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THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

1994 Report

(presented by the Commission)

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INTRODUCTION

Article 7 of the Protocol on social policy to the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union states that "*The Commission shall draw up a report each year on progress in achieving the objective of Article 1, including the demographic situation in the Community.*". (Article 1, for its part, provides that "*The Community and the Member States shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion.*")

It is the Commission's intention to publish a report covering the aforementioned objectives in Article 1 after the end of 1994. However, because the report on demography is the first of its type for the Union and because it is especially highlighted in Article 7 of the Protocol, the Commission considers it appropriate to publish this report separately at this juncture.

This report has been prepared on the basis of material and of technical assistance supplied by Eurostat, with the assistance of private experts in the field of demography.

Contemporary European demography immediately raises four main questions, each of which is dealt with in a separate chapter.

The main trends in European demography in the world and the issues that they raise are examined in Chapter 1. Is there a "European" demographic model? Are the Twelve faced by the same demographic processes and therefore the same social and economic challenges? In the case of economic challenges in particular, what changes have taken place in the active population? Is the population of the Union moving towards demographic behaviour and an age structure which is specific to this population? Do the forecasts point to new developments?

The ageing of the population is nowadays a major and central trend in demographic evolution. During the next century, this ageing is likely to cause the world population to move towards a stationary situation. Ageing is affecting many aspects of our economic and social organisation. Chapter 2 studies the development of age structures in the European Union and opens up discussion of its consequences from the point of view, among others, of the situation of the elderly, labour organisation and the financing of retirement.

This population ageing is being paralleled by growing differences in household and family life. Analysis of this trend, in Chapter 3, is important for two reasons. First, because the family is the place of demographic reproduction and is therefore closely involved in the construction of demographic models. Second, because the family is the pivot between the individual and society with the result that its analysis makes it possible to observe trends in the socio-economic system as a whole.

Chapter 4 looks at migration. The mechanism of declining natural growth, i.e. the surplus of births over deaths, is amplifying the extent of the increase due to migration. Bearing this in mind, does migration help to modify demographic evolution and in particular the ageing process?

These are all vast questions and have complex interrelations. It is therefore very important to give the analysis a global dimension, as demographic evolution is part and parcel of a wider set of far-reaching changes, in particular a technological and economic revolution, a family and social revolution and finally a political and cultural revolution.

It is for this reason, in this first report, that we will shall endeavour principally to describe demographic events in a broad perspective rather than attempting a detailed analysis of the actual causes of certain aspects.

The approach is broad in time, as demographic events take place over a longer time-space than other events. Today's demographic situation is to a large extent the result of demographic behaviour in the past, just as today's demographic behaviour will structure the population of the next century.

It is also broad in space, since world demographic balances are constantly changing in the same way as economic balances.

It is also broad as regards its investigations, as the issues affecting human life are very complex: the economy, politics, ways of thinking and social structure are all factors involved in demographic behaviour.

This initial report analyses what we currently know about demographic development. This may seem reductive. The aim of this work is surely to provide a vision of the future? This is true, but the choice of strategy can be explained. In the first instance, it was vital to identify the major, societal trends linked to demographic development. We needed to understand the mechanisms that are generating this development in order to be able to pinpoint inevitable changes in the short term and separate those factors that can be influenced from those that it is difficult to control. The major trends that our analysis has highlighted are summarised in boxes at the end of each chapter. This is the only way of building up relevant scenarios of future development that can be used to provide a serious and constructive forward-looking perspective that avoids short-term suppositions. This forward-looking perspective will be the guiding thread of subsequent reports.

CHAPTER I

THE DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

If a description of the main demographic parameters of the European Union is to be of use it must shed some light on wider questions relating to these parameters. It is precisely for this reason that the consequences of the ageing of the population and the issues raised by family changes and by migration are analysed in this report. A more general question needs to be raised in the first instance if this analysis is to be meaningful: will the various common policies entailed in European union lead to a convergence of demographic behaviour or will this behaviour be independent of this union? This initial chapter examines the question in detail and attempts to find out about the demographic model specific to the European Union, to understand, as far as this is possible, on what essential principles it is based and to estimate, from this, the demographic future of the Union.

All the demographic indicators of the European Union can, when analysed in the long term, be classified in terms of their ability to discriminate at geographical level, i.e. their ability to show a difference or a similarity, on the one hand between the Union and other regions of the world and, on the other hand between Union Member States. Five series can be identified:

(1) *At world level*, natural growth (surplus of births over deaths) and the ageing of age structures differentiate developed countries from developing countries;

(2) *In comparison with other developed countries*, the European Union forms a block with the other countries of the European continent as regards population density and growth rates. Population density is half that of Japan but much higher than that of the USA or Australia; demographic growth is more vigorous than in Japan but less than in North America;

(3) *On the European continent*, three indices clearly separate the European Union and EFTA countries from other States: the migration model, the simultaneous nature of changes in behaviour as regards fertility and other family parameters and mortality levels;

(4) *Within the European Union itself*, some demographic variables closely linked to the status of women show a North-South axis. short-term fertility levels, family models and women's work;

(5) No grouping is possible for some variables that require observation at the *at the level of Member States*. This is true of the ageing effect and in particular the structure of the active population whose differences are sustained by social and employment policies specific to each Member State. The composition of migration stocks, where history plays a major role, is also specific to each Member State.

1.1 The European Union in the world

- 1 - The Union's demographic ranking: third in the world, first in the developed world

With its 348.5 million inhabitants on 1 January 1994, the European Union is the third world demographic power after China (1.188 billion) and India (870 million). It is in front of the CIS (290 million) and the United States (255 million). Indonesia (180 million), Brazil (156 million), Japan, Pakistan and Bangladesh (120 million each) and lastly Nigeria (around 116 million) come further down the ranking.

The Union retains its third place, among the groups mentioned above, in the United Nations' mean projection for 2025.

Table 1

Table 1

The European Union in the World														
Region	Population (1)										Growth rate			
	1950		1970		1982		2000		2025		1950-71	1970-83	1982-01	2000-26
	Size (millions)	% of world	Size (millions)	% of world	Size (millions)	% of world	Size (millions)	% of world	Size (millions)	% of world				
World	2516	100,0%	3697	100,0%	5479	100,0%	6228,3	100,0%	8472,4	100,0%	46,9%	48,2%	13,7%	36,0%
Developed countries	832	33,1%	1048	28,3%	1224,7	22,4%	1278	20,6%	1403,3	16,6%	26,0%	16,9%	4,4%	8,8%
of which														
EUR12	278	11,0%	320,3	8,7%	347,3	6,3%	353,5	5,7%	358,7	4,2%	15,2%	8,4%	1,8%	1,9%
USA	152,3	6,1%	205,1	5,5%	255,2	4,7%	275,3	4,4%	322	3,8%	34,7%	24,4%	7,9%	17,0%
Japan	83,6	3,3%	104,3	2,8%	124,5	2,3%	128,1	2,1%	127	1,5%	24,8%	19,4%	2,9%	-0,9%
Russian Federation			130,1	3,5%	149							14,9%		
Developing countries	1684	66,9%	2648	71,7%	4254,3	77,6%	4950,3	79,6%	7069,2	83,4%	67,3%	60,9%	16,4%	42,8%
of which														
China	554,8	22,1%	830,7	22,5%	1188	21,7%	1308,7	21,0%	1539,8	18,2%	49,7%	43,0%	10,2%	17,6%
India	357,8	14,2%	554,9	15,0%	879,5	16,1%	1018,7	16,4%	1393,8	16,5%	55,2%	58,9%	15,8%	36,8%
Nigeria	32,9	1,3%	56,6	1,5%	115,7	2,1%	147,7	2,4%	285,8	3,4%	72,0%	104,4%	27,7%	83,5%
Brazil	53,4	2,1%	95,8	2,6%	154,1	2,8%	172,8	2,8%	219,7	2,6%	79,4%	60,9%	12,1%	27,1%
Some demographic features in 1993 (2)														
	Infant Mortality	Life Expect.	Fertility	Pop. < 15	Pop. > 65									
		M/F												
World	7,0%	63/67	3,3	33%	6%									
Developed countries	1,4%	71/78	1,8	21%	12%									
of which														
EUR12	0,7%	73/80	1,5	18%	15%									
USA	0,9%	72/79	2	22%	13%									
Japan	0,4%	76/82	1,5	18%	13%									
Russian Federation	2,0%	64/74	1,7	23%	11%									
Developing countries	7,7%	61/64	3,7	36%	4%									
of which														
China	5,3%	68/71	1,9	28%	6%									
India	9,1%	58/59	3,9	36%	4%									
Nigeria	8,4%	52/54	6,6	45%	3%									
Brazil	6,3%	64/71	2,6	35%	5%									

Sources: (1) Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994, (2) Population Reference Bureau - World Population Data Sheet 1993

These figures show the extent to which the world demographic situation has changed over the last forty years. Over this short period of time the world population has doubled, increasing from 2.5 billion to 5.5 billion inhabitants. There is, however, a major difference between the developing countries and the developed countries. It would not be exaggerated to talk about a demographic explosion among the former where growth has been from 1.7 to 4.2 billion. Growth in the latter group has been much more moderate: from 832 million to 1.2 billion. In percentage terms, a growth of 147% as against 44%. Is it surprising that the population of the developed world, which accounted for one third of the world population at the end of the war, now accounts for no more than one fifth? Its decline would have been even more precipitate if it had not been offset by the positive effects of the *baby boom*, falling mortality rates and immigration.

The world population: changing groups

A comparison of trends in developing countries and in developed countries over the period 1960 to 2025 assumes that these two groups will retain the same composition. Nothing is less certain. What would the term "developing" otherwise mean? Among the countries of the third world in 1960 some, such as South Korea and the other Asian "tigers", are now developed. Others are very likely to be developed by 2025. Brazil and the whole of South America, Turkey and part of the Middle East, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and possibly China and Vietnam will have joined the group of developed countries by 2025. This forecast is borne out whatever the development criterion used: per capita income, human development index of the United Nations Development Programme or fertility levels. It is to be feared, however, that some countries which are developed at present will leave the leading group if the political and economic problems that they currently face continue. The observation, based on United Nations' forecasts, that the developed countries will account for a further reduced proportion of the world population in 2025 is not relevant as it does not take account of the entry of new countries into this group.

This situation also applies to the future of the European Union: forecasts should take account of both demographic changes and political changes. Since this report has been drawn up, three additional States have voted to adhere to European Union. By early in the next Century, other EFTA countries and a number of Eastern and Central European countries may have also joined the Union. There is little doubt that the area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals formed in this way would not only retain its current world demographic ranking fifty years hence, but could even increase it. There is also little doubt that these changes would have a major impact on the conclusions that can now be drawn from the current European Union's "demographic model".

- 2 - Natural growth: almost zero in the developed world, still high elsewhere

The UN has estimated world population growth in 1993 at 1.6%, which would, if this rate were maintained, double the planet's population in 42 years, i.e. between now and 2035. This growth is not, however, equally distributed over the planet: it is almost zero in the most developed countries (0.4%) and still substantial in those countries which are least developed (2.3% if China, which has restrained its growth to 1.2%, is excluded).

The Third World Conference on population and development which took place in Cairo last September examined demographic problems linked to development. There now seems to be a consensus about the need for slower natural growth in the developing countries. Since a fall in fertility rates has to do with personal decisions, couples' free choice to decide on the number and timing of their children has been put forward as a basic principle. The action programme adopted at the conference therefore focused on ways of promoting this free choice, essential among which were: enhancing the status of women, equality between men and women in society, support for the family and all that this entails in the area of information, education and health services.

While it may be true that world growth has slowed down in recent years, two large areas of Africa have not yet joined this trend. In sub-Saharan Africa, women still have an average of 6.7 children and demographic growth in this area exceeds 3% which is close to the growth rate of North Africa and the Middle East, the second area with high fertility levels.

- 3 - The ageing of age structures: soon to affect the world as a whole

Differences in fertility and mortality levels between developed and developing countries have led to a twofold age structure. In the developing countries, 40% of the population is aged under 15. This proportion is close to 50% in those African countries where fertility levels are high, whereas it is only 20% in the developed countries. The latter, however, have proportions of elderly people (aged over 65) of some 12% to 15%, whereas these proportions are 4% or less in the developing countries.

Despite this, the demographic indicators show that a number of countries are now in the midst of a stage of demographic transition where declining fertility is running parallel with the earlier drop in mortality. Demographic ageing has therefore become - and will increasingly become - a worldwide phenomenon likely to affect all countries of the planet as they progress through their demographic transition.

In overall terms, the classical divide - the wealthy and old developed countries and the poor and young developing countries - will become increasingly irrelevant, not only from the economic point of view, but also from the demographic point of view. What will remain true, however, is that major differences in ageing levels between these two groups of countries will continue for a long time, even if there is a certain amount of catching up because the demographic transition proves to be more rapid in the South than it was in the North.

This highlights the main problem - the developing countries will have to deal with the challenge of ageing when they are having to tackle a number of other problems - integrating young people, modernising their economy, paying off their debts, improving their health and education systems and safeguarding their environment. Even though they still have fairly low ageing indices, many countries in the Southern hemisphere are already having to support growing elderly populations in large towns and cities and in some cases in rural areas which have been abandoned by young people. Elderly people are already more numerous, in absolute terms, in the countries of the South than in the countries of the North and this trend seems likely to continue to worsen over the next twenty to thirty years.

According to United Nations' forecasts for 2025, the developed countries, including Europe and North America, will have no more than a quarter or so of all the world's "elderly" (60 and over) - less than in Southern Asia alone. On this same date, China and India will probably have more octogenarians (80 and over: 36 million) than Europe, plus the former USSR, the United States and Japan, but with the additional difference that in the seventy-five years since 1950 the number of elderly people will have increased fivefold in these two giants, whereas they will only have doubled in Europe¹.

The burden of ageing will therefore be more difficult to support in those areas of the world with the most urgent development needs. Ways of tackling the demographic explosion, which will continue long after fertility has started to decline, need to be found. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that administrative, health and social welfare structures for elderly people are not well developed.

1.2 The European Union among developed countries

- 1 - Geographical distribution of the population

With Asia, the European Union is one of the planet's most densely populated areas: 140 inhabitants per km² in the European Union as against 40 in the world and 110 in Europe as a whole - the decrease in the European average being explained by the low population density of Scandinavia.

In the other developed countries - with the exception of Japan which has 330 inhabitants per km² - densities are very low. North America and the CIS, for instance, have only 13 inhabitants per km² and Australia has only 3 inhabitants per km².


¹ Source : D. Tabutin, "L'âge vermeil du Tiers Monde: perspectives des populations âgées dans les pays jeunes" (The silver age of the third world: prospects for elderly populations in young countries), in M. Loriaux, D. Remy and E. Vilquin, (1990), *Populations âgées et révolution grise*, pp. 1087-1103.

Provided that these United Nations projections are not invalidated by wars or epidemics, the situation of these two extremes should not be any different in 2025. The European high density pole, however, will extend to the Middle East and that of Asia will increase in size. Two secondary areas of demographic concentration are also likely to appear on the Guinea coast and in Eastern Africa.

At national level, the map of densities shows a concentric distribution in the European Union as a whole. The population epicentre is in Benelux with over 300 inhabitants per km². Close to this, densities are 200 inhabitants or over in the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, but start to decrease further away. Densities are below 100 inhabitants beyond the Pyrenees, in Scandinavia, over the Russian-Polish border and in the South of the Balkans.

When a more detailed breakdown is made for the main regions of the Union, population densities are not so uniform. There is some consistency, however, since adjacent regions have the same features. From Manchester to Milan there is a large very highly populated crescent. Around this backbone, ribs of population extend over the Italian, French and even Spanish coasts and towards Central Europe.

Population density in Europe, 1992



Source: Eurostat / Competitiveness and cohesion, trends in the regions - Fifth periodic report on the social and economic situation and development of the regions in the Community (EC 1994)

- 2 - Moderate demographic growth

In comparison with growth in the USA which is much higher and growth in Japan which is lower, the total growth of the Union population can be seen as moderate and also as more stable. This is due to two factors. Japan's population structure is older than that of the Union. As fertility (1.5 children per woman) and migration balances are low in Japan, growth is in decline, and may even be negative at the beginning of the next millennium. In contrast, the United States still has a fertility level close to the generation renewal threshold (2 children per woman) and positive migration flows.

Moderate demographic growth and a high density are consequently the two main features of Europe. They separate Europe from the other developed countries - CIS, United States, Japan - although there does not seem to be a clear-cut divide between the Union Member States and the other European countries. This divide does, however, exist. In order to find it, more detailed indicators pinpointing the dynamic that has given the Union its specific nature need to be examined. The trends which shape this or that demographic system and provide it with its originality consequently need to be investigated. There is little doubt that Western Europe has its own demographic system.

1.3 Similarities between Member States

If, after comparing the European continent with the rest of the world, the field of investigation is limited to Europe alone, it can be seen that the European Union differs from the remainder of the continent because of converging processes which to some extent determine its population flows: (1) migration models, (2) some family practices, (3) mortality.

- 1 - The migration model: emigration at an end, and a reserve of foreign population

At the beginning of the 1960s, migration varied greatly among Union countries. Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal provided large numbers of immigrants. Migration flows to France, Belgium and Germany were substantial: people returning from colonial empires in France and Belgium and foreign workers in Germany. The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg also took in significant numbers of immigrants. This trend was not reflected by other countries, such as the Scandinavian countries where there had been intense emigration to the United States at the beginning of the century.

Table 2

Trends in net migration in a Selection of Member States (annual average in thousands)					
	1950-1959	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1985	1992(*)
Belgium	9	12	9	3	26
Denmark	-6	1	3	4	11
Germany (BDR)	275	191	178	-2	788
Germany (DDR)	-187	-64	-10	-27	
Greece	-21	-40	20	13	60
Spain	-78	-61	14	0	9
France	96	197	262	66	90
Ireland	:	:	:	:	-6
Italy	-101	-95	1	72	173
Luxembourg	:	:	:	:	4
Netherlands	-15	7	33	10	58
Portugal	-66	-66	-6	27	-10
United Kingdom	-54	-8	-22	-16	-11

Source: Council of Europe "The Future of Europe's Population", by R. Clignet

Series "Demography" - Population Studies nr. 28, 1983


(*) Eurostat - Demographic Statistics 1994

Nowadays, the number of foreigners is increasing more rapidly in Italy, Greece and Spain, where immigration is a recent development. It is levelling off in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg where immigration is older. Despite this timelag, all the Union Member States are tending towards the same model: low emigration, controlled immigration from non-EU countries and a trend towards settling in of the foreign population. There is nothing mysterious about these similarities: international migration is sensitive to economic factors. In a democratic system, an economic community is gradually reflected by similar migration flows resulting from converging standards of living, migration thus becoming an act of reasoned decision and free personal choice. The recent history of the Eastern block shows similar migration patterns. While the block was isolated, migration was almost zero. Once the barriers were down, migration was more substantial.


- 2 - Simultaneous nature of some practices connected with the family life cycle

The similarity of family practices is a much more curious example since it cannot be explained by a common European policy on the family as no such policy exists. This similarity does, however, exist. Western Europe, in particular the Union, obviously differs from Eastern Europe in this area. This is borne out by two figures: the mean age of women at first marriage and the mean age of women at the birth of their first child.

Map 2: Mean age of women at birth of first child around 1993



Map 3: Mean age of women at first marriage around 1993



Source: Council of Europe, Recent demographic developments in Europe - 1994

For both of these variables, a precise line divides Europe into two: in the West the mean age of women at first marriage is over 24 and in the East it is still below 22.5.

The difference in age at marriage between the West and the East may well be explained by the two opposing systems which were in force until recently. In the East, it was necessary to be married to have a flat allocated by the State. In the West, it was - and still is - necessary to be settled to marry. In other words, people in the West have to have adequate savings or income which entails a relatively long waiting period.

Over and above age at marriage, this historical difference between the East and West - maintained by economies of opposite types - highlights an even more fundamental difference in family life cycles and in individual relationships within families and with society. Methods of controlling and trends in procreative behaviour provide a further illustration.

There are few reliable data on induced abortion. The few official data that are available, those on abortion carried out under medical supervision, are underestimated to varying extents. Despite this, these data show that abortion is practised in the East to an extent that is three, four and even five times higher than in the West. In the European Union, percentages around 1990 were below 35 abortions per 100 births, while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had rates of 60 to 150 abortions per 100 births. Whatever the reason for this, one thing is clear: women in the European Union, because they use modern contraceptive methods, have more control over their fertility than women in the countries of the East and Centre of Europe, providing them with greater autonomy in their choice of family model. This factor has undoubtedly helped to differentiate the Western family from the Eastern family.

Before modern contraceptive methods were available, this difference was already perceptible in the extraordinarily simultaneous way in which fertility trends were reversed in all the Western countries. To appreciate this, we need to focus on fertility trends rather than fertility levels which vary from country to country.

If the dates corresponding to the reversal of the fertility trend in the countries of the European continent are plotted on a time line extending from 1900 to the present, Western Europe forms a very compact group from the 1920s onwards, while Central and Eastern Europe is very erratic. In all the countries of the West, from Finland to Spain, from Iceland to Italy and from Ireland to Austria, fertility fell between 1920 and the mid-1930s. It then rose again from a date between 1934 and 1939. There was a pause during the war followed by a further increase immediately after the war. It soared in the 1950s but the trend was reversed between 1961 and 1964, marking the beginning of a long decline. The same fluctuations took place in North America and Australia, but five years earlier. Japan, where fertility has simply fallen from over four children to less than two in the few years following the war, has not followed this pattern. Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, a new trend seems to be generating a North-South divide within Western Europe itself.

It seems likely, therefore, that different societies started to evolve together after the first world war. While they undoubtedly retained the differences of level shaped by their past, they were now subject to the same determining factors. At this stage, parallelism would be a more appropriate term than convergence.

The substantial increase in the age at which women have their first child highlights an important development. The period of life separating childhood, and even youth, from the age of parenthood has been extended with the result that people live for longer with their parents, in consensual unions, or continue their education for longer periods in the hope of obtaining a better job. Unemployment has also had an impact. In many Member States, 50% of young people now become settled only after the age of 25. It is only at this age that they have a job, a residence away from the parental home and a relationship with a stable partner. What some people have called a "new age of life" then takes the form more of a time of experimentation than a waiting period, profoundly changing morals and in particular relationships between sexes and the generations. This is likely to produce young Europeans having a profile which differs from that of young Americans, young Eastern Europeans and young Japanese.

The fertility index is very sensitive to calendar variations, i.e. earlier or later marriage and conception - events which provide family formation with its rhythm. It is for this reason that it does not measure the dimension of the family once it has been fully formed. All this makes the concomitant trends in the countries of Western Europe even more surprising. It means that, despite relatively different family structures, these countries have reacted in the same way to historic events. People have curbed or accelerated family formation at the same time. Made prudent by the 1929 crisis, for instance, they postponed conception, but returned to their normal practices five or six years later. In other words, rather than pointing to a convergence of structures, this seems to show that influences and reactions are identical.

Analysis of the European Union therefore shows a community of reactions as regards contraceptive methods, age at marriage and fertility rates, differentiating Member States from other European countries and from the rest of the world.

- 3 - Trends in mortality

Trends in life expectancy and in infant mortality in Europe since 1945 are both constructed around the same scenario. After the war, infant mortality fell to fifty per thousand throughout Northern Europe. It was slightly higher in France, Belgium, Germany, Austria and Italy; and much higher - seventy per thousand - to the East of the Elbe and the South of the Pyrenees. Progress was so rapid in the East that in 1970 the distribution was completely reversed: mortality showed a North-South divide as the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic reached the low levels of the West. Scandinavia and the Netherlands remained at the top with levels lower than fifteen per thousand, whereas the whole of the Southern Europe was behind with levels still over twenty-five per thousand and even close on fifty per thousand in Rumania, and fifty-five per thousand in Portugal.

Table 3

Infant mortality trends (1970-1992) and Life Expectancy in Europe around 1993								
	Infant Mortality rates		Life Expectancy around 1993					
			Male			Female		
	1970	1992	> 73 Years	70-73 Years	< 70 Years	> 79 Years	77-79 Years	< 77 Years
	<i>(per 1000)</i>							
Belgium	21,1	8,2		x		x		
Denmark	14,2	6,6		x			x	
Germany	22,5	6,2		x		x		
Greece	29,6	8,4	x			x		
Spain (1991)	28,1	7,2	x			x		
France	18,2	6,8	x			x		
Ireland	19,5	6,7		x				x
Italy	29,6	8,3	x			x		
Luxembourg	24,9	8,5		x			x	
Netherlands	12,7	6,3	x			x		
Portugal	55,5	9,3		x				x
United Kingdom	18,5	6,6	x					x
Austria	25,9	7,5	x			x		
Finland	13,2	5,2		x		x		
Norway	12,7	5,8	x			x		
Sweden	11,0	5,3	x			x		
Switzerland	15,1	6,4	x			x		
Bulgaria	27,3	15,9			x			x
Czech Rep.	20,2	9,9			x			x
Estonia	17,7	15,8			x			x
Hungary	35,9	14,1			x			x
Lithuania	19,3	16,5			x			x
Poland	33,2	14,5			x			x
Rumania	49,4	23,3			x			x
Slovak Rep.	25,7	12,6			x			x
Slovenia	24,5	8,9		x			x	
Russian Fed.	22,9	17,6						x
Albania (1991)	97,9	32,9						x

Source: Eurostat - non-UE Life Expectancy; Council of Europe

This was followed by a new change of geography: infant mortality started to stagnate in the East whereas it fell rapidly elsewhere. In 1980 the dividing line between East and West was almost as exact as for mean age at marriage or at the birth of the first child. At present, the gap has continued to widen. The same sequence would also be observed if the trend in men's life expectancy or adult mortality were to be monitored.

Consequently the main demographic flows have converged towards the creation of an identity, or rather a specific demographic nature, of Western Europe. The combination of moderate migration and late fertility, leaving aside a mortality differing from that of the East, has led to a development and an age structure specific to the European population. It has a trough, which is specific to Europe, at the base of the age pyramid, a slower demographic growth and much more accentuated ageing than in other developed countries and the East.

TWO CENTURIES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN THE LIFE OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE AREA OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Far-reaching demographic changes take a long time to become established and need several generations before their effects are fully felt. This pseudo-inertia of population trends conceals the substantial changes that have taken place in the main demographic parameters in the recent history of Western countries and in the lives of men and women over the last 200 or 250 years, as the secular progression of these parameters shows.

Overall, life expectancy at birth has increased by at least a factor of 3 (increasing from 25 to 75) and fertility has been divided by a factor of 3 or 4; infant mortality has been reduced by a factor of 25; the duration of life after marriage has more than doubled and the age at which children lose at least one of their parents has increased by 30 years (from 15 to 45).

In other words, behind these relatively stark and not very explicit figures, the conditions of individual life and collective organisation have changed dramatically and have had to be adapted to the new social situations created by demographic change. Living longer does not solely mean gaining years of life, but living in a different way, living longer with parents and grandparents (even though this means inheriting at a later date) or supporting one's partner for a longer period (which may help to explain - to some extent - the increase in divorces). States must also take steps to modify their legislation or organise the relationships between generations in different ways through social, fiscal, health and employment policies.

At the same time, however, while demographic conditions modify economic, social and political conditions, they are not unconnected with or due to external causes, but are the product of the changes in the other main structures of society, such as technology, production methods, social relationships, political ideologies, etc. This means that major sectors of our society develop through complex processes of interdependence and mutual interaction.

Table 4 - Historical changes in the demographic timetable of the European citizen

	In the XVIIIth. century	Around 1945	Around 1992
Average life span(female)	25,0	65,0	80,0
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)	250,0	70,0	7,0
Mean age at first marriage (women)	25,0	24,0	25,0
Number of people surviving at this age (out of 1000 born alive)	450,0	920,0	980,0
Average life span after marriage	25,0	60,0	55,0
Median duration of the couple's common life (not broken up by divorce)	17,0	38,0	46,0
% of marriages broken up by divorce	0,0	10,0	20,0
Number of births per woman	6,5	2,5	1,8
Mean age at which a child becomes fatherless or motherless	15,0	35,0	45,0
Average life span after retirement (at 60 years)	8,0	15,0	23,0

Source: Eurostat

1.4 The variables generating a North-South divide in the Union

While there is little doubt, however, that differences with the East and to a certain extent with America and Japan have become more marked, differences within the Union should not be underestimated. Nothing is more uncertain than the convergence of several independent States towards a shared ethic. Within the overriding trend which is bringing the European Union towards a particular demographic model, there are still very active differences. Some of these have been marked for some years.

- 1 - Recent total fertility patterns

Fertility, after reaching its lowest level, began to rise in some European countries between 1983 and 1987. This rise was not uniform: fertility patterns differed for the first time in the period between the wars. From the second half of the 1980s, fertility increased regularly in Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. There was a smaller recovery in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. In contrast, between 1985 and 1991, it fell in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal. Trends in France, Switzerland and Austria have fluctuated with a drop in France and an increase in Switzerland and Austria.

Whether or not the countries in question are part of the Union, there is therefore a consistent landscape opposing the North and South of Europe. This will shape the future classification of levels of completed fertility. Northern Europe has already outstripped the figures for the West and in particular the South. These observations point to a possible hypothesis: is the divide between the North and the South of the Union, recorded since the 1980s, no more in practice than a symptom of converging demographic behaviour? This difference may well be linked to the different status of women in the respective societies of these two parts of the Union, since it is mainly the variables concerning women that have shaped this divide.

Table 5

	Total fertility rate				
	1960	1970	1980	1990	1992
EUR12	2,61	2,40	1,82	1,54	1,48
Belgium	2,56	2,25	1,68	1,62	1,56
Denmark	2,54	1,95	1,55	1,67	1,76
Germany	2,37	2,03	1,56	1,45	1,30
Greece	2,28	2,39	2,21	1,42	1,39
Spain	2,66	2,90	2,20	1,33	1,23
France	2,73	2,47	1,95	1,78	1,73
Ireland	3,76	3,93	3,23	2,19	2,03
Italy	2,41	2,42	1,64	1,30	1,25
Luxembourg	2,28	1,98	1,49	1,61	1,64
Netherlands	3,12	2,57	1,60	1,62	1,59
Portugal	3,10	2,83	2,18	1,54	1,55
United Kingdom	2,72	2,43	1,90	1,84	1,79

Source: Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994

Table 5

There seems to be a kind of "catching up" as regards women's demographic behaviour, which may ultimately lead to a greater demographic similarity between Member States.

- 2 - Women's work

In all European countries, working women have fewer children than other women. Fertility might well be expected, therefore, to be greatest where the proportion of working women is lowest. In fact, the opposite is true. In Northern Europe, where fertility is rising to levels close to two children per woman, the majority of the female population works between the ages of 20 and 50. In the South, in contrast, where fertility is decreasing and is still around 1.5 children, most women are excluded from the labour market. Rather than explaining this contrast by women's status, we undoubtedly need to look at aspirations.

Should we see this as a short-term reaction or as a long-term and far-reaching change likely to affect the issue of the generations in question? Perhaps the question should not be posed in these terms. The recent trend in fertility seems to show that behaviour can no longer be explained in terms of "calendar" and "intensity", but rather by a combination of both. If, for instance, women in the South, believing that they are not achieving their social aspirations, continue to postpone motherhood, their family aspirations could be curtailed.

Table 6 Several measures regarding the female activity and the family						
	% live births outside marriage 1992 (*)	% of young people not involved in any association	% of young people having found a job thanks to their family	Female activity rates at		
				15-19 Years	20-24 Years	25-29 Years
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
B	11	41	28	7,2	60,6	80,0
DK	46	15	19	64,1	77,6	86,1
D	15	41	21	34,8	72,2	74,3
GR	3	74	69	16,2	51,7	59,6
E	10	67	61	20,9	58,7	66,6
FR	33	59	35	11,0	62,1	78,7
IRL	18	41	33	19,2	69,1	70,9
I	7	54	65	22,3	52,2	60,6
L	13	24	27	23,6	70,4	70,1
NL	12	26	18	43,3	75,0	74,3
P	16	76	58	29,5	64,0	79,7
UK	31	41	28	50,4	72,6	70,5

Source: Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994

Note: (*) B (1989) E (1991)

(2) (3) Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer "Young Europeans in 1990", n°34-2, 1991

(4) Eurostat - Labour Force Surveys 1992

- 3 - Family models

A number of aspects linked to family formation show similar trends. Events which have become commonplace in the North are still peripheral in the South: cohabitation prior to marriage, births outside marriage, frequency of divorce, proportions of single-parent families and reconstituted families.

1.5 Disparities between Member States

Population ageing is a development which is now shared by all developed countries. It is, however, having different demographic and economic effects in the Member States of the European Union. From the demographic point of view, ageing depends on the initial age structures to which it is applied, and these structures vary from one Member State to another. From the economic and financial point of view, the effect of population ageing depends on the ways in which the age-groups which economically define this ageing are managed, on the regulations and legislation on social welfare linked to age (health, pensions, old age) and on the structure of the labour market (length of employment, income levels, rate of participation by age and sex, extent of unemployment). It is not therefore surprising that examination of this trend points to a disparate situation.

We concluded earlier that migration models were converging, in the sense that all Member States have become countries of immigration. The timetable, intensity and composition of migration flows are, however, factors shaping differences between Member States, principally for reasons of geopolitical history.

- 1 - Differential ageing in Member States

Examination of the ageing of structures within the Union highlights two apparently contradictory trends: the current disparity between Member States, shown by different timetables and differences in the intensity of ageing, will lead in fifteen to twenty years' time to more similar relationships of dependence as regards the elderly. These relationships, whatever development hypothesis are taken as a starting point, will undoubtedly grow.

If the extreme groups, i.e. the under-20s and the over-60s, are related to total numbers aged between 20 and 59, the index for the Twelve is 0.82. The index for seven Member States is higher than this EU average. Ireland has the highest index (1.01) largely because its population still has a very young structure, and therefore a substantial proportion of people aged 0 to 19. Portugal, Spain and France, which also have indices higher than the average, are substantially in the same position. In two other Member States, however, the index is higher than the average because of the high proportions of elderly people. These are the United Kingdom and Belgium.

Table 7

Population ageing in 1993, and demographic dependency ratio in 1991				
	Age groups in 1993			Dependency ratio in 1991 (%)
	0-19 ans	20-59 ans	60 ans et +	
EUR12	:	:	:	48,7
Belgium	24,3	54,6	21,1	49,6
Denmark	23,8	56,1	20,1	48,3
Germany	21,5	58,1	20,4	45,3
Greece	24,6	54,6	20,8	49,0
Spain	26,5	53,9	19,6	49,1
France	26,8	53,5	19,7	51,9
Ireland	34,9	49,8	15,3	62,2
Italy	22,6	56,1	21,3	45,1
Luxembourg	23,3	57,5	19,2	44,7
Netherlands	24,6	57,8	17,6	45,2
Portugal	27,4	53,1	19,5	51,6
United Kingdom	:	:	:	53,4

(*) in 1991, $\frac{[0-14] + [65 \text{ and } >]}{[15-64]}$

Source: Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994

Despite the fact that they have the lowest proportions of young people in the Union and elderly people already account for one fifth of their total population, Germany and Italy currently have a smaller burden of demographic dependency because their intermediate population is well represented. In these countries, however, ageing will soon have repercussions from the point of view of dependency. In Luxembourg and Denmark, the larger proportion of young people will delay this development. The demographic effects of ageing are least in the Netherlands where the elderly population is still small (17.6%), the proportion of young people fairly high (24.6%) and demographic dependency is relatively moderate (0.73).

- 2 - The active population

On its own, demographic dependency shows little more than the ratios between age groups. If it is wished to deduce financial dependence from this, i.e. to measure an economic burden, a number of variables defining this dependency need to be added. This work is complex and a large number of statistical indicators cannot be used because they are not available. The most that is possible is to compare the economic burden and the demographic burden by examining differentials among the active population.

In 1992, 150 million people were part of the European Union's active population. Expressed as rates of participation of the over-15s, these figures represent a participation of 67.8% among men and 44% among women. While men's participation in the workforce is similar in extent in all Member States and is generally around 65% or 70%, the same cannot be said of working women and the participation of certain age-groups.

As mentioned above, fewer women in the South of the Union have joined the labour force. Just over one third of these women are economically active, as against close on half, and in some cases such as Denmark even more, in the Northern Member States. Belgium is an exception here, with a women's participation rate which is still below 40%. If these data are to be correctly interpreted, account should be taken of differences between men and women as regards working hours: full time work is the prevailing model for men, whereas part time work is very widespread among women.

Amongst young workers aged 15 to 24, the differences between men and women are less marked. The difference here relates to the intensity of participation in different Member States. The United Kingdom and Denmark stand out because of high rates for both sexes. The same is true of the Netherlands and Germany. Elsewhere, young men's participation is lower than the overall level, and that of women is higher, showing different career paths since women often take a break when families are formed. Among more elderly people, the male-female differences are more sizeable than ever. Differences between men and women in the age groups reaching retirement age and the type of work carried out undoubtedly provide an explanation. There may well be, however, a difference in generational behaviour, in that women presently on the labour market have not adopted the model of their elders and continue to work until older ages.

Marked differences among Member States as regards work and unemployment, may have a substantial impact on our conclusions on the financial impact of demographic ageing.

For instance, in the United Kingdom, demographic dependency due to ageing is one of the highest in the Union: it occupies second place. If account is taken, however, of the high participation rate (76.2%) and the lower level of unemployment (8.9%), the real dependency that can be calculated, placing the United Kingdom in seventh position, is lower than that of Member States which had, however, a younger age structure and a smaller demographic dependency. This is true of Italy, which in terms of demographic dependency was in eighth position in the Union and which, in view of low participation rates (61.8%) and a high unemployment rate (10.1%), is in sixth position from the point of view of its actual dependency.

Table 8

	Dependency ratios in 1991 taking activity into account		
	Activity rates	Unemployment rates	Dependency (7)
EUR12	67,1	8,9	30,9
Belgium	63,0	7,5	35,5
Denmark	83,5	8,9	15,2
Germany	69,6	5,8	23,8
Greece	57,6	7,2	42,7
Spain	58,6	16,4	51,1
France	65,7	9,5	35,5
Ireland	61,7	16,2	58,0
Italy	61,8	10,1	36,0
Luxembourg	75,4	1,6	15,5
Netherlands	67,6	7,1	26,7
Portugal	74,3	4,0	20,8
United Kingdom	76,2	8,9	23,5

Source: Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994

Eurostat - Labour Force Surveys 1992

(7) $[(0-14) + (65 \text{ et } +)/(15-64)]$ active and employed

In conclusion, classification of Member States by level of demographic dependency is completely overturned when the structure of the labour market is taken into account.

- 3 - Specific features as regards stocks and flows of migrants

It is possible to see a certain convergence in the Union in the area of migration since all the Member States have started to receive migrants from increasingly far-off areas over the last twenty or so years. Historical differences have created specific national features in this case as well. The presence of North Africans in France is closely linked to the repercussions of the Algerian war. The presence of Turks in Germany is a result of labour shortages in the post-war period. In the United Kingdom, the presence of Indians and Pakistanis is a result of the Commonwealth.

This difference can also be seen in the rules for obtaining the various nationalities and their application. As will be seen in Chapter 4, however, migration has no impact in practice on the other demographic variables and in particular on demographic flows (fertility, mortality).

1.6 Future development scenarios

We shall conclude with a question: how can the demographic future of the European Union be envisaged? According to the United Nations most recent demographic projections, this future can be summarised as follows:

1. The total population seems unlikely to increase to any great extent (graph 1). A maximum of slightly over 353 million inhabitants will be reached around the year 2005, i.e. an increase of five million people from today. Beyond that date there is likely to be a slow but constant decrease. The Union seems likely to lose approximately half a million people each year, with the result that its population will be the same in 2020 as it is now: 348 million, but with a very different age structure.
2. The number of children aged under fifteen is likely to continue to fall (graph 2), entailing a decrease of between 18% and slightly under 15%.
3. After reaching a maximum of 237 million at the turn of the century, the population aged between 15 and 64 should in turn start to decline (graph 3). Between 1994 and 2020, this trend is likely to be reflected by the loss of 9 million people.
4. The number of elderly people aged over 65 will grow throughout the period of projection (graph 4). In 2020 this age group should include 70 million people, i.e. 18 million people more than today. As a proportion of the total population, it will therefore have increased from 15% to 20%.

Are these forecasts meaningful? Do they not need to be considered with some misgivings? There are two ways of estimating the degree of uncertainty. The first is to compare former projections with the actual population recorded and the second is to compare demographic projections with forecasts based on scenarios.

The accuracy of old projections can be checked in table 9. This table compares the real population in 1980 and 1990 with the forecasts produced by the United Nations 20 years earlier. This shows that the forecasts, in general and in the short term, *under-estimated* growth in the least populated Member States and *over-estimated* it for other Member States. The margins of error of these short-term forecasts have been recorded for Portugal (underestimation of 8.3%) and France (overestimation of 2.3%). In the medium term, *over-estimation* is widespread. The total population of the Union was overestimated by 0.5% in 1980 and 2.9% in 1990.

There is little doubt that this illustration is not representative of the quality of more recent population projections. The quality of forecasts may vary from one period to another. During the 1960s and 1970s, it was very difficult to predict future trends in fertility and forecasts of future levels of immigration are very problematic at present. The conditions under which projections are conducted have also improved: there has been a major improvement in data collection, resources and knowledge of demographic behaviour. Several empirical studies carried out at national level have also shown that projections are more likely to be incorrect for certain age-groups. The size of the population of working age can be predicted with a greater degree of certainty than the size of the population of young people who have not been born and the size of the population of the very old.

This potential for errors makes it necessary to raise a key question: what will demographers of the turn of the century have disregarded? They are no more sheltered from the caprices of History than their predecessors, which bears out the idea that it is time to take demographic forecasting out of its isolation. If it is to be efficient it must be accompanied by forward socio-economic and political studies. It must also take place over the very long term bearing in mind that demographic change goes together with social and political change. This redefinition of demography will obviously make it necessary to produce forecasts for shorter periods or to increase the number of scenarios.

Table 9

Total population: comparison between observed and forecasts figures								
- thousands - 1980 and 1990								
	Observed pop. (thousands)		UN 1973 forecasts (thousands)		Difference between forecasts and observed population			
	1980 (1)	1990 (2)	1980 (3)	1990 (4)	1980 (3) - (1)	1990 (4) - (2)	1980 (3-1)/(1)	1990 (4-2)/(2)
Belgium	9852	9951	10061	10464	209	513	2,1	5,2
Denmark	5123	5140	5104	5238	-19	98	-0,4	1,9
Germany	78304	79365	82023	84188	947	2355	1,2	3,0
GDJ	:	:	17228	17532	:	:	:	:
Greece	9643	10238	9080	9369	-563	-869	-5,8	-8,5
Spain	37542	39272	37209	41041	-333	1769	-0,9	4,5
France	53880	56718	55103	58816	1223	2098	2,3	3,7
Ireland	3401	3503	3298	3658	-103	155	-3,0	4,4
Italy	56434	57023	56319	58677	-115	1654	-0,2	2,9
Luxembourg	364	381	345	350	-19	-31	-5,2	-8,1
Netherlands	14144	14952	14107	15116	-37	164	-0,3	1,1
Portugal	9766	9868	8957	9463	-809	-405	-8,3	-4,1
United Kingdom	56330	57411	57519	59993	1189	2582	2,1	4,5
EUR12	334783	343822	336353	353905	1570	10083	0,5	2,9

Sources: United Nations (1973 forecasts) and Eurostat - Demographic Statistics 1994 (observed populations)

It is precisely in order to introduce this forward study element that the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) has used population scenarios rather than demographic projections. This type of forecast explores the realistic boundaries of future demographic trends and does not aim to produce hypotheses. In other words, scenarios predict substantial uncertainties, whereas projections envisage maximum probability. Eurostat has recently built up, for all Member States, two long-term development scenarios which differ completely from one another, for population by region and for the active population by sex and by age.

The "low" scenario assumes:


- fertility will continue to decline to a level of 1.5 children per woman among recent generations;
- a slight increase in life expectancy to the end of the century, then a levelling off of life expectancy;
- an abrupt fall in immigration levels in the Union. The migration balance is likely to drop from its 1990 level of 1 million to an annual level of 250 000 people;
- the gradual, but less pronounced, continuation of recent trends in participation rates, i.e. an increase for women and a decrease for men.

In the case of international and regional variations, the low scenario assumes that many processes of convergence will stagnate.

The "high" scenario assumes, in contrast, that processes of convergence will continue in the Union. The impact of this convergence is quantified using the following indicators:

- achievement of a generational fertility level of two children per woman;
- continued increase in life expectancy;
- reduction of migration balances to an annual level of 750 000 people after 1994;
- continued growth in women's work and an upturn in men's work to the levels recorded in the second part of the 1970s.

Graph 1 -Trends in total population - EU 1960-2020 (millions)






The results of the forecasts based on these two European Union scenarios show that, in the period 1990-2000:

- The number of teenagers, young adults, and people reaching the age of eighty will undoubtedly fall, while the number of people in their thirties, forties, early fifties, early sixties, seventies and the very old will undoubtedly increase;
- If the present low fertility level continues (low scenario), the number of young children will decrease again, but if it shows an upturn (high scenario), there will be a small-scale baby boom;
- The reduction in the number of young people and very young workers cannot be avoided, and will take place at the same time as numbers of older working people (aged 30 to 55) increase;
- If the low participation rate of the over-55s proves untrue, the oldest group of the active population will ultimately decrease in number; if current trends in these rates are reversed, however, there could be a considerable increase in this category of people.

Uncertainties about the future population increase with time. Whatever the case may be, it is now accepted that during the next twenty-five years the Union will have to take account of an increasing number of elderly people, both young pensioners and the very old. The number of people aged over 50, currently 110 million, will be between 142 and 155 million in 2020.

The population of 20-34-year-olds will probably decrease. Even if the Union recorded a net migration flow of 750 000 immigrants each year (high scenario), the population of working age would decrease by eight million people.

Long-term estimates of groups of children, teenagers and young adults are very dubious. These categories could increase or substantially decrease depending on trends in fertility levels.





Forecast of EU population growth (%) by age

Graph 5: between 1990 and 2000

Graph 6: between 1990 and 2020

(1990 = 100%)



Source: Eurostat


According to the development scenarios for the active population, the number of workers seems set to increase up to the year 2000 in both a pessimistic and an optimistic scenario. This positive trend is due to two events: variations in age structure play the major part, but in some Member States the behavioural effect, i.e. the increase in the number of working women, plays a more substantial part. Over the last five years, for instance, there has been a positive variation in participation in the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg and Belgium largely as a result of the increase in working women.

Evaluations of demographic dependency must in this case take account of this increase in the number of working women as this could absorb a proportion of demographic mishaps.


It needs to be borne in mind, however, as shown in graph 8, that there are major uncertainties about the development of the active population in the long term. There is a twofold uncertainty, relating on the one hand to the development of the population structure and, on the other hand, to that of participation in economic activity. This uncertainty is particularly marked among working people aged over 60.

Forecast of working population growth in the EU (%) by age

Graph 7: between 1900 and 2000 (1900 = 100%)



Graph 8: between 1900 and 2020 (1900 = 100%)



Source: Eurostat

In the equation balancing workers and non-workers, a differentiation needs to be made between economically useful workers, their degree of usefulness and the length of this usefulness. At this point, we will merely observe that intergenerational balances are threatened and that their development will be based on the combination of three factors: increase in women's work, continuation of men's work, increase in "useful" work. For this purpose, it is not just the job supply that needs to support this growth, but solutions also need to be found, in the case of women's work, so that the family is no longer an obstacle to work.

Chapter 1

Key points for further consideration

1. The European Union's demographic size, which places it at the top of the developed countries and in third position in the world, makes it one of the major players on the world scene. From a geo-political point of view, it is a key axis for the populations surrounding it, whether in the Mediterranean basin or in the centre and east of Europe. These two regions of the world are encountering problems of various economic, social and political types and the Union has a key role to play in helping these regions to develop and become genuine trading and political partners of the Union.
2. As part of the developed world, the European Union has not evolved in the same way as its partners. In comparison with North America and Australia, the Union has managed to provide its citizens with a better quality of life, as the indicators relating to mortality, life expectancy and infant mortality show. In comparison with Japan, it has given its citizens a more egalitarian status, by offering, for instance, more equal opportunities for men and women. It is therefore important for the Union to maintain its principles of social protection and equal opportunities, despite the new demographic trends and in particular population ageing.
3. There is some convergence of demographic behaviour within EU Member States, although differences in level are continuing as a result of timelags. The mobility of European Union citizens has changed character since movement is now free and no longer generates mass migration. All the Member States have become host countries for non-EU citizens. Mortality has fallen everywhere in the European Union and the differences which existed even ten years ago have levelled out. Mortality and migration have a direct link with the economic situation.
4. According to the scenarios of demographic development that have been put forward, continued convergence or a stagnation of this process would both have a major impact on the future structure and size of the Union population. These scenarios need to be refined and produced in larger numbers so that the effects of the different parameters can be measured independently.

CHAPTER II

TRENDS IN AGE STRUCTURES

Despite timelags, there seems to be some convergence in overall demographic trends within the European Union. This is true of mortality profiles which are all moving in the direction of increased life expectancy; it is true of fertility where, despite calendar variations, differences between Member States are being reduced in terms of completed fertility and it is also true of migration which is not having a significant effect on population anywhere.

When these developments are applied, however, to different age structures, they may produce a marked disparity between Member States as regards the ratios between people belonging to different age-groups and as regards the size of these groups. Many aspects of our economic, social and political organisation are rightly based on age: compulsory education, legal age of majority, right to work, retirement, financial benefits for certain public services, etc. The active population is also recruited from an age-group which may well be large but is relatively demarcated. If the balance between the active population and the non-active population is lost, other balances which depend on it, in particular the financial balance, may well be affected.

The aim of this chapter is to update current and predicted age structures for Member States, to clarify the demographic mechanisms which have led to these structures and to sketch out the longer-term challenges that the modifications of this age structure entail for the European Union.

2.1 Age structures in the European Union

Like most Western countries, the European Union is recording a rise in all the indicators pointing to the ageing of its age structures. As, however, an "ageing" population structure is not necessarily a population with an old structure, it is useful to bear in mind some of the mechanisms intrinsic to the ageing process before attempting any analysis.

2.1.1 The ageing of structures

Demographic ageing is no more than a transformation of the age structures of a population. While its mechanisms are relatively complex, it is relatively simple to describe. It entails a situation in which the older age-groups are increasing in proportional terms to the younger age-groups; in other words, where the average age of the population as a whole is increasing.

Sometime after it has started, demographic ageing is accompanied by an increase in the absolute number of elderly people, but at the beginning of the process, when the birth rate is falling and the number of children decreasing, the number of elderly people does not necessarily increase, even if the proportion of the total population for which they account does increase.


This is no longer the case in the European Union: nowadays, most ageing parameters are developing in a similar way: increase in the number of elderly people - especially the very elderly - in absolute terms and as a percentage, and in the average age of the total population and of the main age-groups (adults and the elderly). This, as will be seen below, is a sign that ageing is well and truly underway and that it will continue in the long term whatever changes take place in the younger age-groups.

2.1.2 The mature structure of the European Union: review and prospects

- 1 - The age pyramid - an increasingly narrow base

Graphique 9

B-2 AGE PYRAMID - EUR 12 - 1.1.1993



It might be wondered whether the term "age pyramid" is in keeping with the situation of the Union population, especially as it is now far from the triangular shape which gave it its name.

It has a narrow base as a result of the relatively low fertility levels of the Union. The most numerous age-groups are currently the 20-39-year-olds who account for 29.8% of the total population. In future, however, the 40-59-year-olds will become the largest group. This is important from the point of view of the structure of the active population.

The apex of this pyramid shows the arrival of larger numbers among the oldest age-groups (60 and over). The magnitude of this age-group becomes increasingly evident if it is related to the younger groups (0-19). There is a ratio of four elderly people to five young people (which ratio is likely to increase in the future). Within the elderly group, moreover, the ratio of those aged 80 and over to those aged 60-79 is 1 to 5. This also seems set to increase, when larger groups reach the age of 80.

Over and above the ageing of the population reflected by the increase in the proportion of those aged 60 and over, there is currently, therefore, a second ageing within the group of the elderly where the over-80s are increasing in proportional terms.

Table 10

Population by broad age groups and by sex on 1.1.1993, and some ageing indicators				
	male		female	
				Total
0-19	12,5		11,9	24,4
20-59	27,9		27,5	55,4
20-39		15,7		15,1
40-59		12,3		12,3
60+	8,3		11,9	20,2
60-79		7,2		9,3
80+		1,1		2,6
Mean age of EU population				38 years
Ageing ratio (60+) / (0-19)				0,83
Dependency ratio ((0-19) + (60+)) / (20-59)				0,81
Old active/young active ratio (40-59) / (20-39)				0,80
Ageing intensity (80+) / (60-79)				0,22

Source: Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994

One fact is evident: "bottom-up" ageing due principally to the decrease in the birth rate, which has long been predominant, is gradually being replaced by "top-down" ageing due to an increase in life expectancy to very old ages. All the structural "mishaps" due to historic events (wars, crises and/or short-term fluctuations of demographic parameters) leave their mark on the pyramid long after they have taken place.

- 2 - Stable dependency ratios, but a significant ageing of the active population

Most demographic ageing coefficients, i.e. indicators through which it is possible to measure its different dimensions, progress during the period 1950-2025. The progression is slow for some and rapid for others and reflects the extent of the changes in balances due to ageing. These indicators are based on a notion of economic burden, linked to actual management practices in our societies.

The ratio of the elderly (60+) to the young (<20) is the most rapid trend, but is reversed as regards the coefficient of dependency which starts to decrease after the year 2000.

In contrast, this population of working age is likely to undergo increased internal ageing: starting at the beginning of the 1990s, this ageing will increase substantially over the next fifteen years. The gradual entry of the *baby-boomers*, i.e. the age-groups of the post-war period, into working life and soon retirement, is therefore having its initial impact. It is this that will contribute to a substantial increase in ageing from the next century onwards. The generations born between 1945 and 1965, whose numbers are in some cases 30% higher than those of the generations preceding or following them, will reach retirement age between 2000 (in the case of those retiring early) and 2025 (in the case of those retiring later) with a peak around 2015. The financial burden of these surplus non-workers will therefore weigh more heavily on the smaller number of workers.

This "knock-on" effect of the *baby-boomers* is also incontrovertible and measurable, since the protagonists are already on the scene and their chances of survival are known with some accuracy.


Lastly, there is an "ageing within ageing", i.e. the proportion of the over-80s to 60 to 80-year-olds will really start to increase over the next few years.

These overall data for the Union, however, may be shaped by compensatory effects among Member States; it is therefore necessary to look at the situation in each of these Member States.


*** Graphs 10 - 11

Trends in some ageing indicators
from 1960 to 1990, and from 1995 to 2020
according to Eurostat scenarios

Graph 10: Total dependency ratio and Elderly dependency ratio



Graph 11: Ageing coefficient and Intensity of ageing



Sources: Eurostat

2.1.3 Disparities between Member States

- 1 - Age pyramids with very different shapes

The profiles of the age pyramids of Member States are not at all identical (see the annexed age pyramids for Member States).

Ireland has the most "conventional" and also the youngest structure, even if the initial two age-groups have been pointing to a fall in the birth rate for ten years or so. Spain and Portugal also have fairly uniform structures where a baby boom effect is not very visible. This confirms that the timetable of "top-down" ageing will come later in the countries of the South (including Greece) than in the countries of the North. Curiously, it is the Mediterranean countries which have been in top position as regards "bottom-up" ageing for some ten years or so with a sharp decline in the birth rate.

Germany has the most irregular pyramid as a result of its turbulent history (wave of births after the war followed by a wave of massive immigration in the 1950s).

The French pyramid shows that it has had the longest period of high fertility and that the decline in fertility has been lower and slower than among its neighbours. The Dutch pyramid shows one of the greatest contrasts due to variations in the birth rate between 1945 and 1965.

In the United Kingdom, the *baby boom* reached a peak of births in 1965, which will help to delay the time at which the repercussions of the baby boom on ageing will be felt.


The imbalances between the sexes at older ages are particularly marked in Germany and Belgium.

- 2 - Ageing coefficients

Examination of a number of indices measuring the nature of ageing takes further account of the differences between Member States. This is of particular interest, as each of these indices is associated with consequences that are specific to it.

The ageing coefficient relates the oldest to the youngest. It evaluates the demographic situation, by measuring whether and to what extent ageing is likely to increase, hence its name. This indicator shows a clear-cut line between four groups: (1) Member States in which the indicator is low, where the older age-groups clearly eclipse the new generations are, in order, Germany, Belgium and Italy; (2) Member States where this situation is not so pronounced, but is on the point of becoming pronounced because fertility trends are not being reversed, are Denmark, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and Greece; (3) four Member States - Spain, Portugal, France and the Netherlands - have better balanced numbers of the oldest age-groups; (4) the situation in Ireland differs as its younger generations are strongly represented.

The dependency ratio is not used to find out about a demographic future, but rather an immediate economic weight. As the term and the categories are not chosen at random, it attempts to compare "non-workers", i.e. those who have not yet reached working age (0-19) and those who are no longer working (60+), with "workers", or at least those who are of a working age (20-59). The index has to be viewed with caution as it is based on only one of the variables which play a part in real economic dependency. It measures, to a substantial extent, the structure of the active population (unemployment, women's work) or the structure of financial transfers (social security payments, income levels). The larger the gaps between Member States in these areas, the less comparable the dependency ratios are. The Union is currently in this situation with the result that care has to be taken in interpreting this ratio. Another weakness is that the indicator does not take account of a possible difference of "economic burden" between the youngest and the oldest generations. This makes it possible to illustrate a situation, unrealistic it is true, but very convincing, of two population structures whose dependency ratios are identical.



These few considerations highlight the need to comment on dependency ratios in the Member States in the light of other indicators that have already been analysed. It is only in this way that it is possible to interpret the Irish ratio, by far the largest, as due to a large extent to the dependency of young people. It can also be seen that higher proportions of elderly people are exerting greater pressures on Belgium and Italy than on Germany, because Germany has a higher proportion of people of working age. It can also be seen that dependency is accentuated in Member States which do not have the most significant ageing: Portugal, France, United Kingdom, Spain and Greece.

Whatever the case may be, the figures are clear: there is no mechanical, one-way link between demographic ageing and economic burdens with the result that refinements need to be introduced into the age-groups and a number of other variables need to be included.

Finally, the intensity of ageing is measured by the ratio of people aged over 80 to those who are younger but already retired (60 to 79). The Member State having the largest proportion of the very elderly is France. This proportion is lowest in Portugal. The differences between Member States, currently low, will become more explicit over the next few decades. France, Germany and the United Kingdom, i.e. those Member States which currently have the largest proportions of the very elderly, could well be overtaken, in particular by Greece and Italy, in the next twenty years.

2.2 The causes of ageing

Demographic ageing is not true of all populations. For centuries, even millennia, demographic evolution was not reflected by any significant ageing of populations, the proportion of elderly people remaining at levels which were insignificant in practice (less than 5% for the over-65s). It is also true that the birth and death rates have hardly evolved at all during most of the history of humanity, reaching a ceiling at very high levels of relative balance.

Demographic ageing could start to soar only when the Western demographic transition started, paving the way for a movement away from a traditional demographic system with high mortality and fertility rates towards a "modern" system where these variables are low. The history of demographic ageing is therefore relatively recent. In Europe, it dates back no more than two centuries in countries where this transition started early and no more than one century for those where the transition came later.

Table 11

Some ageing indicators by Member State on 1st January 1993								
	Broad age groups				Mean age	Demographic ratios		
	0-19 (Y)	20-59 (A)	60+ (O)	80+ (VO)		Ageing (O/Y)	Depend. (Y+O)/(A)	Ageing intens. (VO)/(O)
Belgium	24,3	54,7	21,1	3,7	38,57	0,87	0,83	0,17
Denmark	23,8	56,1	20,1	3,9	38,80	0,85	0,78	0,19
Germany	21,5	58,1	20,4	3,9	39,48	0,95	0,72	0,19
Greece	24,6	54,6	20,8	3,4	38,75	0,85	0,83	0,16
Spain	26,5	54,0	19,6	3,0	37,32	0,74	0,85	0,15
France	26,8	53,8	19,7	4,0	37,37	0,74	0,87	0,20
Ireland	34,9	49,9	15,3	2,4	33,36	0,44	1,01	0,16
Italy	22,6	56,2	21,3	3,6	39,31	0,94	0,78	0,17
Luxembourg	23,3	57,6	19,2	3,3	38,09	0,82	0,74	0,17
Netherlands	24,6	57,8	17,6	3,0	37,07	0,72	0,73	0,17
Portugal	27,4	53,1	19,5	2,7	37,26	0,71	0,88	0,14
United Kingdom	24,3	53,5	22,2	3,8	38,11	0,91	0,87	0,17

Source: Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994

Note: Y = Young A = Adult O = Old VO = Very Old

Table 12

TABLE 12

Percentage of the EU population aged 80 and over in the total population (TP) and among the over 60-s												
	<u>1960</u> 80 + /TP	<u>1960</u> 80 + /60 +	<u>1980</u> 80 + /TP	<u>1980</u> 80 + /60 +	<u>2000</u> 80 + /TP Low	<u>2000</u> 80 + /60 + Low	<u>2000</u> 80 + /TP High	<u>2000</u> 80 + /60 + High	<u>2020</u> 80 + /TP Low	<u>2020</u> 80 + /60 + Low	<u>2020</u> 80 + /TP High	<u>2020</u> 80 + /60 + High
Belgium	1,8	10,5	2,6	14,1	3,5	15,9	3,5	16,2	4,9	18,4	5,5	21,4
Denmark	1,6	10,4	2,8	14,6	4,1	20,2	4,1	20,6	4,2	16,1	4,6	18,6
Germany	1,5	9,0	2,7	14,0	3,3	14,6	3,4	15,1	5,2	18,7	6,0	22,6
Greece	1,3	11,0	2,3	13,3	3,7	15,5	3,7	15,9	5,5	21,1	6,1	24,6
Spain	1,2	9,4	1,7	11,3	3,5	16,5	3,5	16,9	4,9	19,3	5,4	23,3
France	2,0	11,8	3,0	17,5	3,4	16,9	3,4	17,2	4,9	19,2	5,4	21,8
Ireland	1,9	12,2	1,9	12,5	2,7	17,1	2,7	17,6	3,1	13,6	3,1	16,4
Italy	1,3	9,7	2,2	12,7	3,5	15,3	3,6	15,7	5,9	20,7	6,5	24,0
Luxembourg	1,6	9,9	1,9	11,0	3,2	15,4	3,1	15,6	4,5	16,9	4,5	19,9
Netherlands	1,4	10,4	2,3	14,4	3,2	17,7	3,2	17,0	4,0	15,6	4,3	18,0
Portugal	1,2	10,3	1,4	9,5	3,2	15,8	3,2	16,1	4,3	18,6	4,8	22,1
United Kingdom	1,9	11,2	2,7	13,5	4,0	19,5	4,0	19,7	4,3	17,7	4,9	20,4
EUR12	1,6	10,3	2,5	13,9	3,5	16,4	3,5	16,7	4,9	18,9	5,5	22,0

Source: Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994

2.2.1 Falling fertility, responsible for "bottom-up" ageing

While falling fertility is an important historical factor, it has not been continuous in the post-war period. An initial period during which ageing slowed down as a result of the upturn in fertility between 1945 and 1965 (the *baby boom*) was followed by a period of intensification linked to the massive decline in fertility from 1965 to the present, with a slight trend towards a levelling off or upturn since the 1990s. Chapter 3 gives detailed data on fertility and analyses these data.

Future trends in fertility are very uncertain and it is not yet clearly known whether it will stabilise, whether and to what extent it will start to increase, or whether it will fall again after a short recovery. At present, the most likely hypothesis - or in any case the hypothesis put forward most frequently - seems to be a gradual stabilisation around a threshold which is not far from the generation replacement level (for instance 1.8 or 1.9 children per woman), which would limit, but would not completely eliminate, the impact of fertility on ageing.

2.2.2 Continuing increases in life expectancy, or "top-down" ageing

The decline in mortality, or more precisely its age structure, points to another cause of ageing. This decline affects the top of pyramid as increasing numbers of the oldest people continue to survive.

- 1 - Life expectancy: general increase and convergence of levels in the Union

The second cause of ageing is the increase in average life span and in particular in life expectancy at adult ages. In the European Union, these two developments are part of a continuation of the first epidemiological transition, when deaths due to infectious diseases declined sharply, which ended everywhere in Western Europe around 1950 or 1960. This first epidemiological transition was followed by a new period of declining mortality due, this time, to changes in lifestyles and advances in the treatment of organic degenerative diseases (cancer, cardiovascular diseases).

In the second quarter of the 20th century, life expectancy on birth differed by ten years between the least favoured Member States and the others. In the Southern Member States (Spain, Greece and Portugal), life expectancy on birth was just over 50 for women, but was well over 60 in Denmark and the Netherlands for both men and women.

Member States which had lagged behind in the past made up for this delay during the 1970s. They are now among the leaders. In sixty years, therefore, Spanish women gained a further life expectancy of 30 years, whereas Danish women, whose gain in life expectancy came earlier, only achieved half of this figure.

The 1970s were a period of major progress for men and women in all Member States. This trend shows that declining mortality is the result of a process involving a complex interaction of biological factors and the environment, helped by the methods of socio-economic organisation of societies.

Nowadays in the Europe of Twelve, life expectancy is 72.9 years for men and over 79 for women, tending towards a gain of one additional year approximately every four years.

- 2 - Future prospects for increased life span

There is some uncertainty about increasing longevity. There may be surprises in store which may belie many of the current forecast hypotheses which are rather pessimistic as regards a future decline in mortality. If the rate of decline observed since the 1980s were to continue or speed up, and average life span was, for instance, around ninety years within the next thirty or forty years, ageing would then make considerable progress and would exceed all the current demographic forecasts for 2025 or 2050.

The potential progression of viral epidemics such as AIDS, or increases in morbidity linked to increasing pollution and environmental damage seems, however, to urge caution.

What do the figures show? The continuing decline in mortality at very old ages even in Member States which have relatively low levels, in particular France, tends to suggest that further reductions of mortality are still possible.

This also seems to be borne out by the absence of a concentration of deaths at very old ages around a limit threshold.

Deaths at high ages are still very dispersed. At present there seems to be nothing to prevent the gain of an additional year of life, at least in the short term, every 3 to 4 years as is the case at present.

Table 13

Life expectancy at several ages in the member States of the EU, in 1991			
		Male	Female
Belgium	E0	72,8	79,5
	E40	35,0	41,0
	E65	14,2	18,6
	E75	8,5	11,1
Denmark	E0	72,5	78,0
	E40	34,7	39,3
	E65	14,3	17,9
	E75	8,7	11,1
Germany	E0	72,1	78,7
	E40	34,4	40,1
	E65	14,2	17,8
	E75	8,3	10,5
Greece	E0	74,6	79,8
	E40	36,9	41,2
	E65	15,7	18,1
	E75	9,5	10,6
Spain	E0	73,3	80,5
	E40	36,1	42,0
	E65	15,3	19,1
	E75	9,2	11,2
France	E0	72,9	81,1
	E40	35,7	42,7
	E65	15,7	20,1
	E75	9,5	12,2
Ireland	E0	72,2	77,7
	E40	34,3	39,0
	E65	13,4	16,9
	E75	7,8	10,0
Italy	E0	73,6	80,3
	E40	36,0	41,6
	E65	15,0	18,9
	E75	8,9	11,2
Luxembourg	E0	72,0	79,1
	E40	34,9	40,8
	E65	14,6	18,6
	E75	8,8	11,2
Netherlands	E0	74,0	80,1
	E40	35,8	41,4
	E65	15,4	19,0
	E75	8,6	11,4
Portugal	E0	70,7	77,5
	E40	34,4	39,5
	E65	14,3	17,2
	E75	8,2	9,7
United Kingdom	E0	73,2	78,6
	E40	35,2	39,9
	E65	14,2	17,8
	E75	8,6	10,9
EUR12	E0	72,9	79,5
	E40	35,3	40,9
	E65	14,7	18,5
	E75	8,8	11,1

Source: Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994

Table 14

Life expectancy in year 2020 according to different forecasts in a selection of member States										
	United Nations 1994		Eurostat (High scénario)		Eurostat (Low scénario)		Case and Egidi 1991		National statistical institutes	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Denmark	75,5	81,2	77,5	82,0	72,5	78,0	74,6	80,2	72,2	77,7
France	76,9	83,6	78,0	84,5	73,5	81,5	75,7	85,4	78,0	86,5
Italy	78,5	84,3	79,0	84,0	74,5	81,0	78,1	84,5	:	:
Netherlands	77,6	83,2	78,5	83,5	74,0	80,5	77,0	87,2	76,0	81,5
Portugal	75,5	82,0	77,5	82,5	72,5	79,0	76,4	82,6	:	:

2.3 The economic and social impact of ageing

The prospect of an increased life span for everyone has changed attitudes and behaviour. The social need for procreation for the purposes of group reproduction is no longer a collective constraint. Work no longer occupies more than a small part of the life capital available. Free time and leisure are taking its place. Savings and investments can be made over much longer periods and used to finance long-term projects with little risk of compromise by an early death.

These considerations bear out the idea that the ageing of populations is not simply a demographic matter but, more than a simple modification of age structures, has become an overall problem of society. It has more, further reaching and more subtle implications than has long been supposed. Over and above the very real questions raised by this development in the area of family policy, of financial balance between the generations and of differential systems for financing pensions, it needs to be tackled from a forward-looking and dynamic point of view. In this section we shall look at some key areas in which the main issues of ageing in the Union are having an impact.

2.3.1 Profound change in the life cycle: more free time

Birth-education-work-death was for long the fate of most men and women. Nowadays, birth and death still bound the human adventure, but the time interval which separates them has become much greater with a long period of inactivity prior to death. Education now lasts longer than ever. The most change has taken place as regards work, whose nature and intensity have been transformed.

In slightly over a century, the working hours of an urban manual worker in industrialised countries has fallen from approximately 4000 hours per year, without a free evening, without a weekend, without holidays and without retirement, to approximately 1600 hours with free time which overtook working time between 1975 and 1985. This development is not just linked to periods of prosperity as it has continued during periods of recession as well. This change in working practices is no more than the result of a far-reaching technological, economic, social and ultimately cultural revolution.


It is not therefore unreasonable to put forward the hypothesis that, as past trends continue, working hours will be reduced in the future in one of three conventional ways: reduction of daily or weekly hours, increase in holiday periods, reduction of the number of working years. Assuming 30 hours per week, 40 weeks per year and 33 years of working life, provided that the male life span has reached 80 by this time, working time would account for only 6% of the total life span. The result would be an increase of some 53% in free time.

Demographic ageing therefore raises the fundamental structural implications, even greater in the longer term, of the technological progress that we have generated making it necessary rapidly to find ways of adapting our attitudes, behaviour, institutions and methods of organisation to this evolution.

It is very inviting when anticipating the future, on the basis of current ageing, to put forward very daring hypotheses such as a future life cycle where a new period devoted solely to the family would take its place between "education time" and work time. This free time also opens up major prospects for continuing training and leisure.

At present, however, ageing is presenting society with two immediate and considerable challenges: how to maintain economic performance with a smaller and older labour force and how to ensure the same level of social protection for increasing numbers of social security claimants with greater chances of survival.

Graph 12
Trends in the use of time from 1900 to 1990, and according to a forward scenario



2.3.2 Organisation of the labour market

The relationship between population and employment covers two questions: the correspondence between volume of employment and workers and the correspondence between types of employment and workers' qualifications. The structure of the labour market (workers, non-workers, unemployed people, nature of jobs, etc.) depends on these balances. If one of these parameters is modified, the whole equilibrium of the system is affected.

- 1 - Relationship between numbers of workers and volume of employment

It may be said in practice that employment/population imbalances are a constant phenomenon, since it is true that the labour market and the labour force are continuously changing. History often shows considerable divergences in this area. In the post-war period, several Western States had to call upon large numbers of foreign workers to make up for the local labour force deficit. What is new, however, is the present nature of the imbalance and possibly its extent. There is a shortage of work rather than a shortage of workers, and therefore an imbalance caused in the first instance by economic factors rather than as a consequence of demographic factors.


Nobody would deny, however, that demographic developments make these imbalances more worrying, but instead of merely blaming the inability to finance the age risk on a lack of income, it would be better to attack the roots of the problem. Job creation has to be seen as a priority objective in this area. At the same time, it may be useful to examine the distribution of resources between all the social partners, in societies which are continuing to become more wealthy, and to rethink the economic and social usefulness of the growing category of the population formed by the elderly.

At the same time, a way of making work more flexible needs to be found.

Graph 13 - Trends in the working population by age, 1990-2020, EUR12, according to Eurostat scenarios


Graph 13-A: Low scenario

Working population 1990-2020 EU (Low scenario)



Graph 13-B: High scenario

Working population 1990-2020 EU (High scenario)




Source: Eurostat

This is the root of the problem: the total amount of work available is tending to decrease as technical progress is made; new activities with a high concentration of human capital are not offsetting losses of employment due to more intense automation. These activities could, for instance, be in the field of information and communications technologies, where research and development require major investments of human time.

Most experts foresee a decrease in the volume of employment. The consequences of this can only be offset by a reduction of working hours (whether daily, weekly or annual). The active population will continue to increase up to the next millennium at least, as a result of the entry of the *baby boomers* into the labour market and the potential increase in the numbers of working women. There is therefore likely to be more pressure on employment in future years.

In the past, men's participation rates were around 100% at all ages of working life between 15 and 65 and slightly less in the extreme age-groups (15-19 and 60-64). This situation was still true around 1950, but since then the profiles of the participation curves have changed substantially: while men's participation in economic activity is still maximum at the central ages (between 25 and 50), there has been a very substantial decrease in participation among young and elderly adults: this is due, on the one hand, to longer periods of education and training which may continue in some cases to the age of 25 and, on the other hand, to the effects of the lowering (in some countries such as France) of the statutory age of retirement or the implementation of early retirement programmes as well as a general lowering of the actual age at which people give up work, which is becoming earlier and earlier in many countries.


These practices have substantially modified peoples' life cycles. During the 1950s or 1960s, many Europeans had a working life of approximately 45 years with 15 years of retirement, whereas today they are more likely to work for 35 to 40 years and be retired for 20 to 25 years; the ratio has fallen from three to one to two to one or less.



Working lives are not only shorter nowadays, but increasingly erratic with alternating periods of work and unemployment and periods of retraining and redeployment. This is not without an impact on workers' ability to accumulate old-age capital or pension rights on a par with those available to current beneficiaries.

For some years there has been a substantial increase in the number of women on the labour market. At present the curve of women's participation rates in Europe is very similar to the curve for men except that there is a timelag at the bottom and a more rapid outflow after 40. The negative curve between 15 and 30, reflecting the effects of marriage and fertility, has disappeared and has been replaced by a very marked upward trend.


Graph 15 - Activity rate by age, EU, 1992 and 2020



Source: Eurostat - Community Labour Force Surveys

Entry into the static category of the "over-60s" does not mean that everyone stops work everywhere. The statutory ages at which people can retire still vary considerably from one country to another and departure from the labour market may be later in some professions or in some sectors of activity.

Approximately 6 300 000 of the over-60s work in the European Union, including 4 300 000 men and 2 000 000 women. Most people working in the services (over 50% of women) and employees continue to work beyond 60. Among the over-60s still working, however, the proportion of employers and the self-employed is higher than in the remainder of the active population.

Graph 16
Percentage of EU working population by age groups - 1992

These workers are not affected by the statutory age of retirement and can freely continue to work to an elderly age. A breakdown by sectors of activity shows that the same is true of farmers, who are proportionally more numerous after the age of 60 than before. Lastly, part-time work is more widespread amongst elderly workers than among the young (5 times more among men and 1.6 times among women).

- 2 - Correspondence between types of employment and workers' qualifications

If the total population is ageing, it is evident that the active population is also ageing. This conclusion is often put forward as one of the main sources of concern and problems. Is an older labour force more of a handicap from the point of view of economic performance than a younger labour force? Many arguments would seem to bear this out: larger numbers of elderly workers cost more in a system where salary scales are linked to age; these same workers will have many handicaps: reduced productivity and geographical and professional mobility, less ability to adapt to new technologies and greater absenteeism due to illness and disability.

These arguments are less and less in keeping with the current situation of 40-to-60-year-old workers. They can be counterbalanced by arguments that are just as valid: the ageing of the labour force increases the average qualification level of the active population because workers are more experienced, thereby reducing the costs of training and apprenticeship.

This still leaves, however, the question of the balance between employment and population. Drawing more sophisticated conclusions from the demographic parameter alone would not be very credible or meaningful. Analysis has to be based on a larger number of empirical variables, not just demographic but economic and social as well, and should be able to measure their correlations. The juxtaposition of two data is not just inadequate in this case, but dangerous as well. A resolutely forward-looking view also needs to be adopted, as the current situation is based on a past employment model which differs substantially from that of the future as regards working hours, professional life cycle, nature of work, capitalization as well as accumulated rights. Using a simplifying strategy would simply impede the quest for more comprehensive solutions within the framework of integrated age and employment policies.

2.3.3 Social protection expenditure

The arrival of larger numbers of claimants having greater chances of survival will inevitably step up the volume of social protection expenditure.

- 1 - Financing of retirement pensions

The financing of retirement pensions is generally seen as the key problem raised by population ageing. It immediately raises two questions: despite increasing numbers of claimants and decreasing numbers of contributors, can old-age insurance systems continue to operate as in the past? Which is more in keeping with the new pressures exerted by ageing: financing based on a principle of distribution or financing based on a principle of capitalisation?

The demographic dimension of the financing of retirement pensions is only one aspect of the problem. Developments such as slower economic growth and increasing unemployment, which reduce income and increase burdens, are more directly "responsible" for the increased cost of social security. This has been demonstrated by studies carried out at national level which have evaluated the purely demographic burden of ageing in a distribution system.

In the debate on systems of financing retirement pensions, demographers are often asked whether it is preferable, during a period of population ageing, to use a capitalisation rather than a pay-as-you-go system.

The potential risks of this kind of development are immediately evident: basic schemes may gradually be prevented from adjusting to trends in the cost of living index so that supplementary schemes can take up the baton in the interests of the financial survival of these protection systems to which we are so attached.

The risk, in other words, is of recreating a very substantial divide within the retired population: on the one hand, those who have been able to acquire solid supplementary personal pensions or have done so through enterprises or professional associations and, on the other hand, those who will have to make do with a basic pension based on an "old-age minimum" which is increasingly remote from the average levels of workers' pay.


Some economists have argued that this debate is wide of the mark for another reason: the idea that the use of capitalisation makes it possible to offset the "lack of young people" due to ageing. From a macro-economic point of view, the financial saving offered by capitalisation has a basic corollary: over time, when the generations of workers who have made capital savings enter retirement, they need to realise the assets which they have accumulated. The only people to whom they can go for this purpose is the group of people who are still working, i.e. the younger generations. Market laws mean that the demand from younger generations, fewer in number, for these assets capitalised by their elders may be smaller and may lead to depreciation. Capitalisation does not therefore resolve the demographic imbalance, as it is impossible, from the point of view of the global economy, to store up purchasing power.

- 2 - Social expenditure on the elderly


Have elderly people become the main beneficiaries of public social expenditure under redistribution mechanisms, in particular pensions and health care? The proportion of social expenditure for which they account is undoubtedly much greater than their demographic size (between 35 and 45%), but this age-group is also the most delicate and the most threatened. The proportion allocated to adults (15-64) is also far from negligible and may be as much as 50% (as in Italy).

Social protection expenditure accounts for a very substantial proportion of European States' budgets. This heading includes various types of protection, such as protection against sickness and disability or old-age which are by far the most important items, but also unemployment insurance, family allowances and maternity benefits and housing benefit. In 1992, each European citizen received on average the equivalent of ECU 4348 although the differences between countries are in some cases, in absolute terms, approximately 1 to 4.

Graph 17-A




Graph 17-B



In the Union, the two main functions of "old age" and "health" account alone for 80% of social protection expenditure. Family allowances and even unemployment allowances come well behind old age and health, representing six times less in percentage terms.

Graph 17-C



Source: Eurostat

The growth of the social protection/GDP ratio slowed down considerably during the 1980s after the rapid increase of the 1970s. In some European countries the trend seems for some years to have been towards stabilisation (Belgium, Denmark) or towards a reduction (Germany). Nevertheless, there are still substantial differences between Member States because those States in which social protection was less developed have started to catch up (Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal) with respect to those where major progress had already been made (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark).

A final question needs to be raised. Is the increasing proportion of elderly people likely to generate an increase in health costs? Although studies have demonstrated that the consumption of health care actually increases with age, there is not enough data at present to measure the impact of ageing on health costs with any accuracy. The information available is not broken down by the age of beneficiaries and shows only overall costs. Health expenditure, moreover, depends on State regulations that define beneficiaries, on the types of benefits financed and on the amounts of these benefits. A decrease or an increase in health expenditure is more likely to be caused by these factors than by demographic development per se.

It may be wondered, however, whether demographic development will rapidly lead to a demand for new social protection services. The ageing of age structures goes together with changes in family models and increasing numbers of working women. The traditional suppliers of care within the family then become less available.

2.3.4 Economic and social situation of pensioners

- 1 - Standards of living and sources of income

Wages and pay account for only a small proportion of the total resources of elderly people (between 5 and 20%). Old-age pensions and other retirement benefits, whether public, professional or private, are the most substantial source of income and range from 70% to 95% or more in different Member States.

In the Union as a whole, the mean retirement pension represents approximately 60% of the GDP per inhabitant and pensioners can expect a pension giving a net replacement of 40 to 100% (depending on the country) of the average salary of an employee.

These figures mask, however, major disparities, not only between countries, but within the same Member State between different social categories. It should be borne in mind that it is difficult to

measure this disparity with any accuracy as there is a shortage of information on this type of data.

Taking all ages together, percentages of the poor, defined as people possessing less than half the mean income per inhabitant, vary from 7% (Belgium, Netherlands) to more than 25% (Greece, Portugal), but poverty is generally more intense among the elderly than among the younger age-groups since the situation of the very old is also more unstable. Victims of poverty include people who have not had a full working life, who have not been able to claim any entitlement to a survivor's or reversionary pension (widows) or who do not satisfy the conditions for the allocation of minimum living allowances.

Although all social security systems contain, to different degrees, provisions to cover atypical cases, levels of protection may vary substantially in different Member States. In surveys conducted in the Union, only 12% of the elderly people surveyed said that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their financial situation in comparison with three times as many people (36%) who considered their situation comfortable or very comfortable. There are substantial differences between countries. They range from only 2% of dissatisfied people in Denmark to more than 50% in Greece. Countries with the highest levels of satisfaction are, in decreasing order: Denmark (76%), the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (69%), the Netherlands (53%) and Italy (51%).


- 2 - The state of health of the elderly

Is increasing longevity accompanied by a parallel improvement in health? At the outset, during the 1970s, declining mortality rates went together with an increase in minor disabilities. Since the mid-1980s, however, this pattern seems to have been reversed, with an apparent decline in health problems. In other words, life without disability seems to increase at the same rate as life itself.

When the over-60s are questioned, moreover, two thirds say that they are "in good health" in the sense that they are not suffering from any disorder which limits their activity - the percentage being slightly higher for men than for women. The percentage drops with age but, nevertheless, over half of octogenarians and above do not seem to have any restrictions on what they do.

Graph 18
Elderly people's perception of their state of health

Percentage of over-60s stating that they are not suffering from any illness, disability or long-term infirmity limiting their activities - EU



Source: Eurobarometer 1992

This percentage varies substantially among the Member States. It is only 46% in Greece, whereas it is above 75% in Belgium. Without supplementary information, it is undoubtedly difficult to interpret these differences validly. They raise questions, however, in particular when it is borne in mind that functional independence, or at least its perception, is a basic criterion in characterising the living conditions of elderly people.

2.3.5 The social and economic usefulness of the elderly

Western societies are going through a spectacular change in the area of service production, which is no longer in competition with, but supplements and even stimulates the production of goods. Services are now an integral part of production and make use, both upstream and downstream, of high-technology goods with a high added value. They therefore have substantial spin-off effects on the economy as a whole.

The elderly and the demand from elderly people, especially the "new old", are one of the main potential markets for many of these activities. This can already be seen in the area of health and leisure, although it is slightly less true at present in the area of education.

In Europe, the senior citizens' market already contains over 100 million people, who have high levels of purchasing power because of the quality of European social protection schemes.

The demand from new consumers will completely reshape Western economies in a growing number of sectors. In so doing, new jobs will be created in these cultural industries and services which may offset, partially or totally, losses in traditional sectors and in particular in those industrial activities most threatened by robotics.

Lastly, elderly people, because they have an unrivalled health capital and life span, play an essential role in the informal economy as a result of the services that they transfer to the other generations.

Key points for further consideration

1. Analysis of trends in age structures in the Union undoubtedly requires an examination of two dimensions at the same time. A basic dimension, which consists in studying the ageing process as part of a developing societal system, and another shorter-term dimension attempting to measure the effects of this ageing on today's economic and social organisation.
2. As a process, the ageing of population structures in the European Union is inevitable. This is a normal stage of human development which is due to major advances and the extension of life and its quality, and which is leading towards a stationary demographic situation. The developing countries are at present in the midst of a demographic transition or are likely to be so soon, thereby triggering the process of ageing. Attempting to reverse this trend is not just illusory but serves no purpose either.
3. While our demographic structures are changing so is the world of employment. We are leaving the industrial era and entering the era of technology and services. This situation requires redeployment towards other types of activity, more costly in terms of research and development, but much less costly in terms of production. An investment in human capital today would perhaps provide the economic stimulus needed to finance tomorrow's pensioners.
4. One way of ensuring that the elderly are genuinely integrated into our societies would be to abolish certain practices which artificially accentuate the ageing of society. These include the abolition of age limits (on jobs), the removal of the linear career model with three successive stages and the establishment of an alternation between work, training and leisure in the organisation of life cycles, the removal of barriers between working life and non-working life by abandoning fixed retirement in favour of flexible retirement and making the most of human capital by encouraging pensioners to take on "second careers" in sectors of social utility.
5. Because of the structural effect of the "baby boom" between 1945 and 1965, ageing has yet to place its most substantial burdens on social protection. The oldest of these generations will reach retirement age only at the beginning of the next century. The "demographic balance" of the active population is not guaranteed anywhere. It may well be offset by the growth of women's work, but this growth will be compromised if the volume of jobs currently available is not sufficiently attractive.
6. There is no doubt that demographic analysis has some relevance in explaining the causes of changes in the balances between generations and predicting their impact. On its own, however, it is unable to measure the economic and social cost of the imbalances that it reveals. In order to do so, analysis has to include economic variables (level and structure of income; unemployment; sectors of activity; professional cycles; and many others) and in particular factors linked to the current organisation of social protection (definition of beneficiaries and their entitlements). This is a question that cannot be treated lightly and it is to be deplored that conclusions in this area are sometimes drawn solely from estimates of demographic development which are themselves hypothetical.

CHAPTER III

LESS CONSISTENT FAMILY STRUCTURES

By proclaiming 1994 as the international year of the family, the United Nations wanted to give a new boost to international cooperation intended to promote this basic entity of society. The motto "Building the smallest democracy within society" stressed the essential aspects of this event's message: the respect of individual rights and freedoms, equality of the sexes and solidarity within the family. The role of the family as a pivot between the individual and society was vigorously emphasised at the recent international conference on population and development in Cairo. Those decisions which, when added together, fashion the overall structures of the population are made in this private and closely-knit space, in this "pivot" micro-group formed by the family. The family therefore seems to be the key protagonist in future trends in demographic evolution, and it is for this very reason that it is studied here.

In turn, however, the economic and social organisation of States has an impact on families. Policies on housing, social law, labour organisation, the dates of school holidays and social protection systems are all fields in which decisions affect families. It is not therefore possible to disregard the fact that the family is part and parcel of all social and economic changes; the relationship between these different developments needs to be stressed. This is particularly true of the position that the family occupies in the informal economy through its function as a network of solidarity and through the transmission of wealth, property and services.

3.1 The household - a space for the family

The solidarity of the nuclear family is reflected by its shared life, accommodation and income. It is for this reason that it corresponds in most cases to a household, which can then be seen as its morphological expression. Households do occasionally include members who are unrelated, although the counterpart to this is that some people nowadays live outside of any family. The household is therefore a broader concept than the family. The immediate focus of demographers when collecting data, moreover, is the household in the first instance and not the family. Households consequently have to be taken into account, bearing in mind that by far the largest number of households consists of one family and that the inclusion of members outside the "close" family is much less common.

3.1.1 The main categories of households

The main distinction between households is between households with family and households without family. Households with family are themselves divided into three main categories: couples with children, childless couples and single parents with children. Households without family include single-person households and those of several people not related by family ties.

- 1 - Childless family households account for one fifth of family households

Statistics on childless family households are difficult to interpret as they cover three groups whose numbers may not all have changed in the same way in different Member States: households of former parents, households of "parents-to-be" and those of partners who have never had children. Overall, these households account for a relatively consistent percentage of around 20%. Their components are undoubtedly weighted, however, in very different ways: increasing life span after the departure of the first child, increased age when the first child is born and also, as in certain countries such as Germany, increasing numbers of couples permanently without children. These percentages are also influenced by the age structure of the population.

TABLE 15: Breakdown of private households by composition (in %)

		EUR 12	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
TOTAL PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS	Number	130879	3953	2274	36258	3205	11836	21542	1029	19909	145	6162	3146	22422
	Percentage	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS		70,3	68,6	61,8	62,3	78,8	83,1	70,8	72,9	76,3	69,0	62,3	83,7	70,6
Single-family households		68,8	67,7	59,9	60,1	:	82,0	70,2	72,3	74,6	67,5	62,3	79,8	69,6
Couples without children		:	22,9	:	23,3	23,7	17,9	24,8	13,7	19,4	21,2	22,5	22,2	27,4
without other person		23,9	21,9	26,6	23,1	20,2	16,1	23,7	12,2	17,8	19,5	22,2	20,0	26,2
with other person		:	0,9	:	0,2	3,6	1,8	1,3	1,5	1,5	1,6	0,3	2,2	1,1
Couples with children		:	35,7	:	30,5	49,1	55,8	38,1	47,9	46,7	38,4	33,5	49,9	33,2
without other person		37,9	34,3	26,3	30,2	41,8	49,6	36,4	41,9	42,9	34,8	33,0	43,9	31,7
with other person		:	1,4	:	0,3	7,3	6,2	1,7	6,0	3,7	3,8	0,5	6,0	1,4
Single-parent families		:	9,2	:	6,3	6,0	8,2	7,2	10,6	8,5	7,9	6,3	6,8	9,0
Single fathers with child(ren)		:	1,8	:	1,2	1,2	1,1	1,0	1,8	2,0	1,6	1,5	0,9	1,3
without other person		2,8	1,2	0,9	0,9	0,9	1,0	1,0	1,5	1,2	1,0	0,8	0,8	1,1
with other person		:	0,6	:	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,3	0,9	0,6	0,6	0,2	0,1
Single mothers with child(ren)		:	7,3	:	5,1	4,8	7,1	6,1	8,8	6,5	6,4	4,8	5,9	7,8
without other person		7,4	6,2	4,9	4,6	4,1	5,9	5,7	7,3	5,7	4,9	4,2	4,8	7,1
with other person		:	1,1	:	0,6	0,7	1,2	0,4	1,5	0,8	1,4	0,6	1,1	0,7
Households of two or more families		1,5	0,8	1,9	2,2	:	1,1	0,6	0,7	1,7	1,5	0,0	3,9	0,9
NON FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS		29,7	31,4	38,2	37,7	21,2	16,9	29,2	27,1	23,7	31,0	37,7	16,3	29,5
Single-person households		26,1	28,4	34,4	33,6	16,3	13,4	27,1	20,2	20,6	25,4	30,0	13,8	26,2
Male		9,6	11,8	14,5	12,4	5,8	3,8	10,1	9,5	6,3	10,0	12,5	4,2	10,0
Female		16,6	16,6	19,9	21,2	10,5	9,6	17,1	10,6	14,3	15,5	17,4	9,7	16,2
2 or more unrelated people		3,5	3,0	3,8	4,0	4,9	3,5	2,1	6,9	3,1	5,5	7,7	2,4	3,3

Source: Eurostat

- 2 - Family households with children - disparities among Member States

The percentages of households made up of a couple with at least one child are higher and more diverse than the preceding group. They exceed 40% in Ireland and Portugal, but reach only 26% in Denmark. A whole range of factors has an impact on these percentages in this case as well: percentage of childless couples, increasing numbers of young adults living with their parents and in some cases the age limit from which the child, even when resident, is no longer considered to be a child for statistical purposes. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to draw any general conclusions. It seems to be the case, however, that in the Union (with the exception of the Mediterranean Member States) the percentages show a swing away from households of two parents with children towards single-parent households in particular.

- 3 - Single-parent families - mothers are responsible in 85% of cases

There has undoubtedly been a clear increase in the numbers of single-parent households.

Table 16

Percentage of single-parent families with at least one child aged under 15 (*)		
	1981/82	1990/91
Belgium	9,4	14,6
Denmark	18,1	20,4
Germany	9,8	15,4
Greece	:	5,7
Spain	5,4	6,0
France	8,3	10,8
Ireland	7,2	10,7
Italy	7,3	:
Luxembourg	9,1	12,3
Netherlands	7,9	12,2
Portugal	:	9,0
United Kingdom	13,7	19,0
EUR 12	:	:

(*) out of total families with at least one child aged under 15

Source: Eurostat

The percentage of this type of household where the mother has sole responsibility is 85% in all the Member States. This percentage has not decreased for thirty years. Whether the division of the "burden" of children is decided by the courts or by agreement between the parents, this figure remains unchanged. It is evident, on the other hand, that mothers, in this type of family, are increasingly less likely to be single or widowed and increasingly more likely to be divorced.

Spiralling divorce rates explain the substantial increase in this type of household since 1980.

Reconstituted households

Do we need to look at reconstituted households? Hardly any reliable statistics are available for these households. Evaluations are possible only on the basis of retrospective surveys. Estimates of their proportion of all households have provided figures of 4% in France, 8% in the United Kingdom and 7% in Denmark. Even though the remarriage rate has fallen, it is the spiralling divorce rate that has made this family model more common.

- 4 - Substantial growth in single-person households

The family is traditionally the core of the household. In the past it was inconceivable for someone, whether single or widowed, to live on their own permanently.

Nine tenths of households without family are those formed by a single person. Other types are not generally studied in any great detail.

The proportion of single-person households with respect to all households has continued to grow.

Table 17

Trends in single-person households since 1950 (%)					
	1950	1960	1971	1981	1991
B	16	17	19	23	28
DK	14	20	23	30	34
D	12	17	25	31	34
GR	9	10	11	15	16
E	:	:	7	10	13
F	19	20	20	25	27
IRL	10	12	14	17	20
I	:	11	13	18	21
L	9	12	16	21	25
NL	9	12	17	23	30
P	8	11	10	13	14
UK	11	11	18	22	26

Source: Eurostat

This type of household was exceptional for a long time. It was inconceivable to live outside the family. Nowadays, in many Member States, the percentage is close on or over 30%. This increase is due to a whole range of factors which are difficult to analyse if the very heterogeneous aggregate that this type of family forms is taken as a starting point. It includes single people living alone, divorcees, married people awaiting divorce or simply separated, elderly widowers and in particular elderly widows. Any analysis of these factors has therefore to be preceded by a breakdown of the people making up these households by sex, marital status and broad age-groups. These data are available and it is to be hoped that they can be processed and published for the Union as a whole.

The increase in the number of single-person households augments cases of single life. This quantitative observation has a pejorative connotation. It concerns women in particular, bearing in mind that larger numbers of women remain permanently single than men, the remarriage rate is lower for women and, in particular, their life expectancy is longer. These considerations should not mask the fact that some people choose the single life and that living alone does not mean living outside a network of relationships. A new, but inevitable, factor is that certain single-person households represent situations, of differing length, of transition between two family households or between two consensual unions, whereas others are permanent. This period of transition and permanent single life have nothing in common apart from the morphological structure of the moment.


3.1.2 Household size

Recent trends, especially the proliferation of single-person households and the drop in the birth rate, are causing demographic composition to become less consistent. One- or two-person households account for half of all households and in certain cities single-person households reach this percentage on their own. Households of five or more people account for only 13% of all households.

This overall breakdown undoubtedly masks disparate situations in different Member States. The average size of households is approximately three people in the Mediterranean Member States and Ireland, but is no more than 2.1 people in Germany and Denmark. The most striking trend, perhaps, is the downturn in the type of household which was most widespread for many years: households made up of two married people and at least one child. Even when households of unmarried parents are included, the figure is never more than 50% of the total and is often around 35%.

This situation reflects major changes in behaviour accompanied, in some cases, by a certain haziness of the concept of the household which has up to now been relatively clear.

Graph 19



Graphique 19

This is true, for instance, of some reconstituted households where the children live part of the time with one parent and part with the other; at the time of formation of some couples; in cases, albeit rare, of married people who each have a home but are not actually "separated" and are often known as "LATs" (Living Apart Together). These changing situations make statisticians' tasks more difficult.

3.2 Family biographies

The structure of households, at a given moment, is a snapshot of the many events causing new households to be formed, modified or broken up. The different histories of these households therefore have to be analysed if we are genuinely to understand this overall structure.


3.2.1 More complex family patterns

In societies where the extended family formed the family unit, this family was constantly renewed. The same was true of the patriarchal family. People left "home" and were replaced by others through marriage and birth. There was continuity. This history has now become more complex, marking a definite break with the past as the same is not now true of the conjugal household. A family is created by the union of two partners: it develops through the birth of children, who grow up and leave the household. One of the partners dies. With the death of the other partner, the family history comes to an end. This outline is the simplest and, for the most part, the most common.

Divorce and separation break up the initial family, however, and often lead to reconstituted families. If the beginning of the consensual union and not marriage is taken as the family's starting point, cases of these episodic histories mushroom.

Looking now from the point of view of individuals, it can be seen that family histories can take a whole range of directions. The diagram of family routes shows that, following departure from the parental home, people take a wide variety of routes of differing complexity. The central route is the simplest: it reflects a single choice binding the individual from marriage to death.

It can also be seen that men's or women's lives may be made up of a number of family sequences, in most cases separated by differing periods of single life. This discontinuity is then, in most cases, the result of a decision by one of the partners. In this case, the story becomes a sequence of episodes with a large number of protagonists linked only by their common children. The time of the break-up, the length of the union and the extent of the solidarity ties that have been broken give the break-up different meanings. The separation of a young childless couple, whose shared life has been short, cannot be viewed in the same way as divorce in a family with children whose union has lasted several years.



3.2.2 Signs of the breakdown of family biographies

- 1 - Cohabitation outside marriage, frequent in the North, but still minimal in the South

At the beginning of family life there is now, in some countries at least, a relatively long period during which young men and women live together without marriage. Measuring this phenomenon is no easy task, and estimates from censuses and through household analysis enable only an imprecise evaluation. They do however provide an order of magnitude.

Table 18

Consensual unions as percentage of all unions, around 1985, in a selection of European countries										
Age	D (FGR)	F	I	NL	UK	S	FIN	N	A	H
15-19	30,0	35,8	4,2	63,0	50,4	92,7	49,7	75,0	45,4	8,2
20-24		14,0	2,1	38,3	29,0	77,1		47,0	18,7	3,3
25-29	6,2	10,1	1,8	15,9	12,8	48,1	23,9	23,0	5,9	2,4
30-34		6,0	1,6	6,7	6,8	29,6	11,6	12,0	3,9	2,7
35-39	2,0	5,5	1,1	4,0	4,3	19,2	7,1	7,0	3,2	2,9
40-44			1,1	2,2	3,7	13,0			2,9	2,9
45-49	2,0		1,0	2,1	2,8	10,2	3,7	3,0	2,1	3,1
50-54			1,0	1,8	1,5	8,7			2,0	2,7
55-59	1,9		1,1	2,3	0,9	5,9	3,7	3,0	1,5	2,7
60-64			1,4	1,8	1,2	4,7			2,2	3,0
Total	4,7	8,8	1,4	7,7	6,2	19,9	11,4	10,8	4,2	2,9

Source: Popnet 1994-2

Since 1985, percentages have increased substantially, although the Member States have retained more or less the same rankings. Three different levels of living together by young people can be seen. It is clearly evident that this situation accounts for half or more of unions between people aged between 20 and 24 in the Scandinavian countries. The example of Italy is, nevertheless, significant: even if under-declarations are taken into account, this model has not really gained a foothold among Mediterranean populations. Between these two extremes there are varying, but relatively substantial, frequencies among the remaining European countries.

This photograph does not, however, give an exact picture of the extent of this phenomenon. Some of the situations of cohabitation observed on a given date will lead rapidly to marriage, others to marriage at a later stage and others will not end in marriage at all. The real extent of the "pre-marital cohabitation" model can be pinpointed only if it is possible to answer the question: "What proportion of marriages have been preceded by living together on a permanent basis?" The answer, in this case as well, is very difficult and can be provided only by specific surveys. Some information is available, however, for some countries.

This table does not show the percentage of people living together who go on to become married, but the percentage, among a number of marriages, of those preceded by living together. At present less than 10% of marriages now take place immediately in Sweden. The percentage for France is no more than 30%. This means that these data are largely out of date: there has been a rapid increase over the last 10 years. This table is interesting, however, as it highlights the increase in Denmark, which is fairly representative of the Scandinavian countries, and the absence of the Mediterranean countries where the trend was still of little significance around 1980.

It is obviously impossible to predict the proportion of people currently living together who will get married. The percentages of those "already married" by the age of 35 among generations for whom living together has been a common practice show that this is for the most part a premarital lifestyle. In Denmark and Sweden, for instance, some 70% of the 1955 generation of women were married by the age of 35.

Graph 21 - Percentage of women living in consensual unions, by age, for certain countries




Table 19

Percentage of women who have cohabited before marriage				
Country	Marriage cohorts			
Denmark	:	:	1971-1976	:
			80%	
France	:	1966-1970	1971-1976	1976-1977
		13%	22%	31%
United Kingdom	:	1966-1970	1971-1976	1976-1977
		4%	12%	20%
Sweden	1950-1965	1965-1970	1970-1975	1975-1981
	39%	53%	81%	89%
Norway	1947-1965	1965-1970	1970-1976	1975-1977
	11%	15%	26%	47%
United States	:	1965-1974	1975-1979	1980-1984
		8%	26%	34%

Source: Louis Roussel, "Le futur de la famille", in Eurostat, Human Capital at the dawn of XXI-th century, November 1991

- 2 - Marriage rates: marriage is postponed everywhere, but more in the North than the South

Living together can be reconciled with a marriage rate which continues to account for the majority only if age at the time of marriage increases.

Table 20

Mean age of women at first marriage, between 1960 and 1992													
	EUR12	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
1960	24,0	22,8	22,8	23,4	25,2	26,1	23,0	27,6	24,8	:	24,2	24,8	23,3
1970	23,1	22,4	22,8	22,5	23,7	24,7	22,6	25,3	23,9	:	22,9	24,3	:
1980	23,2	22,2	24,6	22,9	23,1	23,5	23,0	25,0	23,8	23,0	23,1	23,2	23,0
1990	25,1	24,2	27,6	25,3	24,5	25,3	25,5	26,1	25,6	25,4	25,9	24,9	:
1992	25,4*	24,7	28,0	25,8	25,0	25,6(1)	26,1	26,6	25,7(1)	26,0	26,5	24,3	25,5(1)


(1): 1991

*: Eurostat estimates

Source: Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994

This age decreased generally between 1960 and 1980 and has increased over the last ten years. It is very significant that Denmark, as well as Sweden, are exceptions. In practice, the general trend towards a decrease in age at the time of marriage was affecting all the Member States in the 1960s and 1970s. The reversal of the trend started in the North while age at the time of marriage was continuing to fall in the South, especially in Spain. The reversal of the trend that is affecting all the Member States of the Union is therefore the same, but with a substantial timelag between the North and the South. This is concealed by the overall trends in average ages at the time of first marriage for the Union as a whole.

Graph 22 - Trends in mean age at first marriage
EU, 1960-1992



Source: Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994 and estimates for 1991-1992

All these changes have ultimately had only a relatively small impact on the number of couples sharing their lives: people living together have cancelled out the deficit of non-marriages and the reduction in the number of married people between the ages of 20 and 40 is almost counterbalanced by the number of consensual unions. It is not, therefore, falling numbers of people living together that provide an explanation for the fall in fertility.

- 3 - Majority-age children living with their parents

Another major change has taken place in the family life cycle: children continue to live with their parents for much longer periods after reaching the age of majority. In the 1950s, young men generally left the parental home after their military service and young women after their marriage;

this took place in most cases around the ages of 21-22, at least in the Northern and Central areas of the Union. The current situation is quite different in many Member States.

Several surveys have shown, for instance, that young women continue to leave the parental home earlier than their brothers. They are now older, however, than they were 25 years ago. The most rapid change has taken place over the last ten years. Two consecutive factors explain this change: in the first instance, parents wanted to make the most of this period of economic prosperity to give their children good vocational qualifications. Between 1960 and 1980, the numbers of men and women students continued to grow throughout the Union. The rates differed in different Member States but were high everywhere.

Table 21

Portion of students in the population aged 20-24, 1991-92													
	EUR12	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
	(*)	(*)						(*)			(*)		(*)
Total	25%	30%	30%	29%	:	28%	26%	18%	:	:	34%	15%	18%
Women	25%	31%	31%	26%	:	29%	28%	16%	:	:	29%	19%	18%

(*): estimated value : data non available

Source: Eurostat

For the last ten years, unemployment among young people has extended the period during which majority-age children continue to live with their parents almost everywhere. The lack of a job not only encourages them to look for higher qualifications at university but also deprives them of their own resources.

Table 22

Unemployment rate of population aged 20-24, by sex, in 1992													
	EUR 12	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
Male	16,1	10,5	15,6	5,9	17,0	26,6	17,2	22,3	22,2	:	6,9	8,7	18,9
Female	18,0	14,0	14,7	7,0	31,1	38,6	23,6	17,9	29,5	:	7,5	9,1	10,5
Total	17,0	12,3	15,2	6,4	23,4	32,0	20,4	20,2	25,5	(2,6)	7,2	8,9	15,1

Source: Eurostat - Labour Force Surveys 1992


As can be seen, these levels vary greatly from one Member State to another and it seems likely that the frequency of living with parents is linked to these levels. In many Member States, over 50% of young men, if not young women, in this age-group remain at home. This is a new situation for the family. It undoubtedly has advantages for both generations, since parents are in most cases happy to keep in daily contact with their children and children gain the security that their social integration has not yet given them from this extension of life in the parental home. These advantages are not without drawbacks, however. This leads to an ambiguous situation. Is this extended hospitality part of parents' normal obligations or is it a generous contribution on their part? Is it possible for children to be both dependent and adult? These ambivalences lead in some cases to situations where the parents find it hard not to feel exploited in some way or another and the young people consider the hospitality that they receive as an inevitable, but overly long, constraint.

- 4 - A new stage between retirement and genuine old age

A pensioner who stops work at the age of sixty can now expect a further twenty or so years of life. At the same age, a woman can expect twenty-five. During part of this time, there will undoubtedly be a loss of autonomy, whose extent and length may differ. It seems, however, that the expectation of life without any disability is increasing at the same rate as life expectancy itself. Under these circumstances, it is the proportion of "alert" retirement which is continuing to increase. The length of this period is likely to vary substantially depending on the individual, but it would not be unreasonable for men to count on fifteen years and women on at least twenty.

Two "active" generations therefore coexist; the first is submerged, however, by its tasks, while the second has a substantial capital of leisure time. It is possible, therefore, for these "young" retired parents and their 30 to 40-year-old children to complement one another, as the former can make the substantial amount of time that they have available to the latter. This symbiosis often starts before retirement. The "pivotal" generations, made up for the most part of women, are likely to be around 50 years old and are likely to have intense contacts with their children and grandchildren, as a survey of this issue has shown.

Demographic development has therefore laid the foundations for the family to take its share of the securities which are still assumed in most cases by society. The economic recession and the job crisis have meant that instrumental values are regaining a strong foothold in the family. For young unemployed people, handicapped parents, discouraged teenagers, the family appears to be the only safe haven. Will this rediscovered function of unconditional solidarity not provide the family with new vigour? There is no certain answer. Recent studies show that the precarious nature of employment has an impact on the stability of marriage. Marriages find it hard to withstand long-term unemployment. The malaise of our time does not therefore always lead to closer links between generations or between partners. It may also generate, if the family remains without support, a permanent divide between integrated citizens and the marginalised.



- 5 - Breakdowns and reconstitutions of unions

In most Member States the divorce rate was similar in 1960 to the rate 40 years previously with an approximate average of 10 divorces for 100 marriages. Nowadays, again with the exception of the South, numbers of divorces have increased two, three or even more times. In Scandinavia, divorce affects one out of two marriages. The break-up of a marriage has therefore become an everyday event. This development can be explained, as we will see below, not by short-term reasons tending to multiply the causes of divorce, but because the marriage pact now includes a "de-marriage" clause for cases in which the partners feel that their expectations have been seriously compromised. The environment of marriage has not become less favourable, but the model of marriage itself has been transformed. The meaning of divorce has therefore changed and any comparisons between the situation now and in 1965 have to be carried out with great care.

The graph illustrating the divorce rate in the European Union shows the existence of a North-South divide.

To provide a complete picture, break-ups of consensual unions have to be taken into account. Few data are available in this case. Data that have been collected in some European countries show that these unions have continued to become more unstable over the last 15 years. When a marriage takes place, it is fairly common for each partner to have lived with one or several partners beforehand.

In overall terms, except in the Southern Member States, a substantial proportion of the population will enter into several unions, in most cases under different types of marital status.

Map 4 - Current divorce rate for 100 marriages in 1990



Household analysis led to the conclusion of fragmentation. It is now clearer that this fragmentation is partly due to the discontinuity of family histories. The last two centuries have seen a move away from complex extended households to simple closely-knit households. Relatively short, but generally simple, family histories have been replaced by histories that are longer, but much more fragmented. In no way can these be seen as small changes. They reflect genuine, rapid and clear-cut changes in our family patterns.

3.3 The issues raised by changing families

All the morphological changes which have been described above require explanation if we are to estimate their inertia and evaluate their possible duration. Their relatively simultaneous occurrence suggests that a single, but central, change has led, in the space of a few years, to these different developments. Both conventional anthropology and sociology have developed their nature, and it seems useful to examine them here in order better to understand the demographic consequences of family change.

3.3.1 The new family model of our time: the "family-as-a-pact"

Since the 1960s the old institutional model of the family has disintegrated and been replaced by a new model based on greater autonomy. Under the old system, partners chose one another freely, but their new status entailed a certain number of obligations laid down by society, especially the hierarchy of the sexes and the generations. These two fundamental precepts of differentiation, sex and generation, seemed in the 1960s to be out of kilter with equality perceived as the cornerstone of modernity and democracy. At the same time, economic prosperity and advances in science made people feel that the time had come to take down the barriers so that everyone could forge their own identities.

Legislation very quickly endorsed the idea of the equality of the sexes and the freedom to break up marriages by mutual consent. Private life was then regulated by the agreement of two parties with equal rights. Statisticians monitored this trend and relatively quickly abandoned the concept of "head of household". In principle, marriage stopped being an institution and became a pact.

This pact is based in the first instance on the clear perception of a kind of passport to happiness: this is what is known as love. This is, in any case, the prerequisite stated by respondents to a Eurobarometer survey of the perception of the family by Europeans: to get married, the partners need to respect one another, then love one another intensely, they say in proportions of 87 and 78% respectively. Consequently, in comparison with the 1950s' model, contemporary couples seem to have retained the same central objective of happiness but now consider the old institutional strategies to be alienating. The whole system has moved away from external regulation towards regulation which is seen as autonomous. The results of this change are obviously substantial, both for partners and for their children, and are reflected by completely new demographic behaviour such as the family breakdowns and reconstitutions already discussed above.

3.3.2 Socio-demographic consequences of family change

- 1 - The entry of women into working life

It was not enough for women to obtain equality in principle. They needed their own resources if they were to achieve actual equality. Massive numbers of women therefore entered the working world from 1970 onwards.

Table 23

Female activity rates - 1960 to 1992 (in %)													
	EUR 12	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
1960	22,0	20,0	28,0	33,0	28,0	14,0	28,0	21,0	20,0	22,0	16,0	29,0	21,0
1970	26,6	24,9	36,9	30,3	:	18,2	29,4	19,7	21,9	21,7	18,9	:	31,2
1980	30,0	30,8	45,3	32,0	21,1	20,0	33,8	20,5	25,7	26,4	23,7	34,6	36,4
1990	42,4	36,0	60,8	44,9	34,9	31,9	46,0	34,5	34,5	33,6	43,3	46,8	51,7
1992	44,0	38,9	62,4	47,9	34,2	33,4	47,3	36,8	34,5	39,1	46,1	49,5	52,1

Source: Eurostat - 1960 to 1980: Employment statistics; 1990 and 1992: Labour force surveys

In many Member States, the proportion of working women has doubled over 30 years. This increase is even more spectacular when it is borne in mind that it relates to only one group of women, since levels have dropped sharply in the 15-24 age-group because of longer periods of education. Moreover, women aged over 45 have not been affected to any great extent by this change. The increase in the average is therefore due for the most part to women aged between 25 and 44 and, among them, to mothers of families in particular, most of whom had tended not to work between these ages.

The Irish situation shows that working women are in most cases single women and women without children. Levels in Denmark are fairly close to those for men. Lifestyles, timetables and space for family life are obviously very different in these two extreme cases. Paradoxically, however, the birth rate is very similar. While mothers of one or two children almost all work in Denmark, however, the same is not true of those with three children. There is a sharp fall in the rate for these women, as in other Union Member States.

Full-time work is not the only factor in this increase in women's work. Between 1983 and 1989, the spread of part-time work was by far the most decisive factor in this increase in a number of Member States.

This type of work has therefore grown in popularity over the last 20 years: it represents a third way of life and a kind of compromise allowing women to retain their financial independence, but not their capacity to forge a real career and also makes it possible for women to stay with their children for longer periods.

Opinion surveys showed, some twenty-five years ago, that women preferred this compromise. The formula which is nowadays preferred is that of full-time work as it is most in keeping with the egalitarian ideal. It might have been thought that the current economic recession would lead, as in the 1930s recession, to an outflow of women from the labour market. This has not been the case. Wives feel that their jobs are safeguards against their husband's unemployment or divorce. Over and above this material advantage, women still want, despite the problems which it raises, to ensure their independence through their work.

Table 24

Growth of women's employment between 1987 and 1992				
	Total employment growth (%)	Full-time employment growth (%)	Part-time employment growth (%)	Growth due to part-time growth (%)
EUR12	11.5	8.3	19.6	47.7
B	19.5	13.2	39.2	48.6
DK	1.9	11.5	-11.2	*
D (1)	17.3	8.3	38.9	66.2
GR	3.8	6.5	-18.9	*
E	21.3	21.6	19.4	12.7
F	6.5	4.5	13.3	47.0
IRL	15.8	12.0	36.1	36.2
I	7.5	6.2	18.7	25.9
L	13.2	14.3	7.9	10.5
NL	24.8	6.1	38.5	89.5
P	11.9	10.7	21.6	19.0
UK	7.5	7.1	8.0	47.8


Source: Eurostat - Labour Force Surveys 1992

(1) within its frontiers prior to 3 October 1990

*: part-time employment is declining in these countries


This has had a major impact on trends in the active population. During the last five years, it is largely the growing number of working women which has shaped the increase in the active population. Eurostat estimates, moreover, that in five years' time between 50 and 60% of this increase will be due to women. This increased participation by women in the labour force will play a significant part in counterbalancing the number of non-workers generated by the ageing process.

Graph 24 - Activity rates by age, in 1992



Source: Eurostat - Community Labour Force Survey 1992

Graph 24 (end) - Activity rates by age, in 1992



Source: Eurostat - Community Labour Force Survey 1992

- 2 - Decreasing fertility

The most widespread of all the demographic changes observed over the last 30 years is undoubtedly the drop in fertility. It has affected all the Union Member States to differing extents at different times.

Fertility is measured by two conventional indicators: the total fertility rate and the completed fertility of generations. The former is much more sensitive, but of less importance as it refers to a single year, although it can obviously be monitored over time. The second brings together the children of women of a given generation: it is available only when these women have reached the end of their reproductive life.

There has been a spectacular fall almost everywhere in the total fertility rate. From a starting point where the generation renewal threshold (2.10 children per woman) was reached everywhere in Europe, we have moved to a situation where only a few countries come near to this threshold (Ireland and Scandinavian countries). In some countries there does seem to have been a temporary levelling off at between 1.7 and 1.4 children per woman. In some regions (former Federal Republic of Germany, Northern Italy) the rate has fallen below 1.0. In all likelihood, a calendar effect will entail a slight rise in countries where the rate is currently below 1.4. The recent increase in Scandinavian countries raises problems and will need time for objective interpretation.


In the case of completed fertility the calendar effect is cancelled out. A movement towards a fertility rate which is close to or slightly less than the renewal threshold can be seen among the 1960 generation, the first for which there is a satisfactory estimate. It would, however, be as naive to take this relative balance as the truth as to be alarmed by the surpluses that some total fertility rates are showing. These two indicators, whose significance differs, obviously need to be read together. For the moment, completed fertility in European Member States does not seem to be pointing to a failure to replace the generations. If current total fertility rates continued, however, they would lead to a completed fertility which rapidly showed a deficit. National officials should base their appraisals on this twofold observation.

Are the spread of the contraceptive pill and the legalisation of abortion responsible alone for the drop in fertility? Two demographers, Westoff in the United States and Leridon in France, have shown that new contraceptive methods were a necessary factor but do not explain the drop in fertility on their own. The drop is due to the fact that couples, now able to exercise total control over their fertility, want fewer children than couples in 1960. It is this reduction of the number of children that couples want, that needs to be explained.


Despite a genuine increase in infertility, surveys conducted in Member States show that most couples want to have at least one child. While this may differ in different countries, it would not be exaggerated to see it as an almost general desire. In practice, most parents do not just want one, but two, children. In most Member States there is some disapproval of only children. Why, then, is the rejection of a third child so widespread?

In this case we need to return to the family plan. The family is a plan for happiness, but for balanced happiness. The ideal number of children is therefore that which is compatible with the quest for the other belongings that people want, without forgetting the imperative of equality which means that these objectives are as possible for the woman as for the man. The prevailing opinion is that almost all parents' goals can be achieved with two children, but not with three. European Union figures show that a third child costs one out of ten women their jobs and that this child considerably increases the financial burden linked to having children.

Graph 25 - TOTAL FERTILITY RATE PER WOMEN, 1950-1993, in the EU Member States



Graph 26 - COMPLETED FERTILITY OF FEMALE GENERATIONS 1915-1959, in the EU Member States



- 3 - Equality between men and women

On a day-to-day basis, an equal distribution of tasks is a necessary consequence of basing the family on a pact. If equality between men and women has been acquired in principle, actual practices are far from this ideal, as functions remain specialised and women bear a much heavier burden of domestic work than men, even when the wife has a full-time job. Time-budget surveys agree on this point: the time that men devote to domestic work is far from the time spent on it by women and the progress which has been made does not add up to much. Many people rightly stress the need for a genuine adjustment, i.e. a more equal distribution of tasks, including education. In this sense, endeavours to reconcile family life and work will in the future affect men just as much as they affect women at present.

- 4 - Births outside marriage

Nowadays the union exists solely by the decision of the union: Couples therefore gain emotional and sexual solidarity in stages: the partners do not live together, then they live together on a more or less regular basis and finally they move into a permanent and declared home; in an increasing number of cases the decision to have a child is taken before marriage is on the cards. In some countries, births outside marriage, very often premarital, have reached statistical values that make them completely unexceptional.

Table 25 - Live births outside marriage per 100 live births, between 1960 and 1992

	EUR 12	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
1960	0,5	2,1	7,8	7,6	1,2	2,3	6,1	1,6	2,4	3,2	1,4	9,5	5,2
1970	5,2	2,8	11,0	7,2	1,1	1,4	6,9	2,7	2,2	4,0	2,1	7,3	8,0
1980	8,8	4,1	33,2	11,9	1,5	3,9	11,4	5,0	4,3	6,0	4,1	9,2	11,5
1990	18,6	11,3*	46,4	15,3	2,2	9,6	30,1	14,6	6,5	12,9	11,4	14,7	27,9
1992	20,0	:	46,5	14,9	2,6	:	33,2	18,0	6,8	12,7	12,4	16,1	30,8

Source: Eurostat Note: * Data for 1989

As can be seen, the main increase in births outside marriage has taken place over the last ten years. The changes consequently followed one another in a more or less regular order: first of all a falling birth rate and growing numbers of divorces; then the spread of living together before marriage and finally births outside marriage. In this case as well, it can be seen that Denmark and in practice all the Scandinavian countries have the highest indices, while the South of Europe, apart from Portugal, has lower indices.

The only thing that these children born outside marriage have in common with 1950s' children is the marital status of their parents. In those days, 40 years ago, such children were born to mothers abandoned by the father who became mothers in an atmosphere of social stigma. Nowadays, in most cases, children are born to an established couple who intend to get married at some point in the future. Society willingly assumes that their parents will put their house in order in the near future.

3.3.3 Development prospects

There is little doubt that Union Member States will have to tackle a number of similar problems in the near future. Europeans are increasingly following the same fashions, buying the same consumer products and watching the same films. Has this "common market" bred or is it about to breed similar lifestyles and similar family practices?

The European Observatory on National Family Policies provides very detailed information on trends and developments in family policy in the Union Member States. EUROSTAT collects demographic data. Eurobarometer surveys make it possible to compare opinions in Union Member States. What is currently emerging from all these resources is the diversity of Europe.

The analyses discussed above show major differences within the current situation: from Portugal, where the marriage rate remains high, to France, where, according to current indices only one out of every two men is likely to get married; from Sweden, where the fertility rate is higher than two children per woman to Spain where it is just over 1.2; from Sweden again, where divorce is affecting one out of every two marriages, to Ireland, where divorce is not legal. At present Europe is divided into two by a very clear boundary. In Northern Europe, family models where couple formation and family practices do not necessarily presuppose marriage are widely accepted. Premarital cohabitation is the norm in the Scandinavian countries and births outside marriage account for close on 50% of all births.

In the Mediterranean Member States, however, cohabitation and births outside marriage are rare or exceptional. From this point of view, and this is fundamental, there are two Europes. From the point of view of the optional nature of marriage, it would be possible to draw a different, and less clear-cut, boundary: in this case between the Scandinavian countries where cohabitation is the norm and intermediate countries where it is acceptable and relatively frequent. From this point of view, the European Union, with the Scandinavian countries, is not therefore a jumbled mosaic, but rather a curve along which the institution of marriage increases in importance from North to South.

The picture is much less intelligible for the other demographic characteristics. The fertility rate in Germany is close to the rate in the Mediterranean countries. Marriage in Britain, from the point of view of its timetable at least, is not very far removed from marriage in Greece. The situation of the Scandinavian countries which are both the most emancipated and the most fertile is paradoxical. Portugal, which seems to be the most religious of the Mediterranean countries but has a relatively high percentage of births outside marriage (16%), is also paradoxical. Spain, where marriage remains the norm, but where, among all the European countries, people are most in favour of "total sexual freedom" ("Values" Survey, 1990), is also paradoxical. There is a clear picture of differences in cohabitation, births outside marriage and divorce rates. Practices and opinions in other areas are more confused. This is the current situation. Have recent changes entailed greater coherence or have they intensified previous disparities?

If account were taken only of the situation on the two extreme dates, 1965 and 1994, the conclusion would have to be that differences have undoubtedly become more accentuated. While the present Europe of the Twelve was far from comparable thirty years ago, the current divide between the Mediterranean countries and the remainder of Europe did not exist: consensual unions and births outside marriage were relatively exceptional everywhere. Where, in the past, similar colours were juxtaposed, there are now striking contrasts. Development therefore seems to have moved in the direction of substantial differentiation.

Following the developments that have taken place in the European Union over each ten-year period provides a very different interpretation. A massive movement started in the North, eating away at the institutions of marriage, rendering them useless in principle or emptying them of their traditional meaning, causing a reduction in the fertility and marriage rates and then a proliferation of couples living together but not married.

There appear to be two, or even three, stages in this development bearing in mind the timelag between the spread of consensual cohabitation and that of births outside marriage. A single large-scale movement, but with major timelags from North to South, which means that the basic change has still only skimmed the surface of the South. It could therefore be argued, without fear of contradiction, that current differences are no more than a moment in a history which will ultimately converge.

The importance of economic data, alongside social and cultural factors, needs to be stressed by way of conclusion to this analysis. Successful families depend on faith, in the broad sense, but also on resources and the country's economic system. While these two dimensions are not genuinely independent, it is not enough merely to mention the former. Standards of living, labour organisation, social legislation, living conditions and laws on inheritance are all factors which have an impact on daily relationships and family models. A potential rapprochement of Union Member States in the area of demographic behaviour depends on the convergence of all these factors. Similar lifestyles can be achieved only by reducing differences between standards of living.

Economic constraints stratify conduct and opinions within each country. This also has to be true of countries. It is impossible to dissociate the development of families in the European Union from the more general development of social solidarity. In other words, these convergences are not necessarily written in tablets of stone, but also depend on the volition of those involved.

Chapter 3

Key points for further consideration

1. Over the last twenty to thirty years, relatively short, but generally simple, family histories have been replaced by histories that are longer, but much more fragmented. Family histories have become complex: cohabitation and births outside marriage, separation and divorce and reconstituted households have become everyday events, at least in the northernmost part of the Union. The very basis of the family has changed. The family, in the past an institution and means of social integration, has become a pact between two individuals looking for personal fulfilment.
2. The instability of some families, combined with economic problems, may make young people feel rejected by society. They become independent increasingly late in life, their fixed reference points are becoming blurred and their parents are in increasingly frail economic situations. Many young people feel excluded in advance and this is a major problem that the Union as a whole will have to tackle.
3. These changes in the role of the family have gone together with the major events of our century: women's emancipation, the massive entry of women into the labour market and control over fertility. These have entailed radical and permanent changes in economic and social organisation and in the relationships between generations and between the sexes.
4. Despite these changes, the family is the main network of individual relationships and solidarity. It plays an important part in social equilibrium. In a period of dwindling resources and doubts about State intervention in the family arena, the time has come to think about an answer to the following question: what place should the European Union give to the family and children in the light of the key issue of social ties and social cohesion?

CHAPTER IV

MIGRATION

A complete demographic portrait of the Union has to include migration flows. This is an important factor, as it is increasingly significant as a component of population growth and is one of the essential parameters in demographic projections. We need to find out, therefore, what impact migration is having on the developments already discussed above such as ageing, the active population, family models, etc.

4.1 Analytical constraints

Some precisions are needed for a clearer understanding of the role of migration in the Union's demography: they involve two characteristics differentiating migratory growth from natural growth. In the first instance, there is a difference in duration. Whereas birth and death rates develop over the long term and with substantial continuity, at least when there are no major disturbances (wars, natural catastrophes), this is not true of migration whose intensity may vary substantially in very short periods under the impetus of a less abrupt short-term development. The statistical data needed for a reliable evaluation of the levels and composition of migration flows are also difficult to find. While births, marriages, divorces and deaths are scrupulously recorded in most modern States, changes of residence are not recorded in the same detail. Consequently, only countries with a population register are able to provide this information and we know, from experience, that these are in some cases incomplete.

- 1 - Sources of data

In the European Union, five Member States do not have a population register: France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In the absence of direct statistical or administrative data, use then has to be made of a range of approximations of numbers of migrants for these Member States, using population censuses, labour force surveys or other surveys carried out at national level. An approach of this type then raises the problem of the comparability of information between Member States. It is for this reason that analysis of migration trends, which is difficult to carry out and necessarily incomplete, has to be supplemented by other indicators. For this purpose, it is useful to observe the population by nationality, a variable for which there is reliable information and for which it is possible to separate out demographic characteristics such as age or sex. Observation of this type is commonly known as "stock" measurement, in contrast to the evaluation of migration "flows" or streams.

- 2 - Stocks of migrants

The confusion that is caused in some cases by the use of these two concepts needs to be avoided. Flows relate to the volume and characteristics of people who, over a given period, leave or enter a given territory. Stocks are the results of all these movements. Stocks are measured at a given moment - vertically, it might be said - whereas flows are measured horizontally, over a specific period.

Stocks of migrants are usually ascertained, for statistical and administrative purposes, by separating the national population and the population of foreign nationality.

Nationality, it is true, is an important indicator in studying the economic and political impact of migration. As it is based on a legal notion, nationality determines rights and privileges in a territory, from both an economic point of view (right to work, to claim social benefits, to receive a pension, to have preferential relationships with financial organisations) and a political point of view (right to vote, employment in the public service).

Nationality is, however, a relatively poor indicator for understanding the social implications of migration. Many subjective factors far removed from the legal status represented by nationality determine the way in which a person is perceived by a community. The other problem linked to the use of this variable to estimate migration is that nationality is not exclusive and may vary during people's lives. A non-national may acquire the nationality of the host country depending on the legislation in force in that country, just as a national may return to the country. In both these cases, the migratory movement is not identified simply by nationality. These principal limitations need to be borne in mind when interpreting data on nationality.

- 3 - Migration flows

Statistics are ultimately of little help in understanding not only the direction - immigration or emigration - of migration flows and their intensity, but also their frequency and their demographic and social composition. This is a pity as statistics are a substantial source of information when measuring the impact of migration on demographic development. In order to refine demographic analysis, EUROSTAT needs to be able to pursue the efforts to harmonise and supplement data collection that it has undertaken with Member States.

When migration is not recorded in a population register it is possible to make use of censuses. These latter provide indirect information on spatial mobility through questions about place of birth, previous residence or residence at a particular date in the past. These censuses take place, however, only every ten years. Moreover, the question about place of previous residence, when asked, does not cover the same periods. The limitations imposed by the use of these derived estimates are evident.

Another data collection source is the United Kingdom's frontier survey evaluating international mobility. There are shortcomings, however, in its cover and accuracy.

Lastly, migrant identification criteria vary from one Member State to another. They often differ depending on whether nationals or foreigners are involved. In 1981, the United Nations proposed to define "long-term" immigrants as people entering national territory with the intention of residing there for at least one year, after having been absent from that territory for at least one year. In practice, the only country to make use of this definition is the United Kingdom in its International Passenger Survey. The identification criteria of other countries are limited either to the migrant's intention to reside for a period of at least one year in the country, or quite simply, the intention to reside and occupy housing, taking no account of duration.

This diversity of sources and identification criteria is not the only factor which makes it difficult to draw up comparable statistics on migration flows. There are also major shortcomings in the reliability of the collection process. The level of cover of data collection varies greatly from one country to another, whatever the type of criteria used, and it is not rare for the recording of emigration, for instance, to cover only one out of two emigrants and even, in certain cases, one out of ten. It is to be hoped that EUROSTAT and the United Nations will review international recommendations in this field.

4.2 The foreign population in the European Union

Before presenting the most recent data on the foreign population resident in the Union, it is pointed out that a distinction has to be drawn between the situation of nationals of Member States of the EU, who are entitled to move around and reside freely within the Union under the terms of the EC Treaty, and the situation of nationals from non-EU countries, who are not in principle so entitled. It is useful to recall Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union which defines citizenship of the Union as follows:

1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby.


Article 8A states:

1. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territories of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect.
2. The Council may adopt provisions with a view to facilitating the exercise of the rights referred to in paragraph 1; save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Council shall act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament.

- 1 - Composition and development of the population by nationality

The most recent statistics show that on 1 January 1992 slightly over 97% of the population of the Union was made up of Union citizens. Within this group, 4 million people, i.e. 1.5%, were living in a Member State other than the State whose nationality they possessed. On this date, the foreign non-EU population was therefore 10 million people (3% of the total).


Graph 27
Breakdown of EU population
by nationality - 1.1.1992



Source: Eurostat

There was little change in the distribution of the Union population by nationality until four years ago. From 1990, the number of non-EU foreigners suddenly increased, growing by more than 1.5 million people in two years. Slightly earlier, between 1988 and 1990, Union citizens had started this trend; a larger proportion of Union citizens had decided, during this period, to reside in another Member State. The intensity of this recent increase in the proportion of foreign population is obviously reflected by an increase in migration flows. The flows do not, however, explain the whole of this increase; during this period, a proportion of the foreigners already, but illegally, residing in a Member State regularised their situation making use of a number of regularisation laws.

Graph 28
Trends in the national and non-national
population in the EU - 1980 to 1992



Source: Eurostat


The proportions of foreigners in the Union are not comparable. Member States to which, in the past, workers have immigrated or people have returned from former colonies have higher percentages of foreign non-EU populations. These include Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. These countries alone account for 7.5 million foreigners of non-EU origin, i.e. 77% of the total of this category of foreigners. This means that these foreigners reside in much smaller numbers in other Member States, especially in the Union's Southern Member States.

It is again Germany and France, together with Benelux and in this case the United Kingdom, which account for almost all (90.5%) foreign citizens of the Union.

These two findings show that while there may be positive migration flows to the other Member States, these are mainly the result of people returning to their own countries.


Graph 29-A

Breakdown of the national population by Member State, on 1 January 1992



Graph 29-B


Breakdown of the other EU citizens by Member State, on 1 January 1992



Source: Eurostat

Graph 29-C


Breakdown of the non-EU citizens by Member State, on 1 January 1992



- 2 - Distribution and origin of the foreign population


The distribution of foreigners by original nationality has to be interpreted with care, as it does not take account of the foreigner's length of residence in the host country. We know that naturalisation criteria vary from one Member State to another. The fact that there were more Turks in the Union in 1992 than, for instance, Moroccans, may be because fewer Turks and their offspring have taken the nationality of their host country than Moroccans. This does not necessarily mean, therefore, that more immigrants have come in the past from Turkey than from Morocco.

The increase in the number of foreigners of a given nationality between 1985 and 1992 makes it possible to fill this gap to a certain extent. During this period, Turks accounted for the greatest increase in the European Union: more than half a million. The number of Italian, Portuguese and Spanish foreigners decreased during this seven-year period, a very clear sign that these people are returning to their own countries, as it is not very likely that they are emigrating out of the Union or becoming naturalised. The decrease in the number of Algerians, however, is more likely to be due to the acquisition of French nationality.




In the recent period between 1990 and 1992, Germany admitted eight times more foreigners, both Union citizens (160 000) and non-EU foreigners (800 000), than the other Member States. Nationals of Central and Eastern Europe accounted for 25% of this increase (over 200 000 people).

Graph 31 - Increase in numbers of non-nationals from 1990 to 1992



As mentioned above, only 1.4% of Union citizens reside in a Member State other than the State whose nationality they possess. There is a very different picture for each Member State. Over 12% of the Irish and 8% of the Portuguese reside elsewhere in the Union. The Irish, as is known, migrate in large numbers to the United Kingdom and large numbers of the Portuguese have emigrated in the post-war period, which, in proportion to the size of the population, generates a greater effect than in Italy, for instance.



So that these nationality data can be interpreted more correctly, a table has been drawn up of trends in the numbers of acquisitions of citizenship by foreigners by Member State and of levels of naturalisation of all foreigners for the last year for which this information was available. Several Member States, including Germany and Belgium, the Union's main catchment areas for foreigners, have naturalisation levels which are rather low in comparison with those of France and the Netherlands, which are also hosts to a substantial non-EU population. Shaped by different laws, these differences in acquisition of citizenship generate an underestimate of the extent of migration flows for France and the Netherlands.

Table 26

	Acquisition of citizenship in EU Member States					Ratio (*)
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	
B	1705	1878	2049	1410	2536	0.3%
DK	3744	3258	3028	5484	5104	3%
D	16521	17573	20078	27162	:	0.5%
GR	1571	1217	1090	886	1204	0.6%
E	8143	5919	7033	3752	5226	1.4%
F	48351	49330	54381	59684	59252 (1)	1.5%
IRL	333	529	383	373	347	0.4%
I	:	:	:	:	:	:
L	917	780	893	748	739	0.6%
NL	9114	28730	12794	29112	36237	4.9%
P	34	210	87	43	117	0.1%
UK	64584	117129	57271	57836	41601	2.1%

Source: Eurostat


Notes: (*) percentage of non-national population on 1. January of the latest year available

(1) Referring to 1990

- 3 - Demographic characteristics of the foreign population

The aim was to understand what part migration played in the demographic development of the Union. While it is true that the characteristics of the foreign population are an initial index, it needs to be borne in mind that an essential datum is missing: length of stay. There is then a risk of producing an amalgam of very different contributions, bearing in mind that impact on demographic behaviour (fertility, family formation model, mortality) takes place over the long term and will be shaped by older immigrants, and impact on demographic structures (age, sex, employment) takes place immediately and is generated by new immigrants. If it is added that the composition of the population of foreign nationality may vary, even if its volume does not change, simply through the effect of migrations and naturalisations, the limitations of this analysis are evident.

Graph 33 - Breakdown of the population by nationality and age-group in a number of Member States, 1.1.1992



Source: Eurostat

The breakdown of the resident population by main age-groups and nationality (nationals, EU citizens, non-EU citizens) is given for those Member States for which the information was available. The age structure of non-EU residents is, without exception, not as old as that of nationals. Non-EU residents have smaller proportions of elderly people (aged over 65) and in general higher proportions of young people (0-19) as well. Foreigners who are citizens of the Union also have a structure which is not as old as that of nationals, with the exception of the United Kingdom. Among EU foreigners, however, young people account for a smaller proportion than among young nationals everywhere. Fewer elderly people and fewer young people necessarily mean more people of working age. In the 20-64 age-group, young workers aged between 20 and 49 are again proportionally more numerous among foreigners than among nationals.

Why these differences? They are largely explained by migration, which is principally undertaken for reasons of employment. This is particularly evident in the age profile of foreigners who are EU nationals. In the non-EU population, the largest proportion of young people could be due to the migration of migrant workers' families. It is difficult, however, to dissociate the effect of migration from the effect of the fertility of foreigners in this case. In some Member States, the birth of a child to foreign parents makes it easier for this child to acquire the citizenship of that State. Failure to record the reason for migration again places limits on more detailed processing of this variable.

It should be noted that the breakdown of foreigners by sex leads to the same divergence between nationals and foreigners. In all Member States, the number of women is higher than the number of men among nationals. The female/male ratio varies in Member States from slightly over 100 (Ireland) to 110 (Germany). This variable is obviously linked to age structure: since it is known that women have a higher life expectancy than men, women are necessarily over-represented in the elderly population. The ratios between sexes are, however, almost always in favour of men in foreign populations, in particular among non-EU citizens. The youth of this population is supplemented in this case by a probable differential between the sexes from the point of view of migration.

- 4 - Foreign workers

We concluded from the above that the foreign population included a substantial proportion of people of working age. This observation is borne out by data that it has been possible to draw from the labour force surveys. In Member States as a whole, there is a certain consistency, over a ten-year period, in the proportion of workers among foreigners. There were almost 6 million foreign workers in 1992, distributed in a non-uniform way among the Member States. In comparison with the Union's current figure of 52%, the proportion of workers among foreigners is lower in Belgium (38.5%), France (46%) and the Netherlands (44%) and higher in the other Member States with high levels of foreigners: Germany (60%), Luxembourg (65%).

Table 27-A

Number of foreign workers (thousands) 1983-1992										
	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
EUR 12	4776	4811	4869	4688	4946	4893	4999	5123	5271	5931
B	246	229	209	244	217	216	218	236	243	271
DK	37	38	40	38	38	36	44	45	53	49
D	2024	2063	1966	1970	2044	1937	2143	2310	2484	2836
GR	24	23	24	20	20	24	21	23	30	44
E	:	:	:	:	37	35	34	33	49	69
F	1332	1383	1344	1268	1237	1271	1313	1287	1253	1230
IRL	26	27	26	25	26	28	27	29	32	32
I	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	188
L	43	44	46	46	48	48	49	52	53	60
NL	165	:	155	:	168	175	185	189	202	224
P	:	:	:	18	14	24	28	25	28	19
UK	878	1006	1060	1059	1096	1100	937	893	843	908

Source: Eurostat - Labour force surveys

Table 27-B

Proportions of foreign workers in the total non-national population, 1983-1992										
	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
EUR 12	53,2	53,3	55,2	51,4	50,1	50,7	51,6	51,9	51,3	52,3
B	39,2	37,9	39,2	38,6	35,8	34,9	35,0	35,6	37,5	38,5
DK	55,2	52,0	59,3	58,2	58,8	51,8	53,7	53,0	53,1	56,7
D	61,0	61,5	59,8	57,5	56,6	57,6	58,4	58,2	57,8	60,0
GR	38,8	35,6	39,1	36,2	36,7	40,0	38,7	41,0	44,5	49,1
E	:	:	:	:	38,1	36,3	34,4	34,9	39,4	47,6
F	49,3	48,3	46,9	46,8	45,6	45,7	46,1	46,6	46,1	45,9
IRL	40,9	39,2	39,6	38,5	38,7	40,6	40,1	41,7	43,4	40,2
I	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	47,6
L	60,2	61,7	60,8	62,1	62,6	61,2	61,0	60,0	61,6	64,7
NL	44,0	:	40,8	:	41,3	41,3	41,7	41,1	40,0	43,8
P	:	:	:	51,4	51,5	48,3	56,6	50,7	54,6	43,4
UK	52,2	52,0	52,2	51,4	51,5	53,9	56,2	56,9	52,8	51,4

Source: Eurostat - Labour force surveys

It has been possible to break down these foreign workers by nationality for some Member States. The table shows, in order of importance, the four most common nationalities. The direction of certain migration flows are very clear. Turkish workers and workers from the former Yugoslavia account for 51% of the foreign labour force in Germany. They are also numerous (22%) in Denmark. Some other Member States also have a concentration of foreign non-EU workers where some groups are represented to a greater extent: Moroccans in Spain (27%), Italy (14%) and the Netherlands (14%); Turks in the Netherlands (21%).

In other Member States the predominant proportions of foreign workers are Union citizens: the United Kingdom with 26% of Irish workers; Greece with 33% of British workers; Luxembourg with 27% of both French and Portuguese workers; Portugal with 6% of Spanish and 5% of British workers. In these two Member States, no more than 6% of non-EU workers have the same nationality.

Table 28


Non-national workers by largest citizenship groups, in a selection of Member States - 1992									
DK		D		GR		E			
Turks	14%	Turks	33%	British	33%	Moroccans	27%		
British	10%	Former-Yugoslav	18%	Germans	13%	Portuguese	6%		
Germans	9%	Italians	8%	French	10%	British	5%		
Former-Yugoslavs	8%	Greeks	5%	Italians	5%	Germans	4%		
Other EU	9%	Other EU	11%	Other EU	10%	Other EU	8%		
Other non-EU	51%	Other non-EU	25%	Other non-EU	29%	Other non-EU	50%		
Total non-nationals	100%	Total non-nationals	100%	Total non-nationals	100%	Total non-nationals	100%		
I		L		NL		P		UK	
Moroccans	14%	French	27%	Turks	21%	Spanish	6%	Irish	26%
Tunisians	7%	Portuguese	27%	Moroccans	14%	British	5%	Italians	5%
Former-Yugoslavs	5%	Belgians	17%	Belgians	10%	Germans	3%	French	3%
British	4%	Germans	11%	British	9%	USA citizens	3%	Spanish	2%
Other EU	11%	Other EU	13%	Other EU	21%	Other EU	6%	Other EU	6%
Other non-EU	59%	Other non-EU	6%	Other non-EU	23%	Other non-EU	76%	Other non-EU	55%
Total non-nationals	100%	Total non-nationals	100%	Total non-nationals	100%	Total non-nationals	100%	Total non-nationals	100%

Source: Eurostat - Labour force surveys 1992

Note: Due to rounding, total non-national workers might not sum up to 100%

The sectors in which foreign workers work is also a factor of differentiation. Whereas less than half of male nationals work in industry, a percentage of close on 60% of foreign workers work in industry. Over-representation in industry can also be seen among foreign women.

Graph 34 - Breakdown of employees by nationality, sex and sector of activity - EU - 1992




Source: Eurostat

4.3 Migration flows

We have looked up to now at the population of foreign nationality. This has meant that we have disregarded information that is fundamental in evaluating the demographic impact of migration: what are the yearly volumes of migration flows and what are their composition? We shall now attempt to answer this question.

- 1 - Components of demographic growth

Graph 35 - Total and natural increase of the EU population, from 1960 to 1992



Source: Eurostat

The differences between total growth and natural growth represent the proportion of a population for which migration growth accounts. The continuing decline in the natural growth of the European Union began in 1965. For close on ten years, births have exceeded deaths in the Union by only 500 000 to 600 000. Total growth is, however, more erratic over this period as a result of the effect of migration. While there were divergences in migration balances in the period 1960-1985, which were positive in some cases and negative in others, for the first time in forty years there was a sustained growth in the migration proportion over a longer period. Between 1985 and 1990, the migration balance increased from 278 000 to 954 000. During the last two years of observation, between 1990 and 1992, this balance was again higher (2 million in total).


These migration balances represent the difference between the number of immigrants and emigrants. An increase in these balances may therefore be due to two factors: a rise in the number of immigrants or a fall in the number of emigrants. There may also have been improvements in data collection which may have pinpointed previous disparities. In order to find out which of these is applicable, it is therefore essential to look at the statistics on migrants. These data are not readily available. There are no data for Italy; no data on emigration in Greece, France and Spain and the data available on immigration in France and Portugal relate only to nationals.

It is striking, when looking at the emigration and immigration trends for those countries supplying this information, that emigration is very stable with respect to immigration. The sharp upturn in numbers of immigrants between 1987 and 1989 may be due to the return to the former Federal Republic of Germany of people of German origin resident in the former German Democratic Republic (the "Übersiedler") or elsewhere in the countries of the East (the "Aussiedler").

Since 1990, Germany has again attracted the largest number of immigrants, this time from Central Europe and the former Yugoslavia. It should be borne in mind, however, that these data relate only to legal immigrants and that in 1990, after German reunification, movements between the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic were no longer deemed to be international migration.


In the United Kingdom, the Member State with the second highest figures for migration flows, emigration exceeded immigration in 1992. Migration balances are also negative in Portugal and Ireland.

Graph 36 - International migration, from 1980 to 1992, in a selection of Member States



Source: Eurostat

Graph 37 - Immigration and emigration in the Member States, in 1992



Source: Eurostat


- 2 - Characteristics of migrants

Apart from their nationality and country of last residence, little is known about the characteristics of migrants. The direct demographic impact of immigration on geographical distribution and age structure, for instance, cannot be measured.

It is interesting to note that Union citizens, often nationals returning to their own countries, account for at least half of immigrant flows in most Member States. Immigration into the Netherlands is below this figure, however, and immigration into Germany does not follow this pattern at all. 75% of immigrants to Germany in 1992 were non-EU citizens and 25% were non-EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe. Emigration which is, as mentioned above, small in extent except in Germany and the United Kingdom, relates mostly to Union citizens and in many cases to nationals themselves. In Germany, however, emigration by citizens is proportionally distributed in the same way as immigration. This shows that many people come and go between Germany and countries with which it has migration exchanges.

Observation of the countries from which migrants come and their nationality, highlights the important part that the political events in Eastern Europe, especially the Yugoslav conflict, have played in recent migration movements. The former Yugoslavia and Poland are the two regions from which the majority of migrants seem to come and go: they have the nationalities of those countries, and leave in massive numbers, but also return in large numbers (migrants returning to the former Yugoslavia can only be of Croatian or Slovenian nationality, although this precise information is not shown in the statistics). In 1992, 300 000 immigrants were of German nationality and were Aussiedler coming for the most part from the countries of Eastern Europe. Not all of them came to settle permanently in Germany: volumes of German emigrants are still sizeable (110 000 people). The USA is also a popular destination for many emigrants.

Graph 38 - Breakdown of immigrants and emigrants



Source: Eurostat

In 1990, the number of people leaving one Member State to settle in another was estimated at 600 000. This information has not been calculated for 1992 because no data are available. The origin-destination grid that can be drawn up for 1992, albeit incomplete, bears out the powers of attraction that the central Member States, in particular Germany and the United Kingdom, exert on Union citizens.

A proportion of non-EU immigrants are asylum seekers. Estimating their numbers from applications would be erroneous in this case as well. Data are not comparable among Member States and several applications for asylum may come from a single applicant. The growth in the number of applications is indicative, however, and Germany appears to be the most attractive country. The United Kingdom records ten times fewer applications, but its powers of attraction have increased substantially since 1985. Since the beginning of the 1990s, France seems to have become less attractive to asylum seekers.

The origins of applicants for asylum differ in different Member States. Applications received in Belgium come principally from Zaire and Rumania. In Denmark, 65% of applicants are nationals of the former Yugoslavia. These asylum applications from Yugoslavs also account for the majority in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Spain and France have different profiles: applications come from Peruvians and Poles in Spain and from Turks and Zairians in France.

Table 29

Asylum applications in the main EU host countries, 1986 to 1992 (1)								
	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	
in thousands								
Germany	73,8	99,7	57,4	103,1	121,3	193,1	256,1	438,2
United Kingdom	6,2	5,7	5,9	5,7	16,8	30,3	57,7	32,0
France	28,9	26,3	27,7	34,4	61,4	54,8	47,4	27,0 (2)
Netherlands	5,6	5,9	13,5	7,5	13,9	21,2	21,6	20,3
Belgium	5,3	7,6	6,0	4,5	8,1	12,9	15,4	17,6
Denmark	8,7	9,3	2,7	4,7	4,6	5,3	4,6	13,9
Spain	2,3	2,8	3,7	4,5	4,1	8,6	8,1	11,7
1985=100								
Germany	100	135	78	140	164	262	347	594
United Kingdom	100	93	95	93	272	492	937	520
France	100	91	96	119	213	190	164	93 (2)
Netherlands	100	104	238	133	246	376	383	360
Belgium	100	143	113	85	153	243	290	332
Denmark	100	107	31	54	53	61	53	160
Spain	100	122	161	196	177	376	354	509

Source: Eurostat

(1) The countries have been ranked by number of applicants for asylum in 1992.

Because the national definitions may differ strongly from each other, the possibilities for international comparison of the absolute numbers are limited.

(2) Provisional

Table 30 - Asylum applicants by country of origin, for a selection of host countries, 1992

Host country >	Belgium	Denmark	Germany	Spain
<u>Country of origin</u>				
Rumania	3463	Former-Yougoslavia 9008	Former-Yougoslavia 121592	Peru 2580
Former-Yougoslavia	1927	Irak 932	Rumania 103787	Poland 1190
India	1093	Somalia 896	Bulgaria 31540	Dominican Rep. 1041
Ghana	934	Former USSR 533	Turkey 28327	Senegal 959
Zaire	3749	Sri Lanka 361	Vietnam 12258	Rumania 891
Other	6481	Other 2154	Other 140687	Other 5047
Total	17647	Total 13884	Total 438191	Total 11708

Host country >	France	Netherlands	United Kingdom
<u>Country of origin</u>			
Turkey	9915	Former-Yougoslavia 5658	Former-Yougoslavia 5635
Zaire	4402	Somalia 4246	Sri Lanka 2085
Sri Lanka	3400	Iran 1298	Turkey 1865
Mali	3223	Sri Lanka 1034	Pakistan 1700
Rumania	2486	Rumania 981	Ghana 1600
Other	23954	Other 7129	Other 11725
Total	47380	Total 20346	Total 24610

Source: Eurostat

4.4 The demographic impact of migration

The history of migration is part and parcel of overall changes in world societies and economies. A question can then be raised about the demographic impact of migration: is migration likely to modify the course of demographic development, in particular by affecting the ageing of structures, and is it possible to apprehend future trends in migration?

- 1 - The role of migration in the ageing of the population

The effects of the ageing of the populations of Northern countries should be felt to an even greater extent at the beginning of the 21st century. It is only then that an imbalance between the active and non-active population can be predicted in most European countries. This type of reasoning is based, however, on the hypothesis that everything else will remain the same - a forward-looking intellectual exercise that history has often disproved. In the meantime, the ratio of young to less young people in the active population will be in favour of the older group and the dynamic nature of the Western labour force could, looked at pessimistically, be eaten away. Some people are worried about imbalances in social security systems and in particular in pension payment systems.

These fears have led to the idea that it is possible to offset demographic ageing by importing foreigners. Empirical observation disproves this idea: it is mistaken to believe that an immigration policy can remedy the growing imbalance in the age pyramid.

Studies at national level have unequivocally shown that it takes less than one generation for immigrants settling in a country to adopt its demographic behaviour, in particular as regards fertility and mortality. It is not therefore possible to rely, in order to "rejuvenate" the population, on the long-term impact of immigration. Massive immigration by a population with a very young structure is the only other way of plugging the "gaps" in our age pyramids. Over and above the practical and ethical problems that massive immigration would entail from the point of view of the reception of these populations, immigration largely by young children, i.e. the group that contains the deficits that are causing ageing, is unthinkable.

- 2 - Migration prospects

Migration currents are closely linked to short-term economic and political events. It is just as impossible to predict the former as it is to anticipate the latter. Past trends are almost useless in predicting future immigration levels as the profiles of migration have undergone such major structural changes. This is vital. It makes it necessary to understand the important part played by better economic and political balances in controlling migration flows. Consequently, the economic and political development of regions bordering on the Union, such as the Central and Eastern part of the European continent and the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, will play a key role in determining migration pressures in the next century.

- 3 - Freedom of movement

The challenge currently facing the Union is to create a genuine European area of free movement in which freedom of movement is not only a legal right but also becomes a daily reality for the people of Europe. This mobility would make it possible to attain the objectives of the Single Market, while establishing a more flexible and more efficient European employment market.

In a period of high unemployment, it is obviously more difficult to achieve this objective; the remaining barriers need to be removed, however, so that free movement can be promoted. The EURES system was created with this aim in view. Some estimates predict, as the Single Market is completed, an increase in the migration flows of frontier-zone managers and workers. Some Community programmes are promoting the mobility of some groups of people such as students, researchers and teachers.

Chapter 4

Key points for further consideration

1. Migration is the least predictable of demographic events as its extent may vary substantially in very short periods in response to short-term developments. This was the case between 1990 and 1992 when the political upheavals of the central and eastern part of Europe caused substantial migration to the Union. From this point of view, the development of the Mediterranean basin regions and the European countries in economic transition has to be seen as one of the key factors in potential migration pressures on the Union.
2. International migration has little impact on the demographic model of the Member States. Migration cannot, in any case, counteract the effects of population ageing. At local level, however, a spatial concentration of new immigrants can generate particular stratifications. Unfortunately, it is not possible to appreciate this issue on the basis of the statistics currently available.
3. The challenge currently facing the Union is to create a genuine European area of free movement in which freedom of movement is not only a legal right but also becomes a daily reality for the people of Europe. This mobility would make it possible to attain the objectives of the Single Market, while establishing a more flexible and more efficient European employment market.

GLOSSARY

Some definitions which may be of use in understanding the demographic concepts used in this report are given below.

DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT

Population increase

Changes in the size of a population over a given period, i.e. the increase of this population, depend on its *natural growth* and its *net migration*. *Natural growth* is the difference between births and deaths; *net migration* measures the difference between numbers of emigrants and immigrants.

Demographic transition

The term "demographic transition" is used by demographers to denote a transition from the uncontrolled mortality and fertility of traditional societies to controlled systems where natality and mortality levels are much lower. Practically all countries of the world have now entered this stage of demographic transition, but most countries are facing a much more rapid fall in mortality than in the European countries in the last century. As their birth rate is also high, the timelag between falling mortality and falling fertility entails a period of very high demographic growth.

Demographic projections

How can we find out about a particular population in 5, 10, 15 or even 20 years' time? Current population figures are projected to the date which is of interest on the basis of *hypotheses* about fertility, mortality and migration. If a sub-population such as the active population needs to be studied, these need to be supplemented by hypotheses on men's and women's future participation rates. The longer the period, the more questionable these hypotheses become, as they then apply to a population which is itself hypothetical. Moreover, the age-groups most affected by some events (young people in the case of fertility; old people in the case of mortality; young adults in the case of migration) may be subject to varying degrees of error. It is therefore preferable to use *scenarios* which make it possible accurately to test the impact of a particular hypothesis on the population as a whole.

DEMOGRAPHIC AGEING

Population ageing

Demographic ageing entails a modification of the age structure of the population leading to an increase in the proportion of elderly people. At the outset this is generated by a fall in fertility which proportionally reduces the population of young people. At present, however, the ageing of western populations is due to a proportional increase in the numbers of elderly people as a result of increasing longevity.

Life expectancy

Life expectancy measures the mean number of years for which a person of a given age can expect to live. When no age is specified, life expectancy is measured from birth, expressed as e_0 . Life expectancy at 65 (e_{65}), for instance, indicates the mean number of years for which a person reaching the age of 65 can expect to live. This value is calculated from mortality tables which establish, from the deaths recorded by age for a year, the probability of death at each age.

Demographic dependency

Demographic dependency, also known as the *dependency ratio*, is a ratio between age-groups showing the proportions that some age-groups represent with respect to others. This dependency attempts, in general, to evaluate the burden that the numbers of young people and pensioners place on workers by relating the population aged under 15 and over 65 to that aged between 15 and 65.

HUMAN REPRODUCTION

Terminology

Birth rate, fertility and fecundity are often confused. These terms relate to different concepts. *Birth rate* refers to the number of births that take place at a given time in the total population, while *fertility* measures the number of children born to women. The former is a "snapshot" measurement while the latter is a longitudinal measurement. Not having given birth to children is described as *infertility*. *Fecundity* refers to a couple's biological ability to procreate.

Birth rate

The birth rate is obtained by dividing the number of births taking place during a year by the mean population of a country for that year. This measurement, although useful, does not genuinely reflect a population's procreative behaviour, however, as it provides no information on the number of children actually born to women of procreative age. From this point of view, the birth rate does not make it possible to ascertain the direction in which the population will evolve in the long term.

Total fertility rate

In order to evaluate the reproduction of a population using the number of births, use needs to be made of the total, also called the synthetic, fertility rate. This measurement shows the number of children that women would have during their life if the procreative behaviour, by age, of all women remained similar to that observed in a given year. Although it can be readily measured, this rate is shaped by the events of a given year and may therefore be greatly influenced by short-term events.

Completed fertility of a generation

Completed fertility is the only real indicator of fertility: it measures the mean number of children that women born in a given year have actually had during their life. Unfortunately, it can be calculated only for the older generations, when women are no longer fertile. It is for this reason that use is often made of the fertility rate, taking account of the limits on its interpretation.


The generation renewal threshold: fertility of 2.1 to prevent a decline

At what level does women's fertility need to be to ensure the renewal of the generations, when there is no immigration? If as many boys as girls are born, and no woman dies before reaching the end of her reproductive life, the answer would be obvious: an average of two children per woman which would allow the full reproduction of each couple. For unexplained reasons, however, 105 boys are born on average for every 100 girls, throughout the world. To prevent a population reduction, 100 women must obviously give birth to an average of 100 girls, which means a total of 205 children, i.e. 2.05 children per woman. As there is still a low level of mortality among women of procreative age, however, the necessary level is 2.1 children per woman. This means that if the short-term fertility index is below 2.1 for a long period, and there is not a positive migration balance, a demographic decrease is inevitable.


ANNEX

Age pyramids of the EU Member States at 1.1.1993


B-3 AGE PYRAMID - BELGIQUE/BELGIE 1.1.1993




B-4 AGE PYRAMID - DANMARK 1.1.1993




B-5 AGE PYRAMID - BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 1.1.1993




B-6 AGE PYRAMID - ELLAS 1.1.1993




B-7 AGE PYRAMID - ESPAÑA 1.1.1993




B-8 AGE PYRAMID - FRANCE 1.1.1993




8-9 AGE PYRAMID - IRELAND 11.1993




B-10 AGE PYRAMID - ITALIA 1.1.1993




B-11 AGE PYRAMID - LUXEMBOURG 1.1.1993




B-12 AGE PYRAMID - NEDERLAND 1.1.1993



B-13 AGE PYRAMID - PORTUGAL 1.1.1993



B-14 AGE PYRAMID - UNITED KINGDOM 1.1.1992



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