can be. This is why it is more urgent than ever to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation.

Taking into account this context and given the substantive work realised by States Parties during the current review cycle, the Ninth Review Conference represents a unique opportunity not only to strengthen the Convention and its implementation, and to improve biosafety and biosecurity globally, but also to advance assistance, cooperation, response and preparedness of the States Parties.

As a long-term supporter of the BTWC, the EU is firmly committed to contributing to the success of the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC. Our primary aim is to adopt forward-looking decisions and recommendations, which will provide a clear roadmap for the next review cycle, based on a productive intersessional programme.

As part of this strong commitment to a successful Ninth Review Conference, the EU has provided substantial support to this end. In particular, I would like to mention the series of EU-sponsored Regional Workshops for Europe and the Middle East, the Americas, Asia and Africa that were organised by the ISU in preparation for the Review Conference. The goal of these workshops was to increase common understanding of key issues and challenges and to facilitate building consensus on the need for, and measures required for, reinforcement of the Convention. The report of these Regional Workshops will be presented during a side event on 1 December. I would also like to note that the EU is sponsoring 28 delegates from 25 States to participate in this Review Conference.

The EU Position on the Ninth Review Conference has been submitted to the Review Conference as a Working Paper. It includes a broad range of specific measures supported by the EU with a view to strengthening the BTWC. This statement will only emphasise certain priority issues while we remain ready to provide further information on EU position on all topics, as appropriate, during the upcoming deliberations.

Mr. President,

The European Union regards verification as a central element of a complete and effective disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including within the BTWC. The EU reiterates its readiness to explore the issue of verification in greater depth, taking into account the developments in science and technology relevant to the Convention as well as the evolution of the threat. In this regard, the EU encourages the Review Conference to take action on near-term, concrete measures that would immediately strengthen the BTWC while negotiating further measures to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation in the upcoming intersessional period, including on increasing transparency and enhancing assurance in compliance. We call on States Parties to approach these issues in a constructive and ambitious manner and welcome concrete proposals.

Taking into account the rapid developments in life sciences and in technology relevant to the Convention, the EU furthermore supports the Ninth Review Conference in delegating certain decision-making powers to the Meeting of States Parties.

The EU also supports the concrete implementation of Article X of the BTWC through the numerous assistance programmes the EU and its Member States have undertaken. We consider international cooperation and assistance for peaceful purposes in the framework of the BTWC one of the most important aspects of the Convention, especially considering the experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Further action to enhance international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, on promoting capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases is of utmost importance. We stand ready to explore relevant initiatives aiming at reinforcing biosafety and biosecurity.

In addition, the EU supports the promotion of biorisk management standards as a concrete measure to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity at the international level.

Furthermore, the EU supports a Science & Technology Review Process based on more frequent and focused assessments of relevant scientific and technological developments, which may have implications for the BTWC. Such a Review Process has gathered widespread support since the Eighth Review Conference and its establishment is urgent and necessary to keep pace with advancements. The EU specifically supports the establishment of a dedicated board of experts and scientists. Such a mechanism could help identify emerging risks of potential misuse of technologies and expertise in dual use research and their potential relevance to the goals and objectives of the BTWC. The EU also supports the adoption of a voluntary code of conduct for scientists as an element in this process, as well as the establishment of a science and technology officer position within the ISU.

The EU also supports the operationalisation of Article VII, regarding assistance to States Parties that have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention. Building on agreements reached at the Eighth Review Conference, which supported 'the establishment of a database open to all States Parties to facilitate assistance under the framework of Article VII' as well as the establishment of guidelines for seeking assistance under Article VII, we particularly support the proposal by France and India to establish such a database.

Another priority of the European Union and its Member States is universal adherence to the Convention. We are pleased that since the Eighth Review Conference in 2016, six States have joined the Convention: Samoa, Palestine, Niue, Central African Republic, Tanzania and Namibia. We furthermore call on all States not party to the Convention to adhere thereto without further delay. We encourage them to participate as observers in formal BTWC meetings and to implement, on a voluntary basis, its provisions. In line with this priority, the EU has carried out, in the run up to this Review Conference, demarches on universal adherence to the BTWC with States not party to the Convention.

We welcome the fact that in 2021 a record number of reports on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) was submitted by States Parties. We strongly encourage all States Parties to use EU-funded assistance tools such as the CBM guide and the electronic CBM facility to submit their annual CBM reports to the ISU. The EU furthermore recalls its long-standing support to further confidence building measures such as peer reviews, voluntary visits and other initiatives that contribute to enhance transparency.

At the same time, we also encourage States Parties to participate in peer review initiatives and voluntary visits to relevant facilities and other transparency and confidence-building initiatives. It is important to note that these initiatives are not designed to be substitutes for a legally-binding verification mechanism, but to strengthen national implementation and thereby the BTWC.

The assistance the ISU provides to States Parties for the implementation of their Treaty obligations and to the intersessional work programme is invaluable. The EU continues to support the strengthening of the ISU's role.

Timely and full contributions to the BTWC budget are the essential requirement for the functioning and strengthening of the Convention, including for convening regular meetings and sustaining the ISU. Once again, we call on all States to fulfil their financial obligations under the Convention and to pay their assessed contributions on time and in full. We urge States Parties in arrears to pay their dues without further delay.

Mr President,

Since 2006, the European Union has provided substantial financial support of circa EUR 12 million to BTWC core activities. The two Council Decisions that are being implemented by the ISU provide approximately EUR 5 million in support of the BTWC. The latest decision was adopted in November 2021 and it provides EUR 2 million support notably to activities in Africa in the context of the Global Partnership Signature Initiative strengthening Biosecurity in Africa. There will be several side events on projects conducted as part of European Union support to the BTWC.

Moreover, the EU is a staunch supporter of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons, the UNSGM. Currently we provide EUR 1,4 million in support of UNODA's efforts to further operationalise and strengthen this mechanism, which is the only existing international independent mechanism for investigating alleged use of biological weapons.

In this context, I also wish to also mention the important EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative that aims at enhancing the institutional capacity of partner countries to mitigate CBRN risks, whether deliberate, accidental, or natural in origin. Under this initiative, more than 90 projects have been funded, with one third of them addressing biological security amounting in overall to EUR 85 million. There will be a Side Event today (28 November) at 13:00 presenting the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence.

Mr President,

The EU underlines that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls is an important horizontal priority for the Union and emphasises the importance to integrate gender perspectives into discussions in the BTWC. Furthermore, as a firm supporter of Action 36 of United Nations Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament, which focuses on the 'Full and Equal Participation of Women in Decision-Making Processes', the EU fully supports and promotes the equal participation of women and men in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and encourages women's participation at the BTWC Review Conference.

We also support disarmament and non-proliferation education, to which the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, the European network of independent think tanks, is contributing with various activities. In line with the EU Youth Strategy, the EU also encourages the inclusion of youth in the debate relating to the BTWC. To that end, the EU recalls that on 21 January 2019 it adopted a Decision that provides funding in support of a project aimed at providing capacity-development opportunities for young policymakers, scientists and academics from the Global South engaged in fields related to the BTWC. A side event on the presentation of the recommendations of the Youth for Biosecurity initiative partners for the Review Conference will take place on 30 November.

Mr President,

We note that Russia has invoked procedures under Article V and Article VI of the Convention. Regrettably, this long-awaited Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC takes place at a time when Russia's unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine rages on, and Ukraine's civilian population and civilian infrastructure is being deliberately targeted and destroyed. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's aggression, which grossly violates international law and the UN Charter, and undermines international peace and security. As part of its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has been engaged in a campaign of disinformation in spreading unsubstantiated and unfounded claims, among other things, regarding alleged development of biological weapons in Ukraine.

Articles V and VI are crucial in ensuring confidence in compliance with the BTWC. They should therefore be invoked only on a well-founded basis. Efforts to misrepresent or undermine legitimate health related research and capacity building, including for strengthened biosafety and biosecurity, only weaken the Convention and undermine international cooperation for peaceful purposes under Article X. This includes important efforts to prevent, detect and control possible outbreaks of disease, which the European Union strongly supports.

The processes under Article V and VI have been concluded. Any further discussion here on the allegations would only prove the lack of good faith towards this Review Conference's goals. The States Parties should focus on the important task ahead of us: to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation, to ensure the Convention remains responsive to S&T developments, and to pave the way towards a productive intersessional period.

Mr President,

Allow me to assure you once again that the European Union and its Member States have a strong interest in a successful Ninth Review Conference and will spare no effort to this effect.

Thank you.

3.4.3. 9th Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – Closing remarks (Geneva, 16.12.2022)

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova, the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Canada align themselves with this declaration.

At the outset, we wish to express our appreciation for your leadership, tireless determination, diplomatic skills and dedicated efforts throughout the last three weeks. We also commend the significant work of your team, the Chairs of the Committee of the Whole and the Drafting Committee, all the facilitators, and the whole Implementation Support Unit.

As a long-term supporter of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), we have actively contributed to the success of the Ninth Review Conference. We have clearly reaffirmed our aspiration to adopt forward-looking decisions and recommendations, which would facilitate full and effective implementation of this important Convention, which relevance has been underscored by the disruptive pandemic of COVID-19.

We are pleased to see that a future-oriented package, although limited in its ambitions, has been adopted. But at the same time we regret that a few countries decided to take hostage the much larger aspirations of a wide membership of the BTWC across all three regional groups. The majority of States Parties not only aimed at addressing current challenges and significantly strengthening the convention but also at meeting today's needs through advancing assistance, cooperation, response and preparedness of the States Parties.

In particular, we welcome the establishment of a Working Group to strengthen the effectiveness and to improve the implementation of the Convention in all its aspects, the decision to develop a mechanism for international cooperation and assistance and for the review of scientific and technological developments. This opens a new opportunity to move this global norm into the 21st century. This is especially important in view of the current security environment marked by mistrust, increasingly high tensions and serious proliferation crises and challenges.

We deeply regret that despite the commendable efforts by you, Mr. President, the Chairs of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee, and all the facilitators, in lengthy negotiations over the past three weeks, it has not been possible to achieve consensus on a progressive Final Declaration that would advance commitments of the States Parties to the purposes of the Preamble and all the provisions of the Convention. We missed the unique opportunity to make tangible progress in all aspects of the Convention.

Moreover, we regret that in the Final Document we could not take into account the lessons learned of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The EU remains firmly committed to a multilateral and treaty-based approach that maintains and reinforces international peace and security. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is one of the major pillars of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. It embodies the important legally-binding norm that the development, production, stockpiling and usage of biological agents and toxins as weapons is prohibited. It is our hope that in a not very distant future there will be another occasion to join forces and work together with the whole international community to advance our common objective of strengthening this Convention and its implementation.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.5. BALLISTIC MISSILES

3.5.1. **DPRK: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch (Brussels, 25.3.2022)**

The EU strongly condemns the launch by the DPRK of an intercontinental ballistic missile on 24 March. This is a violation of multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions and a serious threat to international and regional peace and security. The EU calls on the DPRK to refrain from any further action that could increase international or regional tensions. The DPRK must comply with UN Security Council resolutions by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and cease immediately all related activities. The DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear weapons state. The EU calls on all UN Members to take action to implement in full the UN Security Council sanctions. The EU stands ready to implement and complement if necessary any action that could be taken by the UN Security Council in response to this event. The DPRK's blatant violations of international law divert resources from its own people, prevent its economic development and undermine the welfare of its people. The EU urges the DPRK to cease destabilising actions, respect international law, and resume dialogue with relevant partners. The EU stands ready to support any meaningful diplomatic process.

Ahead of the tenth NPT Review Conference, the EU insists that the DPRK returns to compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and brings into force the Additional Protocol. At the same time, the EU urges Pyongyang to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, The Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

3.5.2. **EU Statement at the 21st Annual Regular Meeting of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) (Vienna, 20.5.2022)**

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Norway, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Andorra and San Marino.

This year's Annual Regular Meeting takes place while one Subscribing State is conducting a full scale military invasion against another Subscribing State. The European Union condemns in the strongest possible terms this unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. The Russian invasion is a blatant violation of the UN Charter. It shows complete and utter disrespect for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Ukraine. Russia bears full responsibility for this act of aggression and for all the human suffering, loss of life and destruction it is causing. Russia will be held accountable for its actions.

We demand an immediate and unconditional termination of the Russian military invasion, and a complete withdrawal of all Russian forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine. We remain deeply concerned over recorded flights of Russian cruise missiles over Ukrainian territory, including over the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). We call on Russia to immediately cease such reckless actions, which pose a serious and direct threat to safety and security, significantly raise the risk of a nuclear accident and endanger the civilian population of Ukraine, neighbouring states and the entire international community.

Chair,

The HCoC is the only multilateral instrument aiming at both preventing ballistic missile proliferation and increasing transparency for the benefit of the Subscribers. The EU and its Member States reaffirm their strong support for the HCoC by actively promoting the universalisation, full implementation and efficient functioning of

the Code. We call on all UN Member States that have not yet done so, to subscribe to the Code. This will help build confidence, encourage restraint and create more peace and security for all. In this regard, the EU has actively engaged in diplomatic outreach to UN Member States that have not yet subscribed to the Code.

Since 2008, the EU has continued to provide significant political and financial support for the Code, a number of outreach events and meetings having taken place in cooperation with the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). In the framework of the current EU Council Decision, we have accomplished seven expert missions, eleven regional seminars, thirteen outreach events and published a number of papers related to the Code.

Chair,

The EU and its Member States remain gravely concerned by the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in particular the pursuit by several countries of concern of ballistic missile programmes in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. We call for the immediate dismantlement of such programmes, which are a source of mistrust and contribute to regional instability.

Since the last HCoC Annual Regular Meeting, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has launched a number of ballistic missiles, including yet another an intercontinental ballistic missile on 24 May 2022. The repeated ballistic missile launches by the DPRK represent a grave threat to regional and international peace and security and violate multiple UN Security Council Resolutions. We urge the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons and delivery systems programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to fully comply with all its international obligations and commitments. In particular, we call on the DPRK to comply with Security Council resolutions demanding that it shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation and to cease all activities linked to a ballistic missile programme. Until this happens, the EU and its Member States will continue to strictly enforce existing sanctions and call on all other States to do the same. Furthermore, the EU and its Member States recall that all UN Member States are obliged to implement the restrictions targeting the DPRK's illegal activities, as imposed by the UN Security Council, and should do their utmost to curb proliferation of goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile-related programmes, including the transfer of dual-used items and their financing.

The EU remains resolutely committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts undertaken within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to facilitate a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. Full and verified implementation of Iran's nuclear-related commitments will enable the international community to receive the necessary assurances. It is high time for Iran to seize the opportunity currently on the table to bring negotiations which started in Vienna more than fourteen months ago to a successful conclusion.

The EU urges Iran to refrain from any ballistic missile activities that are inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2231, notably its Annex B which calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology. Iran's space programme in particular is enabling it to test technology that is essential to the development of ballistic missiles, including future long-range delivery systems, as demonstrated again with Iran's announcement on 8 March of a launch of a military satellite. We urge Iran to cease all these activities and fully abide by UNSCR 2231 (2015). The EU continues to fully apply UNSCR 2231 provisions which prohibit the export of missile-related items to and from Iran unless authorised by the UN Security Council, and calls upon Iran to fully respect all relevant UN Security Council resolutions related to the transfer of missiles and relevant material and technology to state and non-state actors. We deplore the missile attack by the IRGC on Erbil on 13 March 2022 and reiterate our long-standing serious concern about the regional military build-up.

Since December 2012, the Syrian regime has launched numerous ballistic missiles, ranging from liquid-propellant Scud-based missiles but also more accurate and more operational solid-propellant Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs). The Syrian activities related to missile technology, along with strong indications of technical and financial support from third countries and resulting proliferation of missile technologies from the Syrian soil to non-state actors in the region, constitute a source of concern for the international community.

These developments in countries that are currently not subscribing to the Hague Code of Conduct only further highlight the importance of universalisation of the Code, which we will continue to promote through various activities funded under the EU Council Decision.

Chair,

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the Code and the EU, the Netherlands and France, with the support of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, organise an outreach event on 1 June, in Vienna, in order to mark this important occasion and discuss the further universalisation of the Code. In four sessions, experts and diplomats working on the Code will share their views on a number of relevant issues, from negotiating the Code back in 2002 to discussing its relevance today. This event will constitute a key milestone in the run-up to the vote on the biannual UNGA resolution in support of the Code, at the end of this year.

Let me conclude by warmly welcoming Nigeria's Ambassador Umar as the new Chair for 2022 to 2023 and expressing our gratitude to Ambassador Ainchil of Argentina for all the work and efforts undertaken during his HCoC chairmanship. We also thank Austria for its efficient support to the Code as the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) in Vienna.

The EU would also like to assure you of our full support and cooperation for the issuance of a communiqué by this Annual Regular Meeting which should help to increase awareness and mobilise further international support for the HCoC.

Thank you Chair.

3.5.3. **DPRK: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the recent launch of multiple missiles (Brussels, 5.11.2022)**

The EU strongly condemns the significant increase of illegal missile launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), including, an intercontinental ballistic missile and the short-range ballistic missile that landed south of the Northern Limit Line.

These actions represent a dangerous escalation in the DPRK's repeated violation of UN Security Council resolutions. The unprecedented number of DPRK ballistic missiles launched in 2022 represents an alarming illustration of its intention to continue undermining the global non-proliferation regime. This poses a grave threat to all nations and undermines international and regional peace and security.

The DPRK's actions demand a resolute and united response by the international community. The EU calls on all UN Member States, especially Members of the UN Security Council, to ensure the full implementation of sanctions to prevent the DPRK from procuring materials, knowledge and finance that support its illegal weapons programmes.

The DPRK must immediately comply with UN Security Council resolutions by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and cease all related activities.

The EU stresses yet again that the illegal actions taken by the DPRK cannot and will never confer upon it the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the NPT or any other special status in this regard. The EU urges the DPRK to return immediately to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The EU expresses its full solidarity with Japan and the Republic of Korea and reiterates its call on the DPRK to cease its aggressive and destabilising actions, respect international law and resume dialogue with all relevant parties. The only route to sustainable peace and security lies in dialogue. The EU reiterates its readiness to support a meaningful diplomatic process aimed at building peace and security and pursuing complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

The candidate countries Türkiye, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova, the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this declaration.

3.5.4. DPRK/North Korea: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (Brussels, 19.11.2022)

The EU strongly condemns the DPRK's launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile that landed in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone on 18 November. The EU is deeply concerned by such dangerous, illegal and reckless action.

Pyongyang's continuing efforts to develop ever more menacing means to deliver weapons of mass destruction threatens all countries. The EU urges the DPRK to immediately stop destabilising actions that violate United Nations Security Council resolutions and raise international and regional tensions.

The EU calls upon the DPRK to comply with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions. The DPRK must abandon all its nuclear weapons, any other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and cease immediately all related activities.

The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is critical that the United Nations Security Council responds in an appropriate manner in order to address the growing threat the DPRK poses to international peace and security. The EU recalls the duty for all UN Members to take action to fully implement sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council.

The EU insists that the DPRK returns to full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon State and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and brings into force the Additional Protocol. At the same time, the EU urges Pyongyang to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The EU expresses its solidarity with Japan and the Republic of Korea and once again urges the DPRK to resume meaningful dialogue with all the main parties concerned. The EU stands ready to support any meaningful diplomatic process and is committed to working with all relevant partners to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

3.6. UNSCR 1540

3.6.1. EU Statement – UN 1540 Committee: Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540 (New York, 1.6.2022)

Mr Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

Let me start by congratulating you, Ambassador de la Fuente Ramírez and your team for organising these Open Consultations as a part of the Comprehensive Review on the status of Implementation of Resolution 1540. It is an essential step towards a meaningful and inclusive review process. I would also like to thank the members of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts for their work on the review.

Mr Chairman,

Security Council Resolution 1540 is a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture, a key part of the global efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, including to terrorists and other non-state actors.

The EU Member states are at the forefront of implementing the provisions of Resolution 150 in national legislation. However, the protection against proliferation of materials and know-how only works if it is executed and monitored across borders and sectors. That is why we work with partner countries to strengthen their capacity to adhere to the provisions of

Resolution 1540 and support the UN agencies in their work to promote understanding and compliance. Let me underline that the implementation of Resolution 1540 is not only about non-proliferation; it also encourages and strengthens a wide range of other goals: border control, trade and export control, environmental protection and public health. The unfolding of Russia's unjustified war against Ukraine has thrown a light on the broader relevance of this regime and exposed the vulnerability of chemical, biological and nuclear facilities and the vital importance of ensuring control and monitoring.

We are encouraged to see that the Group of Experts has registered progress in implementing the provisions of Resolution 1540 in national legislation. With the voluntary cooperation and sharing of know-how and best practices promoted by the Group of Experts, the necessary frameworks and mechanisms to ensure enforcement are also established. We are and will remain strong supporters of this work.

Mr Chairman,

The Comprehensive Review provides an important opportunity to take stock of the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and discuss how the regime can be adjusted: build on what is working and address new challenges.

An essential element of the 1540 regime is the 2011 decision to establish a Group of Experts. The nine group members have undertaken important work to monitor implementation and, just as importantly, support and assist member states in raising awareness, coordinating assistance, and identifying and sharing best practices. The importance of the Group of Experts' active outreach should be underlined and emphasised in the next mandate.

The development of new technologies to produce and deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction is moving quickly. To remain relevant and effective, the next mandate needs to reflect scientific advances in nuclear, chemical and biological research and related technological developments.

Also, the provisions to counter proliferation financing have to be strengthened as recommended by the Financial Actions Task Force.

Finally, the Women, Peace and Security agenda should also be considered in the new mandate. The Secretary-General's 'Agenda for Disarmament' points out that empowering women and ensuring their equal and meaningful participation in disarmament and arms control decision-making processes can lead to more inclusive, effective and sustainable policy outcomes.

Mr Chairman,

The EU and its Member States will remain strong and active supporters of the full and universal implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540. The provisions of the Resolution are implemented through national legislation and, as a regional organisation based on tight trade relations, the establishment of EU-wide regional preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks and security policy, emphasising cross-border and cross-sectoral cooperation. The aim is to ensure the legitimate commercial exchange and peaceful use of sensitive materials and technologies while keeping them safe from criminal and terrorist actors. Importantly, the EU helps others implement the 1540 obligations through bilateral cooperation and assistance partnerships and support to the UN and regional organisations.

Firstly, we currently provide a total of over UDE 48 million in support of non-proliferation efforts globally through international organisations, most importantly UNODA, OSCE, IAEA, OPCW and OAS. The aim is notably to help partner countries develop relevant regulatory frameworks; improve the safety and security of their biological and chemical laboratories and to raise awareness of their scientists.

Secondly, the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence Initiative provides significant assistance to mitigate risks from accidental, natural or criminal incidents in partner countries. This needs- and demand-driven initiative strengthens all-hazards security governance, both at national and regional levels. With a budget of almost USD 180 million in 2021–2028, the CBRN Centres of Excellence support capacity building through real-time, large-scale cross-border exercises with 62 countries.

Thirdly, the EU also helps States mitigate CBRN risks through the EU Partner-to-Partner Export Control Programme for Dual-Use Goods, which focuses on reducing the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by strengthening international cooperation in the field of dual-use trade controls and strengthening national and regional capacity.

Finally, the EU remains a strong supporter of the implementation of the conventions and regimes and initiatives related to non-proliferation and disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction, most importantly the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), UN Secretary General's Mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons (UNSGM), the Hague Code of Conduct as well as the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr Chairman,

The EU and its Member States will continue to actively contribute to the universal implementation of Resolution 1540 through national programmes and our expansive help and assistance to other countries, bilaterally and through international and regional organisations. The new mandate should strengthen what works best and adjust with a view to new challenges, risks, and vulnerabilities to ensure that the 1540 regime remains a relevant and effective instrument.

Thank you.

3.7. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

3.7.1. **EU Statement on the consideration of the implementation of the Programme of Action – Eighth Biennial Meeting of States (New York, 27.7.2022)**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area as well as the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

Allow me first to congratulate you on your appointment as chairperson. The European Union (EU) welcomes the transparent and inclusive way you have steered preparations for this meeting.

Mr. Chair,

We convene here today amid Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, which has increased global insecurity. Nations from every corner of the world have united at the UN General Assembly in calling for peace, demanding that Russia immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraws from the territory of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders, demanding civilian protection and humanitarian access in Ukraine.

Russia, bears full responsibility for the loss of life, the human suffering and all the destruction it causes in Ukraine. The EU fully acknowledges Ukraine's right to self-defence and the Ukrainian armed forces' efforts to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity and population in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. We commend the Ukrainian people's strength, courage and resistance to withstand Russia's aggression and we stand with them in firm solidarity.

Mr. Chair,

The diversion, illicit trade and unauthorised use of small arms and light weapons continues to constitute a serious impediment for peace, growth, development, and security in the world. Ever since its adoption in 2001, the EU has actively promoted the implementation of the UN Programme of Action (UN PoA) to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects. The EU considers that the UN PoA continues to provide an effective framework for states valid and effective strategy to consider, commit to, and implement activities to address such impediments.

In order to further strengthen its action against the destabilising accumulation and spread of SALW and their ammunition, the Council of the European Union on 19 November 2018 adopted the EU strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition 'Securing arms, protecting citizens'.

With regard to the implementation of the UN PoA, the EU supports the inclusion of the following elements in the outcome document of the BMS8.

BMS8 should promote the exchange of information between states on identified diversion in order to expose and cut off arms trafficking channels, and in order to improve the capacity for risk assessment in the context of arms export control (link with Article 11 of Arms Trade Treaty). The prevention of diversion of small arms to unauthorised actors constitutes an undeniable link between the UN PoA and the Arms Trade Treaty, especially with the first programmed meeting of the Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF) during CSP8. The EU deplores that some states deny this link, thereby remaining blind for the synergies between the UN PoA and the ATT. The EU would like to see BMS8 recognise that the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol contribute to the implementation of the UN PoA, which is supported by synergies with international instruments with similar objectives.

States should underline their commitment to promote national implementation by means of, where appropriate, dedicated interagency coordination bodies, national action plans and strategies, national points of contact, national legislation, including penal clauses, regulations, administrative procedures and record-keeping. The monitoring of the relevant aspects of the SALW life cycle including manufacturing and marking, trade, export control, safe and secure stockpiling and disposal is also critical.

States should confirm their commitment to transparency by sharing national points of contact for the UN PoA, submitting their biennial reports on the status of the UN PoA and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) implementation, by including SALW in their reports for the UN Register of Conventional Arms, and by promoting synergies on that matter with other related international instruments such as the Arms Trade Treaty.

Controlling the export and import of arms is an important tool in the fight against illicit SALW. The risk of SALW diversion can significantly be reduced by effective arms export control and risk assessment prior to authorising a transfer. The use of authenticated end-user agreements, as supported by the UN PoA, should be promoted.

BMS8 should confirm that, in line with the 2030 Agenda, including SDG Targets 16.1 and 16.4. that are shared objectives with the UN PoA, sustainable development cannot be realised without peace and security and that peace and security will be at risk without sustainable development. Curbing the illicit trade in SALW and ammunition is crucial in this regard.

The EU supports BMS8 discussions on increasing the measurability of the impact of cooperation and assistance in SALW control. We should promote and support the implementation of standards and best practices for the handling and stockpiling of small arms and ammunition, such as the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (Mosaic) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). The application of new technologies should be considered with a view to improved Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM).

SALW-control should be promoted in bilateral and interregional security cooperation, including cross-border cooperation and information sharing between law enforcement and customs agencies. Regional and sub-regional organisations have an important role in assisting states in their implementation of the UN PoA. BMS8 should reiterate the important role played by researchers, civil society and industry in the UN PoA related activities. Civil society plays an essential role in increasing accountability and transparency in conventional arms control as well as informing and shaping all levels of decision-making.

In the outcome document, States should underscore the importance of a gender sensitive approach to SALW-control, acknowledge the differing impacts of armed violence on women, men, girls and boys, and, with the aim of improving their effectiveness, promote a strong role of women in the implementation of the UN PoA and gender mainstreaming in SALW control actions. The EU would like to see a reference to UNSCR 1325 of 2000 on Women, Peace and Security in the BMS8 outcome document, and in this regard a special reference to UNSCR 2242 of 2015 that specifically encourages empowering of women with the efforts related to the fight against illicit SALW.

BMS8 should address the issue of illicit manufacture through illicit reactivation of deactivated firearms and the illicit conversion of blank firearms. They should consider the establishment of an international standard for irreversible deactivation and a standard for manufacturing norms for blank firearms, with a view to rendering impossible this source of illicit firearms.

The scope of the UN PoA must include preventing, combatting and eradicating the illicit trade in ammunition. In this context, we welcome the work of the Open-ended working group (OEWG) on conventional ammunition in the context of UNGA Resolution 76/233 of 24 December 2021 and we look forward to building upon the outcomes of this body in the implementation of safe and secure management of ammunition over its whole life-cycle with a focus on preventing diversion and unintended explosions.

BMS8 should highlight the role of the UN PoA in the fight against terrorism. The EU supports the reference to Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (Manpads) to be included in the outcome document as these weapons pose a very specific risk when diverted into unauthorised hands.

The outcome document should also address the growing importance of internet and online transactions, including the intangible transfer of technology and design, with regard to the illicit trade in SALW and their parts and components.

BMS8 should call for increasing capacities to monitor and enforce arms embargoes, i.a. by supporting the work of UN panels that monitor arms embargoes. UN and regional peace support missions should improve exchange of information on illicit flows of SALW with UN panel of experts when present in the same region.

Finally, BMS8 should also pay attention to addressing illicit SALW in conflict-affected areas, i.a. by encouraging the involvement where appropriate, of UN and regional peace support operations in the collecting, recording, tracing and destruction of illicit SALW and their ammunition, and support national capacities to track and trace the origins of illicit SALW and ammunition. This should also include taking account of SALW and ammunition in post-conflict reconstruction programmes and Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes in particular.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

3.7.2. EU Statement – On consideration of the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, 8th Biennial Meeting of States on the UN POA to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (New York, 28.6.2022)

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area as well as the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

The EU welcomes today's opportunity to assess the state of play in the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). The EU is a convinced supporter of the ITI. We consider it as one of the most important achievements of the UN Programme of Action and an essential tool in the fight against diversion, un-authorised re-export and the illicit trade in SALW.

The ITI provides the only global standard on how and where to mark SALW. Through the ITI all States have committed themselves to mandatory marking and record-keeping of SALW and to cooperate internationally with the tracing of seized and collected illicit SALW. The ITI is therefore a unique and essential component of the capacity of states to identify and fight arms trafficking. It is the responsibility of this Biennial Meeting to make sure that the ITI can continue to deliver this essential contribution, also in the light of developments in manufacture, technology and design of SALW.

In relation to this, the EU is concerned that the ITI does not properly address the developments in manufacture, technology and design of SALW like modular and polymer frame weapons. The EU therefore wants BMS8 to agree on the establishment of an Open-Ended Technical Expert Group and on its modalities, to ensure the effectiveness and applicability of the ITI in the light of developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design.

The absence of a global standard on how and where to mark modular weapons risks gradually undermining the capacity to trace these weapons if there is no agreement on what constitutes the essential component which should bear the marking. This process should also reflect other implications of developments in SALW technology and design, including increased use of polymers, 3D-printed weapons, and developments in marking, recordkeeping and tracing.

Given the limited space that is fit for durable marking on SALW with polymer frames, the increased use of polymer frames complicates the application of markings that are required or recommended by the ITI, including import markings. The EU is therefore of the view that the outcome document should promote import marking, if possible, at time of manufacture.

Developments in SALW technology and design do not only pose challenges for the implementation of the ITI. They also offer opportunities for more effective marking, recordkeeping and tracing, and hence more secure control of SALW in general.

The EU and its Member States have been flagging this issue since BMS4 in 2010, already eleven years ago. The issue is real and well documented. All stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies and industry, have flagged it since many years. It is our responsibility to start this process at BMS8.

Finally, the EU promotes the tracing of SALW in conflict affected areas. Conflict tracing can contribute to the identification and containment of illicit arms flows and trafficking channels into conflict zones and to the reduction of violence. UN and regional peace support operations may take up a role in the collection, recording, tracing and destruction of illicit SALW and their ammunition, in accordance with their mandates and resources, where possible, in cooperation with UN expert groups in charge of monitoring UN arms embargoes. Conflict tracing can also be supported through capacity development for local security and law enforcement agencies for tracing and investigation, in combination with promotion of the iARMS database of Interpol and other relevant databases; and by supporting initiatives such as iTrace by Conflict Armament Research.

States should call for increasing capacities to monitor and enforce arms embargoes, inter alia by supporting the work of UN panels that monitor arms embargoes.

Thank you, Mr. Chair

3.7.3. **EU Statement – 2022 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Geneva, 16.11.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine and the potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

I would like to begin by congratulating Poland on its assumption of the Presidency of the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties and assure you of the EU's full support. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank France for its skilful chairing of the Review Conference last year.

The EU recalls that the CCW and its Protocols are an essential and integral part of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and reiterates the commitment of the European Union and its Member States to respect and comply fully with IHL, as well as to continue implementing fully the EU Guidelines on the promotion of compliance with IHL. The EU emphasises the importance of the universalisation of the Convention and its Protocols, which remains a top priority and supports all efforts to this end. We call upon all countries that have not yet done so to join them as soon as possible.

The EU underlines that the CCW is a unique international forum gathering diplomatic, legal and military expertise. In light of the particular challenges of weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, this expertise has previously led to the adoption of prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific weapons, such as incendiary weapons, as codified in Protocol III, as well as to prohibitions on the use of specific weapons, such as reflected in Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons. The Convention offers, inter alia, a flexible way to respond to new developments in weapons technologies and to support the implementation of an essential part of IHL, which contributes to preventing and reducing the suffering of both civilians and combatants

In addition, we need to underline the importance of transparency and confidence building in the implementation of the CCW and its Protocols and encourage High Contracting Parties to complete detailed reports on a regular basis. We are also fully committed to mainstreaming a gender perspective into all disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control efforts, including by promoting women's meaningful participation in the CCW and other disarmament fora.

In this context, the EU welcomes the work done over the past years by the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and acknowledges its substantial contribution and ongoing efforts to find common understanding of this complex issue. The EU underlines that the CCW is the relevant international forum in this regard, and that we expect it to deliver results, given that the topic of Lethal Autonomous weapons systems is an important topic that should be addressed taking into account operational, legal, technological aspects and bearing in mind ethical perspectives. The EU emphasises that it is important that the GGE continue its efforts, according to its mandate, building on past achievements to allow for progress. We need, therefore, to address these issues with urgency as the research and development of new weapons technologies progresses at a rapid pace.

The EU remains committed to pursue its efforts in the GGE with a view to ensuring that the outcome reflects the necessity of compliance with International Law, in particular International Humanitarian Law, taking into account relevant ethical considerations. Human beings must make the decisions with regard to the use of lethal force, exert control over weapons systems that they use and remain accountable for decisions over the use of force in order to ensure compliance with International Law, in particular International Humanitarian Law across the life cycle of these weapon systems. We believe that a two-tier or dual track approach to weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS merits further consideration. This approach is based on the prohibition of systems that cannot be used in compliance with IHL, and the regulation of other types of systems featuring autonomy in order to ensure the compliance with the rules and principles of IHL.

The EU remains deeply concerned about the continued severe global impact of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and their indiscriminate use and effects, in particular in the perpetration of terrorist acts and the use of IEDs by non-state actors. In this context, we welcome the updated political Declaration on IEDs adopted last year by the High Contracting Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II and remain in full support of the relevant United Nations General Assembly Resolutions.

The EU highlights the humanitarian impact and the heavy consequences on social and economic development caused by the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM). While acknowledging that MOTAPM are legitimate weapons, Parties are obliged to ensure that they are used in accordance with IHL, including by taking all feasible precautions, to protect civilians from the effects of these weapons. The EU urges States Parties to further discuss how to ensure compliance with Amended Protocol II, also with respect to MOTAPM. MOTAPM should therefore remain on the CCW agenda in order to ensure that High Contracting Parties can continue to consider the matter in a constructive and transparent manner.

The EU remains concerned about the reported use of incendiary weapons against civilians or against targets located within a concentration of civilians, their indiscriminate use causing cruel effects and unacceptable suffering. We call on all States not yet party to join Protocol III of the Convention, which prohibits in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons and we urge all States to fully comply with its provisions. We regret that Protocol III issues were removed from the CCW agenda because of the opposition by one High Contracting Party and we request to have them back next year. Our work is based on the clear understanding that appropriate time has to be allocated to allow a structured debate on the implementation of the Convention and all of its Protocols.

Mr. President,

We face one of the most significant challenges to global peace and security. Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression is an affront to everything we work for here. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's gross violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions as well as the use of other explosive weapons, such as rockets and artillery shells or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) directed against civilians in Ukraine. The EU actively supports the work of the International Criminal Court in ensuring accountability for the most serious international crimes.

We recall that the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine confirmed in its report of 18 October to the UN General Assembly (A/77/533) that war crimes, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed in Ukraine since 24 February 2022 by in particular Russian armed forces.

We demand the Russian Federation to immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.

I thank you, Mr. President.

3.7.4. EU Statement – Twentieth meeting of the States Parties of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Geneva, 21.11.2022)

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The candidate countries North Macedonia and Montenegro and the potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina align themselves with this declaration.

At the outset, allow me to congratulate you, Ambassador Alvaro Enrique Ayala Melendez of Colombia, for assuming the Presidency of the Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. I wish to also acknowledge all efforts of your predecessor Ambassador Arango Olmos and her team for skilfully steering the preparations for this important meeting.

Over the last 25 years, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, has become a success story of multilateral diplomacy with a total of 164 countries bound by the global norm it established. Since then, considerable progress has been made to stop the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines. By virtue of this joint multilateral effort, significantly fewer people have been injured or killed because of an anti-personnel mine.

This remarkable result could not have been achieved without the devotion and commitment of the mine ban community, in particular the commitment of survivors and civil society, who work globally and in mine affected countries, often risking their own lives. The EU is fully committed to ensuring the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society, based on respect for human rights, gender equality, inclusion and non-discrimination.

With all its Member States being parties to the Convention, the EU is strongly united in upholding the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. The EU continues to be fully committed to strengthen the ban against anti-personnel mines and to achieve a world free of anti-personnel mines, and free of any new victims. Furthermore, it is of utmost importance that we continue our collective efforts in order to meet the obligations under the Convention; to achieve the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, the clearance of mine-contaminated land, provide mine risk education assistance to mine victims and sustainable national capacities. The MSP represents a key platform to share information on progress made and maintain the momentum towards the full implementation of the Oslo Action Plan.

The EU is also committed to mainstreaming a gender perspective into its mine action work and we continue to support the work of stakeholders in mine action to integrate gender perspective and take diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities into their humanitarian mine action policies.

While we celebrate this anniversary, this year we are witnessing a significant challenge to this norm. In this respect, the EU deplores the alleged use of anti-personnel mines by Myanmar, a terrible assault on collective international efforts banning this weapon. Moreover, the EU condemns the continued use in ongoing conflicts, in particular in Ukraine.

We condemn Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. This war of aggression is not only a blatant violation of international law but also a humanitarian catastrophe for Ukraine and its people brought about by the Russian Federation in flagrant disrespect for international humanitarian law and human rights law. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's use of anti-personnel landmines and we call for immediate cease of use of this insidious weapon in Ukraine.

We call on Russia to immediately stop its military activities and demand the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders. The EU also calls on all stakeholders to refrain from the production, stockpiling, trade in and transfer of anti-personnel mines and strongly condemn their use anywhere, at any time, by any actors, whether States or non-States actors.

In conclusion, we invite all partners to renew efforts to eliminate the violent impact of anti-personnel mines and explosive ordnance. The EU remains committed to mine action and will continue to be dedicated to assist in achieving our common goals from Colombia to Cambodia and elsewhere to achieve an anti-personnel mine free world. Let us step up our efforts to ensure the rigorous implementation of the Ottawa Convention.

In conclusion, we expect from this meeting the reaffirmation that human life, human dignity and human rights are at the core of our work. We thank the entire international community and we are pleased to partner with the UN entities, the ICRC, GICHD, international and regional organisations and civil society. We extend our special appreciation to the Implementation support Unit of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention for excellently implementing the EU's projects and for their dedication and invaluable work in the implementation of the Conventions' goals.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.8. EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES

3.8.1. **EU Explanation of Vote – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security (New York, 3.11.2022)**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Member States of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and the Republic of Moldova, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, San Marino and Canada align themselves with this statement.

The EU calls upon States to vote against the Chinese draft resolution L.56 submitted to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, titled 'Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the context of International Security'.

This resolution further builds last year's Resolution 76/234. And despite the fact that divergent views and serious concerns were expressed since the adoption of that resolution, there is no reflection of these concerns in the draft text.

This resolution continues to suggest a false dichotomy between peaceful uses of nuclear, chemical and biological materials on one hand, and export control regimes and other non-proliferation measures on the other.

We recall that a number of export control regimes and related arrangements have been established to contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. These include the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Wassenaar Arrangement and Zangger Committee. These multilateral regimes contribute to the enhancement of international peace and security by preventing the diversion of sensitive materials, technology and equipment to end-users of concern. They further contribute to the implementation of treaty obligations on non-proliferation and UN Security Council resolutions. The export control regimes are setting clear guidelines and control lists, which give the exporting states necessary assurances to export sensitive products to trusted recipients.

Export control regimes are open to membership based on transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria. All States can adhere to, and benefit from, the guidelines of the regimes and apply the control lists, as they are public documents available on the regimes' websites. Outreach is also conducted through the regimes to non-Participating States in order to inform them about changes in the control lists, address membership issues and answer other questions non-Participating States might have. Specific topics, including those with regard to peaceful uses, can be raised on these occasions. Individual trade restrictions can always be addressed bilaterally and/or through the appropriate multilateral bodies. The EU fully supports this transparency.

The EU is concerned with the unfounded suggestion that export control measures and regimes put 'undue restrictions' on exports of sensitive items. This assertion is not based on facts. Unfortunately, this negative approach to export controls could ultimately undermine international trade as well as scientific and technological cooperation, which requires robust and trustworthy export controls.

The draft implies export control authorities of UN Member States do not exercise their task correctly, considering that export control decisions fall within the national competence of States, based on their national, regional and international obligations. In mentioning 'undue restrictions', the draft resolution disregards the content of the report of the UN Secretary-General (A/77/96), in which no evidence or facts have been presented to support the claim that existing export controls are excessive or undue. The report also highlighted that there are no findings in the comprehensive review of UNSC Resolution 1540 that 'undue restrictions' through export controls would inhibit sustainable development. Furthermore, in contributions to the report no suggestions were submitted for concrete initiatives outside the existing frameworks whereas this draft resolution keeps the way open to the creation of a new framework on peaceful uses, which would be parallel to the one already existing.

On the contrary, the report contained, in the submissions, various initiatives to strengthen the IAEA, BTWC, and CWC frameworks. These initiatives should be addressed in the frameworks of these respective instruments.

The EU fully supports international cooperation on peaceful uses and already actively promotes it, for instance by supporting the role of the IAEA or of the OPCW in third countries and financing concrete projects in support of peaceful uses. The EU and its Member States are the largest donor of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology that will provide better training facilities for developing countries. The EU and its Member States are also among the largest contributors to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme. Many countries have benefited from these EU-funded projects. The EU is providing widespread support to partner countries in setting up or enhancing their own export control systems, as required by UNSC Resolution 1540 in order to prevent illicit exports of sensitive goods to non-state actors, through the CBRN Centres of Excellence in 64 countries and the EU P2P export control outreach programme.

Given the important contribution of multilateral export control regimes to international peace and security as well as facilitating legitimate trade and international cooperation, this framework must not be undermined. Unfortunately, we do not see an impartial and balanced approach in this draft, and therefore call upon States to vote against the resolution

In addition and on top of what has been said, we would like to recall that the main sponsor is a member of export control regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which puts the motivation of this initiative into question.
